



LIBRARY OF PRINCETON

NOV 27 2000

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY








THE BRIDGEWATER TREATISES  
ON THE  
POWER, WISDOM, AND GOODNESS OF GOD,  
AS MANIFESTED IN THE CREATION.

---

TREATISE I.  
ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE, TO  
THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL  
CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

BY THE REV. T. CHALMERS, D. D.





ON THE

POWER, WISDOM, AND GOODNESS

OF GOD,

AS MANIFESTED IN THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE, TO THE  
MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

---

BY THE

REV. THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D.,

PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

---

A NEW EDITION.

Philadelphia :

CAREY, LEA, & BLANCHARD.

.....  
1835.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY

TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND  
CHARLES JAMES,  
LORD BISHOP OF LONDON.

MY LORD,

YOUR Lordship's personal kindness to myself would alone have inclined me to solicit for this work the honour of your patronage and name.

But I must further confess the peculiar satisfaction which I feel, in offering it as a tribute and a public acknowledgment of my admiration for an order of men, who, more than all others, have enriched by their labours the moral and theological literature of England.

In the prosecution of that arduous and hitherto almost unattempted theme which the late President of the Royal Society has, by your Lordship's recommendation, assigned to me, I have derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Bishop Butler, than I have been able to find besides, in the whole range of our existent authorship.

With his powerful aid I commenced the high investigation to which your Lordship has called me. To imagine that I have completed it, would be to forget at once the fulness of the Crea-

tion, and the finitude of the Creature. Whatever the department of Nature may be which we explore, in quest of evidence for the perfections of its Author, there is no inquirer, though even of the most transcendent powers, who shall ever attain the satisfaction of having traversed the whole length and breadth of the land. He will have but entered and proceeded a certain way, within the margin of a territory, whose riches are inexhaustible.

That your Lordship may long continue, by your zeal, and talents, and lofty erudition, to sustain the honours, and to promote the vital good of our Religious Establishments in this empire, is the fervent desire and prayer of

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obliged

and obedient Servant,

**THOMAS CHALMERS.**

*Edin. May 13, 1833.*

## NOTICE.

THE series of Treatises, of which the present is one, is published under the following circumstances :

The RIGHT HONOURABLE and REVEREND FRANCIS HENRY, EARL of BRIDGEWATER, died in the month of February, 1829 ; and by his last Will and Testament, bearing date the 25th of February, 1825, he directed certain Trustees therein named to invest in the public funds the sum of Eight thousand pounds sterling ; this sum, with the accruing dividends thereon, to be held at the disposal of the President, for the time being, of the Royal Society of London, to be paid to the person or persons nominated by him. The Testator further directed, that the person or persons selected by the said President should be appointed to write, print, and publish one thousand copies of a work *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation ; illustrating such work by all reasonable arguments, as for instance the variety and formation of God's creatures in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms ; the effect of digestion, and thereby of conversion ; the construction of the hand of man, and an infinite variety of other arguments ; as also by discoveries ancient and modern, in arts, sciences, and the whole extent of literature.* He desired, moreover, that the profits arising from the sale of the works so published should be paid to the authors of the works.

The late President of the Royal Society, Davies Gilbert, Esq. requested the assistance of his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the Bishop of London, in determining upon the best mode of carrying into effect the intentions of the Testator. Acting with their advice, and with the concurrence of a nobleman immediately connected with the deceased, Mr. Davies Gilbert appointed the following eight gentlemen to write separate Treatises on the different branches of the subject as here stated :



**THE REV. THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D.**

PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL  
AND INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

---

**JOHN KIDD, M. D. F. R. S.**

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE  
PHYSICAL CONDITION OF MAN.

---

**THE REV. WILLIAM WHEWELL, M. A. F. R. S.**

FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

ON ASTRONOMY AND GENERAL PHYSICS.

---

**SIR CHARLES BELL, K. H. F. R. S.**

THE HAND: ITS MECHANISM AND VITAL ENDOWMENTS  
AS EVINCING DESIGN.

---

**PETER MARK ROGET, M. D.**

FELLOW OF AND SECRETARY TO THE ROYAL SOCIETY.

ON ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE PHYSIOLOGY.

---

**THE REV. WILLIAM BUCKLAND, D. D. F. R. S.**

CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH, AND PROFESSOR OF GEOLOGY IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

ON GEOLOGY AND MINERALOGY.

---

**THE REV. WILLIAM KIRBY, M. A. F. R. S.**

ON THE HISTORY, HABITS, AND INSTINCTS OF ANIMALS.

---

**WILLIAM PROUT, M. D. F. R. S.**

ON CHEMISTRY, METEOROLOGY, AND THE FUNCTION  
OF DIGESTION.

---

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF SUSSEX, President  
of the Royal Society, having desired that no unnecessary delay  
should take place in the publication of the above mentioned  
treatises, they will appear at short intervals, as they are ready  
for publication.

## CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER . . . . .	15
--------------------------------	----

### PART I.

#### ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

CHAP. I. On the Supremacy of Conscience . . . . .	41
II. SECOND GENERAL ARGUMENT. On the Inherent Pleasure of the Virtuous, and Misery of the Vicious Affections . . . . .	62
III. THIRD GENERAL ARGUMENT. The Power and Operation of Habit . . . . .	80
IV. On the General Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man . . . . .	93
V. On the Special and Subordinate Adaptations of External Na- ture to the Moral Constitution of Man . . . . .	108
VI. On those Special Affections which conduce to the Civil and Political Well-being of Society . . . . .	123
VII. On those Special Affections which conduce to the Econo- mic Well-being of Society . . . . .	156
VIII. On the Relation in which the Special Affections of our Nature stand to Virtue; and on the Demonstration given forth by it, both to the Character of man and the Charac- ter of God . . . . .	182
IX. Miscellaneous Evidences of Virtuous and Benevolent De- sign, in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man . . . . .	191
X. On the Capacities of the World for making a virtuous Spe- cies happy; and the Argument deducible from this, both for the Character of God and the Immortality of Man . . . . .	205

## PART II.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE INTELLECTUAL  
CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

CHAP. I. Chief Instances of this Adaptation . . . . .	222
II. On the Connexion between the Intellect and the Emotions . . . . .	247
III. On the Connexion between the Intellect and the Will . . . . .	266
IV. On the Defects and the Uses of Natural Theology . . . . .	285

## P R E F A C E .

IT is an incongruous thing, when there is any want of conformity between the subject matter of an essay, and its title. The object of this explanatory preface is to shew that it is an incongruity into which we have not fallen.

In the first place we were not in fair circumstances for expounding the adaptation of external nature to the mental constitution of man, till we had made manifest in some degree what that constitution is. There is no distinct labourer in that conjunct demonstration of the divine attributes which is now being offered to the world, to whom this essentially preliminary topic had been assigned as the subject of a separate work. It was therefore unavoidable, that, to a certain extent we should undertake it ourselves, else, in proceeding to the construction of our argument, we might have incurred the charge of attempting to rear a superstructure, without a foundation to rest upon.

But in the execution of this introductory part of our subject, we could scarcely have refrained from noticing the indications of divine wisdom and goodness in our mental constitution itself, even though our strictly proper, because our assigned task, was to point out these indications in the adaptation of this constitution to external nature. We could not forget that the general purpose of the work was to exhibit with all possible fulness the argument for the character of the Deity, as grounded on the laws and appearances of nature. But we should have left out a very rich and important track of argument, had we forborne all observation on the evidence for the divine perfections, in the structure and processes of the mind itself, and confined our-

selves to the evidence afforded by the relations which the mind bore to the external world. In the adaptation of external nature to man's physical constitution, there are many beautiful and decisive indications of a God. But prior to these, there is a multitude of distinct indications, both in the human anatomy, and the human physiology, viewed by themselves, and as separate objects of contemplation. And accordingly, in this joint undertaking, there have been specific labourers assigned to each of these departments. But we have not had the advantage of any previous expounder for the anatomy of the mind, or the physiology of the mind; and we felt that to have left unnoticed all the vivid and various inscriptions of a Divinity, which might be collected there, would have been to withhold from view some of the best attestations in the whole range and economy of nature, for the wisdom and benevolence of its great architect.

But to construct a natural theology on any subject, it is not necessary to make of that subject a full scientific exposition. The one is as distinct from the other, as the study of final is from the study of efficient causes—the former often lying patent to observation, while the latter may be still involved in deepest obscurity. It were a manifest injury to our cause, it were to bedim the native lustre of its evidences—did we enter with it among the recondite places of the mental philosophy, and there enwrap it in the ambiguity of questions yet unresolved, in the mist of controversies yet unsettled. Often, though not always, the argument for a God in some phenomenon of nature depends upon its reality, and not upon its analysis, or the physical mode of its organization—on the undoubted truth that so it is, and not on the undetermined, perhaps indeterminable question of how it is. We should not have shrunk from the obscurer investigation, had it been at all necessary. But that is no reason why time must be consumed on matters which are at once obscure and irrelevant. It is all the more fortunate that we are not too long detained from an entry on our proper task, among the depths or the difficulties of any preliminary disquisition which comes before

it—and that the main strength of the argument which our mental constitution, taken by itself, furnishes to the cause of theism, lies not in those subtilities which are apprehended only by few, but in certain broad and palpable generalities which are recognised by all men.

But there is another explanation which we deem it necessary to make, in order fully to reconcile the actual topics of our essay, with the designation which has been prefixed to it.

If by external nature be meant all that is external to mind, then the proper subject of our argument is the adaptation of the material to the mental world. But if by external nature be meant all that is external to one individual mind, then would the subject be very greatly extended; for beside the reciprocal influence between that individual mind, and all sensible and material things, we should consider the reciprocal influence between it and all other minds. By this contraction of the idea from the mental world to but one individual member of it; and this proportional extension in the idea of external nature from the material creation to the whole of that living, as well as inanimate creation, by which any single man is surrounded; we are introduced not merely to the action and reaction which obtain between mind and matter; but, which is far more prolific of evidence for a Deity, to the action and reaction which obtain between mind and mind. We thus find access to a much larger territory, which should otherwise be left unexplored—and have the opportunity of tracing the marks of a divine intelligence in the mechanism of human society, and in the frame-work of the social and economical systems to which men are conducted, when they adhere to that light, and follow the impulse of those affections which God has bestowed on them.

But in the progress of our argument, we come at length to be engaged with the adaptations of external nature, even in the most strict and limited sense of the term. In the origin and rights of property, as well as in the various economic interests of society, we behold the purest exemplification of that adjustment which

obtains between the material system of things and man's moral nature—and when we proceed to treat of his intellectual constitution, it will be found that the harmonies between the material and the mental worlds are still more numerous, and more palpably indicative of that wisdom which originated both, and conformed them with exquisite and profound skill to each other.



## INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

---

### GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

1. EXTERNAL nature, when spoken of in contradistinction to mind, suggests chiefly, if not solely, the idea of the material universe. Even though restricted to this limited and proper sense of the term, we should still behold the proofs of beneficent design in the fitnesses of the one to the other; but far more abundantly and decisively, it must be confessed, in the adaptation of external nature to the physical, than in its adaptation to the moral and intellectual constitution of man. For fully developing our peculiar argument, an enlargement of the meaning commonly affixed to external nature seems indispensable,—an enlargement that we should not have ventured on, if in so doing we crossed the legitimate boundaries of our assigned subject; and that, for the mere purpose of multiplying our topics, or possessing ourselves of a wider field of authorship. But the truth is, that did we confine our notice to the relations which obtain between the world of mind and the world of matter, we should be doing injustice to our own theme, by spoiling it of greatly more than half its richness—beside leaving unoccupied certain fertile tracts of evidence, which, if not entered upon in our division of the general work, must, as is obvious from the nature of the respective tasks, be altogether omitted in the conjunct demonstration that is now being offered to the public, of the Goodness and Wisdom of the Deity.

2. It is true that, with even but one solitary human mind in midst of the material creation, certain relations could be traced between them that would indicate both skill and a benevolent purpose on the part of Him who constructed the framework of nature, and placed this single occupier within its confines. And, notwithstanding this limitation, there would still be preserved to us certain striking adaptations in the external system of things to the intellectual, and some too, though fewer and less noticeable, to the moral constitution of man. But, born as man obviously is for the companionship of his fellows, it must be evident that the main tendencies and aptitudes of his moral constitution should be looked for in connection with his social relationships, with the action and reaction which take place between man and the brethren

of his species. We therefore understand external nature to comprehend in it, not merely all that is external to mind, but all that is external to the individual possessor of a human mind,—who is surrounded not only by an economy of complex and extended materialism, but who is surrounded by other men and other minds than his own. Without this generalized view of external nature, we should be left in possession of but scanty materials for evincing its adaptation to the moral constitution of man, though an ample field of observation would still lie open to us, in unfolding the aptitude of the human understanding, with its various instincts and powers, for the business of physical investigation. For the purpose then of enhancing our argument, or rather of doing but justice to it, we propose to consider not merely those relations between mind and matter, but those relations between mind and mind, the establishment of which attests a wise and beneficent contrivance. We shall thus be enabled to enter on a department of observation distinct from that of all the other labourers in this joint enterprize,—and while their provinces respectively are to trace the hand of a great and good Designer in the mechanism of the heavens, or the mechanism of the terrestrial physics, or the mechanism of various organic structures in the animal and vegetable kingdoms; it will be part of ours, more especially, to point out the evidences of a forming and presiding, and withal benevolent intelligence in the mechanism of human society.

3. We conceive of external nature then that it comprehends more than the mute and unconscious materialism, and the objective truth—it comprehends also the living society by which the possessor of a moral and intellectual constitution is surrounded. Did we exclude the latter from our regards, we should be keeping out of view a number of as wise, and certainly, in the degree that mind is of higher consideration than body, of far more beneficial and important adaptations than any which are presented to our notice in the mechanical, or chemical, or physiological departments of creation. Both in the reciprocities of domestic life, and in those wider relations, which bind large assemblages of men into political and economical systems, we shall discern the incontestable marks of a divine wisdom and care; principles or laws of human nature in virtue of which the social economy moves rightly and prosperously onward, and apart from which all would go into derangement; affinities between man and his fellows, that harmonize the individual with the general interests, and are obviously designed as provisions for the well-being both of families and nations.

4. It might help to guard us against a possible misconception, if now, at the outset of our argument, we shall distinguish be-

tween the moral constitution of man, and that moral system of doctrine which embodies in it the outer truths or principles of ethical science. The two are as distinct from each other, as are the objective and subjective in any quarter of contemplation whatever, and ought no more to be confounded than, in optics, the system of visible things with the anatomical structure of the eye. The organ which perceives or apprehends truth is separate in reality, and should be kept separate in thought, from the truth which is apprehended; and thus it is that we should view the moral constitution of man and the moral system of virtue as diverse and distinct from each other. The one belongs to the physiology of the mind, and is collected, like all other experimental truth, by a diligent observation of facts and phenomena. The other, involving, as it does, those questions which relate to the nature of virtue, or to the origin and principles of moral obligation, directs the attention of the mind to another quarter than to its own processes, and presents us with a wholly distinct matter of contemplation. The acts of moral judgment or feeling should not be confounded with the objects of moral judgment or feeling, any more, in fact, than the rules of logic should be confounded with the laws which govern the procedure of the human understanding. The question, "what is virtue?" or "what is that which constitutes virtue?" is one thing. The question, "what is the mental process by which man takes cognizance of virtue?" is another. They are as distinct from each other as are the principles of good reasoning from the processes of the reasoning faculty. It is thus that the mental philosophy, whose proper and legitimate province is the physics of the mind, should be kept distinct from logic and ethics, and the philosophy of taste. The question, "what is beautiful in scenery?" or "what is right in character?" or "what is just in argument?" is distinct from the question, "what is the actual and historical procedure of the mind in addressing itself to these respective objects of contemplation?" as distinct, indeed, as the question of "*Quid est*" is from "*Quid oportet*;" or as the question of "what is" from "what ought to be."\* A sound objective system of ethics may be framed, irrespective of any attention that we give to man's moral constitution. A sound system of logic may be framed, irrespective of any attention that we give to man's intellectual

\* See the Introduction to Sir James Macintosh's Ethical Dissertation. "The purpose of the physical sciences, throughout all their provinces, is to answer the question, "*What is?*" The purpose of the moral sciences is to answer the question, "*What ought to be?*"—It should be well kept in view, that mental philosophy is one province of the physical sciences, and belongs to the first of these two departments, being distinct from moral philosophy, which forms the second of them.

constitution. And on the other hand, however obscure or unsettled these sciences may still be; and more especially, whatever controversies may yet obtain respecting the nature and the elementary principles of virtue,—such notwithstanding, may be the palpable and ascertained facts in the nature and history of subjective man, that, both on his mental constitution, and on the adaptation thereto of external nature, there might remain a clear and unquestionable argument for the power, and wisdom, and goodness of God.

5. Having thus referred our argument, not to the constitution of morality in the abstract, but to the constitution of man's moral nature—a concrete and substantive reality, made up of facts that come within the domain of observation; let us now consider how it is that natural theology proceeds with her demonstrations, on other constitutions and other mechanisms in creation, that we may learn from this in what manner we should commence and prosecute our labours, on that very peculiar, we had almost said, untried field of investigation which has been assigned to us.

6. The chief then, or at least the usual subject-matter of the argument for the wisdom and goodness of God, is the obvious adaptation wherewith creation teems, throughout all its borders, of means to a beneficial end. And it is manifest that the argument grows in strength with the number and complexity of these means. The greater the number of independent circumstances which must meet together for the production of a useful result—then, in the actual fact of their concurrence, is there less of probability for its being the effect of chance, and more of evidence for its being the effect of design. A beneficent combination of three independent elements is not so impressive or so strong an argument for a divinity, as a similar combination of six or ten such elements. And every mathematician, conversant in the doctrine of probabilities, knows how with every addition to the number of these elements, the argument grows in force and intensity, with a rapid and multiple augmentation—till at length, in some of the more intricate and manifold conjunctions, those more particularly having an organic character and structure, could we but trace them to an historical commencement, we should find, on the principles of computation alone, that the argument against their being fortuitous products, and for their being the products of a scheming and skillful artificer, was altogether overpowering.

7. We might apply this consideration to various departments in nature. In astronomy, the independent elements seem but few and simple, which must meet together for the composition



of a planetarium. One uniform law of gravitation, with a force of projection impressed by one impulse on each of the bodies, could suffice to account for the revolutions of the planets round the sun, and of the satellites around their primaries, along with the diurnal revolution of each, and the varying inclinations of the axes to the planes of their respective orbits. Out of such few contingencies, the actual orrery of the heavens has been framed. But in anatomy, to fetch the opposite illustration from another science, what a complex and crowded combination of individual elements must first be effected, ere we obtain the composition of an eye,—for the completion of which mechanism, there must not only be a greater number of separate laws, as of refraction and muscular action and secretion; but a vastly greater number of separate and distinct parts, as the lenses, and the retina, and the optic nerve, and the eye-lid and eye-lashes, and the various muscles wherewith this delicate organ is so curiously beset, and each of which is indispensable to its perfection, or to the right performance of its functions. It is passing marvellous that we should have more intense evidence for a God in the construction of an eye, than in the construction of the mighty planetarium—or that, within less than the compass of a handbreadth, we should find in this lower world a more pregnant and legible inscription of the Divinity, than can be gathered from a broad and magnificent survey of the skies, lighted up though they be, with the glories and the wonders of astronomy.

8. But while nothing can be more obvious than that the proof for design in any of the natural formations, is the stronger, in proportion to the number of separate and independent elements which have been brought together, and each of which contributes essentially to its usefulness—we have long held it of prime importance to the theistical argument, that clear exhibition should be made of a distinction not generally adverted to, which obtains between one set of these elements and another. We shall illustrate this by a material, ere we apply it to a mental workmanship.

9. There is, then, a difference of great argumentative importance in this whole question, between the Laws of Matter and the Dispositions of Matter. In astronomy, for example, when attending to the mechanism of the planetary system, we should instance at most but two laws—the law of gravitation; and perhaps the law of perseverance, on the part of all bodies, whether in a state of rest or of motion, till interrupted by some external cause. But had we to state the dispositions of matter in the planetary system, we should instance a greater number of

particulars. We should describe the arrangement of its various parts, whether in respect to situation, or magnitude, or figure—as the position of a large and luminous mass in the centre, and of the vastly smaller but opaque masses which circulated around it, but at such distances as not to interfere with each other, and of the still smaller secondary bodies which revolved about the planets: And we should include in this description the impulses in one direction, and nearly in one plane, given to the different moving bodies; and so regulated, as to secure the movement of each, in an orbit of small eccentricity. The dispositions of matter in the planetary system were fixed at the original setting up of the machine. The laws of matter were ordained for the working of the machine. The former, that is the dispositions, make up the frame-work, or what may be termed the apparatus of the system. The latter, that is the laws, uphold the performance of it.

10. Now the tendency of atheistical writers is to reason exclusively on the laws of matter, and to overlook its dispositions. Could all the beauties and benefits of the astronomical system be referred to the single law of gravitation, it would greatly reduce the strength of the argument for a designing cause. La Place, as if to fortify still more the atheism of such a speculation, endeavoured to demonstrate of this law—that, in respect of its being inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the centre, it is an essential property of matter. La Grange had previously established—that but for such a proportion, or by the deviation of a thousandth part from it, the planetary system would go into derangement—or, in other words, that the law, such as it is, was essential to the stability of the present mundane constitution. La Place would have accredited the law, the unconscious and unintelligent law, that thing according to him of blind necessity, with the whole of this noble and beautiful result—overlooking what La Grange held to be indispensable as concurring elements in his demonstration of it—certain dispositions along with the law—such as the movement of all the planets, first in one direction, second nearly in one plane, and then in nearly circular orbits. We are aware that according to the discoveries, or rather perhaps to the guesses of some later analysts, the three last circumstances might be dispensed with; and yet notwithstanding, the planetary system, its errors still remaining periodical, would in virtue of the single law oscillate around a mean state that should be indestructible and everlasting. Should this come to be a conclusively settled doctrine in the science, it will extenuate, we admit, the argument for a designing cause in the formation of the planetarium. But it will

not annihilate that argument—for there do remain certain palpable utilities in the dispositions as well as laws of the planetary system, acknowledged by all the astronomers; such as the vastly superior weight and quantity of matter accumulated in its centre, and the local establishment there of that great fountain of light and heat from which the surrounding worlds receive throughout the whole of their course an equable dispensation. What a mal-adjustment would it have been, had the luminous and the opaque matter changed places in the firmament; or the planets, by the eccentricity of their orbits, been subject to such vicissitudes of temperature, as would certainly, in our own at least, have entailed destruction both on the animal and vegetable kingdoms.

11. But whatever defect or doubtfulness of evidence there may be in the mechanism of the heavens—this is amply made up for in a more accessible mechanism, near at hand. If either the dispositions of matter in the former mechanism be so few, or the demonstrable results of its single law be so independent of them, that the agency of design rather than of necessity or chance be less manifest than it otherwise would be in the astronomical system; nothing on the other hand can exceed the force and concentration of that proof, which is crowded to so marvellous a degree of enhancement within the limits of the anatomical system. It is this which enables us to draw so much weightier an argument for a God, from the construction of an eye than from the construction of a planetarium. And here it is quite palpable, that it is in the dispositions of matter more than in the laws of matter, where the main strength of the argument lies, though we hear much more of the wisdom of Nature's laws, than of the wisdom of her collocations.\* Now it is true that the law of refraction is indispensable to the faculty of vision; but the laws indispensable to this result are greatly outnumbered by the dispositions which

\* This distinction between the laws and collocations of matter is overlooked by atheistical writers, as in the following specimen from the "Système de la Nature" of Mirabaud. "These prejudiced dreamers," speaking of believers in a God, "are in an extacy at the sight of the periodical motion of the planets; at the order of the stars; at the various productions of the earth; at the astonishing harmony in the component parts of animals. In that moment however, they forget the laws of motion; the power of gravitation; the forces of attraction and repulsion; they assign all these striking phenomena to unknown causes, of which they have no one substantive idea."

When Professor Robison felt alarmed by the attempted demonstration of La Place, that the law of gravitation was an essential property of matter, lest the cause of natural theology should be endangered by it—he might have recollected that the main evidence for a Divinity lies not in the laws of matter, but in their collocations—because of the utter inadequacy in the existing laws to have originated the existing collocations of the material world. So that if ever a time was, when these collocations were not—there is no virtue in the laws that can account for their commencement, or that supersedes the fiat of a God.



are indispensable to it—such as the rightly sized and shaped lenses of the eye ; and the rightly placed retina spread out behind them, and at the precise distance where the indispensable picture of external nature might be formed, and presented as it were for the information of the occupier within ; and then, the variety and proper situation of the numerous muscles, each entrusted with an important function, and all of them contributing to the power and perfection of this curious and manifoldly complicated organ. It is not so much the endowment of matter with certain properties, as the arrangement of it into certain parts, that bespeaks here the hand of an artist ; and this will be found true of the anatomical structure in all its departments. It is not the mere chemical property of the gastric juice that impresses the belief of contrivance ; but the presence of the gastric juice, in the very situation whence it comes forth to act with advantage on the food, when received into the stomach, and there submitted to a digestive process for the nourishment of the animal economy. It is well to distinguish these two things. If we but say of matter that it is furnished with such powers as make it subservient to many useful results, we keep back the strongest and most unassailable part of the argument for a God. It is greatly more pertinent and convincing to say of matter, that it is distributed into such parts as to ensure a right direction and a beneficial application for its powers. It is not so much in the establishment of certain laws for matter, that we discern the aims or the purposes of intelligence, as in certain dispositions of matter, that put it in the way of being usefully operated upon by the laws. Insomuch, that though we conceded to the atheist, the eternity of matter, and the essentially inherent character of all its laws—we could still point out to him, in the manifold adjustments of matter, its adjustments of place, and figure, and magnitude, the most impressive signatures of a Deity. And what a countless variety of such adjustments within the compass of an animal, or even a vegetable frame-work. In particular, what an amount and condensation of evidence for a God in the workmanship of the human body. What bright and convincing lessons of theology might man, (would he but open his eyes,) read on his own person—that microcosm of divine art, where as in the sentences of a perfect epitome, he might trace in every lineament or member the finger and authorship of the Godhead.

12. In the performances of human art, the argument for design that is grounded on the useful dispositions of matter, stands completely disentangled from the argument that is grounded on the useful laws of matter—for in every implement or piece of mechanism constructed by the hands of man, it is in the latter

apart from the former, that the indications of contrivance wholly and exclusively lie. We do not accredit man with the establishment of any laws for matter—yet he leaves enough by which to trace the operations of his intelligence in the collocations of matter. He does not give to matter any of its properties; but he arranges it into parts—and by such arrangement alone, does he impress upon his workmanship the incontestable marks of design; not in that he has communicated any powers to matter, but in that he has intelligently availed himself of these powers, and directed them to an obviously beneficial result. The watch-maker did not give its elasticity to the main-spring, nor its regularity to the balance-wheel, nor its transparency to the glass, nor the momentum of its varying forces to the levers of his mechanism,—yet is the whole replete with the marks of intelligence notwithstanding, announcing throughout the hand of a maker who had an eye on all these properties, and assigned the right place and adjustment to each of them, in fashioning and bringing together the parts of an instrument for the measurement and the indication of time. Now, the same distinction can be observed in all the specimens of natural mechanism. It is true that we accredit the author of these with the creation and laws of matter, as well as its dispositions; but this does not hinder its being in the latter and not in the former, where the manifestations of skill are most apparent, or where the chief argument for a divinity lies. The truth is, that mere laws, without collocations, would have afforded no security against a turbid and disorderly chaos. One can imagine of all the substantive things which enter into the composition of a watch, that they may have been huddled together, without shape, and without collocation, into a little chaos, or confused medley;—where, in full possession of all the properties which belong to the matter of the instrument, but without its dispositions, every evidence of skill would have been wholly obliterated. And it is even so with all the substantive things which enter into the composition of a world. Take but their forms and collocations away from them, and this goodly universe would instantly lapse into a heaving and disorderly chaos—yet without stripping matter of any of its properties<sup>or</sup> powers. There might still, though operating with random<sup>and</sup> undirected activity, be the laws of impulse, and gravitation<sup>on</sup>, and magnetism, and temperature, and light, and the force<sup>of</sup> chemistry, and even those physiological tendencies, which<sup>however abortive</sup> spirit of a God tive in a state of primitive rudeness, or before right distribution moved on the face of the waters, waited full effect and establishment of the parts of matter, to develope intents. The thing wanted

for the evolution of this chaos into an orderly and beneficial system is not the endowing of matter with right properties ; but the forming of it into things of right shape and magnitude, and the marshalling of these into right places. This last alone would suffice for bringing harmony out of confusion ; and, apart altogether from the first, or, without involving ourselves in the metaphysical obscurity of those questions which relate to the origination of matter and to the distinction between its arbitrary and essential properties, might we discern, in the mere arrangements of matter, the most obvious and decisive signatures of the artist hand which has been employed on it.

13. That is a fine generalization by the late Professor Robison, of Edinburgh, which ranges all philosophy into two sciences—one the science of contemporaneous nature ; the other, the science of successive nature. When the material world is viewed according to this distinction, the whole science of its contemporaneous phenomena is comprehended by him under the general name of Natural History, which takes cognizance of all those characters in external nature that exist together at the instant, and which may be described without reference to time—as smell, and colour, and size, and weight, and form, and relation of parts, whether of the simple inorganic or more complex organic structures. But when the elements of time and motion are introduced, we are then presented with the phenomena of successive nature ; and the science that embraces these is, in contradistinction to the former, termed Natural Philosophy. This latter science may be separated or subdivided further into natural philosophy, strictly and indeed usually so called, whose province it is to investigate those changes which take effect in bodies by motions that are sensible and measurable ; and chemistry, or the science of those changes which take effect in bodies by motions which are not sensible or, at least, not measurable, and which cannot therefore be made the subjects of mathematical computation or reasoning. This last, again, is capable of being still further partitioned into the science which investigates the changes effected by means of insensible motion in all inorganic matter, or chemistry, strictly and usually so called ; and the science of physiology, whose province it is to investigate the like changes that take place in organic bodies, whether of the animal or vegetable kingdoms.

14. Or, a distinction between these two sciences of contemporaneous and successive nature may otherwise be stated thus. The one, or natural philosophy, is conversant with objects—the other, or natural history, is conversant with events in its most comprehensive meaning, is

It is obvious that the dispositions of

matter come within the province of the former science—while the laws of matter, or the various moving forces by which it is actuated, fall more properly under the enquiries of the latter science. Now, adopting this nomenclature, we hold it a most important assertion for the cause of natural theology, that should all the present arrangements of our existing natural history be destroyed, there is no power in the laws of our existing natural philosophy to replace them. Or, in other words, if ever a time was, when the structure and dispositions of matter, under the present economy of things were not—there is no force known in nature, and no combination of forces that can account for their commencement. The laws of nature may keep up the working of the machinery—but they did not and could not set up the machine. The human species, for example, may be upholden, through an indefinite series of ages, by the established law of transmission—but were the species destroyed, there are no observed powers of nature by which it could again be originated. For the continuance of the system and of all its operations, we might imagine a sufficiency in the laws of nature; but it is the first construction of the system which so palpably calls for the intervention of an artificer, or demonstrates so powerfully the fiat and finger of a God.

15. This distinction between nature's laws and nature's collocations is mainly lost sight of in those speculations of geology, the object of which is to explain the formation of new systems emerging from the wreck of old ones. They proceed on the sufficiency of nature's laws for building up the present economy of things out of the ruins of a former economy, which the last great physical catastrophe on the face of our earth had overthrown. Now, in these ruins, viewed as materials for the architecture of a renovated world, there did reside all those forces, by which the processes of the existing economy are upholden; but the geologists assign to them a function wholly distinct from this, when they labour to demonstrate, that by laws, and laws alone, the frame-work of our existing economy was put together. It is thus that they would exclude the agency of a God from the transition between one system, or one formation, and another, although it be precisely at such transition when this agency seems most palpably and peculiarly called for. We feel assured that the necessity for a divine intervention, and, of course, the evidence of it would have been more manifest, had the distinction between the laws of matter and its collocations been more formally announced, or more fully proceeded on by the writers on natural theism. And yet it is a distinction that must have been present to the mind of our great Newton, who expressly



affirms that a mechanism of wonderful structure could not arise by the mere laws of nature. In his third printed letter to Bentley, he says, that "the growth of *new systems* out of *old ones*, without the mediation of a divine power, seems to me apparently absurd;" and that "the system of nature was *set in order* in the beginning, with respect to size, figure, proportions, and properties, by the counsels of God's own intelligence." In the last extracts, by his admission of the properties along with the dispositions of matter, he somewhat confounds or disguises again the important distinction which, at times, he had clearly in his view.\*

16. But one precious fruit of the recent geological discoveries may be gathered from the testimony which they afford to the destruction of so many terrestrial economies now gone by, and the substitution of the existing one in their place. If there be truth at all in the speculations of this science, there is nothing which appears to have been more conclusively established by them, than a definite origin or commencement for the present animal and vegetable races. Now we know what it is which upholds the whole of the physiological system that is now before our eyes,—even the successive derivation of each individual member from a parent of its own likeness; but we see no force in nature, and no complication of forces which can tell us what it was that originated the system. It is at this passage in the history of nature, where we meet with such pregnant evidence for the interposition of a designing cause,—an evidence, it will be seen, of prodigious density and force, when we compute the immense number and variety of those aptitudes, whether of form or magnitude or relative position, which enter into the completion of an organic structure. It is in the numerical superiority of the distinct collocations to the distinct laws of matter, that the superior evidence of the former lies. We do not deny that there is argument for a God in the number of beneficial, while, at the same time, distinct and independent laws wherewith matter is endowed. We only affirm a million-fold intensity of argument in the indefinitely greater number of beneficial, and at the same time distinct and indepen-

\* Towards the end of the third book of Newton's Optics, we have the following very distinct testimony upon this subject: "For it became Him who created them to set them in order. And if he did so, it is unphilosophical to seek for any other origin of the world, or to pretend that it might arise out of a chaos by the mere laws of nature; though being once formed, it may continue by those laws for many ages."

This disposition to resolve the collocations into the laws of nature proves, in the expressive language of Granville Penn, how strenuously, not "physical science, but only some of its disciples have laboured to exclude the *Creator* from the *details* of his own creation; straining every nerve of ingenuity to ascribe them *all* to *secondary causes*."

dent number of collocations whereinto matter has been arranged. In this respect the human body may be said to present a more close and crowded and multifarious inscription of the divinity, than any single object within the compass of visible nature. It is instinct throughout with the evidence of a builder's hand; and thus the appropriate men of science who can expound those dispositions of matter which constitute the anatomy of its framework, and which embrace the physiology of its various processes, are on secure and firm vantage ground for an impressive demonstration.

17. Now there are many respects in which the evidence for a God, given forth by the constitution of the human body, differs from the evidence given forth by the constitution of the human spirit. It is with the latter evidence that we have more peculiarly to deal; but at present we shall only advert to a few of its distinct and special characteristics. The subject will at length open into greater detail, and developement before us,—yet a brief preliminary exposition may be useful at the outset, should it only convey some notion of the difficulties and particularities of the task which has been put into our hands.

18. A leading distinction between the material and the mental fabrications is, the far greater complexity of the former, at least greater to all human observation. Into that system of means which has been formed for the object of seeing, there enter at least twenty separate contingencies, the absence of any one of which would either derange the proper function of the eye, or altogether destroy it. We have no access to aught like the observation of a mental structure, and all of which our consciousness informs us is a succession of mental phenomena. Now in these we are sensible of nothing but a very simple antecedent followed up, and that generally on the instant, by a like simple consequent. We have the feeling and still more the purpose of benevolence, followed up by complacency. We have the feeling or purpose, and still more the execution of malignity, or rather the recollection of that execution, followed up by remorse. However manifold the apparatus may be which enables us to see an external object,—when the sight itself, instead of the consequent in a material succession, becomes the antecedent in a mental one; or, in other words, when it passes from a material to a purely mental process; then, as soon, does it pass from the complex into the simple; and, accordingly, the sight of distress is followed up, without the intervention of any curiously elaborated mechanism that we are at all conscious of, by an immediate feeling of compassion. These examples will, at least, suffice to mark a strong distinction between the two enquiries,

and to show that the several arguments drawn from each must at least be formed of very different materials.

19. There are two distinct ways in which the mind can be viewed, and which constitute different modes of conception, rather than diversities of substantial and scientific doctrine. The mind may either be regarded as a congeries of different faculties; or as a simple and indivisible substance, with the susceptibility of passing into different states. By the former mode of viewing it, the memory, and the judgment, and the conscience, and the will, are conceived of as so many distinct but co-existent parts of mind, which is thus represented to us somewhat in the light of an organic structure, having separate members, each for the discharge of its own appropriate mental function or exercise. By the latter, which we deem also the more felicitous mode of viewing it, these distinct mental acts, instead of being referred to distinct parts of the mind, are conceived of as distinct acts of the whole mind,—insomuch that the whole mind remembers, or the whole mind judges, or the whole mind wills, or, in short, the whole mind passes into various intellectual states or states of emotion, according to the circumstances by which at the time it is beset, or to the present nature of its employment. We might thus either regard the study of mind as a study in contemporaneous nature; and we should then, in the delineation of its various parts, be assigning to it a natural history,—or we might regard the study of mind as a study in successive nature; and we should then, in the description of its various states, be assigning to it a natural philosophy. When such a phrase as the anatomy of the human mind is employed by philosophers, we may safely guess that the former is the conception which they are inclined to form of it.\* When such a phrase again as the physiology of the human mind is made use of, the latter is the conception by which, in all probability, it has been suggested. It is thus that Dr. Thomas Brown designates the science of mind as mental physiology. With him, in fact, it is altogether a science of sequences, his very analysis being the analysis of results, and not of compounds.

20. Now, in either view of our mental constitution there is the same strength of evidence for a God. It matters not for this, whether the mind be regarded as consisting of so many useful parts, or as endowed with as many useful properties. It is the number, whether the one or other, of these—out of which the product is formed of evidence for a designing cause. The only

\* It is under this conception too that writers propose to lay down a map of the human faculties.



reason why the useful dispositions of matter are so greatly more prolific of this evidence than the useful laws of matter, is, that the former so greatly outnumber the latter. Of the twenty independent circumstances which enter into beneficial concurrence in the formation of an eye, that each of them should be found in a situation of optimism, and none of them occupying either an indifferent or a hurtful position—it is this which speaks so emphatically against the hypothesis of a random distribution, and for the hypothesis of an intelligent order. Yet this is but one out of the many like specimens, wherewith the animal economy thickens and teems in such marvellous profusion. By the doctrine of probabilities, the mathematical evidence, in this question between the two suppositions of intelligence or chance, will be found, even on many a single organ of the human framework, to preponderate vastly more than a million-fold on the side of the former. We do not affirm of the human mind that it is so destitute of all complication and variety, as to be deficient altogether in this sort of evidence. Let there be but six laws or ultimate facts in the mental constitution, with the circumstance of each of them being beneficial; and this of itself would yield no inconsiderable amount of precise and calculable proof, for our mental economy being a formation of contrivance, rather than one that is fortuitous or of blind necessity. It will at once be seen, however, why mind, just from its greater simplicity than matter, should contribute so much less to the support of natural theism, of that definite and mathematical evidence which is founded on combination.

21. But, although in the mental department of creation, the argument for a God that is gathered out of such materials, is not so strong as in the other great department—yet it does furnish a peculiar argument of its own, which, though not grounded on mathematical data, and not derived from a lengthened and logical process of reasoning, is of a highly effective and practical character notwithstanding. It has not less in it of the substance, though it may have greatly less in it of the semblance of demonstration, that it consists of but one step between the premises and the conclusion. It is briefly, but cannot be more clearly and emphatically expressed than in the following sentence.—“He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” That the parent cause of intelligent beings shall be itself intelligent is an aphorism, which, if not demonstrable in the forms of logic, carries in the very announcement of it a challenging power over the acquiescence of all spirits. It is a thing of instant conviction, as if seen in the light

of its own evidence, more than a thing of lengthened and laborious proof. It may be stigmatized as a mere impression—nevertheless the most of intellects go as readily along with it, as they would from one *contiguous* step to another of many a stately argumentation. If it cannot be exhibited as the conclusion of a syllogism, it is because of its own inherent right to be admitted there as the major proposition. To proscribe every such truth, or to disown it from being truth, merely because incapable of deduction, would be to cast away the first principles of all reasoning. It would banish the authority of intuition, and so reduce all philosophy and knowledge to a state of universal scepticism—for what is the first departure of every argument but an intuition, and what but a series of intuitions are its successive stepping-stones? We should soon involve ourselves in helpless perplexity and darkness, did we insist on every thing being proved and on nothing being assumed—for valid assumptions are the materials of truth, and the only office of argument is to weave them together into so many pieces of instruction for the bettering or enlightening of the species.

22. That blind and unconscious matter cannot, by any of her combinations, evolve the phenomena of mind, is a proposition seen in its own immediate light, and felt to be true with all the speed and certainty of an axiom. It is to such truth, as being of instant and almost universal consent, that, more than to any other, we owe the existence of a natural theology among men: yet, because of the occult mysticism wherewith it is charged, it is well that ours is a case of such rich and various argument; that in her service we can build up syllogisms, and expatiate over wide fields of induction, and amass stores of evidence, and, on the useful dispositions of matter alone, can ground such large computations of probability in favour of an intelligent cause or maker for all things, as might silence and satisfy the reasoners.

23. But we forget that the object of the joint compositions which enter into this work, is not properly to demonstrate the being but the attributes of God, and more especially His power, and wisdom, and goodness. We start from that point at which the intuitions and proofs of the question have performed their end of convincing man that God is; and from this point, we set forth on an enquiry into the character which belongs to him. Now this is an enquiry which the constitution of the mind, and the adaptation of that constitution to the external world, are pre-eminently fitted to illustrate. We hold that the material universe affords decisive attestation to the natural perfections of the Godhead, but that it leaves the question of his moral per-

fections involved in profoundest mystery. The machinery of a serpent's tooth, for the obvious infliction of pain and death upon its victims, may speak as distinctly for the power and intelligence of its Maker as the machinery of those teeth which, formed and inserted for simple mastication, subserve the purposes of a bland and beneficent economy. An apparatus of suffering and torture might furnish as clear an indication of design, though a design of cruelty, as does an apparatus for the ministration of enjoyment furnish the indication also of design, but a design of benevolence. Did we confine our study to the material constitution of things, we should meet with the enigma of many perplexing and contradictory appearances. We hope to make it manifest, that in the study of the mental constitution, this enigma is greatly alleviated, if not wholly done away; and, at all events, that within our peculiar province there lie the most full and unambiguous demonstrations, which nature hath any where given to us, both of the benevolence and the righteousness of God.

21. If, in some respects, the phenomena of mind tell us less decisively than the phenomena of matter, of the existence of God, they tell us far more distinctly and decisively of His attributes. We have already said that, from the simplicity of the mental system, we met with less there of that evidence for design which is founded on combination, or on that right adjustment and adaptation of the numerous particulars, which enter into a complex assemblage of things, and which are essential to some desirable fulfilment. It is not, therefore, through the medium of this particular evidence—the evidence which lies in combination; that the phenomena and processes of mind are the best for telling us of the Divine existence. But if otherwise, or previously told of this, we hold them to be the best throughout all nature for telling us of the Divine character. For if once convinced, on distinct grounds, that God is, it matters not how simple the antecedents or the consequents of any particular succession may be. It is enough that we know what the terms of the succession are, or what the effect is wherewith God wills any given thing to be followed up. The character of the ordination, and so the character of the ordainer, depends on the terms of the succession; and not on the nature of that intervention or agency, whether more or less complex, by which it is brought about. And should either term of the succession, either the antecedent or consequent, be some moral feeling, or characteristic of the mind, then the inference comes to be a very distinct and decisive one. That the sight of distress, for example, should be followed up by compassion, is an obvious provision of benevolence,

and not of cruelty, on the part of Him who ordained our mental constitution. Again, that a feeling of kindness in the heart should be followed up by a feeling of complacency in the heart, that in every virtuous affection of the soul there should be so much to gladden and harmonize it, that there should always be peace within when there is conscious purity or rectitude within; and, on the other hand, that malignity and licentiousness, and the sense of any moral transgression whatever, should always have the effect of discomfiting, and sometimes even of agonizing the spirit of man—that such should be the actual workmanship and working of our nature, speaks most distinctly, we apprehend, for the general righteousness of Him who constructed its machinery and established its laws. An omnipotent patron of vice would have given another make, and a moral system with other and opposite tendencies to the creatures whom he had formed. He would have established different sequences; and, instead of that oil of gladness which now distils, as if from a secret spring of satisfaction, upon the upright; and, instead of that bitterness and disquietude which are now the obvious attendants on every species of delinquency, we should have had the reverse phenomena of a reversely constituted species, whose minds were in their state of wildest disorder when kindling with the resolves of highest excellence; or were in their best and happiest, and most harmonious mood, when brooding over the purposes of dishonesty, or frenzied with the passions of hatred and revenge.

25. In this special track of observation, we have at least the means or data for constructing a far more satisfactory demonstration of the divine attributes, than can possibly be gathered, we think, from the ambiguous phenomena of the external world. In other words, it will be found that the mental phenomena speak more distinctly and decisively for the character of God than do the material phenomena of creation. And it should not be forgotten that whatever serves to indicate the character, serves also to confirm the existence of the Divine Being. For this character, whose signatures are impressed on Nature, is not an abstraction, but must have residence on a concrete and substantive Being, who hath communicated a transcript of Himself to the workmanship of His own hands. It is thus, that, although in our assigned department there is greater poverty of evidence for a God, in as far as that evidence is grounded on a skilful disposition of parts,—yet, in respect of another kind of evidence, there is no such poverty; for, greatly more replete as we hold our special department to be with the unequivocal tokens of a moral character, we, by that simple but strong ligament of proof which



connects a character with an existence, can, in the study of mind alone, find a firm stepping-stone to the existence of a God. Our universe is sometimes termed the mirror of Him who made it. But the optical reflection, whatever it may be, must be held as indicating the reality which gave it birth; and, whether we discern there the expression of a reigning benevolence, or a reigning justice, these must not be dealt with as the aerial or the fanciful personifications of qualities alone, but as the substantial evidences of a just and benevolent, and, withal, a living God.

26. But, in the prosecution of our assigned task, we shall, after all, meet with much of that evidence, which lies in the manifold, and, withal, happy conjunction of many individual things, by the meeting together of which, some distinctly beneficial end is accomplished, brought about in that one way and in no other. For it ought further to be recollected, that, simple as the constitution of the human mind is, and proportionally unfruitful, therefore, as it may be of that argument for a God, which is founded on the right assortment and disposition of many parts, or even of many principles; yet, on studying the precise terms of the commission which has been put into our hands, it will be found that the materials even of this peculiar argument lie abundantly within our province. For it is not strictly the mental constitution of man which forms the subject of our prescribed essay, but the adaptation to that constitution of external nature. We have to demonstrate, not so much that the mind is rightly constituted in itself, as that the mind is rightly placed in a befitting theatre for the exercise of its powers. It is to demonstrate that the world and its various objects are suited to the various capacities of this inhabitant—this moral and intelligent creature, of whom we have to prove that the things which are around him bear a fit relation to the laws or the properties which are within him. There is ample room here for the evidence of collocation. Yet there remains this distinction between the mental and the corporeal economy of man, that whereas the evidence is more rich and manifold in the bodily structure itself, than even in its complex and numerous adaptations to the outer world;\* the like evidence, in our peculiar department, is meagre, as afforded by the subjective mind, when compared with the evidence of its various adjustments and fitnesses to the objective universe around it, whether of man's moral constitution to the state of human society, or of his intellectual to the various objects of physical investigation.

\* Yet Paley has a most interesting chapter on the adaptations of external nature to the human frame-work, though the main strength and copiousness of his argument lie in the anatomy of the frame-work itself.

27. The great object of philosophy is to ascertain the simple or ultimate principles, into which all the phenomena of nature may by analysis be resolved. But it often happens that in this attempt she stops short at a secondary law, which might be demonstrated by further analysis to be itself a complex derivative of the primitive or elementary laws. Until this work of analysis be completed, we shall often mistake what is compound for what is simple, both in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of matter—being frequently exposed to intractable substances or intractable phenomena in both, which long withstand every effort that science makes for their decomposition. It is thus that the time is not yet come, and may never come, when we shall fully understand, what be all the simple elements or simple laws of matter; and what be all the distinct elementary laws, or, as they have sometimes been termed, the ultimate facts in the constitution of the human mind. But we do not need to wait for this communication, ere we can trace, in either department, the wisdom and beneficence of a Deity—for many are both the material and the mental processes which might be recognized as pregnant with utility, and so, pregnant with evidence for a God, long before the processes themselves are analyzed. The truth is, that a secondary law, if it do not exhibit any additional proof of design, in a distinct useful principle, exhibits that proof in a distinct and useful disposition of parts—for, generally speaking, a secondary law is the result of an operation by some primitive law, in peculiar and new circumstances. For example, the law of the tides is a secondary law, resolvable into one more general and elementary—even the law of gravitation. But we might imagine a state of things, in which the discovery of this connection would have been impossible,—as a sky perpetually mantled with a cloudy envelopment, which, while it did not intercept the light either of the sun or moon, still hid these bodies from our direct observation. In these circumstances, the law of the tides and the law of gravitation, though identical in themselves, could not have been identified by us; and so, we might have ascribed this wholesome agitation of the sea and of the atmosphere to a distinct power or principle in nature—affording the distinct indication of both a kind and intelligent Creator. Now this inference is not annihilated—it is not even enfeebled by the discovery in question; for although the good arising from tides in the ocean and tides in the air, is not referable to a peculiar law—it is at least referable to a peculiar collocation. And this holds of all the useful secondary laws in the material world. If they cannot be alleged in evidence for the number of beneficial principles in nature—they can at least be alleged in evidence

for the number of nature's beneficial arrangements. If they do not attest the multitude of useful properties, they at the least attest the multitude of useful parts in nature; and the skill, guided by benevolence which has been put forth in the distribution of them. So that long ere the philosophy of matter is perfected, or all its phenomena and its secondary laws have been resolved into their original and constituent principles—may we, in their obvious and immediate utility alone, detect as many separate evidences in nature as there are separate facts in nature, for a wise and benevolent Deity.

28. And the same will be found true of the secondary laws in the mental world, which, if not as many distinct beneficial principles in the constitution of the mind, are the effect of as many distinct and beneficial arrangements in the objects or circumstances by which it is surrounded. We have not to wait the completion of its still more subtle and difficult analysis, ere we come within sight of those varied indications of benevolent design which are so abundantly to be met with, both in the constitution of the mind itself, and in the adaptation thereto of external nature. Some there are, for example, who contend that the laws of taste are not primitive but secondary; that our admiration of beauty in material objects is resolvable into other and original emotions, and, more especially, by means of the associating principle, into our admiration of moral excellence. Let the justness of this doctrine be admitted; and its only effect on our peculiar argument is, that the benevolence of God in thus multiplying our enjoyments, instead of being indicated by a distinct law for suiting the human mind to the objects which surround it, is indicated both by the distribution of these objects and by their investment with such qualities as suit them to the previous constitution of the mind—that he hath pencilled them with the very colours, or moulded them into the very shapes which suggest either the graceful or the noble of human character; that he hath imparted to the violet its hue of modesty, and clothed the lily in its robe of purest innocence, and given to the trees of the forest their respective attitudes of strength or delicacy, and made the whole face of nature one bright reflection of those virtues which the mind and character of man had originally radiated. If it be not by the implantation of a peculiar law in mind, it is at least by a peculiar disposition of tints and forms in external nature, that he hath spread so diversified a loveliness over the panorama of visible things; and thrown so many walks of enchantment around us; and turned the sights and the sounds of rural scenery into the ministers of so much and such exquisite enjoyment; and caused the outer world of matter to image forth in such profusion those

various qualities, which at first had pleased or powerfully affected us in the inner world of consciousness and thought. It is by the modifying operation of circumstances that a primary is transmuted into a secondary law ; and if the blessings which we enjoy under it cannot be ascribed to the insertion of a distinct principle in the nature of man, they can at least be ascribed to a useful disposition of circumstances in the theatre around him.

29. It is thus that philosophical discovery, which is felt by many to enfeeble the argument for a God, when it reduces two or more subordinate to simpler and anterior laws, does in fact leave that argument as entire as before—for if, by analysis, it diminish the number of beneficial properties in matter, it replaces the injury which it may be supposed to have done in this way to the cause of theism, by presenting us with as great an additional number of beneficial arrangements in nature. And further, it may not be out of place to observe, that there appear to be two distinct ways by which an artificer might make manifest the wisdom of his contrivances. He may either be conceived of, as forming a substance and endowing it with the fit properties ; or as finding a substance with certain given properties, and arranging it into fit dispositions for the accomplishment of some desirable end. Both the former and the latter of these we ascribe to the divine artificer—of whom we imagine, that He is the Creator as well as the Disposer of all things. It is only the latter that we can ascribe to the human artificer, who creates no substance, and ordains no property ; but finds the substance with all its properties ready made and put into his hands, as the raw material out of which he fashions his implements and rears his structures of various design and workmanship. Now it is a commonly received, and has indeed been raised into a sort of universal maxim, that the highest property of wisdom is to achieve the most desirable end, or the greatest amount of good, by the fewest possible means, or by the simplest machinery. When this test is applied to the laws of nature—then we esteem it, as enhancing the manifestation of intelligence, that one single law, as gravitation, should, as from a central and commanding eminence, subordinate to itself a whole host of most important phenomena ; or that from one great and parent property, so vast a family of beneficial consequences should spring. And when the same test is applied to the dispositions, whether nature or art—then it enhances the manifestation of wisdom, when some great end is brought about with a less complex or cumbersome instrumentality, as often takes place in the simplification of machines, when, by the device of some ingenious ligament or wheel, the apparatus is made equally, perhaps more effective, whilst less unwieldy or



less intricate than before. Yet there is one way in which, along with an exceeding complication in the mechanism, there might be given the impression, of the very highest skill and capacity having been put forth on the contrivance of it. It is when, by means of a very operose and complex instrumentality, the triumph of art has been made all the more conspicuous, by a very marvellous result having been obtained out of very unpromising materials. It is true, that, in this case too, a still higher impression of skill would be given, if the same or a more striking result were arrived at, even after the intricacy of the machine had been reduced, by some happy device, in virtue of which, certain of its parts or circumvolutions had been superseded; and thus, without injury to the final effect, so much of the complication had been dispensed with. Still, however, the substance, whether of the machine or the manufacture, may be conceived so very intractable as to put an absolute limit on any further simplification, or as to create an absolute necessity for all the manifold contrivance which had been expended on it. When this idea predominates in the mind—then all the complexity which we may behold does not reduce our admiration of the artist, but rather deepens the sense that we have, both of the reconditeness of his wisdom, and of the wondrous vastness and variety of his resources. It is the extreme wideness of the contrast, between the sluggishness of matter and the fineness of the results in physiology, which so enhances our veneration for the great Architect of Nature, when we behold the exquisite organizations of the animal and vegetable kingdoms.\* The two exhibitions are wholly distinct from each other—yet each of them may be perfect in its own way. The first is held forth to us, when one law of pervading generality is found to scatter a myriad of beneficent consequences in its train. The second is held forth, when, by an infinite complexity of means, a countless variety of expedients with their multiform combinations, some one design, such as the upholding of life in plants or animals is accomplished. Creation presents us in marvellous profusion with specimens of both these—at once confirming the doctrine, and illustrating the significance of the expression in which Scripture hath conveyed it to us, when it tells of the *manifold* wisdom of God.

30. But while, on a principle already often recognised, this multitude of necessary conditions to the accomplishment of a given end, enhances the argument for a God, because each separate condition reduces the hypothesis of chance to a more

\*Dr. Paley would state the problem thus. The laws of matter being given, so to organize it, as that it shall produce or sustain the phenomena, whether of vegetation or of life.

violent improbability than before ; yet it must not be disguised that there is a certain transcendental mystery which it has the effect of aggravating, and which it leaves unresolved. We can understand the complex machinery and the circuitous processes to which a human artist must resort, that he might overcome the else uncomplying obstinacy of inert matter, and bend it in subserviency to his special designs. But that the Divine artist who first created the matter and ordained its laws, should find the same complication necessary for the accomplishment of his purposes ; that such an elaborate workmanship, for example, should be required to establish the functions of sight and hearing in the animal economy, is very like the lavish or ostensible ingenuity of a Being employed in conquering the difficulty which himself had raised. It is true, the one immediate purpose is served by it which we have just noticed,—that of presenting, as it were, to the eye of enquirers a more manifold inscription of the Divinity. But if, instead of being the object of inference, it had pleased God to make himself the object of a direct manifestation, then for the mere purpose of becoming known to his creatures, this reflex or circuitous method of revelation would have been altogether uncalled for. That under the actual system of creation, and with its actual proofs, he has made his existence most decisively known to us, we most thankfully admit. But when question is made between the actual and the conceivable systems of creation which God might have emanated, we are forced to confess, that the very circumstances which, in the existing order of things, have brightened and enhanced the evidence of His being, have also cast a deeper secrecy over what may be termed the general policy of His government and ways. And this is but one of the many difficulties, which men of unbridled speculation and unobservant of that sound philosophy that keeps within the limits of human observation, will find it abundantly possible to conjure up on the field of natural theism. It does look an impracticable enigma that the Omnipotent God, who could have grafted all the capacities of thought and feeling on an elementary atom, should have deemed fit to incorporate the human soul in the midst of so curious and complicated a frame-work. For what a variegated structure is man's animal economy. What an apparatus of vessels and bones and ligaments. What a complex mechanism. What an elaborate chemistry. What a multitude of parts in the anatomy, and of processes in the physiology of this marvellous system. What a medley, we had almost said, what a package of contents. What an unwearied play of secretions and circulations and other changes incessant and innu-

merable. In short, what a laborious complication; and all to uphold a living principle, which, one might think, could by a simple fiat of omnipotence, have sprung forth at once from the great source and centre of the spiritual system, and mingled with the world of spirits—just as each new particle of light is sent forth by the emanation of a sunbeam, to play and glisten among the fields of radiance.

31. But to recall ourselves from this digression among the possibilities of what might have been, to the realities of the mental system, such as it actually is. Ere we bring the very general observations of this chapter to a close, we would briefly notice an analogy between the realities of the mental and those of the corporeal system. The enquirers into the latter have found it of substantial benefit to their science, to have mixed up with the prosecution of it a reference to final causes. Their reasoning on the likely uses of a part in anatomy, has, in some instances, suggested or served as a guide to speculations, which have been at length verified by a discovery. We believe, in like manner, that reasoning on the likely or obvious uses of a principle in the constitution of the human mind, might lead, if not to the discovery, at least to the confirmation of important truth—not perhaps in the science itself, but in certain of the cognate sciences which stand in no very distant relation to it. For example, we think it should rectify certain errors which have been committed both in jurisprudence and political economy, if it can be demonstrated that some of the undoubted laws of human nature are traversed by them; and so, that violence is thereby done to the obvious designs of the Author of Nature. We shall not hold it out of place, though we notice one or two of these instances, by which it might be seen that the mental philosophy, when studied in connection with the palpable views of Him by whom all its principles and processes were ordained, is fitted to enlighten the practice of legislation, and more especially to determine the wisdom of certain arrangements which have for their object the economic well-being of society.

32. We feel the arduousness of our peculiar task, and the feeling is not at all alleviated by our sense of its surpassing dignity. The superiority of mind to matter has often been the theme of eloquence to moralists. For what were all the wonders of the latter and all its glories, without a spectator mind that could intelligently view and that could tastefully admire them? Let every eye be irrevocably closed, and this were equivalent to the entire annihilation in nature of the element of light; and in like manner, if the light of all consciousness were put out in the world of mind, the world of matter, though as rich

in beauty, and in the means of benevolence as before, were thereby reduced to a virtual nonentity. In these circumstances, the lighting up again of even but one mind would restore its being, or at least its significancy to that system of materialism, which, untouched itself, had just been desolated of all those beings in whom it could kindle reflection, or to whom it could minister the sense of enjoyment. It were tantamount to the second creation of it,—or, in other words, one living intelligent spirit is of higher reckoning and mightier import than a dead universe.

## PART I.

### ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

---

#### CHAPTER I.

##### *On the Supremacy of Conscience.*

1. AN abstract question in morals is distinct from a question respecting the constitution of man's moral nature ; and the former ought no more to be confounded with the latter, than the truths of geometry with the faculties of the reasoning mind which comprehends them. The virtuousness of justice was a stable doctrine in ethical science, anterior to the existence of the species ; and would remain so, though the species were destroyed—just as much as the properties of a triangle are the enduring stabilities of mathematical science ; and that, though no matter had been created to exemplify the positions or the figures of geometry. The objective nature of virtue is one thing. The subjective nature of the human mind, by which virtue is felt and recognized, is another. It is not from the former, any more than from the eternal truths of geometry, that we can demonstrate the existence or attributes of God—but from the latter, as belonging to the facts of a creation emanating from His will, and therefore bearing upon it the stamp of His character. The nature and constitution of virtue form a distinct subject of enquiry from the nature and constitution of the human mind. Virtue is not a creation of the Divine will, but has had everlasting residence in the nature of the Godhead. The mind of man is a creation ; and therefore indicates, by its characteristics, the character of Him, to the fiat and the forthgoing of whose will it owes its existence. We must frequently, in the course of this discussion, advert to the principles of ethics ; but it is not on the system of ethical doctrine that our argument properly is founded. It is on the phenomena and the laws of actual human nature, which itself, one of the great facts of creation, may be regarded



like all its facts, as bearing on it the impress of that mind which gave birth to creation.

2. But further. It is not only not with the system of ethical doctrine—it is not even with the full system of the philosophy of our nature that we have properly to do. On this last there is still a number of unsettled questions; but our peculiar argument does not need to wait for the conclusive determination of them. For example, there is many a controversy among philosophers respecting the primary and secondary laws of the human constitution. Now, if it be an obviously beneficial law, it carries evidence for a God, in the mere existence and operation of it, independently of the rank which it holds, or of the relation in which it stands to the other principles of our internal mechanism. It is thus that there may, at one and the same time, be grounded on the law in question a clear theological inference; and yet there may be associated with it an obscure philosophical speculation. It is well that we separate these two; and, more especially, that the decisive attestation given by any part or phenomenon of our nature to the Divine goodness, shall not be involved in the mist and metaphysical perplexity of other reasonings, the object of which is altogether distinct and separate from our own. The facts of the human constitution, apart altogether from the philosophy of their causation, demonstrate the wisdom and benevolence of Him who framed it: and while it is our part to follow the light of this philosophy, as far as the light and the guidance of it are sure, we are not, in those cases, when the final cause is obvious as day, though the proximate efficient cause should be hidden in deepest mystery,—we are not, on this account, to confound darkness with light, or light with darkness.

3. By attending throughout to this observation, we shall be saved from a thousand irrelevancies as well as obscurities of argument; and it is an observation peculiarly applicable, in announcing that great fact or phenomenon of mind, which, for many reasons, should hold a foremost place in our demonstration—we mean the felt supremacy of conscience. Philosophers there are, who have attempted to resolve this fact into ulterior or ultimate ones in the mental constitution; and who have denied to the faculty a place among its original and uncompounded principles. Sir James Macintosh tells us of the generation of human conscience; and, not merely states, but endeavours to explain the phenomenon of its felt supremacy within us. Dr. Adam Smith also assigns a pedigree to our moral judgments; but, with all his peculiar notions respecting the origin of the awards of conscience, he never once disputes their authority; or, that, by the general consent of mankind, this authority is, in sentiment and

opinion at least, conceded to them.\* It is somewhat like an antiquarian controversy respecting the first formation and subsequent historical changes of some certain court of government, the rightful authority of whose decisions and acts is, at the same time, fully recognized. And so, philosophers have disputed regarding the court of conscience—of what materials it is constructed, and by what line of genealogy from the anterior principles of our nature it has sprung. Yet most of these have admitted the proper right of sovereignty which belongs to it; its legitimate place as the master and the arbiter over all the appetites and desires and practical forces of human nature. Or, if any have dared the singularity of denying this, they do so in opposition to the general sense and general language of mankind, whose very modes of speech compel them to affirm that the bidings of conscience are of paramount authority—its peculiar office being to tell what all men should, or all men ought to do.

4. The proposition, however, which we are now urging, is not that the obligations of virtue are binding, but that man has a conscience which tells him that they are so—not that justice and truth and humanity are the dogmata of the abstract moral system, but that they are the dictates of man's moral nature—not that in themselves they are the constituent parts of moral rectitude, but that there is a voice within every heart which thus pronounces on them. It is not with the constitution of morality, viewed objectively, as a system or theory of doctrine, that we have properly to do; but with the constitution of man's spirit, viewed as the subject of certain phenomena and laws—and, more particularly, with a great psychological fact in human nature, namely, the homage rendered by it to the supremacy of conscience. In a word, it is not of a category, but of a creation that we are speaking. The one can tell us nothing of the divine character, while the other might afford most distinct and decisive indications of it. We could find no demonstration whatever of the divine purposes, on a mere ethical, any more than we could, on a logical or mathematical category. But it is very different with an actual creation, whether in mind or in mat-

\* "Upon whatever," observes Dr. Adam Smith, "we suppose our moral faculties to be founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or restrained. It is the peculiar office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature."

ter—a mechanism of obvious contrivance, and whose workings and tendencies, therefore, must be referred to the design, and so to the disposition or character of that Being, whose spirit hath devised and whose fingers have framed it.

5. And neither do we urge the proposition that conscience has in every instance, the actual direction of human affairs, for this were in the face of all experience. It is not that every man obeys her dictates, but that every man feels he ought to obey them. These dictates are often in life and practice disregarded: so that conscience is not the sovereign *de facto*. Still there is a voice within the hearts of all which asserts that conscience is the sovereign *de jure*; that to her belongs the command rightfully, even though she do not possess it actually. In a season of national anarchy, the actual power and the legitimate authority are often disjoined from each other. The lawful monarch may be dethroned, and so lose the might; while he continues to possess—nay, while he may be acknowledged throughout his kingdom to possess the right of sovereignty. The distinction still is made, even under this reign of violence, between the usurper and the lawful sovereign; and there is a similar distinction among the powers and principles of the human constitution, when an insurrection takes place of the inferior against the superior; and conscience, after being dethroned from her place of mastery and control, is still felt to be the superior, or rather supreme faculty of our nature notwithstanding. She may have fallen from her dominion, yet still wear the badges of a fallen sovereign, having the acknowledged right of authority, though the power of enforcement has been wrested away from her. She may be outraged in all her prerogatives by the lawless appetites of our nature,—but not without the accompanying sense within of an outrage and a wrong having been inflicted, and a reclaiming voice from thence which causes itself to be heard and which remonstrates against it. The insurgent and inferior principles of our constitution may, in the uproar of their wild mutiny, lift a louder and more effective voice than the small still voice of conscience. They have the might but not the right. Conscience, on the other hand, is felt to have the right though not the might—the legislative office being that which properly belongs to her, though the executive power should be wanting to enforce her enactments. It is not the reigning but the rightful authority of conscience that we, under the name of her supremacy, contend for; or, rather the fact that, by the consent of all our higher principles and feelings, this rightful authority is reputed to be hers; and, by the general concurrence of mankind awarded to her.



6. And here it is of capital importance to distinguish between an original and proper tendency, and a subsequent aberration. This has been well illustrated by the regulator of a watch, whose office and primary design, and that obviously announced by the relation in which it stands to the other parts of the machinery, is to control the velocity of its movements. And we should still perceive this to have been its destination, even though, by accident or decay, it had lost the power of command which at the first belonged to it. We should not misunderstand the purpose of its maker, although, in virtue of some deterioration or derangement which the machinery had undergone, that purpose were now frustrated. And we could discern the purpose in the very make and constitution of the mechanism. We might even see it to be an irregular watch; and yet this needs not prevent us from seeing, that, at its original fabrication, it was made for the purpose of moving regularly. The mere existence and position of the regulator might suffice to indicate this,—although it had become powerless, either from the wearing of the parts, or from some extrinsic disturbance to which the instrument had been exposed. The regulator, in this instance, may be said to have the right, though not the power of command, over the movements of the timepiece; yet the loss of the power has not obliterated the vestiges of the right; so that, by the inspection of the machinery alone, we both learn the injury which has been done to it, and the condition in which it originally came from the hand of its maker—a condition of actual as well as rightful supremacy, on the part of the regulator, over all its movements. And a similar discovery may be made, by examination of the various parts and principles which make up the moral system of man: for we see various parts and principles there. We see Ambition, having power for its object, and without the attainment of which it is not satisfied; and Avarice, having wealth for its object, without the attainment of which it is not satisfied; and Benevolence, having for its object the good of others, without the attainment of which it is not satisfied; and the love of Reputation, having for its object their applause, without which it is not satisfied; and lastly, to proceed no further in the enumeration, Conscience, which surveys and superintends the whole man, whose distinct and appropriate object it is to have the entire control both of his inward desires and outward doings, and without the attainment of this it is thwarted from its proper aim, and remains unsatisfied. Each appetite, or affection of our nature, has its own distinct object; but this last is the object of Conscience, which may be termed the moral affection. The place which it occupies, or rather which it is felt that it should occupy, and which

naturally belongs to it, is that of a governor, claiming the superiority, and taking to itself the direction over all the other powers and passions of humanity. If this superiority be denied to it, there is a felt violence done to the whole economy of man. The sentiment is, that the thing is not as it should be: and even after conscience is forced, in virtue of some subsequent derangement, from this station of rightful ascendancy, we can still distinguish between what is the primitive design or tendency, and what is the posterior aberration. We can perceive, in the case of a deranged or distempered watch, that the mechanism is out of order; but even then, on the bare examination of its workmanship, and more especially from the place and bearing of its regulator, can we pronounce that it was made for moving regularly. And in like manner, on the bare inspection of our mental economy alone, and more particularly from the place which conscience has there, can we, even in the case of the man who refuses to obey its dictates, affirm that he was made for walking conscientiously.

7. The distinction which we now labour to establish between conscience, and the other principles of our nature, does not respect the actual force or prevalence which may, or may not, severally belong to them. It respects the universal judgment which, by the very constitution of our nature, is passed on the question of rightness—on the question, which of all these should have the prevalence, whenever there happens to be a contest between them. All which we affirm is, that if conscience prevail over the other principles, then every man is led, by the very make and mechanism of his internal economy, to feel that this is as it ought to be; or, if these others prevail over conscience, that this is not as it ought to be. One, it is generally felt, may be too ambitious, or too much set on wealth and fame, or too resentful of injury, or even too facile in his benevolence, when carried to the length of being injudicious and hurtful; but no one is ever felt, if he have sound and enlightened views of morality, to be too conscientious. When we affirm this of conscience, we but concur in the homage rendered to it by all men, as being the rightful, if not the actual superior, among all the feelings and faculties of our nature. It is a truth, perhaps, too simple for being reasoned; but this is because, like many of the most important and undoubted certainties of human belief, it is a truth of instant recognition. When stating the supremacy of conscience, in the sense that we have explained it, we but state what all men feel; and our only argument, in proof of the assertion, is—our only argument can be, an appeal to the experience of all men.

8. Bishop Butler has often been spoken of as the first discoverer of this great principle in our nature ; though, perhaps, no man can properly be said to discover what all men are conscious of. But certain it is, that he is the first who hath made it the subject of a full and reflex cognizance. It forms the argument of his three first sermons, in a volume which may safely be pronounced, the most precious repository of sound ethical principles extant in any language. The authority of conscience, says Dugald Stewart, “although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers, as a fundamental principle in the science of ethics, till the time of Dr. Butler.” It belongs to the very essence of the principle, that we clearly distinguish, between what we find to be the actual force of conscience, and what we feel to be its rightful authority. These two may exist in a state of separation from each other just as in a Civil Government, the reigning power may, in seasons of anarchy, be dissevered from that supreme court or magistrate to whom it rightfully belongs. The mechanism of a political fabric is not adequately or fully described by the mere enumeration of its parts. There must also enter into the description, the relation which the parts bear to each other ; and more especially, the paramount relation of rightful ascendancy and direction, which that part, in which the functions of Government are vested, bears to the whole. Neither is the mechanism of man’s personal constitution fully or adequately described, by merely telling us in succession the several parts of which it is composed—as the passions, and the appetites, and the affections, and the moral sense, and the intellectual capacities, which make up this complex and variously gifted creature. The particulars of his mental system must not only be stated, each in their individuality ; but the bearing or connection which each has with the rest—else it is not described as a system at all. In making out this description, we should not only not overlook the individual faculty of conscience, but we must not overlook its relative place among the other feelings and faculties of our nature. That place is the place of command. What conscience lays claim to is the mastery or regulation over the whole man. Each desire of our nature rests or terminates in its own appropriate object, as the love of fame in applause, or hunger in food, or revenge in the infliction of pain upon its object, or affection for another in the happiness and company of the beloved individual. But the object of the moral sense is to arbitrate and direct among all these propensities. It claims the station and the prerogative of a mistress over them, Its peculiar office is that of superintendence, and there is a

certain feeling of violence or disorder, when the mandates which it issues in this capacity, are not carried into effect. Every affection in our nature is appeased by the object that is suited to it. The object of conscience is the subordination of the whole to its dictates. Without this it remains unappeased, and as if bereft of its rights. It is not a single faculty, taking its own separate and unconnected place among the other feelings and faculties which belong to us. Its proper place is that of a guide or a governor. It is the ruling power in our nature; and its proper, its legitimate business, is to prescribe that man shall be as he ought, and do as he ought. But instead of expatiating any further at present in language of our own, let us here admit a few brief sentences from Butler himself, that great and invaluable expounder both of the human constitution, and of moral science. "That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what in its turn is to have some influence, which may be said of every passion, of the basest appetites: but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others: insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty conscience, without taking in judgment direction and superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is of the faculty itself: and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world." "This faculty was placed within us to be our proper governor; to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and office. Thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the *natural right* and *office* of conscience.

9. Now it is in these phenomena of Conscience that Nature offers to us, far her strongest argument, for the moral character of God. Had He been an unrighteous Being himself, would He have given to this the obviously superior faculty in man, so distinct and authoritative a voice on the side of righteousness? Would He have so constructed the creatures of our species, as to have planted in every breast a reclaiming witness against himself? Would He have thus inscribed on the tablet of every heart the sentence of his own condemnation; and is not this just as unlikely, as that He should have inscribed it in written characters on the forehead of each individual? Would He so have



fashioned the workmanship of His own hands ; or, if a God of cruelty, injustice, and falsehood, would He have placed in the station of master and judge that faculty which, felt to be the highest in our nature, would prompt a generous and high-minded revolt of all our sentiments against the Being who formed us? From a God possessed of such characteristics, we should surely have expected a differently-moulded humanity ; or, in other words, from the actual constitution of man, from the testimonies on the side of all righteousness, given by the vicegerent within the heart, do we infer the righteousness of the Sovereign who placed it there. He would never have established a conscience in man, and invested it with the authority of a monitor, and given to it those legislative and judicial functions which it obviously possesses ; and then so framed it, that all its decisions should be on the side of that virtue which he himself disowned, and condemnatory of that vice which he himself exemplified. This is an evidence for the righteousness of God, which keeps its ground, amid all the disorders and aberrations to which humanity is liable ; and can no more, indeed, be deafened or overborne by these, than is the rightful authority of public opinion, by the occasional outbreaks of iniquity and violence which take place in society. This public opinion may, in those seasons of misrule when might prevails over right, be deforced from the practical ascendancy which it ought to have ; but the very sentiment that it so ought, is our reason for believing the world to have been originally formed, in order that virtue might have the rule over it. In like manner, when, in the bosom of every individual man, we can discern a conscience, placed there with the obvious design of being a guide and a commander, it were difficult not to believe, that, whatever the partial outrages may be which the cause of virtue has to sustain, it has the public mind of the universe in its favour ; and that therefore He, who is the Maker and the Ruler of such a universe, is a God of righteousness. Amid all the subsequent obscurations and errors, the original design, both of a deranged watch and of a deranged human nature, is alike manifest ; first, of the maker of the watch, that its motions should harmonize with time ; second, of the maker of man, that his movements should harmonize with truth and righteousness. We can, in most cases, discern between an aberration and an original law ; between a direct or primitive tendency and the effect of a disturbing force, by which that tendency is thwarted and overborne. And so of the constitution of man. It may be now a loosened and disproportioned thing, yet we can trace the original structure—even as from the fragments of a ruin, we can obtain the perfect model of a building from its capital to its base. It is thus

that, however prostrate conscience may have fallen, we can still discern its place of native and original pre-eminence, as being at once the legislator and the judge in the moral system, though the executive forces of the system have made insurrection against it, and thrown the whole into anarchy. There is a depth of mystery in every thing connected with the existence or the origin of evil in creation; yet, even in the fiercest uproar of our stormy passions, Conscience, though in her softest whispers, gives to the supremacy of rectitude the voice of an undying testimony; and her light still shining in a dark place, her unquelled accents still heard in the loudest outcry of Nature's rebellious appetites, form the strongest argument within reach of the human faculties, that, in spite of all partial or temporary derangements, Supreme Power and Supreme Goodness are at one. It is true that rebellious man hath, with daring footstep, trampled on the lessons of Conscience; but why, in spite of man's perversity, is conscience, on the other hand, able to lift a voice so piercing and so powerful, by which to remonstrate against the wrong, and to reclaim the honours that are due to her? How comes it that, in the mutiny and uproar of the inferior faculties, that faculty in man, which wears the stamp and impress of the highest, should remain on the side of truth and holiness? Would humanity have thus been moulded by a false and evil spirit; or would he have committed such impolicy against himself, as to insert in each member of our species a principle which would make him feel the greatest complacency in his own rectitude, when he feels the most high-minded revolt of indignation and dislike against the Being who gave him birth? It is not so much that Conscience takes a part among the other faculties of our nature; but that Conscience takes among them the part of a governor, and that man, if he do not obey her suggestions, still, in despite of himself, acknowledges her rights. It is a mighty argument for the virtue of the governor above, that all the laws and injunctions of the governor below are on the side of virtue. It seems as if He had left this representative, or remaining witness, for Himself, in a world that had cast off its allegiance; and that, from the voice of the judge within the breast, we may learn the will and the character of Him who hath invested with such authority his dictates. It is this which speaks as much more demonstratively for the presidency of a righteous God in human affairs, than for that of impure or unrighteous demons, as did the rod of Aaron, when it swallowed the rods of the enchanters and magicians in Egypt. In the wildest anarchy of man's insurgent appetites and sins, there is still a reclaiming voice—a voice which, even when in practice disregarded, it is impossible not to own; and to which,



at the very moment that we refuse our obedience, we find that we cannot refuse the homage of what ourselves do feel and acknowledge to be the best, the highest principles of our nature.

10. However difficult from the very simplicity of the subject it may be, to state or to reason the argument for a God, which is founded on the supremacy of conscience—still, historically and experimentally, it will be found, that it is of more force than all other arguments put together, for originating and upholding the natural theism which there is in the world. The theology of conscience is not only of wider diffusion, but of far more practical influence than the theology of academic demonstration. The ratiocination by which this theology is established, is not the less firm or the less impressive, that, instead of a lengthened process, there is but one step between the premises and the conclusion—or, that the felt presence of a judge within the breast, powerfully and immediately suggests the notion of a Supreme Judge and Sovereign, who placed it there. — Upon this question, the mind does not stop short at mere abstraction; but, passing at once from the abstract to the concrete, from the law of the heart, it makes the rapid inference of a lawgiver. It is the very rapidity of this inference which makes it appear like intuition; and which has given birth to the mystic theology of innate ideas. Yet the theology of conscience disclaims such mysticism, built, as it is, on a foundation of sure and sound reasoning; for the strength of an argumentation in nowise depends upon the length of it. The sense of a governing principle within, begets in all men the sentiment of a living governor without and above them, and it does so with all the speed of an instantaneous feeling; yet it is not an impression, it is an inference notwithstanding—and as much so as any inference from that which is seen, to that which is unseen. There is, in the first instance, cognizance taken of a fact—if not by the outward eye, yet as good, by the eye of consciousness which has been termed the faculty of internal observation. And the consequent belief of a God, instead of being an instinctive sense of the Divinity, is the fruit of an inference grounded on that fact. There is instant transition made, from the sense of a Monitor within to the faith of a living Sovereign above; and this argument, described by all, but with such speed as almost to warrant the expression of its being felt by all, may be regarded, notwithstanding the force and fertility of other considerations, as the great prop of natural religion among men.

11. And we mistake, if we think it was ever otherwise, even in the ages of darkest and most licentious paganism. This theology of conscience has often been greatly obscured, but never,

in any country or at any period in the history of the world, has it been wholly obliterated. We behold the vestiges of it in the simple theology of the desert; and, perhaps, more distinctly there, than in the complex superstitions of an artificial and civilized heathenism. In confirmation of this, we might quote the invocations to the Great Spirit from the wilds of North America. But, indeed, in every quarter of the globe, where missionaries have held converse with savages, even with the rudest of nature's children—when speaking on the topics of sin and judgment, they did not speak to them in vocables unknown. And as this sense of a universal law and a Supreme Lawgiver never waned into total extinction among the tribes of ferocious and untamed wanderers—so neither was it altogether stifled by the refined and intricate polytheism of more enlightened nations. The whole of classic authorship teems with allusions to a Supreme Governor and Judge: And when the guilty Emperors of Rome were tempest-driven by remorse and fear, it was not that they trembled before a spectre of their own imagination. When terror mixed, which it often did, with the rage and cruelty of Nero, it was the theology of conscience which haunted him. It was not the suggestion of a capricious fancy which gave him the disturbance—but a voice issuing from the deep recesses of a moral nature, as stable and uniform throughout the species as is the material structure of humanity; and in the lineaments of which we may read that there is a moral regimen among men, and therefore a moral Governor who hath instituted, and who presides over it. Therefore it was that these imperial despots, the worst and haughtiest of recorded monarchs, stood aghast at the spectacle of their own worthlessness. It is true, there is a wretchedness which naturally and essentially belongs to a state of great moral unhingement; and this may account for their discomforts, but it will not account for their fears. They may, because of this, have felt the torments of a present misery. But whence their fears of a coming vengeance? They would not have trembled at nature's law, apart from the thought of nature's lawgiver. The imagination of an unsanctioned law would no more have given disquietude, than the imagination of a vacant throne. But the law, to their guilty apprehensions, bespoke a judge. The throne of heaven, to their troubled eye, was filled by a living monarch. Righteousness, it was felt, would not have been so enthroned in the moral system of man, had it not been previously enthroned in the system of the universe; nor would it have held such a place and pre-eminence in the judgment of all spirits, had not the father of spirits been its friend and ultimate avenger. This is not a local or geographical notion. It is a universal feeling—to be found wherever men are to be found,

because interwoven with the constitution of humanity. It is not, therefore, the peculiarity of one creed, or of one country. It circulates at large throughout the family of man. We can trace it in the theology of savage life; nor is it wholly overborne by the artificial theology of a more complex and idolatrous paganism. Neither crime nor civilization can extinguish it; and, whether in the "conscientia scelerum" of the fierce and frenzied Cataline, or in the tranquil contemplative musings of Socrates and Cicero, we find the impression of at once a righteous and a reigning Sovereign.

12. And it confirms still more our idea of a government—that conscience not only gives forth her mandates with the tone and authority of a Superior; but, as if on purpose to enforce their observance, thus follows them up with an obvious discipline of rewards and punishments. It is enough but to mention, on the one hand, that felt complacency which is distilled, like some precious elixir, upon the heart by the recollection of virtuous deeds and virtuous sacrifices; and, on the other hand, those inflictions of remorse, which are attendant upon wickedness, and wherewith, as if by the whip of a secret tormentor, the heart of every conscious sinner is agonized. We discern in these the natural sanctions of morality, and the moral character of Him who hath ordained them. We cannot otherwise explain the peace and triumphant satisfaction which spring from the consciousness of well doing—nor can we otherwise explain the degradation as well as bitter distress, which a sense of demerit brings along with it. Our only adequate interpretation of these phenomena is, that they are the present remunerations or the present chastisements of a God who loveth righteousness, and who hateth iniquity. Nor do we view them as the conclusive results of virtue and vice, but rather as the tokens and the precursors either of a brighter reward or of a heavier vengeance, that are coming. It is thus that the delight of self-approbation, instead of standing alone, brings hope in its train; and remorse, instead of standing alone, brings terror in its train. The expectations of the future are blended with these joys and sufferings of the present; and all serve still more to stamp an impression, of which traces are to be found in every quarter of the earth—that we live under a retributive economy, and that the God who reigns over it takes a moral and judicial cognizance of the creatures whom He hath formed.

13. What then are the specific injunctions of conscience? for on this question essentially depends every argument that we can derive from this power or property of our nature, for the moral character of God. If, on the one hand, the lessons given forth

by a faculty, which so manifestly claims to be the pre-eminent and ruling faculty of our nature, be those of deceit and licentiousness and cruelty—then, from the character of such a law, should we infer the character of the lawgiver; and so feel the conclusion to be inevitable, that we are under the government of a malignant and unrighteous God, at once the patron of vice and the persecutor of virtue in the world. If on the other hand, temperance, and chastity, and kindness, and integrity, and truth, be the mandates which generally, if not invariably proceed from her—then, on the same principles of judgment, should we reckon that He who is the author of conscience, and who gave it the place of supremacy and honour, which it so obviously possesses in the moral system of man, was himself the friend and the exemplar of all those virtues which enter into the composition of perfect moral rectitude. In the laws and the lessons of human conscience, would we study the character of the Godhead, just as we should study the views and dispositions of a monarch, in the instructions given by him to the viceroy of one of his provinces. If, on the one hand, virtue be prescribed by the authority of conscience, and followed up by her approval, in which very approval there is felt an inward satisfaction and serenity of spirit, that of itself forms a most delicious reward; and if, on the other hand, the perpetrations of wickedness are followed up by the voice of her rebuke, in which, identical with remorse, there is a sting of agony and discomfort, amounting to the severest penalty—then, are we as naturally disposed to infer of Him who ordained such a mental constitution that He is the righteous Governor of men, as, if seated on a visible throne in the midst of us, He had made the audible proclamation of His law, and by His own immediate hand, had distributed of His gifts to the obedient, and inflicted chastisements on the rebellious. The law of conscience may be regarded as comprising all those virtues which the hand of the Deity hath inscribed on the tablet of the human heart, or on the tablet of natural jurisprudence; and an argument for these being the very virtues which characterize and adorn Himself, is that they must have been transcribed from the prior tablet of His own nature.

14. We are sensible that there is much to obscure this inference in the actual circumstances of the world. More especially—it has been alleged, on the side of scepticism, that there is an exceeding diversity of moral judgments among men; that, out of the multifarious decisions of the human conscience, no consistent code of virtue can be framed; and that, therefore, no consistent character can be ascribed to Him, who planted this faculty in the bosom of our species, and bade it speak so uncer-



tainly and so variously.\* But to this it may be answered, in the first place, that the apparent diversity is partly reducible into the blinding, or, at least, the distorting effect of passion and interest, which sometimes are powerful enough to obscure our perception, even of mathematical and historical truths, as well as of moral distinctions; and without therefore affecting the stability of either. It is thus, for example, that mercantile cupidity has blinded many a reckless adventurer to the enormous injustice of the slave trade; that passion and interest together have transmuted revenge into a virtue; and that the robbery, which, if prosecuted only for the sake of individual gain, would have appeared to all under an aspect of most revolting selfishness, puts on the guise of patriotism, when a whole nation deliberates on the schemes, or is led by a career of daring and lofty heroism, to the spoliations of conquest. In all such cases, it is of capital importance to distinguish between the real character of any criminal action, when looked to calmly, comprehensively, and fully; and what that is in the action which the perpetrator singles out and fastens upon as his plea, when he is either defending it to others, or reconciling it to his own conscience. In as far as he knows the deed to be incapable of vindication, and yet rushes on the performance of it, there is but delinquency of conduct incurred, not a diversity of moral judgment; nor does Conscience, in this case, at all betray any caprice or uncertainty in her decisions. It is but the conduct, and not the conscience which is in fault; and to determine whether the latter is in aught chargeable with fluctuation, we must look not to the man's performance, but to his plea. Two men may differ as to the moral character of an action; but if each is resting the support of his own view on a different principle from the other, there may still be a perfect uniformity of moral sentiment between them. They own the authority of the same laws; they only disagree in the application of them. In the first place, the most vehement denouncer of a guilty commerce is at one with the most strenuous of its advocates, on the duty which each man owes to his family; and again, neither of them would venture to maintain the lawfulness of the trade, because of the miseries inflicted by it on those

\* On the uniformity of our moral judgments, we would refer to the 74th and 75th of Dr. Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. "If we bear in mind" says Sir James Mackintosh, "that the question relates to the coincidence of all men in considering the same qualities as virtues, and not to the preference of one class of virtues by some, and of a different class by others, the exceptions from the agreement of mankind, in their systems of practical morality, will be reduced to absolute insignificance; and we shall learn to view them as no more affecting the harmony of the moral faculties, than the resemblance of the limbs and features is affected by monstrous conformations, or by the unfortunate effects of accident and disease in a very few individuals."

wretched sufferers who were its victims. The defender of this ruthless and rapacious system disowns not, in sentiment at least, however much he may disown in practice, the obligations of justice and humanity—nay, in all the palliations which he attempts of the enormity in question, he speaks of these as undoubted virtues, and renders the homage of his moral acknowledgments to them all. In the sophistry of his vindication, the principles of the ethical system are left untouched and entire. He meddles not with the virtuousness either of humanity or justice ; but he tells of the humanity of slavery, and the justice of slavery. It is true, that he heeds not the representations which are given of the atrocities of his trade—that he does not attend because he wills not to attend ; and in this there is practical unfairness. Still it but resolves itself into perversity of conduct, and not into perversity of sentiment. The very dread and dislike he has for the informations of the subject, are symptoms of a feeling that his conscience cannot be trusted with the question ; or, in other words, prove him to be possessed of a conscience which is just like that of other men. The partialities of interest and feeling may give rise to an infinite diversity of moral judgments in our estimate of actions ; while there may be the most perfect uniformity and stability of judgment in our estimate of principles : and, on all the great generalities of the ethical code, Conscience may speak the same language, and own one and the same moral directory all the world over.

15. When consciences then pronounce differently of the same action, it is for the most part, or rather, it is almost always, because understandings view it differently. It is either because the controversialists are regarding it with unequal degrees of knowledge ; or, each, through the medium of his own partialities. The consciencies of all would come forth with the same moral decision, were all equally enlightened in the circumstances, or in the essential relations and consequences of the deed in question ; and, what is just as essential to this uniformity of judgment, were all viewing it fairly as well as fully. It matters not, whether it be ignorantly or wilfully, that each is looking at this deed, but in the one aspect, or in the one relation that is favourable to his own peculiar sentiment. In either case, the diversity of judgment on the moral qualities of the same action, is just as little to be wondered at as a similar diversity on the material qualities of the same object—should any of the spectators labour under an involuntary defect of vision, or voluntarily persist either in shutting or in averting his eyes. It is thus that a quarrel has well been termed a misunderstanding, in which each of the combatants may consider, and often honestly con-



sider, himself to be in the right ; and that, on reading the hostile memorials of two parties in a litigation, we can perceive no difference in their moral principles, but only in their historical statements ; and that, in the public manifestoes of nations when entering upon war, we can discover no trace of a contrariety of conflict in their ethical systems, but only in their differently put or differently coloured representations of fact ; all proving, that, with the utmost diversity of judgment among men respecting the moral qualities of the same thing, there may be a perfect identity of structure in their moral organs notwithstanding ; and that Conscience, true to her office, needs but to be rightly informed, that she may speak the same language, and give forth the same lessons in all the countries of the earth.

16. It is this which explains the moral peculiarities of different nations. It is not that justice, humanity, and gratitude are not the canonized virtues of every region ; or that falsehood, cruelty, and fraud would not, in their abstract and unassociated nakedness, be viewed as the objects of moral antipathy and rebuke. It is, that, in one and the same material action, when looked to in all the lights of which, whether in reality or by the power of imagination, it is susceptible, various, nay, opposite moral characteristics may be blended ; and that while one people look to the good only without the evil, another may look to the evil only without the good. And thus the identical acts which in one nation are the subjects of a most reverent and religious observance, may, in another be regarded with a shuddering sense of abomination and horror. And this, not because of any difference in what may be termed the moral categories of the two people, nor because, if moral principles in their unmixed generality were offered to the contemplation of either, either would call evil good or good evil. When theft was publicly honoured and rewarded in Sparta, it was not because theft in itself was reckoned a good thing ; but because patriotism, and dexterity, and those services by which the interests of patriotism might be supported, were reckoned to be good things. When the natives of Hindostan assemble with delight around the agonies of a human sacrifice, it is not because they hold it good to rejoice in a spectacle of pain ; but because they hold it good to rejoice in a spectacle of heroic devotion to the memory of the dead. When parents are exposed, or children are destroyed, it is not because it is deemed to be right that there should be the infliction of misery for its own sake ; but because it is deemed to be right that the wretchedness of old age should be curtailed, or that the world should be saved from the miseries of an over-crowded species. In a word, in the very worst of these anomalies, some form of

good may be detected, which has led to their establishment ; and still, some universal and undoubted principle of morality, however perverted or misapplied, can be alleged in vindication of them. A people may be deluded by their ignorance ; or misguided by their superstition ; or, not only hurried into wrong deeds, but even fostered into wrong sentiments, under the influences of that cupidity or revenge, which are so perpetually operating in the warfare of savage or demisavage nations. Yet, in spite of all the topical moralities to which these have given birth, there is an unquestioned and universal morality notwithstanding. And in every case, where the moral sense is unfettered by these associations ; and the judgment is uncramped, either by the partialities of interest or by the inveteracy of national customs which habit and antiquity have rendered sacred—Conscience is found to speak the same language, nor, to the remotest ends of the world, is there a country or an island, where the same uniform and consistent voice is not heard from her. Let the mists of ignorance and passion and artificial education be only cleared away ; and the moral attributes of goodness and righteousness and truth be seen undistorted, and in their own proper guise ; and there is not a heart or a conscience throughout earth's teeming population, which could refuse to do them homage. And it is precisely because the Father of the human family has given such hearts and conscience, to all his children, that we infer these to be the very sanctities of the Godhead, the very attributes of his own primeval nature.

17. There is a countless diversity of tastes in the world, because of the infinitely various circumstances and associations of men. Yet is there a stable and correct standard of taste notwithstanding, to which all minds, that have the benefit of culture and enlargement, are gradually assimilating and approximating. It holds far more emphatically true, that in spite of the diversity of moral judgments, which are vastly less wide and numerous than the former, there is a fixed standard of morals, rallying around itself all consciences, to the greater principles of which, a full and unanimous homage is rendered from every quarter of the globe ; and even to the lesser principles and modifications of which, there is a growing and gathering consent, with every onward step in the progress of light and civilization. In proportion as the understandings of men become more enlightened, do their consciences become more accordant with each other. Even now there is not a single people on the face of the earth, among whom barbarity and licentiousness and fraud are deified as virtues,—where it does not require the utmost strength, whether of superstition or of patriotism in its most selfish and con-

tracted form, to uphold the delusion. Apart from these local and, we venture to hope, these temporary exceptions, the same moralities are recognized and honoured ; and, however prevalent in practice, in sentiment at least, the same vices are disowned and execrated all the world over. In proportion as superstition is dissipated, and prejudice is gradually weakened by the larger intercourse of nations, these moral peculiarities do evidently wear away ; till at length, if we may judge from the obvious tendency of things, conscience will, in the full manhood of our species, assert the universality and the unchangeableness of her decisions. There is no speech nor language, where her voice is not heard ; her line is gone out through all the earth ; and her words to the ends of the world.

18. On the whole, then, conscience, whether it be an original or a derived faculty, yet as founded on human nature, if not forming a constituent part of it, may be regarded as a faithful witness for God the author of that nature, and as rendering to his character a consistent testimony. It is not necessary, for the establishment of our particular lesson, that we should turn that which is clear into that which is controversial by our entering into the scientific question respecting the physical origin of conscience, or tracing the imagined pedigree of its descent from simpler or anterior principles in the constitution of man. For, as has been well remarked by Sir James Mackintosh—"If conscience be inherent, that circumstance is, according to the common mode of thinking, a sufficient proof of its title to veneration. But if provision be made, in the constitution and circumstances of all men for uniformity, producing it by processes similar to those which produce other acquired sentiments, may not our reverence be augmented by admiration of that supreme wisdom, which, in such mental contrivances, yet more highly than in the lower world of matter, accomplish mighty purposes by instruments so simple ?" It is not therefore the physical origin, but the fact, of the uniformity of conscience, wherewith is concerned the theological inference that we attempt to draw from it. This ascendant faculty of our nature, which has been so often termed the divinity within us, notwithstanding the occasional sophistry of the passions, is on the whole, representative of the Divinity above us ; and the righteousness and goodness and truth, the lessons of which it gives forth every where, may well be regarded, both as the laws which enter into the juridical constitution, and as the attributes which enter into the moral character of God.

19. We admit a considerable diversity of moral observation in the various countries of the earth, but without admitting any

correspondent diversity of moral sentiment between them. When human sacrifices are enforced and applauded in one nation—this is not because of their cruelty, but notwithstanding of their cruelty. Even there, the universal principle of humanity would be acknowledged, that it were wrong to inflict a wanton and uncalled for agony on any of our fellows—but there is a local superstition which counteracts the universal principle, and overbears it. When in the republic of Sparta, theft, instead of being execrated as a crime, was dignified into an art and an accomplishment, and on that footing admitted into the system of their youthful education—it was not because of its infringement on the rights of property, but notwithstanding of that infringement, and only because a local patriotism made head against the universal principle, and prevailed over it. Apart from such disturbing forces as these, it will be found that the sentiments of men gravitate towards one and the same standard all over the globe; and that, when once the obscurations of superstition and selfishness are dissipated, there will be found the same moral light in every mind, a recognition of the same moral law, as the immutable and eternal code of righteousness for all countries and all ages. The following is the noble testimony of a heathen, who tells us with equal eloquence and truth, that, even amid all the perversities of a vitiated and endlessly diversified creed, conscience sat mistress over the whole earth, and asserted the supremacy of her own unalterable obligations. “*Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet aut vetat, nec improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero, aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator aut interpres ejus alius. Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturum hominus aspernabitur, atque hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiam si cætera supplicia quæ putantur effugerit.*”

20. Such then is our first argument for the moral character of God—even the moral character of the law of conscience; that conscience which He hath inserted among the faculties of our nature; and armed with the felt authority of a master; and furnished with sanctions for the enforcement of its dictates; and so framed, that, apart from local perversities of the understanding



or the habits, all its decisions are on the side of righteousness. The inference is neither a distant nor an obscure one, from the character of such a law to the character of its law-giver. Neither is it an inference, destroyed by the insurrection which has taken place on the part of our lower faculties, or by the actual prevalence of vice in the world. For this has only enabled conscience to come forth with another and additional demonstration of its sovereignty—just as the punishment of crime in society bears evidence to the justice of the government which is established there. In general, the inward complacency felt by the virtuous, does not so impressively bespeak the real purpose and character of this the ruling faculty in man, as do the remorse, and the terror, and the bitter dissatisfaction, wherewith the hearts of the wicked are exercised. It is true, that, by every act of iniquity, outrage is done to the law of conscience; but there is a felt reaction within which tells that the outrage is resented; and then it is, that conscience makes most emphatic assertion of its high prerogative, when, instead of coming forth as the benign and generous dispenser of its rewards to the obedient, it comes forth like an offended monarch in the character of an avenger. Were we endowed with prophetic vision; so as to behold, among the yet undisclosed secrets of futurity, the spectacle of a judge, and a judgment-seat, and an assembled world, and the retributions of pleasure and pain to the good and to the evil; this were fetching from afar an argument for the righteousness of God. But the instant pleasure and the instant pain wherewith conscience follows up the doings of man, brings this very argument within the limits of actual observation. Only, instead of being manifested by the light of a preternatural revelation, it is suggested to us by one of the most familiar certainties of experience, for in these phenomena and feelings of our own moral nature, do we behold not only a present judgment, but a present execution of the sentence.



## CHAPTER II.

## SECOND GENERAL ARGUMENT.

*On the inherent Pleasure of the Virtuous, and Misery of the Vicious Affections.*

1. WE are often told by moralists, that there is a native and essential happiness in moral worth; and a like native and essential wretchedness in moral depravity—insomuch that the one may be regarded as its own reward, and the other as its own punishment. We do not always recollect that this happiness on the one hand, and this misery on the other, are each of them made up, severally of distinct ingredients; and that thus, by mental analysis, we might strengthen our argument both for the being and the character of God. When we discover, that, into this alleged happiness of the good there enter more enjoyments than one, we, thereby obtain two or more testimonies of the divine regard for virtue; and the proof is enhanced in the same peculiar way, that the evidence of design is, in any other department of creation, when we perceive the concurrence of so many separate and independent elements, which meet together for the production of some complex and beneficial result.\*

2. We have already spoken of one such ingredient. There is a felt satisfaction in the thought of having done what we know to be right; and, in counterpart to this complacency of self-approbation, there is a felt discomfort, amounting often to bitter and remorseful agony, in the thought of having done what conscience tells us to be wrong. This implies a sense of the rectitude of what is virtuous. But without thinking of its rectitude at all, without viewing it in reference either to the law of conscience or to the law of God, with no regard to jurisprudence in the matter—there is, in the virtuous affection itself, another and a distinct enjoyment. We ought to cherish and to exercise benevolence; and there is a pleasure in the consciousness of doing what we ought: but beside this moral sentiment, and beside the peculiar pleasure appended to benevolence as moral, there is a sensation in the merely physical affection of benevolence; and that sensation of itself, is in the highest degree pleasurable. The primary or instant gratification which there is in the direct and

\* See Chap. I. 6,

immediate feeling of benevolence is one thing : the secondary or reflex gratification which there is in the consciousness of benevolence as moral is another thing. The two are distinct of themselves ; but the contingent union of them, in the case of every virtuous affection, gives a multiple force to the conclusion, that God is the lover, and, because so, the patron or the rewarder of virtue. He hath so constituted our nature, that in the very flow and exercise of the good affections, there shall be the oil of gladness. There is instant delight in the first conception of benevolence. There is sustained delight in its continued exercise. There is consummated delight in the happy smiling and prosperous result of it. Kindness, and honesty, and truth, are, of themselves, and irrespective of their rightness, sweet unto the taste of the inner man. Malice, envy, falsehood, injustice, irrespective of their wrongness, have of themselves, the bitterness of gall and wormwood. The Deity hath annexed a high mental enjoyment, not to the consciousness only of good affections, but to the very sense and feeling of good affections. However closely these may follow on each other—nay, however implicated or blended together they may be at the same moment into one compound state of feeling ; they are not the less distinct on that account, of themselves. They form two pleasurable sensations, instead of one ; and their apposition, in the case of every virtuous deed or virtuous desire, exhibits to us that very concurrence in the world of mind, which obtains with such frequency and fullness in the world of matter—affording, in every new part that is added, not a simply repeated only, but a vastly multiplied evidence for design, throughout all its combinations. There is a pleasure in the very sensation of virtue ; and there is a pleasure attendant on the sense of its rectitude. These two phenomena are independent of each other. Let there be a certain number of chances against the first in a random economy of things, and also a certain number of chances against the second. In the actual economy of things, where there is the conjunction of both phenomena—it is the product of these two numbers which represents the amount of evidence afforded by them, for a moral government in the world, and a moral Governor over them.

3. In the calm satisfactions of virtue, this distinction may not be so palpable, as in the pungent and more vividly felt disquietudes which are attendant on the wrong affections of our nature. The perpetual corrosion of that heart, for example, which frets in unhappy peevishness all the day long, is plainly distinct from the bitterness of that remorse which is felt, in the recollection of its harsh and injurious outbursts on the innocent sufferers within its reach. It is saying much for the moral character of

God, that he has placed a conscience within us, which administers painful rebuke on every indulgence of a wrong affection. But it is saying still more for such being the character of our Maker—so to have framed our mental constitution, that in the very working of these bad affections there should be the painfulness of a felt discomfort and discordancy. Such is the make or mechanism of our nature, that it is thwarted and put out of sorts, by rage and envy, and hatred; and this, irrespective of the adverse moral judgments which conscience passes upon them. Of themselves, they are unsavoury; and no sooner do they enter the heart, than they shed upon it an immediate distillation of bitterness. Just as the placid smile of benevolence bespeaks the felt comfort of benevolence; so, in the frown and tempest of an angry countenance, do we read the unhappiness of that man who is vexed and agitated by his own malignant affections—eating inwardly as they do on the vitals of his enjoyment. It is, therefore, that he is often styled, and truly, a self-tormentor; or, his own worst enemy. The delight of virtue in itself, is a separate thing from the delight of the conscience which approves it. And the pain of moral evil in itself, is a separate thing from the pain inflicted by conscience in the act of condemning it. They offer to our notice two distinct ingredients, both of the present reward attendant upon virtue, and of the present penalty attendant upon vice; and so, enhance the evidence that is before our eyes, for the moral character of that administration, under which the world has been placed by its author. The appetite of hunger is rightly alleged, in evidence of the care, wherewith the Deity hath provided for the well-being of our natural constitution; and the pleasurable taste of food is rightly alleged as an additional proof of the same. And so, if the urgent voice of conscience within, calling us to virtue, be alleged in evidence of the care, wherewith the Deity hath provided for the well-being of our moral constitution; the pleasurable taste of virtue in itself, with the bitterness of its opposite, may well be alleged as additional evidence thereof. They alike afford the present and the sensible tokens of a righteous administration, and so of a righteous God.

4. Our present argument is grounded, neither on the rectitude of virtue, nor on its utility in the grosser and more palpable sense of that term—but on the immediate sweetness of it. It is the office of conscience to tell us of its rectitude. It is by experience that we learn its utility. But the sweetness of it—the *dulce* of virtue, as distinguished from its *utile*, is a thing of instant sensation. It may be decomposed into two ingredients, with one of which conscience has to do—even the pleasure we

have, when any deed or any affection of ours receives from her a favourable verdict. But it has another ingredient which forms the proper and the distinct argument that we are now urging—even the pleasure we have in the mere relish of the affection itself. If it be a proof of benevolence in God, that our external organs of taste should have been so framed, as to have a liking for wholesome food; it is no less the proof both of a benevolent and a righteous God, so to have framed our mental economy, as that right and wholesome morality should be palatable to the taste of the inner man. Virtue is not only seen to be right—it is felt to be delicious. There is happiness in the very wish to make others happy. There is a heart's ease, or a heart's enjoyment, even in the first purposes of kindness, as well as in its subsequent performances. There is a certain rejoicing sense of clearness in the consistency, the exactitude of justice and truth. There is a triumphant elevation of spirit in magnanimity and honour. In perfect harmony with this, there is a placid feeling of serenity and blissful contentment in gentleness and humility. There is a noble satisfaction in those victories, which, at the bidding of principle, or by the power of self-command, may have been achieved over the propensities of animal nature. There is an elate independence of soul, in the consciousness of having nothing to hide, and nothing to be ashamed of. In a word, by the constitution of our nature, each virtue has its appropriate charm; and virtue, on the whole, is a fund of varied, as well as of perpetual enjoyment, to him who hath imbibed its spirit, and is under the guidance of its principles. He feels all to be health and harmony within; and without he seems as if to breathe in an atmosphere of beauteous transparency—proving how much the nature of man and the nature of virtue are in unison with each other. It is hunger which urges to the use of food; but it strikingly demonstrates the care and benevolence of God, so to have framed the organ of taste, as that there shall be a superadded enjoyment in the use of it. It is conscience which urges to the practice of virtue; but it serves to enhance the proof of a moral purpose, and therefore of a moral character in God, so to have framed our mental economy, that, in addition to the felt obligation of its rightness, virtue should of itself, be so regaling to the taste of the inner man.

5. In counterpart to these sweets and satisfactions of virtue, is the essential and inherent bitterness of all that is morally evil. We repeat, that, with this particular argument, we do not mix up the agonies of remorse. It is the wretchedness of vice in itself, not the wretchedness which we suffer because of its recollected and felt wrongness that we now speak of. It is not



the painfulness of the compunction felt because of our anger, upon which we at this moment insist; but the painfulness of the emotion itself; and the same remark applies to all the malignant desires of the human heart. True, it is inseparable from the very nature of a desire, that there must be some enjoyment or other, at the time of its gratification; but, in the case of these evil affections, it is not unmixed enjoyment. The most ordinary observer of his own feelings, however incapable of analysis, must be sensible, even at the moment of wreaking, in full indulgence of his resentment, on the man who has provoked or injured him, that all is not perfect and entire enjoyment within; but that, in this, and indeed in every other malignant feeling, there is a sore burden of disquietude—an unhappiness tumultuating in the heart, and visibly pictured on the countenance. The ferocious tyrant who has only to issue forth his mandate, and strike dead at pleasure the victim of his wrath, with any circumstance too of barbaric caprice and cruelty, which his fancy in the very waywardness of passion unrestrained and power unbounded might suggest to him—he may be said to have experienced through life a thousand gratifications, in the solaced rage and revenge, which, though ever breaking forth on some new subject, he can appease again every day of his life by some new execution. But we mistake it if we think otherwise than that, in spite of these distinct and very numerous nay daily gratifications if he so choose, it is not a life of fierce internal agony notwithstanding. It seems indispensable to the nature of every desire, and to form part indeed of its very idea, that there should be a distinctly felt pleasure, or at least, a removal at the time of a distinctly felt pain, in the act of its fulfilment—yet, whatever recreation or relief may have thus been rendered, without doing away the misery often in the whole amount of it the intense misery, inflicted upon man by the evil propensities of his nature. Who can doubt for example the unhappiness of the habitual drunkard? and that, although the ravenous appetite, by which he is driven along a stormy career, meets every day, almost every hour of the day, with the gratification that is suited to it. The same may be equally affirmed of the voluptuary, or of the deprecator, or of the extortioner, or of the liar. Each may succeed in the attainment of his specific object; and we cannot possibly disjoin from the conception of success the conception of some sort of pleasure—yet in perfect consistency, we affirm, with a sad and heavy burthen of unpleasantness or unhappiness on the whole. He is little conversant with our nature who does not know of many a passion belonging to it, that it may be the instrument of many pleasurable, nay delicious or exquisite sensations, and



yet be a wretched passion still; the domineering tyrant of a bondsman, who at once knows himself to be degraded, and feels himself to be unhappy. A sense of guilt is one main ingredient of this misery—yet physically, and notwithstanding the pleasure or the relief inseparable at the moment from every indulgence of the passions, there are other sensations of bitterness, which of themselves, and apart from remorse, would cause the suffering to preponderate.

6. There is an important discrimination made by Bishop Butler in his sermons; and, by the help of which, this phenomenon, of apparent contradiction or mystery in our nature, may be satisfactorily explained. He distinguishes between the final object of any of our desires, and the pleasure attendant on or rather inseparable from its gratification. The object is not the pleasure, though the pleasure be an unfailing and essential accompaniment on the attainment of the object. This is well illustrated by the appetite of hunger, of which it were more proper to say that it seeks for food, than that it seeks for the pleasure which there is in eating the food. The food is the object; the pleasure is the accompaniment. We do not here speak of the distinct and secondary pleasure which there is in the taste of food, but of that other pleasure which strictly and properly attaches to the gratification of the appetite of hunger. This is the pleasure, or relief, which accompanies the act of eating; while the ultimate object, the object in which the appetite rests and terminates, is the food itself. The same is true of all our special affections. Each has a proper and peculiar object of its own, and the mere pleasure attendant on the prosecution or the indulgence of the affection is not, as has been clearly established by Butler and fully reasserted by Dr. Thomas Brown, is not that object. The two are as distinct from each other, as a thing loved is distinct from the pleasure of loving it. Every special inclination has its special and counterpart object. The object of the inclination is one thing; the pleasure of gratifying the inclination is another; and, in most instances, it were more proper to say, that it is for the sake of the object than for the sake of the pleasure that the inclination is gratified. The distinction that we now urge, though felt to be a subtle, is truly a substantial one; and pregnant, both with important principle and important application. The discovery and clear statement of it by Butler may well be regarded as the highest service rendered by any philosopher to moral science; and that, from the light which it casts, both on the processes of the human constitution and on the theory of virtue. As one example of the latter service, the principle in question, so plainly and convincingly unfolded by this great Christian phi-

losopher in his sermon on the love of our neighbour, strikes, and with most conclusive effect, at the root of the selfish system of morals ; a system which professes that man's sole object, in the practice of all the various moralities, is his own individual advantage. Now, in most cases of a special, and more particularly of a virtuous affection, it can be demonstrated, that the object is a something out of himself and distinct from himself. Take compassion for one instance out of the many. The object of this affection is the relief of another's misery, and, in the fulfilment of this, does the affection meet with its full solace and gratification ; that is, in a something altogether external from himself. It is true, that there is an appropriate pleasure in the indulgence of this affection, even as there is in the indulgence of every other ; and in proportion, too, to the strength of the affection, will be the greatness of the pleasure. The man who is doubly more compassionate than his fellow, will have doubly a greater enjoyment in the relief of misery ; yet that, most assuredly, not because he of the two is the more intently set on his own gratification, but because he of the two is the more intently set on an outward accomplishment, the relief of another's wretchedness. The truth is, that, just because more compassionate than his fellow, the more intent is he than the other on the object of this affection, and the less intent is he than the other on himself the subject of this affection. His thoughts and feelings are more drawn away to the sufferer, and therefore more drawn away from himself. He is the most occupied with the object of this affection ; and, on that very account, the least occupied with the pleasure of its indulgence. And it is precisely the objective quality of these regards, which stamps upon compassion the character of a disinterested affection. He surely is the most compassionate whose thoughts and feelings are most drawn away to the sufferer, and most drawn away from self ; or, in other words, most taken up with the direct consideration of him who is the object of this affection, and least taken up with the reflex consideration of the pleasure that he himself has in the indulgence of it. Yet this prevents not the pleasure from being actually felt ; and felt, too, in very proportion to the intensity of the compassion ; or, in other words, more felt the less it has been thought of at the time, or the less it has been pursued for its own sake. It seems unavoidable in every affection, that, the more a thing is loved, the greater must be the pleasure of indulging the love of it : yet it is equally unavoidable, that the greater in that case will be our aim towards the object of the affection, and the less will be our aim towards the pleasure which accompanies its gratification. And thus, to one who reflects profoundly and

carefully on these things, it is no paradox that he who has had doubly greater enjoyment than another in the exercise of compassion, is doubly the more *disinterested* of the two ; that he has had the most pleasure in this affection who has been the least careful to please himself with the indulgence of it ; that he whose virtuous desires, as being the strongest, have in their gratification ministered to self the greatest satisfaction, has been the least actuated of all his fellows by the wishes, and stood at the greatest distance from the aims of selfishness.\*

7. And moreover, there is a just and philosophical sense, in which many of our special affections, besides the virtuous, are alike disinterested with these ; even though they have been commonly ranked among the selfish affections of our nature. The proper object of self-love is the good of self ; and this calm general regard to our own happiness may be considered, in fact, as the only interested affection to which our nature is competent. The special affections are, one and all of them, distinct from self-love, both in their objects, and in the real psychological character of the affections themselves. The object of the avaricious affection is the acquirement of wealth ; of the resentful, the chastisement of an offender ; of the sensual, something appropriate or suited to that corporeal affection which forms the reigning appetite at the time. In none of these, is the good of self the proper discriminative object of the affection ; and the mind of him who is under their power, and engaged in their prosecution, is differently employed, from the mind of him, who, at the time, is either devising or doing aught for the general or abstract end of his own happiness. None of these special affections is identical with the affection which has happiness for its object. So far from this, the avaricious man often, conscious of the strength of his propensity, and at the moment of being urged forward by it to new speculations, acknowledges in his heart, that he would be happier far, could he but moderate its violence, and be satisfied with a humbler fortune than that to which his aspirations would carry him. And the resentful man, in the very act of being tempest driven to some furious onset against the person who has affronted or betrayed him, may yet be sensible that, instead of seeking for any benefit to himself, he is rushing on the destruction of his character, or fortune, or even life. And many is the drunkard who under the goadings of an appetite which he cannot withstand, in place of self-love being the principle, and his own greatest happiness the object, knows himself to be on the road to inevitable ruin. There is

\* The purely disinterested character of a right religious affection might be proved by these considerations.

an affection which has happiness for its object ; but this is not the affection which rules and has the ascendancy in any of these instances. These are all special affections, grounded on the affinities which obtain between certain objects and certain parts of human nature ; and which cannot be indulged beyond a given extent, without distemper and discomfort to the whole nature ; so that, in spite of all the particular gratifications which follow in their train, the man over whom they tyrannize may be unhappy upon the whole. The very distinction between the affection of self-love and the special affections proves that there is a corresponding distinction in their objects ; and this again, that many of the latter may be gratified, while the former is disappointed,—or, in other words, that, along with many particular enjoyments the general state of man may be that of utter and extreme wretchedness. It is therefore a competent question, what those special affections are, which most consist with the general happiness of the mind ; and this, notwithstanding that they all possess one circumstance in common—the unavoidable pleasure appendant to the gratification of each of them.\*

8. This explanation will help us to understand wherein it is that the distinction in point of enjoyment, between a good and an evil affection of our nature properly lies. For there is a certain species of enjoyment common to them all. It were a contradiction in terms to affirm otherwise ; for it were tantamount to saying, that an affection may be gratified, without the actual experience of a gratification. There must be some sensation or

\* The following are the clear and judicious observations of Sir James Mackintosh on this subject :—

“ In contending, therefore, that the benevolent affections are disinterested, no more is claimed for them than must be granted to mere animal appetites and to malevolent passions. Each of these principles alike seeks its own object, for the sake simply of obtaining it. Pleasure is the result of the attainment, but no separate part of the aim of the agent. The desire that another person may be gratified, seeks that outward object alone, according to the general course of human desire. Resentment is as disinterested as gratitude or pity, but not more so. Hunger or thirst may be as much as the purest benevolence, at variance with self-love. A regard to our own general happiness is not a vice, but in itself an excellent quality. It were well if it prevailed more generally over craving and shortsighted appetites. The weakness of the social affections, and the strength of the private desires, properly constitute selfishness ; a vice utterly at variance with the happiness of him who harbours it, and as such, condemned by self-love. There are as few who attain the greatest satisfaction to themselves, as who do the greatest good to others. It is absurd to say with some, that the pleasure of benevolence is selfish, because it is felt by self. Understanding and reasoning are acts of self, for no man can think by proxy ; but no man ever called them *selfish*, why ? Evidently because they do not regard self. Precisely the same reason applies to benevolence. Such an argument is a gross confusion of self, as it is a *subject* of feeling or thought, with self considered as the *object* of either. It is no more just to refer the private appetites to self-love because they commonly promote happiness, than it would be to refer them to self-hatred, in those frequent cases where their gratification obstructs it.”



other of happiness, at the time when a man obtains that which he is seeking for ; and if it be not a positive sensation of pleasure, it will at least be the sensation of a relief from pain, as when one meets with the opportunity of wreaking upon its object, that indignation which had long kept his heart in a tumult of disquietude. We therefore would mistake the matter, if we thought, that a state even of thorough and unqualified wickedness was exclusive of all enjoyment—for even the vicious affections must share in that enjoyment, which inseparably attaches to every affection, at the moment of its indulgence. And thus it is, that even in the veriest Pandemonium, might there be lurid gleams of ecstasy, and shouts of fiendish exultation—the merriment of desperadoes in crime, who send forth the outcries of their spiteful and savage delight, when some deep-laid villany has triumphed ; or when in some dire perpetration of revenge, they have given full satisfaction and discharge to the malignity of their accursed nature. The assertion therefore may be taken too generally, when it is stated, that there is no enjoyment whatever in the veriest hell of assembled outcasts ; for even there, might there be many separate and specific gratifications. And we must abstract the pleasure essentially involved in every affection, at the instant of its indulgence, and which cannot possibly be disjoined from it, ere we see clearly and distinctively wherein it is that, in respect of enjoyment, the virtuous and vicious affections differ from each other. For it is true, that there is a common resemblance between them ; and that, by the universal law and nature of affection, there must be some sort of agreeable sensation, in the act of their obtaining that which they are seeking after. Yet it is no less true, that, did the former affections bear supreme rule in the heart, they would brighten and tranquillize the whole of human existence—whereas, had the latter the entire and practical ascendancy, they would distemper the whole man, and make him as completely wretched as he were completely worthless.

9. There is one leading difference then between a virtuous and a vicious affection—that there is always a felt sweetness in the very presence and contact of the former ; whereas, in the presence and contact of the latter, there is generally or very often at least, a sensation of bitterness. Let them agree as they may in the undoubted fact of a gratification in the attainment of their respective ends, the affections themselves may be long in existence and operation before their ends are arrived at ; and then it is, we affirm, that if compared, there will be found a wide distinction and dissimilarity between them. The very feeling of kindness is pleasant to the heart ; and the very feeling of anger is a painful and corrosive one. The latter, we know, is often said



to be a mixed feeling—because of both the pleasure and the pain which are said to enter into it. But it will be found that the pleasure, in this case, lies in the prospect of a full and final gratification; and very often, in a sort of current or partial gratification which one may experience beforehand, in the mere vent or utterance by words, of the labouring violence that is within—seeing that words of bitterness, when discharged on the object of our wrath, are sometimes the only, and even the most effective executioners of all the vengeance that we meditate; besides that by their means, we may enlist in our favour the grateful sympathy of other men—thus obtaining a solace to ourselves, and aggravating the punishment of the offender, by exciting against him, in addition to our own hostility, the hostile indignation of his fellows. And thus too is it, that, in the case of anger, there may not only be a completed gratification at the last, by the infliction of a full and satisfactory chastisement; but a gratification, as it were by instalments, with every likely purpose of retaliation that we may form in our bosoms, and every sentence of keen and reproachful eloquence that may fall from our lips. And so anger has been affirmed to be a mixed emotion, from confounding the pleasure that lies in the gratification of the emotion, with the pleasure that is supposed to lie in the feeling of the emotion. But the truth is, that, apart from the gratification, the emotion is an exceedingly painful one—insomuch that the gratification mainly lies in the removal of a pain, or in the being ridded of a felt uneasiness. Compassion may in the same way be termed a mixed feeling. But on close attention to these two affections and comparison between them, it will be found, that all the pleasure of anger lies in its gratification, and all the pain of it in the feeling itself—whereas all the pain of compassion lies in the disappointment of its gratification, while in the feeling itself there is nought but pleasure. Let the respective gratifications of these two affections—the one, by the fulfilled retaliation of a wrong; the other, by the fulfilled relief of a suffering—let these gratifications be put out of notice altogether, that we might but attend to the yet ungratified feelings themselves: and we cannot imagine a greater difference of state between two minds, than that of one which luxuriates in the tenderness of compassion, and that of another which breathes and is infuriated with the dark passions and the still darker purposes of resentment. Or we may appeal to the experience of the same mind, which at one time may have its hour of meditated kindness, and at another its hour of meditated revenge. We speak of these two, not in the moment of their respective triumphs, not of the sensations attendant on the success of each—but of the direct and instant sensations which lie

in the feelings themselves. They form two as distinct states in the moral world, as sunshine and tempest are in the physical world. We have but to name the elements which enter into the composition of each, in order to suggest the utter contrariety which obtains between them—between the calm and placid cheerfulness on the one hand of that heart which is employed in conceiving the generous wishes, or in framing the liberal and fruitful devices of benevolence ; and, on the other hand, the turbulence and fierce disorder of the same heart, when burning disdain, or fell and implacable hatred has taken possession of it—the reaction of its own affronted pride, or aggrieved sense of the injury which has been done to it.

10. But perhaps the most favourable moment for comparison between them, is when each is frustrated of its peculiar aim ; and so each is sent back upon itself, with that common suffering to which all the affections are liable—the suffering of a disappointment. We shall be at no loss to determine on which side the advantage lies, if we have either felt or witnessed benevolence in tears, because of the misery which it cannot alleviate ; and rage, in the agonies of its defeated impotence, because of the haughty or successful defiance of an enemy, whom with vain hostility it has tried to assail, but cannot reach. We have the example of a good affection under disappointment, in the case of virtuous grief or virtuous indignation ; and of a bad affection under disappointment, in the case of envy, when, in spite of every attempt to calumniate or depress its object, he shines forth to universal acknowledgment and applause, in all the lustre of his vindicated superiority. It marks how distinct these two sets of feelings are from each other, that, with the former, even under the pain of disappointment, there is a something in the very taste and quality of the feelings themselves, which acts as an emollient or a charm, and mitigates the painfulness—while, with the latter, there is nought to mitigate, but every thing to exasperate, and more fiercely to agonize. The malignant feelings are no sooner turned inwardly, by the arrest of a disappointment from without, than they eat inwardly ; and, when foiled in the discharge of their purposed violence upon others, they recoil—and, without one soothing ingredient to calm the labouring effervescence, they kindle a hell in the heart of the unhappy owner. Internally, there is a celestial peace and satisfaction in virtue, even though in the midst of its outward discomfiture, it be compelled to weep over the unredressed wrongs and sufferings of humanity. On the other hand, the very glance of disappointed malevolence, bespeaks of this evil affection, that, of itself, it is a fierce and fretting distemper of the

soul, an executioner of vengeance for all the guilty passions it may have fanned into mischievous activity, and for all the crimes it may have instigated.

11. And this contrast between a good and an evil affection, this superiority of the former to the latter is fully sustained, when, instead of looking to the state of mind which is left by the disappointment of each, we look to the state of mind which is left by their respective gratifications—the one a state of sated compassion, the other of sated resentment. There is one most observable distinction between the states of feeling, by which an act of compassion on the one hand, and of resentment on the other, are succeeded. It is seldom that man feasts his eyes on that spectacle of prostrate suffering which, in a moment of fury, he hath laid at his feet; in the same way that he feasts his eyes on that picture of family comfort which smiles upon him from some cottage home, that his generosity had reared. This looks as if the sweets of benevolence were lasting, whereas the sweets of revengeful malice, such as they are, are in general but momentary. An act of compassion may extinguish for a time the feeling of compassion, by doing away that suffering which is the object of it; but then it generally is followed up by a feeling of permanent regard. An act of revenge, when executed to the full extent of the desire or purpose, does extinguish and put an end to the passion of revenge; and is seldom, if ever, followed up by a feeling of permanent hatred. An act of kindness but attaches the more, and augments a friendly disposition towards its object. It were both untrue in itself, and unfair to our nature to say, that an act of revenge but exasperates the more, and always augments, or even often augments, a hostile disposition towards its object. It has been said that we hate the man whom we have injured: but whatever the truth of this observation may be, certain it is, that we do not so hate the man of whom we have taken full satisfaction for having injured us; or, if we could imagine aught so monstrous, and happily so rare, as the prolonged, the yet unquelled satisfaction of one, who could be regaled for hours with the sighs of him whom his own hands had wounded; or, for months and years, with the pining destitution of the household whom himself had impoverished and brought low; this were because the measure of the revenge had not equalled the measure of the felt provocation, only perhaps to be appeased and satiated by death. This, at length, would terminate the emotion. And here a new insight opens upon us into the distinction between a good and a bad affection. Benevolence, itself of immortal quality, would immortalize its objects: malignity, if not appeased by an infliction short of death, would

destroy them.\* The one is ever strengthening itself upon old objects, and fastening upon new ones; the other is ever extinguishing its resentment towards old objects by the pettier acts of chastisement, or, if nothing short of a capital punishment will appease it, by dying with their death. The exterminating blow, the death which "clears all scores"—this forms the natural and necessary limit even to the fiercest revenge; whereas, the outgoings of benevolence are quite indefinite. In revenge, the affection is successively extinguished; and, if returned, it is upon new objects. In benevolence, the affection is kept up for old objects, while ever open to excitement from new ones; and hence a living and a multiplying power of enjoyment, which is peculiarly its own. On the same principle that we water a shrub just because we had planted it, does our friendship grow and ripen the more towards him on whom we had formerly exercised it. The affection of kindness for each individual object survives the act of kindness, or, rather, is strengthened by the act. Whatever sweetness may have been originally in it, is enhanced by the exercise; and, so far from being stifled by the first gratification, it remains in greater freshness than ever for higher and larger gratifications than before. It is the perennial quality of their gratification, which stamps that superiority on the good affections, we are now contending for. Benevolence both perpetuates itself upon its old objects, and expands itself into a wider circle as it meets with new ones. Not so with revenge, which generally disposes of the old object by one gratification; and then must transfer itself to a new object, ere it can meet with another gratification. Let us grant that each affection has its peculiar walk of enjoyment. The history of the one walk presents us with a series of accumulations; the history of the other with a series of extinctions.

12. But in dwelling on this beautiful peculiarity, by which a good affection is distinguished from a bad one, we are in danger of weakening our immediate argument. We bring forward the matter a great deal too favourably for the malignant desires of the human heart, if, while reasoning on the supposition of an enjoyment, however transitory in their gratification, we give any room for the imagination that even this is unmixed enjoyment. We have already stated, that, of themselves and anterior to their gratification, there is a painfulness in these desires; and that when by their gratification we get quit of this painfulness, we might after all obtain little more than a relief from misery. But the truth is, that, generally speaking, we obtain a great deal less

\* So true it is, that he who hateth his brother with implacable hatred is a murderer.



on the side of nappiness than this ; for, in most cases, all that we obtain by the gratification of a malignant passion, is but the exchange of one misery for another ; and this apart still from the remorse of an evil perpetration. There is one familiar instance of it, which often occurs in conversation—when, piqued by something offensive in the remark or manner of our fellows, we react with a severity which humbles and overwhelms him. In this case, the pain of the resentment is succeeded by the pain we feel in the spectacle of that distress which ourselves have created : and this, too, aggravated perhaps by the reprobation of all the by-standers, affording thereby a miniature example of the painful alternations which are constantly taking place in the history of moral evil ; when the misery of wrong affections is but replaced, to the perpetrator himself, by the misery of the wrong actions to which they have hurried him. It is thus that a life of frequent gratification may, notwithstanding, be a life of intense wretchedness. It may help our imagination of such a state, to conceive of one, subject every hour to the agonies of hunger, with such a mal-conformation at the same time in his organ of taste, that, in food of every description, he felt a bitter and universal nausea. There were here a constant gratification, yet a constant and severe endurance—a mere alternation of cruel sufferings—the displacement of one set of agonies, by the substitution of other agonies in their room. This is seldom, perhaps never realized in the physical world ; but in the moral world it is a great and general phenomenon. The example shows at least the possibility of a constitution, under which a series of incessant gratifications may be nothing better than a restless succession of distress and disquietude ; and that such should be the constitution of our moral nature as to make a life of vice a life of vanity and cruel vexation, is strong experimental evidence of Him who ordained this constitution, that He hateth iniquity, that He loveth righteousness.

13. But the peculiarity which we have been incidentally led to notice, is, in itself, pregnant with inference also. We should augur hopefully of the final issues of our moral constitution, as well as conclude favourably of Him who hath ordained it—when we find its workings to be such, that, on the one hand, the feeling of kindness towards an individual object, not only survives, but is indefinitely strengthened by the acts of kindness ; and, on the other hand, that, not only does an act of revenge satiate and put an end to the feeling of revenge, but even, that certain acts of hostility towards the individual object of our hatred will make us relent from this hatred, and at length extinguish it altogether. May we not perceive in this economy a balance in



point of tendency, and at length of ultimate effect on the side of virtue? May it not warrant the expectation, that, while benevolence, that great conservative principle of being, has in it a principle conservative of itself as well as of its objects, the out-breakings of evil are but partial and temporary; and that the moral world, viewed as a progressive system and now only in its transition state, has been so constructed as to secure both the perpetuity of all the good affections and the indefinite expansion of them to new objects and over a larger and ever-widening territory? At all events, whatever reason there may be to fear, that, in the future arrangements of nature and providence, both virtue and vice will be capable of immortality—we might gather from what passes under our eyes, in this rudimental and incipient stage of human existence, that even with our present constitution virtue alone is capable of a blissful immortality. For malice and falsehood carry in them the seeds of their own wretchedness, if not of their own destruction. Only grant the soul to be imperishable; and if the character of the governor is to be gathered from the final issues of the government over which he presides—it says much for the moral character of Him who framed us, that, unless there be an utter reversal of the nature which Himself has given, then, in respect to the power of conferring enjoyment or of maintaining the soul in its healthiest and happiest mood, it is righteousness alone which endureth for ever, and charity alone which never faileth.

14. And beside taking account of the special enjoyments which attach to the special virtues, we might observe on the general state of that mind, which, under the consistent and comprehensive principle of being or doing what it ought, studies rightly to acquit itself of all the moral obligations. Beside the perpetual feast of an approving conscience, and the constant recurrence of those particular gratifications which attach to the indulgence of every good affection,—is it not quite obvious of every mind which places itself under a supreme regimen of morality, that then, it is in its best possible condition with regard to enjoyment: like a well strung instrument, in right and proper tone, because all its parts are put in right adjustment with each other? If conscience be indeed the superior faculty of our nature, then, every time it is cast down from this pre-eminence, there must be a sensation of painful dissonance; and the whole man feels out of sorts, as one unhinged or denaturalized. This perhaps is the main reason that a state of well-doing stands associated with a state of well-being; and why the special virtue of temperance is not more closely associated with the health of the body, than the general habit of virtue is with a wholesome and well-conditioned

state of the soul. There is then no derangement as it were in the system of our nature—all the powers, whether superior or subordinate, being in their right places, and all moving without discord and without dislocation. It were anticipating our argument, did we refer at present to the confidence and regard wherewith a virtuous man is surrounded in the world. We have not yet spoken of the adaptations to man's moral constitution from without, but only of the inward pleasures and satisfactions which are yielded in the workings of the constitution itself. And surely when we find it to have been so constructed and attuned by its maker, that, in all the movements of virtue there is a felt and grateful harmony, while a certain jarring sense of violence and discomposure ever attends upon the opposite—we cannot imagine how the moral character of that being who Himself devised this constitution and established all its tendencies, can be more clearly or convincingly read, than in phenomena like these.

15. We have already said that the distinction so well established by Butler, between the object of our affection and its accompanying, nay, inseparable pleasure, was the most effectual argument that could be brought to bear against the selfish system of morals. The virtuous affection that is in a man's breast simply leads him to do what he ought; and in that object he rests and terminates. Like every other affection, there must be a pleasure conjoined with the prosecution of it; and at last a full and final gratification in the attainment of its object. But the object must be distinct from the pleasure, which itself is founded on a prior suitableness between the mind and its object. When a man is actuated by a virtuous desire; it is the virtue itself that he is seeking, and not the gratification that is in it. His single object is to be or to do rightly—though, the more intent he is upon this object, the greater will, the greater must be his satisfaction if he succeed in it. Nevertheless, it is not the satisfaction which he is seeking; it is the object which yields the satisfaction—the object too for its own sake, and not for the sake of its accompanying or its resulting enjoyment. Nay, the more strongly and therefore the more exclusively set upon virtue for its own sake; the less will he think of its enjoyment, and yet the greater will his actual enjoyment be. In other words, virtue, the more disinterested it is, is the more prolific of happiness to him who follows it; and then it is, that, when freed from all the taints of mercenary selfishness, it yields to its votary the most perfect and supreme enjoyment. Such is the constitution of our nature, that virtue loses not its disinterested character; and yet man loses not his reward; and the author of this consti-

tution, He who hath ordained all its laws and its consequences, has given signal proof of His own supreme regard for virtue, and therefore, of the supreme virtue of His own character, in that He hath so framed the creatures of His will, as that their perfect goodness and perfect happiness are at one. Yet the union of these does not constitute their unity. The union is a contingent appointment of the Deity; and so is at once the evidence and the effect of the goodness that is in His own nature.

16. This then is our second general argument for the moral character of God, grounded on the moral constitution of man; and prior, as yet, to any view of its adaptation to external nature. It is distinct from the first argument, as grounded on the phenomena of conscience, which assumes the office of judge within the breast, all whose decisions are on the side of benevolence and justice; and which is ever armed with a certain power of enforcement, both in the pains of remorse and the pleasures of self-approbation. These, however, are distinct and ought to be distinguished from the direct pleasures of virtue in itself, and the direct pains of vice in itself, which form truly separate ingredients, on the one hand of a present and often very painful correction, on the other hand, of a present and very precious reward.

## CHAPTER III.

### THIRD GENERAL ARGUMENT.

#### *The Power and Operation of Habit.*

1. WE have as yet been occupied with what may be termed the instant sensations, wherewith morality is beset in the mind of man—with the voice of conscience which goes immediately before, or with the sentence whether of approval or condemnation, which comes immediately after it; and latterly, with those states of feeling which are experienced at the moment when under the power of those affections, to which any moral designation, be it of virtue or vice, is applicable—the pleasure which there is in the very presence and contact of the one, the distaste, the bitterness which there is in the presence and contact of the other.

2. These phenomena of juxtaposition, as they may be termed; these contiguous antecedents and consequents of the moral and the immoral in man, speak strongly the purpose of Him who ordained our mental constitution, in having inserted there such a constant power of command and encouragement on the side of the former, and a like constant operation of checks and discouragement against the latter. But, perhaps, something more may be collected of the design and character of God, by stretching forward our observation prospectively in the history of man, and so extending our regards to the more distant consequences of virtue or vice, both on the frame of his character and the state of his enjoyments. By studying these posterior results, we approximate our views towards the final issues of that administration under which we are placed. That defensive apparatus, wherewith the embryo seed of plants is guarded and protected, might indicate a special care or design in the preserver of it. What that design particularly is comes to be clearly and certainly known, when, in the future history of the plant, we learn what the functions of the seed are, after it has come to maturity; and then observe, that, had it been suffered universally to perish, it would have led,—not to the mortality of the individual, for that is already an inevitable law, but to the extinction and mortality of the species.

3. For tracing forward man's moral history, or the changes which take place in his moral state, it is necessary that we should



advert to the influence of habit. Yet it is not properly the philosophy of habit wherewith our argument is concerned, but with the leading facts of its practical operation. A beneficial effect might still remain an evidence of the divine goodness, by whatever steps it should be efficiently or physically brought about—its power in this way depending not on the question how it is, but on the fact that so it is. It were really, therefore, deviating from our own strict and pertinent line of enquiry, did we stop to discuss the philosophic theory of habit, or suspend our own independent reasoning till that theory was settled—beside most unwisely and unnecessarily attaching to our theme, all the discredit of an obscure or questionable speculation. It is with palpable and sure results both in the material and mental world, more than with the recondite processes in either, that theism has chiefly to do; and it is by the former more than by the latter that the cause of theism is upholden.

4. We might only observe, in passing, that the modification introduced by Dr. Thomas Brown into the theory of habit, was perhaps uncalled for, even for the accomplishment of his own purpose, which was to demonstrate that it required no peculiar or original law of the human constitution to account for its phenomena. He resolves, and we are disposed to think rightly, the whole operation of habit into the law of suggestion—only, he would extend that law to states of feelings, as well as to thoughts or states of thoughts.\* We are all aware that if two objects have been seen or thought of together on any former occasion, then the thought of one of them is apt to suggest the thought of the other, and the more apt the more frequently that the suggestion has taken place—insomuch, that, if the suggestion have taken place very often, we shall find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to break the succession between the thought which suggests and the thought which is suggested by it. Now Dr. Brown has conceived it necessary to extend this principle to feelings as well as thoughts—insomuch, that, if on a former occasion a certain object have been followed up by a certain feel-

\* The following is the passage taken from his forty-third lecture, in which Dr. Brown seems to connect feeling with feeling by the same mental law which connects thought with thought. "To explain the influence of habit in increasing the tendency to certain actions I must remark—what I have already more than once repeated—that the suggesting influence which is usually expressed in the phrase *association of ideas*, though that very improper phrase would seem to limit it to our ideas or conceptions only, and has unquestionably produced a mistaken belief of this partial operation of a general influence—is not limited to those more than to any other states of mind, but occurs also with equal force in other feelings, which are not commonly termed ideas or conceptions; that our desires or other emotions, for example, may, like them, form a part of our trains of suggestion," &c. See another equally ambiguous passage in his sixty-fourth lecture.



ing, or even if one feeling have been followed up by another, then the thought of the object introduces the feeling, or the one feeling introduces the other feeling into the mind, on the same principle that thought introduces thought. Now we should rather be inclined to hold that thought introduces feeling, not in consequence of the same law of suggestion whereby thought introduces thought, but in virtue of the direct power which lies in the object of the thought to excite that feeling. When a voluptuous object awakens a voluptuous feeling, this is not by suggestion, but by a direct influence of its own. When the picture of that voluptuous object awakens the same voluptuous feeling, we would not ascribe it to suggestion, but still put it down to the power of the object, whether presented or only represented, to awaken certain emotions. And as little would we ascribe the excitement of the feeling to suggestion, but still to the direct and original power of the object—though it were pictured to us only in thought, instead of being pictured to us in visible imagery. In like manner, when the thought of an injury awakens in us anger, even as the injury itself did at the moment of its infliction, we should not ascribe this to that peculiar law which is termed the law of suggestion, and which undoubtedly connects thought with thought. But we should ascribe it wholly to that law which connects an object with its appropriate emotion—whether that object be present to the senses, or have only been recalled by the memory and is present to the thoughts. We sustain an injury, and we feel resentment in consequence, without, surely, the law of suggestion having had aught to do with the sequence. We see the aggressor afterwards, and our anger is revived against him, and with this particular succession the law of suggestion has certainly had to do—not, however, in the way of thought suggesting feeling, but only in the way of thought suggesting thought. In truth it is a succession of three terms. The sight of the man awakens a recollection of the injury; and the thought of the injury awakens the emotion. The first sequence, or that which obtains between the first and second term, is a pure instance of the suggestion of thought by thought, or, to speak in the old language, of the association of ideas. The second sequence, or that which obtains between the middle and last term, is still, Dr. Brown would say, an instance of suggestion, but of thought suggesting the feeling wherewith it was formerly accompanied. Whereas, in our apprehension, it is due, not to the law of suggestion but to the law which connects an object, whether present at the time or thought upon afterwards, with its counterpart emotion. Still the result is the same, however differently accounted for. One can think, surely, of the resentment which now oc-

cupies him, as well as he can think of a past resentment—indeed it is difficult to imagine how he can feel a resentment without thinking of it. Let some one thought, then, by the proper law of suggestion, have introduced the thought of an injury that had been done to us ; this second thought introduces the feeling of resentment, not by the law of suggestion, but by the law which relates an object, whether present or thought upon, to its appropriate emotion ; this emotion is thought upon, and, not the emotion, but the thought of the emotion recalls the thought of the first emotion that was felt at the original infliction of the injury ; and this thought again recalls to us the thought of the injury itself, and perhaps the thought of other or similar injuries, which, as at the first, excites anew the feeling of anger, but, at this particular step, by means of a law different from that of suggestion, even the law of our emotions, in virtue of which, certain objects, when present in any way to the cognizance of the understanding, awaken certain sensibilities in the heart. It is thus that thoughts and feelings might reciprocally introduce each other, not by means of but one law of suggestion extending in common to them both, but by the intermingling of two laws in this repeating or circulating process,—even the law of suggestion, acting only upon the thoughts ; and the law of emotion, by which certain objects, when presented to the senses or to the memory, have the power to awaken certain correspondent emotions. We in this way get quit of the mysticism which attaches to the notion of mere feelings either suggesting or being suggested by other feelings, separately from thoughts—more especially when, by the association of thoughts or of ideas alone, and the direct power which lies in the objects of these ideas to awaken certain emotions, all the phenomena are capable of being explained. A certain thought or object may suggest the thought of a former provocation ; this thought might excite a feeling of resentment ; the resentment, thus felt or thought upon, might send back the mind to a still more vivid impression of its original cause ; and this again might prolong or waken the resentment anew, and in greater freshness than before. The ultimate effect might be a fierce and fiery effervescence of irascible feeling. Yet not by the operation of one law, but of two distinct laws in the human constitution ; the first that, in virtue of which, thoughts suggest thoughts ; the second that, in virtue of which, the object thus thought upon awakens the emotion that is suited to it.

5. But though for once we have thus adverted to the strict philosophy of the subject, it will be apparent, that, in this instance, it is of no practical necessity for the purposes of our argument ; and it is truly the same in many other instances, where,

if instead of reasoning theologically on the palpable operations of the mechanism, we should reason scientifically on the *modus operandi*, we would run into really irrelevant discussions. The theme of our present chapter is the effect of Habit, in as far as these effects serve to indicate the design or character of Him who is the author of our mental constitution. It matters not to any conclusion of ours, by what recondate, or, it may be, yet undiscovered process these effects are brought about; and whether the common theory, or that of Dr. Brown, or that again as modified and corrected by ourselves, is the just one. It is enough to know, that, if any given process of intermingled thought and feeling have been described by us once, there are laws at work, which, on the first step of that process again recurring, would incline us to describe the whole of the process over again; and with the greater power and certainty, the more frequently that process has been repeated. We are perfectly sure that the more frequently any particular sequence between thought and thought may have occurred, the more readily will it recur;—so that when once the first thought has entered the mind, we may all the more confidently reckon on its being followed up by the second. This we hold enough for explaining the ever recurring force and facility, wherewith feelings also will arise and be followed up by their indulgence—and that, just in proportion to the frequency wherewith in given circumstances they have been awakened and indulged formerly. In as far as the objects of gratification are the exciting causes which stimulate and awaken the desires of gratification; then, any process which ensures the presence and application of the causes, will also ensure the fulfilment of the effects which result from them. If it be the presence or perception of the wine that stands before us which stirs up the appetite; and if, instead of acting on the precept of looking not unto the wine when it is red, we continue to look till the appetite be so enflamed that the indulgence becomes inevitable—then, as we looked at it continuously when present, will we, by the law of suggestion, be apt to think of it continuously when absent. If the one continuity was not broken by any considerations of principle or prudence—so the less readily will the other continuity be broken in like manner. When we revisit the next social company, we shall probably resign ourselves to the very order of sensations that we did formerly; and the more surely, the oftener that that order has already been described by us. And as the order of objects with their sensations when present, so is the order of thoughts with their desires when absent. This order forces itself upon the mind with a strength proportional to the frequency of its repetition; and

desires, when not evaded by the mind shifting its attention away from the objects of them, can only be appeased by their indulgence.

6. It is thus that he who enters on a career of vice, enters on a career of headlong degeneracy. If even for once we have described that process of thought and feeling, which leads, whether through the imagination or the senses, from the first presentation of a tempting object to a guilty indulgence—this of itself establishes a probability, that, on the recurrence of that object, we shall pass onward by the same steps to the same consummation. And it is a probability ever strengthening with every repetition of the process, till at length it advances towards the moral certainty of a helpless surrender to the tyranny of those evil passions, which we cannot resist, just because the will itself is in thralldom, and we choose not to resist them. It is thus that we might trace the progress of intemperance and licentiousness, and even of dishonesty, to whose respective solicitations we have yielded at the first—till, by continuing to yield, we become the passive, the prostrate subjects of a force that is uncontrollable, only because we have seldom or never in good earnest tried to control it. It is not that we are struck of a sudden with moral impotency; but we are gradually benumbed into it. The power of temptation has not made instant seizure upon the faculties, or taken them by storm. It proceeds by an influence that is gently and almost insensibly progressive—just as progressive in truth, as the association between particular ideas is strengthened by the frequency of their succession. But even as that association may at length become inveterate, insomuch that when the first idea finds entry into the mind, we cannot withstand the importunity wherewith the second insists upon following it; so might the moral habit become alike inveterate—thoughts succeeding thoughts, and urging onward their counterpart desires, in that wonted order, which had hitherto connected the beginning of a temptation with its full and final victory. At each repetition, would we find it more difficult to break this order, or to lay an arrest upon it—till at length, as the fruit of this wretched regimen, its unhappy patient is lording over by a power of moral evil, which possesses the whole man, and wields an irresistible or rather an unresisted ascendancy over him.

7. But this melancholy process, leading to a vicious indulgence, may be counteracted by an opposite process of resistance, though with far greater facility at the first—yet a facility ever augmenting, in proportion as the effectual resistance of temptation is persevered in. That balancing moment, at which pleasure would allure, and conscience is urging us to refrain, may



be regarded as the point of departure or divergency, whence one or other of the two processes will take their commencement. Each of them consists in a particular succession of ideas with their attendant feelings; and whichever of them may happen to be described once, has, by the law of suggestion, the greater chance, in the same circumstances, of being described over again. Should the mind dwell on an object of allurements, and the considerations of principle not be entertained—it will pass onward from the first incitement to the final and guilty indulgence by a series of stepping stones, each of which will present itself more readily in future; and with less chance of arrest or interruption by the suggestions of conscience than before. But should these suggestions be admitted, and far more should they prevail—then, on the principle of association, will they be all the more apt to intervene, on the repetition of the same circumstances; and again break that line of continuity, which but for this intervention, would have led from a temptation to a turpitude or a crime. If on the occurrence of a temptation formerly, conscience did interpose, and represent the evil of a compliance, and so impress the man with a sense of obligation, as led him to dismiss the fascinating object from the presence of his mind, or to hurry away from it—the likelihood is, that the recurrence of a similar temptation will suggest the same train of thoughts and feelings and lead to the same beneficial result; and this is a likelihood ever increasing with every repetition of the process. The train which would have terminated in a vicious indulgence, is dispossessed by the train which conducts to a resolution and an act of virtuous self-denial. The thoughts which tend to awaken emotions and purposes on the side of duty find readier entrance into the mind; and the thoughts which awaken and urge forward the desire of what is evil more readily give way. The positive force on the side of virtue is augmented, by every repetition of the train which leads to a virtuous determination. The resistance to this force on the side of vice is weakened, in proportion to the frequency wherewith that train of suggestions which would have led to a vicious indulgence, is broken and discomfited. It is thus that when one is successively resolute in his opposition to evil, the power of making the achievement and the facility of the achievement itself are both upon the increase; and virtue makes double gain to herself, by every separate conquest which she may have won. The humbler attainments of moral worth are first mastered and secured; and the aspiring disciple may pass onward in a career that is quite indefinite to nobler deeds and nobler sacrifices.

8. And this law of habit when enlisted on the side of righte-



ousness, not only strengthens and makes sure our resistance to vice, but facilitates the most arduous performances of virtue. The man whose thoughts, with the purposes and doings to which they lead, are at the bidding of conscience, will, by frequent repetition, at length describe the same track almost spontaneously—even as in physical education, things, laboriously learned at the first, come to be done at last without the feeling of an effort. And so, in moral education, every new achievement of principle smooths the way to future achievements of the same kind; and the precious fruit or purchase of each moral victory is to set us on higher and firmer vantage-ground for the conquests of principle in all time coming. He who resolutely bids away the suggestions of avarice, when they come into conflict with the incumbent generosity; or the suggestions of voluptuousness, when they come into conflict with the incumbent self-denial; or the suggestions of anger, when they come into conflict with the incumbent act of magnanimity and forbearance—will at length obtain, not a respite only, but a final deliverance from their intrusion. Conscience, the longer it has made way over the obstacles of selfishness and passion—the less will it give way to these adverse forces, themselves weakened by the repeated defeats which they have sustained in the warfare of moral discipline: Or, in other words, the oftener that conscience makes good the supremacy which she claims—the greater would be the work of violence, and less the strength for its accomplishment, to cast her down from that station of practical guidance and command which of right belongs to her. It is just because, in virtue of the law of suggestion, those trains of thought and feeling, which connect her first biddings with their final execution, are the less exposed at every new instance to be disturbed, and the more likely to be repeated over again, that every good principle is more strengthened by its exercise, and every good affection is more strengthened by its indulgence than before. The acts of virtue ripen into habits; and the goodly and permanent result is, the formation or establishment of a virtuous character.

9. This then forms the subject of our third general argument. The voice of authority within, bidding us to virtue; and the immediate delights attendant on obedience, certainly, speak strongly for the moral character of that administration under which we are placed. But, by looking to posterior and permanent results, we have the advantage of viewing the system of that administration in progress. Instead of the insulated acts, we are led to regard the abiding and the accumulating consequences—and by stretching forward our observation through larger intervals and to more distant points in the moral history of men; we are in

likelier circumstances for obtaining a glimpse of their final destination ; and so of seizing on this mighty and mysterious secret—the reigning policy of the divine government, whence we might collect the character of Him who hath ordained it. And surely, it is of prime importance to be noted in this examination, that by every act of virtue we become more powerful for its service ; and by every act of vice we become more helplessly its slaves. Or, in other words, were these respective moral regimens fully developed into their respective consummations, it would seem, as if by the one, we should be conducted to that state, where the faculty, within, which is felt to be the rightful, would also become the reigning sovereign, and then we should have the full enjoyment of all the harmony and happiness attendant upon virtue—whereas, by the other, those passions of our nature felt to be inferior, would obtain the lawless ascendancy, and subject their wretched bondsmen to the turbulence, and the agony, and the sense of degradation, which, by the very constitution of our being, are inseparable from the reign of moral evil.

10. We might not fully comprehend the design or meaning of a process, till we have seen the end of it. Had there been no death, the mystery of our present state might have been somewhat alleviated. We might then have seen, in bolder relief and indelible character, the respective consummations of vice and virtue—perhaps the world partitioned into distinct moral territories, where the habit of many centuries had given fixture and establishment, first, to a society of the upright, now in the firm possession of all goodness, as the well-earned result of that wholesome discipline through which they had passed ; and, second, to a society of the reprobate, now hardened in all iniquity, and abandoned to the violence of evil passions no longer to be controlled and never to be eradicated. We might then have witnessed the peace, the contentment, the universal confidence and love, the melody of soul, that reigned in the dwellings of the righteous ; and contrasted these with the disquietudes, the strifes, the fell and fierce collisions of injustice and mutual disdain and hate implacable, the frantic bacchanalian excesses with their dreary intervals of remorse and lassitude, which kept the other region in perpetual anarchy, and which, constituted as we are, must trouble or dry up all the well-springs of enjoyment, whether in the hearts of individuals or in the bosom of families. We could have been at no loss, to have divined, from the history and state of such a world, the policy of its ruler. We should have recognized in that peculiar economy, by which every act whether of virtue or vice, made its performer still more virtuous or more vicious than before, a moral remuneration on the one hand and a moral pe-

nalty on the other—with an enhancement of all the consequences, whether good or evil, which flowed from each of them. We could not have mistaken the purposes and mind of the Deity—when we saw thus palpably, and through the demonstrations of experience, the ultimate effects of these respective processes; and, in this total diversity of character, with a like total diversity of condition, were made to perceive, that righteousness was its own eternal reward, and that wickedness was followed up and that for ever, with the bitter fruit of its own ways.

11. Death so far intercepts the view of this result, that it is not here the object of sight or of experience. Still, however, it remains the object of our likely anticipation. The truth is, that the process which we are now contemplating, the process by which character is formed and strengthened and perpetuated, suggests one of the strongest arguments within compass of the light of nature, for the immortality of the soul. In the system of the world we behold so many adaptations, not only between the faculties of sentient beings, and their counterpart objects in external nature; but between every historical progression in nature, and a fulfilment of corresponding interest or magnitude which it ultimately lands in—that we cannot believe of man's moral history, as if it terminated in death. More especially when we think of the virtuous character, how laboriously it is reared, and how slowly it advances to perfection; but, at length, how indefinite its capabilities of power and of enjoyment are, after this education of habits has been completed—it seems like the breach of a great and general analogy, if man is to be suddenly arrested on his way to the magnificent result, for which it might well be deemed that the whole of his life was but a preparation; having just reached the full capacity of an enjoyment, of which he had only been permitted, in this evanescent scene, a few brief and passing foretastes. It were like the infliction of a violence on the continuity of things, of which we behold no similar example, if a being so gifted were thus left to perish in the full maturity of his powers and moral acquisitions. The very eminence that he has won, we naturally look upon as the guarantee and the precursor of some great enlargement beyond it—warranting the hope, therefore, that Death but transforms without destroying him, or, that the present is only an embryo or rudimental state, the final development of which is in another and future state of existence.

12. This is not the right place for a full exposition of this argument. We might only observe, that there is an evidence of man's immortality, in the moral state and history of the bad upon earth, as well as of the good. The truth is, that nature's most vivid anticipations of a conscious futurity on the other side of

death, are the forebodings of guilty fear, not the bright anticipations of confident and rejoicing hope. We speak not merely of the unredressed wrongs inflicted by the evil upon the righteous, and which seem to demand an afterplace of reparation and vengeance. Beside those unsettled questions between man and man, which death breaks off at the middle, and for the adjustment of which one feels as if it were the cry of eternal justice that there should be a reckoning afterwards—beside these, there is felt, more directly and vividly still, the sense of a yet unsettled controversy, between the sinner and the God whom he has offended. The notion of immortality is far more powerfully and habitually suggested by the perpetual hauntings or misgivings of this sort of undefined terror, by the dread of a coming penalty—rather than by the consciousness of merit, or of a yet unsatisfied claim to a well-earned reward. Nor is the argument at all lessened by that observed phenomenon in the history of guilt, the decay of conscience; a hebetude, if it may be so termed, of the moral sensibilities, which keeps pace with the growth of a man's wickedness, and, at times, becomes quite inveterate towards the termination of his mortal career. The very torpor and tranquillity of such a state, would only appear all the more emphatically to tell, that a day of account is yet to come, when, instead of rioting, as heretofore, in the impunity of a hardihood that shields him alike from reproach and fear, conscience will at length re-awaken to upbraid him for his misdoings; at once the assessor of its own cause, and the executioner of its own sentence. And even the most desperate in crime, do experience, at times, such gleams and resuscitations of moral light, as themselves feel to be the precursors of a revelation still more tremendous—when their own conscience, fully let loose upon them, shall, in the hands of an angry God, be a minister of fiercest vengeance. Certain it is, that, if death, instead of an entire annihilation, be but a removal to another and a different scene of existence, we see in this, when combined with the known laws and processes of the mind, the possibility, at least, of such a consummation. There is much in the business, and entertainments, and converse, and day-light of that urgent and obtruding world by which we are surrounded, to carry off the attention of the mind from its own guiltiness, and so, to suspend that agony, which, when thrown back upon itself and dis severed from all its objects of gratification, will be felt, without mitigation and without respite. In the busy whirl of life, the mind, drawn upon in all directions, can find, outwardly and abroad, the relief of a constant diversion from the misery of its own internal processes. But a slight change in its locality or its circumstances, would deliver it up to the full burthen and agony



of these; nor can we imagine a more intense and intolerable wretchedness, than that which would ensue, simply by rescinding the connexion which obtains in this world between a depraved mind and its external means of gratification—when, forced inwardly on its own haunted tenement, it met with nothing there but revenge unsatiated, and raging appetites, that never rest from their unappeased fermentation; and withal, to this perpetual sense of want, a pungent and pervading sense of worthlessness. It is the constant testimony of criminals, that, in the horrors and the tedium of solitary imprisonment, they undergo the most appalling of all penalties—a penalty, therefore, made up of moral elements alone; as neither pain, nor hunger, nor sickness, necessarily forms any of its ingredients. It strikingly demonstrates the character of Him who so constructed our moral nature, that from the workings of its mechanism alone, there should be evolved a suffering so tremendous on the children of iniquity, inasmuch that a sinner meets with sorest vengeance when simply left to the fruit of his own ways—whether by the death which carries his disembodied spirit to its Tartarus; or by a resurrection to another scene of existence, where, in full possession of his earthly habits and earthly passions, he is nevertheless doomed to everlasting separation from their present counterpart and earthly enjoyments.

13. There is a distinction sometimes made between the natural and arbitrary rewards of virtue, or between the natural and arbitrary punishments of vice. The arbitrary is exemplified in the enactments of human law; there in general being no natural or necessary connection between the crimes which it denounces, and the penalties which it ordains for them—as between the fine, or the imprisonment, or the death, upon the one hand; and the act of violence, whether more or less outrageous, upon the other. The natural again is exemplified in the workings of the human constitution; there being a connexion, in necessity and nature, between the temper which prompted the act of violence, and the wretchedness which it inflicts on him who is the unhappy subject, in his own bosom, of its fierce and restless agitations. It is thus that not only is virtue termed its own reward, but vice its own greatest plague or self-tormentor. We have no information of the arbitrary rewards or punishments in a future state, but from revelation alone. But of the natural, we have only to suppose, that the existing constitution of man, and his existing habits, shall be borne with him to the land of eternity; and we may inform ourselves now of these, by the experience of our own felt and familiar nature. Our own experience can tell that the native delights of virtue, unaided by any high physical gratifications, and

only if not disturbed by grievous physical annoyances, were enough of themselves to constitute an elysium of pure and perennial happiness : and again, that the native agonies of vice, unaided by any inflictions of physical suffering, and only if unalleviated by a perpetual round of physical enjoyments, were enough of themselves to constitute a dire and dreadful Pandemonium. They are not judicially awarded, but result from the workings of that constitution which God hath given to us ; and they speak as decisively the purpose and character of Him who is the author of that constitution—as would any code of jurisprudence proclaimed from the sanctuary of heaven, and which assigned to virtue on the one hand, the honours and rewards of a blissful immortality, to vice on the other a place of anguish among the outcasts of a fiery condemnation.

## CHAPTER IV.

### *On the General Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man.*

1. IT needs but a cursory observation of life to be made sensible, that man has not been endowed with a conscience, without, at the same time, being placed in a theatre which afforded the most abundant scope and occasion for its exercise. The truth is, that, in the multitude of fellow-beings by whom he is surrounded, and in the manifold variety of his social and family relations, there is a perpetual call on his sense of right and wrong—insomuch, that to the doings of every hour throughout his waking existence, one or other of these moral designations is applicable. It might have been stigmatized as the example of a mal-adjustment in the circumstances of our species, had man been provided with a waste feeling or a waste faculty, which remained dormant and unemployed from the want of counterpart objects that were suited to it. The wisdom of God admits of a glorious vindication against any such charge in the physical department of our nature, where the objective and subjective have been made so marvelously to harmonize with each other; there being, in the material creation, sights of infinitely varied loveliness, and sounds of as varied melody, and many thousand tastes and odours of exquisite gratification, and distinctions innumerable of touch and feeling, to meet the whole compass and diversity of the human senses—multiplying without end, both the notice that we receive from external things, and the enjoyments that we derive from them. And as little in the moral department of our nature, is any of its faculties, and more especially the great and master faculty of all, left to languish from the want of occupation. The whole of life, in fact, is crowded with opportunities for its employment—or, rather, instead of being represented as the subject of so many distinct and ever-recurring calls, conscience may well be represented as the constant guide and guardian of human life; and, for the right discharge of this its high office, as being kept on the alert perpetually. The creature on whom conscience hath laid the obligation of refraining from all mischief, and rendering to society all possible good, lives under a responsibility which never for a single moment is suspended. He may be said to possess a continuity of moral being; and morality whether of a good or evil hue, tinges the whole current of his history. It is a thing of con-

stancy as well as a thing of frequency—for, even when not carried forth into action, it is not dormant ; but possesses the mind in the form of a cherished purpose or cherished principle, or, as the Romans expressed it, of a perpetual will either to that which is good or evil. But over and above this, the calls to action are innumerable. In the wants of others ; in their powers of enjoyment ; in their claims on our equity, our protection, or our kindness ; in the various openings and walks of usefulness ; in the services which even the humblest might render to those of their own family, or household, or country ; in the application, of that comprehensive precept, to do good unto all men as we have opportunity—we behold a prodigious number and diversity of occasions for the exercise of moral principle. It is possible that the lessons of a school may not be arduous enough nor diversified enough for the capacity of a learner. But this cannot be affirmed of that school of discipline, alike arduous and unremitting, to which the great author of our being hath introduced us. Along with the moral capacity by which He hath endowed us, He hath provided a richly furnished gymnasium for its exercises and its trials—where we may earn, if not the triumphs of virtue, at least some delicious foretastes of that full and final blessedness for which the scholarship of human life, with its manifold engagements and duties, is so obviously fitted to prepare us.

2. But let us now briefly state the adaptation of external nature to the moral constitution of man, with a reference to that three-fold generality which we have already expounded. We have spoken of the supremacy of conscience, and of the inherent pleasures and pains of virtue and vice, and of the law and operation of habit—as forming three distinct arguments for the moral goodness of Him, who hath so constructed our nature, that by its workings alone, man should be so clearly and powerfully warned to a life of righteousness—should in the native and immediate joys of rectitude, earn so precious a reward—and, finally, should be led onward to such a state of character, in respect of its confirmed good or confirmed evil, as to afford one of the likeliest prognostications which nature offers to our view of an immortality beyond the grave, where we shall abundantly reap the consequence of our present doings, in either the happiness of established virtue, or the utter wretchedness and woe of our then inveterate depravity. But hitherto we have viewed this nature of man, rather as an individual and insulated constitution, than as a mechanism actuated upon by any forces or influences from without. It is in this latter aspect that we are henceforth to regard it ; and now only it is that we enter on the proper theme of our volume, or that the adaptations of the objective to



the subjective begin to open upon us. It will still be recollected, however,\* that in our view of external nature, we comprehend, not merely all that is external to the world of mind—for this would have restricted us to the consideration of those reciprocal actings which take place between mind and matter. We further comprehend all that is external to one individual mind, and therefore the other minds which are around it; and so we have appropriated, as forming a part of our legitimate subject, the actings and reactings that take place between man and man in society.

3. And first, in regard to the power and sensibility of conscience, there is a most important influence brought to bear on each individual possessor of this faculty from without, and by his fellow men. It will help us to understand it aright, if we reflect on a felt and familiar experience of all men—even the effect of a very slight notice, often of a single word from one of our companions, to recall some past scene or transaction of our lives, which had long vanished from our remembrance; and would, but for this reawakening, have remained in deep oblivion to the end of our days. The phenomenon can easily be explained by the laws of suggestion. Our wonted trains of thought might never have conducted the mind to any thought or recollection of the event in question—whereas, on the occurrence of even a very partial intimation, all the associated circumstances come into vivid recognition; and we are transported back again to the departed realities of former years, that had lain extinct within us for so long a period, and might have been extinct for ever, if not lighted up again by an extraneous application. How many are the days since early boyhood, of which not one trace or vestige now abides upon the memory. Yet perhaps there is not one of these days, the history of which could not be recalled, by means of some such external or foreign help to the remembrance of it. Let us imagine, for example, that a daily companion had, unknown to us, kept a minute and statistical journal of all the events we personally shared in; and the likelihood is, that, if permitted to the perusal of this document, even after the lapse of half a life time, our memory would depone to many thousand events which had else escaped, into utter and irrecoverable forgetfulness. It is certainly remarkable, that, on some brief utterance by another, the stories of former days should suddenly reappear, as if in illumined characters, on the tablet from which they had so totally faded; that the mention of a single circumstance, if only the link of a train, should conjure to life again a whole host of sleeping recollections: And so, in each of our fellow men, might we have

\* See Introductory Chapter, 1, 2, 3.

a remembrancer, who can vivify our consciousness anew, respecting scenes and transactions of our former history which had long gone by ; and which, after having vanished once from a solitary mind left to its own processes, would have vanished everlastingly.

4. It is thus, that, not only can one man make instant translation of his own memory ; but on certain subjects, he can even make instant translation of his own intelligence into the mind of another. A shrewd discerner of the heart, when laying upon its heretofore unrevealed mysteries, makes mention of things which at the moment we feel to be novelties ; but which, almost at the same moment, are felt and recognized by us as truths—and that, not because we receive them upon this authority, but on the independent view that ourselves have of their own evidence. His utterance, in fact, has evoked from the cell of their imprisonment, remembrances, which but for him, might never have been awakened ; and which, when thus summoned into existence, are so many vouchers for the perfect wisdom and truth of what he tells. A thousand peculiarities of life and character, till then unnoticed, are no sooner heard by us, although for the first time in our lives, than they shine before the mind's eye, in the light of a satisfying demonstration. And the reason is, that the materials of their proof have been actually stored up within us, by the history and experience of former years, though in chambers of forgetfulness—whence, however, they are quickly and vividly called forth, as if with the power of a talisman, by the voice of him, who no sooner announces his proposition, than he suggests the by-gone recollections of our own which serve to confirm it. The pages of the novelist, or the preacher, or the moral essayist, though all of them should deal in statements alone, without the formal allegation of evidence, may be informed throughout with evidence, notwithstanding ; and that, because each of them speaks to the consciousness of his readers, unlocking a treasury of latent recollections, which no sooner start again into being, than they become witnesses for the sagacity and admirable sense of him with whom all this luminous and satisfying converse is held. It is like the holding up of a mirror, or the response of an echo to a voice. What the author discovers, the reader promptly and presently discerns. The one utters new things ; but that light of immediate manifestation in which the other beholds them, is struck out of old materials which himself too had long since appropriated, but laid up in a dormitory, where they might have slumbered for ever—had it not been for that voice which charmed them anew into life and consciousness. This is the

only way in which the instant recognition of truths before unheard of and unknown can possibly be explained. It is because their evidence lies enveloped in the reminiscences of other days, which had long passed into oblivion; but are again presented to the notice of the mind by the power of association.

5. This is properly a case of intellectual rather than of moral adaptation; and is only now adverted to for the purpose of illustration. For a decayed conscience is susceptible of like resuscitation with a decayed memory. In treating of the effects of habit, we briefly noticed\* the gradual weakening of conscience, as the indulgences of vice were persisted in. Its remonstrances, however ineffectual, may, at the first, have had a part in that train of thought and feeling, which commences with a temptation, and is consummated in guilt; but in proportion to the frequency, wherewith the voice of conscience is hushed, or overborne, or refused entertainment by the mind, in that proportion does it lift a feebler and a fainter voice afterwards—till at length it may come to be unheard; and any suggestions from this faculty may either pass unheeded, or perhaps drop out of the train altogether. It is thus that many a foul or horrid immorality may come at length to be perpetrated without the sense or feeling of its enormity. Conscience, with the repeated stiflings it has undergone, may, as if on the eve of extinction, have ceased from its exercises. This moral insensibility forms, in truth, one main constituent in the hardihood of crime. The conscience is cradled into a state of stupefaction; and the criminal, now a desperado in guilt, may prosecute his secret depravities, with no relentings from within, and no other dread upon his spirit, than that of discovery by his fellow men.

6. And it is on the event of such discovery, that we meet with the phenomenon in question. When that guilt, to which he had himself become so profoundly insensible, is at length beheld in the light of other minds—it is then that the scales are made to fall from the eyes of the offender; and he, as if suddenly awoke from lethargy, stands aghast before the spectacle of his own worthlessness. It is not the shame of detection, nor the fear of its consequences, which forms the whole of this distress. These may aggravate the suffering; but they do not altogether compose it—for often besides, is there a resurrection of the moral sensibilities within the bosom of the unhappy criminal, as if roused at the touch of sympathy, with the pronounced judgments and feelings of other men. When their unperverted and unwarped consciences, because free from the delusions which encompass his own, give forth a righteous sentence—they enlist

\* See Chap. iii. 6. of this Section.

his conscience upon their side, which then reasserts its power, and again speaks to him in a voice of thunder. When that continuous train between the first excitement of some guilty passion, and its final gratification, from which the suggestions of the moral faculty had been so carefully excluded, is thus arrested and broken—then does conscience, as if emancipated from a spell, at times recover from the infatuation which held it; and utter reproaches of its own, more terrible to the sinner's heart, than all the execrations of general society. And whatever shall forcibly terminate the guilty indulgence, may, by interrupting the accustomed series of thoughts and purposes and passions, also dissipate and put an end to the inveteracy of this moral or spiritual blindness. The confinement of a prison-house may do it. The confinement of a death-bed may do it. And accordingly, on these occasions, does conscience, after an interval it would seem, not of death but only of suspended animation, come forth with the might of an avenger, and make emphatic representation of her wrongs.

7. But this influence which we have attempted to exhibit in bold relief, by means of rare and strong exemplification, is in busy and perpetual operation throughout society—and that, more to prevent crime than to punish it; rather, to maintain the conscience in freshness and integrity, than to reanimate it from a state of decay, or to recall its aberrations. Indeed its restorative efficacy, though far more striking, is not so habitual, nor in the whole amount so salutary, as its counteractive efficacy. The truth is, that we cannot frequent the companionships of human life, without observing the constant circulation and reciprocal play of the moral judgments among men—with whom there is not a more favourite or familiar exercise, than that of discussing the conduct and pronouncing on the deserts of each other. It is thus that every individual, liable in his own case to be misled or blinded by the partialities of interest and passion, is placed under the observation and guardianship of his fellows—who, exempted from his personal or particular bias, give forth a righteous sentence and cause it to be heard. A pure moral light is by this means kept up in society, composed of men whose thoughts are ever employed in 'accusing or else excusing one another'—so that every individual conscience receives an impulse and a direction from sympathy with the consciences around it. We are aware that the love of applause intervenes at this point as a distinct and auxiliary influence. But the primary influence is a moral one. Each man lives under a consciousness of the vigilant and discerning witnesses who are on every side of him; and his conscience, kept on the alert and kept in accordance



with theirs, acts both more powerfully and more purely, than if left to the decay and the self-deception of its own withering solitude. The lamp which might have waxed dim by itself, revives its fading lustre, by contact and communication with those which burn more brightly in other bosoms than its own; and this law of interchange between mind and mind, forms an important adaptation in the mechanism of human society.

8. But, to revert for a moment to the revival of conscience after that its sensibilities had become torpid for a season; and they are quickened anew, as if by sympathy, with the moral judgments of other men. This phenomenon of conscience seems to afford another glimpse or indication of futurity. It at least tells with what facility that Being, who hath all the resources of infinity at command, could, and that by an operation purely mental, inflict the vengeance of a suffering the most exquisite, on the children of disobedience. He has only to reopen the fountains of memory and conscience; and this will of itself cause distillation within the soul of the waters of bitterness. And if in the voice of earthly remembrancers and earthly judges, we observe such a power of re-awakening—we might infer, not the possibility alone, but the extreme likelihood of a far more vivid re-awakening, when the offended lawgiver himself takes the judgment into His own hands. If the rebuke of human tongues and human eyes be of such force to revive the sleeping agony within us, what may we not feel, when the adverse sentence is pronounced against us from the throne of God, and in the midst of a universal theatre? If, in this our little day, the condemnation is felt to be insupportable, that twinkles upon us from the thousand secondary and subordinate lustres by which we are surrounded—what must it be, when He, by whose hand they have all been lighted up, turns towards us the strength of His own countenance; and, with His look of reprobation sends forth trouble and dismay over the hosts of the rebellious.\*

9. But besides the pleasures and pains of conscience, there is, in the very taste and feeling of moral qualities, a pleasure or a pain. This formed our second general argument in favour of God's righteous administration; and our mental constitution, even when viewed singly, furnishes sufficient materials on which to build it. But the argument is greatly strengthened and enhanced by the adaptation to that constitution of external nature,

\* Dr. Abercromby, in his interesting work on the intellectual powers, states some remarkable cases of resuscitated and enlarged memory, which remind one of the explanation given by Mr. Coleridge of the opening of the books in the day of judgment. It is on the opening of the book of conscience that the sinner is made to feel the truth and righteousness of his condemnation.

more especially as exemplified in the reciprocal influences which take place between mind and mind in society: for the effects of this adaptation is to multiply both the pleasures of virtue and the sufferings of vice. The first, the original pleasure, is that which is felt by the virtuous man himself; as, for example, by the benevolent, in the very sense and feeling of that kindness whereby his heart is actuated. The second is felt by him who is the object of this kindness—for merely in the conscious possession of another's good-will, there is a great and distinct enjoyment. And then the manifested kindness of the former awakens gratitude, in the bosom of the latter; and this, too, is a highly pleasurable emotion. And lastly, gratitude sends back a delicious incense to the benefactor who awakened it. By the purely mental interchange of these affections, there is generated a prodigious amount of happiness; and that, altogether independent of the gratifications which are yielded by the material gifts of liberality on the one hand, or by the material services of gratitude on the other. Insomuch, that we have only to imagine a reign of perfect virtue; and then, in spite of the physical ills which essentially and inevitably attach to our condition, we should feel as if we had approximated very nearly to a state of perfect enjoyment among men—or, in other words, that the bliss of paradise would be almost fully realized upon earth, were but the moral graces and charities of paradise firmly established there, and in full operation. Let there be honest and universal good-will in every bosom, and this be responded to from all who are the objects of it by an honest gratitude back again; let kindness, in all its various effects and manifestations, pass and repass from one heart and countenance to another; let there be a universal courteousness in our streets, and let fidelity and affection and all the domestic virtues take up their secure and lasting abode in every family; let the succour and sympathy of a willing neighbourhood be ever in readiness to meet and to overpass all the want and wretchedness to which humanity is liable; let truth, and honour, and inviolable friendship between man and man, banish all treachery and injustice from the world; in the walks of merchandise, let an unflinching integrity on the one side, have the homage done to it of unbounded confidence on the other, insomuch, that each man reposing with conscious safety on the uprightness and attachment of his fellow, and withal rejoicing as much in the prosperity of an acquaintance, as he should in his own, there would come to be no place for the harassments and the heart-burnings of mutual suspicion or resentment or envy: who does not see, in the state of a society thus constituted and thus harmonized, the palpable evidence of a nature so framed, that the happiness of the world

and the righteousness of the world kept pace the one with the other? And it is all important to remark of this happiness, that, in respect both to quality and amount, it mainly consists of moral elements—so that while every giver who feels as he ought, experiences a delight in the exercise of generosity which rewards him a hundred-fold for all its sacrifices; every receiver who feels as he ought, rejoices infinitely more in the sense of the benefactor's kindness, than in the physical gratification or fruit of the benefactor's liberality. It is saying much for the virtuousness of Him who hath so moulded and so organized the spirit of man, that, apart from sense and from all its satisfactions, but from the ethereal play of the good affections alone, the highest felicity of our nature should be generated; that, simply by the interchange of cordiality between man and man, and one benevolent emotion re-echoing to another, there should be yielded to human hearts, so much of the truth and substance of real enjoyment—so that did justice, and charity, and holiness, descend from heaven to earth, taking full and universal possession of our species, the happiness of heaven would be sure to descend along with them. Could any world be pointed out, where the universality and reign of vice effected the same state of blissful and secure enjoyment that virtue would in ours—we should infer that he was the patron and the friend of vice, who had dominion over it. But when assured, on the experience we have of our actual nature, that in the world we occupy, a perfect morality would, but for certain physical calamities, be the harbinger of a perfect enjoyment—we regard this as an incontestable evidence for the moral goodness of our own actual Deity.

10. And in such an argument as ours, although the main beatitudes of virtue are of a moral and spiritual character, its subserviency to the physical enjoyments of life ought not to be overlooked, though, perhaps, too obvious to be dwelt upon. The most palpable of these subserviencies is the effect of benevolence in diffusing abundance among the needy, and so alleviating the ills of their destitution. This is so very patent as not to require being expatiated on. Yet we might notice here one important adaptation, connected with the exercise of this morality—realized but in part, so long as virtue has only a partial occupation in society; but destined, we hope, to receive its entire and beautiful accomplishment, when virtue shall have become universal. It is well known that certain collateral but very serious mischiefs attend the exercise of a profuse and capricious and indiscriminate charity; that it may, in fact, augment and aggravate the indigence which it tries to relieve, beside working a moral deterioration among the humbler clas-

ses, by ministering to the reckless improvidence of the dissipated and the idle; an operation alike injurious to the physical comfort of the one party, and to the moral comfort of the other. These effects are inevitable, so long as the indiscriminate benevolence of the rich meets with an indefinite selfishness and rapacity on the part of the poor. But this evil will be mitigated and at length done away, with the growth of principle among mankind; and more especially, when, instead of being confined to one of these classes, it is partitioned among both. Let the wealthy be as generous as they ought in their doings, and the poor be as moderate as they ought in their expectations and desires; and then will that problem, which has so baffled the politicians and economists of England, find its own spontaneous, while, at the same time, its best adjustment. Let an exuberant yet well directed liberality on the one side come into encounter, instead of a sordid and insatiable appetency, with the recoil of delicacy and self-respect upon the other, and the noble independence of men who will work with their own hands rather than be burthensome; and then will the benefactions of the wealthy and the wants of the indigent, not only meet but overpass. The willingness of the one party to give, will exceed the willingness of the other to receive; and an evil which threatens to rend society asunder, and which law in her attempts to remedy has only exasperated, will at length give way before the omnipotence of moral causes. This, as being one of many specimens, tells most significantly that man was made for virtue, or that this was the purpose of God in making him—when we find, that through no other medium than the morality of the people, can the sorest distempers of society be healed. The impotence of human wisdom, and of every political expedient which this wisdom can devise for the well-being of a state, when virtue languishes among the people, is one of the strongest proofs which experience affords, that virtue was the design of our creation. And we know not how more emphatic demonstration can be given of a virtuous Deity, than when we find society to have been so constructed by His hands, that virtue forms the great alternative on which the secure or lasting prosperity of a commonwealth is hinged—so that for any aggregate of human beings to be right physically and right economically, it is the indispensable, while at the same time the all effectual condition, that they should be right morally.

11. Nothing can be more illustrative of the character of God, or more decisive of the question, whether His preference is for universal virtue or for universal vice in the world, than to consider the effect of each on the well-being of human society—



even that society which He did Himself ordain, and whose mechanism is the contrivance of His own intellect, and the work of His own hands. It may not be easy to explain the origin of that moral derangement into which the species has actually fallen; but it affords no obscure or uncertain indication of what the species was principally made for, when we picture to ourselves the difference between a commonwealth of vice and a commonwealth of virtue. We have already said enough on the obvious connexion which obtains between the righteousness of a nation and the happiness of its families; and it were superfluous to dilate on the equally obvious connexion which obtains between a state of general depravity, and a state of general wretchedness and disorder. And the counterpart observation holds true, that, as the beatitudes of the one condition, so the sufferings of the other are chiefly made up of moral elements. If, in the former, there be a more precious and heartfelt enjoyment in the possession of another's kindness, than in all the material gifts and services to which that kindness has prompted him—so in the latter, may it often happen, that the agony arising from simple consciousness of another's malignity, will greatly exceed any physical hurt, whether in person or property, that we ever shall sustain from him. A loss that we suffer from the dishonesty of another is far more severely felt, than a ten-fold loss occasioned by accident or misfortune—or, in other words, we find the moral provocation to be greatly more pungent and intolerable than the physical calamity. So that beside the material damage, too palpable to be insisted on at any length, which vice and violence inflict upon society, there should be taken into account the soreness of spirit, the purely mental distress and disquietude which follow in their train—of which we have already seen, how much is engendered even in the workings of one individual mind; but susceptible of being inflamed to a degree indefinitely higher, by the reciprocal working of minds, all of them hating and all hateful to each other. In this mere antipathy of the heart, more especially when aided by nearness and the opportunities of mutual expression, there are sensations of most exquisite bitterness. There is a wretchedness in the mere collision of hostile feelings themselves, though they should break not forth into overt-acts of hostility; in the simple demonstrations of malignity, apart from its doings; in the war but of words and looks and fierce gesticulations, though no violence should be inflicted on the one side or sustained upon the other. To make the aggressor in these purely mental conflicts intensely miserable, it is enough that he should experience within him the agitations and the fires of a resentful

heart. To make the recipient intensely miserable, it is enough that he should be demoniacally glared upon by a resentful eye. Were this power which resides in the emotions by themselves sufficiently reflected on, it would evince how intimately connected, almost how identified, wickedness and wretchedness are with each other. To realize the miseries of a state of war, it is not necessary that there should be contests of personal strength. The mere contests of personal feeling will suffice. Let there be mutual rage and mutual revilings; let there be the pangs and the outcries of fierce exasperation; let there be the continual droppings of peevishness and discontent; let disdain meet with equal disdain; or even, instead of scorn from the lofty, let there be but the slights and the insults of contempt from men, who themselves are of the most contemptible; let there be haughty defiance, and spiteful derision, and the mortifications of affronted and irritated pride—in the tumults of such a scene, though tumults of the mind alone, there were enough to constitute a hell of assembled maniacs or of assembled malefactors. The very presence and operation of these passions would form their own sorest punishment. To have them perpetually in ourselves is to have a hell in the heart. To meet with them perpetually in others is to be compassed about with a society of fiends, to be beset with the miseries of a Pandemonium.

12. Whether we look then to the separate or the social constitution of humanity, we observe abundant evidence for the mind and meaning of the Deity, who both put together the elements of each individual nature, and the elements which enter into the composition of society. We cannot imagine a more decisive indication of His favour being on the side of moral good, and His displeasure against moral evil, than that, by the working of each of these constitutions, virtue and happiness on the one hand, vice and wretchedness on the other, should be so intimately and inseparably allied. Such sequences or laws of nature as these, speak as distinctly the character of him who established them, as any laws of jurisprudence would the character of the monarch by whom they were enacted. And to learn this lesson, we do not need to wait for the distant consequences of vice or virtue. We at once feel the distinction put upon them by the hand of the Almighty, in the instant sensations which He hath appended to each of them—implicated as their effects are with the very fountain-head of moral being, and turning the hearts which they respectively occupy, into the seats either of wildest anarchy, or of serene and blissful enjoyment.

13. The law and operation of habit, as exemplified in one in-

dividual mind, formed the theme of our third general argument. The only adaptation which we shall notice to this part of our mental constitution in the frame-work of society, is that afforded by the changes which it undergoes in the flux of its successive generations—in virtue of which, the tender susceptibilities of childhood are placed under the influence of that ascendant seniority which precedes or goes before it. At first sight it may be thought of this peculiarity, that it tells equally in both directions—that is, either in the transmission and accumulation of vice, or in the transmission and accumulation of virtue in the world. But there is one circumstance of superiority in favour of the latter, which bids us look hopefully onward to the final prevalence of the good over the evil. We are aware of the virulence wherewith, in families, the crime and profligacy of a depraved parentage must operate on the habits of their offspring; and of the deadly poison which, in crowded cities, passes with quick descent from the older to the younger, along the links of youthful companionship; and even of those secret, though we trust rare and monstrous societies, which, in various countries and various ages, were held for the celebration of infernal orgies, for the initiation of the yet unknowing or unpractised in the mysteries of vice. But after every deduction has been made for these, who does not see that the systematic and sustained effort, the wide and general enterprize, the combination of numbers in the face of day and with the sympathies of an approving public, give a prodigious balance on the side of moral education? The very selfishness of vice and expansiveness of virtue give rise to this difference between them—the one centered on its own personal enjoyments, and, with a few casual exceptions, rather heedless of the principles of others than set on any schemes or speculations of proselytism; the other, by its very nature, aspiring after the good of the whole species, and bent on the propagation of its own likeness, till righteousness and truth shall have become universal among men. Accordingly, all the ostensible countenance and exertion, in the cause of learning, whether by governments or associations, is on the side of virtue; while no man could dare to front the public eye, with a scheme of discipleship in the lessons whether of fraud or profligacy. The clear tendency then is to impress a right direction on the giant power of education; and when this is brought to bear, more systematically and generally than heretofore, on the pliant boyhood of the land—we behold, in the operation of habit, a guarantee for the progressive conquests, and at length the ultimate and universal triumph of good over evil in society. Our confidence in this result is greatly enhanced, when we witness the influence even

of but one mind among the hundreds of any given neighbourhood—if zealously and wisely directed to the object of moral and economical improvement. Let that most prolific of all philanthropy then be fully and fairly set on foot, which operates, by means of education, on the early germs of character; and we shall have the most effective of all agency engaged, for the production of the likeliest of all results. The law of habit, when looked to in the manageable ductility of its outset, presents a mighty opening for the production of a new era in the moral history of mankind; and the same law of habit, when looked to in the maturity of its fixed and final establishment, encourages the expectation of a permanent as well as universal reign of virtue in the world.

14. Even in the yet chaotic and rudimental state of the world, we can observe the powers and the likelihoods of such a consummation; and what gives an overbearing superiority to the chances on the side of virtue is, that parents, although the most sunken in depravity themselves, welcome the proposals, and receive with gratitude, the services of Christian or moral philanthropy in behalf of their families. However hopeless then of reformation among those whose vicious habits have become inveterate, it is well that there should be so wide and unobstructed an access to those, among whom the habits have yet to be formed. It is this which places education on such firm vantage-ground, if not for reclaiming the degeneracy of individuals, yet for reclaiming after the lapse of a few generations the degeneracy of the species; and, however abortive many of the schemes and enterprizes in this highest walk of charity may hitherto have proved, yet the manifest and growing attention to the cause does open a brilliant moral perspective for the ages that are to come. The experience of what has been done locally by a few zealous individuals, warrants our most cheering anticipations of what may yet be done universally—when the powers of that simple but mighty instrument which they employ, if brought to bear on that most malleable of all subjects, the infancy of human existence, come to be better understood, and put into busy operation over the whole length and breadth of the land. In the grievous defect of our national institutions, and the wretched abandonment of a people left to themselves, and who are permitted to live recklessly and at random as they list—we see enough to account both for the profligacy of our crowded cities, and for the sad demoralization of our neglected provinces. But on the other hand we feel assured, that, in an efficient system of wise and well principled instruction, there are capabilities within our reach for a great and glorious revival. We might not know the reason,



why, in the moral world, so many ages of darkness and depravity should have been permitted to pass by—any more than we know the reason, why, in the natural world, the trees of a forest, instead of starting all at once into the full efflorescence and stateliness of their manhood, have to make their slow and laborious advancement to maturity, cradled in storms, and alternately drooping or expanding with the vicissitudes of the seasons. But, though unable to scan all the cycles either of the moral or natural economy, yet may we recognize such influences at work, as when multiplied and developed to the uttermost, are abundantly capable of regenerating the world. One of the likeliest of these influences is the power of education—to the perfecting of which so many minds are earnestly directed at this moment; and for the general acceptance of which in society, we have a guarantee, in the strongest affections and fondest wishes of the fathers and mothers of families.

## CHAPTER V.

*On the special and subordinate Adaptations of external Nature to the moral Constitution of Man.*

1. WE have hitherto confined our attention to certain great and simple phenomena of our moral nature, which, though affording a different sort of evidence for the being of God from the organic and complicated structures of the material world—yet, on the hypothesis of an existent Deity, are abundantly decisive of His preference for virtue over vice, and so of the righteousness of His own character. That he should have inserted a great master faculty in every human bosom, all whose decisions are on the side of justice, benevolence, and truth, and condemnatory of their opposites; that He should have inserted this conscience with such powers of instant retribution, in the triumphs of that complacency wherewith he so promptly rewards the good, and the horrors of that remorse wherewith He as promptly chastises the evil; that beside these, He should have so distinguished between virtue and vice,\* as that the emotions and exercises of the former should all be pleasureable, and of the latter painful to the taste of the inner man; that He should have so ordained the human constitution, as that by the law of habit, virtuous and vicious lives, or series of acts having these respective moral qualities, should issue in the fixed and permanent results of virtuous and vicious characters—these form the important generalities of our moral nature: And while they obviously and immediately announce to us a present demonstration in favour of virtue; they seem to indicate a preparation and progress towards a state of things, when, after that the moral education of the present life has

\* Butler, in Part I, Chapter 3d of his Analogy, makes the following admirable discrimination between actions themselves and that quality ascribed to them which we call virtuous or vicious.—“An action by which any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all consideration of the morality of such action, consequently the pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the virtuousness, or viciousness of it, though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus to say, such an action or course of behaviour, procured such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different thing from saying that such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In one case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its effect. In the other case, for it will appear that there are such cases, the morality of the action, the action under a moral consideration, i. e. the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect.

been consummated, the great Ruler of men will manifest the eternal distinction which he puts between the good and the evil.

2. Now in these few simple sequences, however strongly and unequivocally they evince the character of a God already proved or already presupposed, we have not the same intense evidence for design, which is afforded by the distinct parts or the distinct principles of a very multifarious combination. Yet the constitution of man's moral nature is not defective in this evidence—though certainly neither so prolific nor so palpable in our mental, as in our anatomical system. Still, however, there is a mechanism in mind as well as body, with a diversity of principles, if not a diversity of parts, consisting of so many laws, grafted it may be on a simple and indivisible substance, yet yielding in the fact of their beneficial concurrence, no inconsiderable argument for the wisdom and goodness of Him who framed us. Nor does it matter, as we have already said, whether these are all of them original, or some of them, as the analysts of mind have laboured to manifest, only derivative laws in the human constitution. If the former, we have an evidence grounded on the beneficial conjunction of a greater number of independent laws. If the latter, we are reduced to fewer independent laws—but these all the more prolific of useful applications, each of which applications is grounded on a beneficial adaptation of some peculiar circumstances, in the operation of which it is, that the primary is transmuted into a secondary law.\* But whether the one or the other, they exhibit phases of humanity distinct from any that we have yet been employed in contemplating; a number of special affections, each characterized by its own name, and pointing to its own separate object, yet all of them performing an important subsidiary part, for the moral good both of the individual and of the species; and presenting us, therefore, with the materials of additional evidence for a moral and beneficent design in the formation of our race.

3. When we look to the beauty which overspreads the face of nature, and the exquisite gratification which it ministers to the senses of man—we cannot doubt, either the taste for beauty which resides in the primeval mind that emanated all this gracefulness; or the benevolence that endowed man with a kindred taste, and so fitted him for a kindred enjoyment. This conclusion, however, like any moral conclusion we have yet come to, re-

\*And besides this, would it not bespeak a more comprehensive wisdom on the part of a human artificer, that by means of one device, or by the application of one principle, he effected not a few, but many distinct and beneficial purposes; and does it not in like manner enhance the exhibition of divine skill in the workmanship of nature, when a single law is found to subserve a vast and manifold variety of important uses?

specting the perfections or the purposes of God, is founded on generalities,—on the general amount of beauty in the world, and the delight wherewith men behold and admire it. Yet, beside this, we may draw a corroborative evidence for the same, from the machinery of certain special contrivances—as the construction of the calyx in plants, for the defence of the tender blossom previous to its expansion; and the apparatus for scattering seeds, whereby the earth is more fully invested with its mantle of rich and varied garniture. And notwithstanding the blight which has so obviously passed over the moral world, and defaced many of its original lineaments, while it has left the materialism of creation, the loveliness of its scenes and landscapes, in a great measure untouched—still we possess very much the same materials for a Natural Theology, in reasoning on the element of virtue, as in reasoning on the element of beauty. We have first those generalities of argument which are already expounded by us at sufficient length; and we have also the evidence, now to be unfolded, of certain special provisions for the preservation and growth of the immortal plant, in the study of which, we shall observe more of mechanism than we have yet contemplated; and more, therefore, of that peculiar argument for design, which lies in the adaptation of varied means, in the concurrence of distinct expedients, each helping the other onward to a certain beneficial consummation.

4. But we must here premise an observation extensively applicable in mental science. When recognising the obvious subserviency of some given feeling or principle in the mind to a beneficial result—we are apt to imagine that it was somehow or other, in the contemplation of this result, that the principle was generated; and that therefore, instead of a distinct and original part of the human constitution, it is but a derivative from an anterior process of thought or calculation on the part of man, in the act of reflecting on what was most for the good of himself, or the good of society. In this way man is conceived to be in some measure the creator of his own mental constitution; or, at least, there are certain parts of it regarded as secondary, and the formation of which is ascribed to the wisdom of man, which, if regarded as instinctive and primary, would have been directly ascribed to the wisdom of God. There are many writers, for example, on the origin and rights of property, who, instead of admitting what may be termed an instinct of appropriation, would hold the appropriating tendency to be the result of human intelligence, after experience had of the convenience and benefits of such an arrangement. Now on this subject, we may take a lesson from the physical constitution of man. It is indispensable



to the preservation of our animal system, that food should be received at certain intervals into the stomach. Yet, notwithstanding all the strength which is ascribed to the principle of self-preservation, and all the veneration which is professed by the expounders of our nature for the wisdom and foresight of man—the author of our frame has not left this important interest merely to our care, or our consideration. He has not so trusted us to ourselves; but has inserted among the other affections and principles wherewith He has endowed us, the appetite of hunger—a strong and urgent and ever-recurring desire for food, which, it is most certain, stands wholly unconnected with any thought on our part, of its physical or posterior uses for the sustenance of the body; and from which it would appear, that we need to be not only reminded at proper intervals of this incumbent duty, but goaded on to it. Could the analysts of our nature have ascertained of hunger, that it was the product of man's reflection on the necessity of food, it might have been quoted as an instance of the care which man takes of himself. But it seems that he could not be thus confided, either with his own individual preservation, or with the preservation of his species; and so, for the security of both these objects, strong appetites had to be given him, which, incapable of being resolved into any higher principles, stand distinctly and unequivocally forth, as instances of the care that is taken of him by God.

5. Now this, though it does not prove, yet may prepare us to expect similar provisions in the constitution of our minds. Indeed the operose and complicated system, which the great Architect of nature hath devised for our bodies, carries in it a sort of warning to those, who, enamoured of the simplifications of theory, would labour to reduce all our mental phenomena to one or two principles. There is no warrant for this in the examples which Anatomy and Physiology, those sciences that have to do with the animal economy of man, have placed before our eyes. Now, though we admit not this as evidence for the actual complexity of man's moral economy—it may at least school away those prepossessions of the fancy or of the taste, that would lead us to resist or to dislike such evidence when offered. We hold it not unlikely that the same Being, who, to supplement the defects of human prudence, hath furnished us with distinct corporeal appetites, that might prompt us to operations, of the greatest subservient benefit both to the individual and the species—might also, to supplement the defects of human wisdom and principle, have furnished us with distinct mental affections or desires, both for our own particular good and the good of society. If man could not be left to his own guidance,

in matters which needed but the anticipation of a few hours ; but to save him from the decay and the death which must have otherwise ensued, had so powerful a remembrancer and instigator given to him as the appetite of hunger—we ought not to marvel, should it be found that nature, in endowing him mentally, hath presumed on his incapacity, either for wisely devising or for regularly acting, with a view to distant consequences, and amid the complicated relations of human society. It may, on the one hand, have inserted forces, when the mere consideration of good effects would not have impelled ; or, on the other hand, may have inserted checks, when the mere consideration of evil effects would not have arrested. Yet so it is, that, because of the good that is thereby secured and of the evil that is thereby shunned—we are apt to imagine of some of the most useful principles of our nature, that they are, somehow, the product of human manufacture ; the results of human intelligence, or of rapid processes of thought by man, sitting in judgment on the consequences of his actions, and wisely providing either for or against them. Now it is very true, that the anger, and the shame, and the emulation, and the parental affection, and the compassion, and the love of reputation, and the sense of property, and the conscience or moral sense—are so many forces of a mechanism, which if not thus furnished, and that too within certain proportions, would run into a disorder that might have proved destructive both of the individual and of the species. For reasons already hinted at, we hold it immaterial to the cause of natural theism, whether these constitutional propensities of the human mind are its original or its secondary laws ; but, at all events, it is enough for any argument of ours, that they are not so generated by the wisdom of man, as to supersede the inference which we draw from them, in favour both of the wisdom and goodness of God.

6. The common definition given of anger, is an instance of the tendency on the part of philosophers, if not to derive, at least to connect the emotions of which we have been made susceptible with certain anterior or higher principles of our nature. Dr. Reid tells us that the proper object of resentment is an injury ; and that as “no man can have the notion of injustice, without having the notion of justice,” then, “if resentment be natural to man, the notion of justice must be no less natural.”\*

\* In glaring contradiction to this, is Dr. Reid's own affirmation regarding the brutes. He says, “that conscience is peculiar to man, we see no vestige of it in the brute animals. It is one of those prerogatives by which we are raised above them.” But animals are most abundantly capable of anger—even of that which, by a very general definition, is said to be the emotion that is awakened by a sense of injury,

And Dr. Brown defines anger to be "that emotion of instant displeasure, which arises from the feeling of injury done or the discovery of injury intended, or, in many cases, from the discovery of the mere omission of good offices to which we conceived ourselves entitled, though this very omission may, of itself, be regarded as a species of injury." Now the sense of injury implies a sense of its opposite—a sense of justice, therefore, or the conception of a moral standard from which the injury that has awakened the resentment, is felt to be a deviation. But as nothing ought to form part of a definition, which is not indispensable to the thing defined, it would appear, as if, in the judgment of both these philosophers, all who were capable of anger must also have, to a certain degree, a capacity of moral judgment or moral feeling. The property of resenting a hurt inflicted upon ourselves, would, at this rate, argue, in all cases, a perception of what the moral and equitable adjustment would be between ourselves and others. Now, that these workings of a moral nature are essential to the feeling of anger, is an idea which admits of most obvious and decisive refutation—it being an emotion to which not only infants are competent, anterior to the first dawns of their moral nature; but even idiots, with whom this nature is obliterated, or still more the inferior animals who want it altogether. There must be a sense of annoyance to originate the feeling; but a sense of injury, implying, as it does, a power of moral judgment or sensibility, can be in no way indispensable to an emotion, exemplified in its utmost force and intensity by sentient creatures, in whom there cannot be detected even the first rudiments of a moral nature. Two dogs, when fighting for a bone, make as distinct and declared an exhibition of their anger, as two human beings when disputing about the boundary of their contiguous fields. The emotion flashes as unequivocally from any of the inferior, as it does from the only rational and moral species on the face of our globe; as in the vindictive glare of an infuriated bull, or of a lioness robbed of her whelps, and who as if making proclamation of her wrongs, gives forth her deep and reiterated cry to the echoes of the wilderness. It is an emotion, in fact, which seems coextensive, not only with moral, but with physical sensation. And, if any faith can be placed in the physiognomy, or the natural signs, by which irrational creatures represent what passes within them; this passion announces itself as vividly and discernibly in the outcries of mutual resentment which ring throughout the ampli-

which sense of injury must imply in it the sense of its opposite, even of justice, and so land us in the conclusion that brutes are capable of moral conception, or that they have a conscience.

tudes of savage and solitary nature, as in the contests of civilized man.

7. The truth, then, seems to be, that the office of the moral faculty is, not to originate, but rather to confine and qualify and regulate this emotion. Anger, if we but study its history and actual exhibitions, will be found the primary and the natural response to a hurt or harm or annoyance of any sort inflicted on us by others; and, as such, may be quite expansive and unrestrained and open to excitation from all points of the compass— anterior to and apart from any consideration of its justice, or whether in the being who called it forth, there have been the purpose or not of violating our rights. Infants are fully capable of the feeling, long before they have a notion of equity, or of what is rightfully their own and rightfully another's. The anger of animals, too, is, in like manner, destitute of that moral ingredient, which the definitions we have quoted suppose indispensable to the formation of it. And yet their emitted sounds have the very expression of fierceness, that we meet with so often among the fellows of our own species. The provocation, the resentment, the kindling glance of hostility, the gradual heightening of the wrath, its discharge in acts of mutual violence, and lastly, its gluttoned satisfaction in the flight and even the death of the adversary—these are all indicative of kindred workings within, that have their outward vent in a common and kindred physiognomy, between him who is styled the lord of the creation, and those beneath his feet, who are conceived to stand at a distance that scarcely admits of comparison in the phenomena of their nature. Even man, in the full growth of his rational and moral nature, will often experience the outbreakings of an anger merely physical; as, to state one instance out of the many, may be witnessed in the anger wreaked by him on the inferior animals, when, all unconscious of injury to him, they enter upon his fields, or damage the fruit of his labours. The object of a just resentment towards others, is the purposed injustice of others towards us; and, so far from purposing the injustice, animals have not even the faculty of conceiving it. The moral consideration, then, does not enter as a constituent part into all resentment. It is rather a superadded quality which designates a species of it. It is not the epithet which characterizes all anger, but is limited to a certain kind of it. It may be as proper to say of one anger that it is just, and of another that justice or morality has had nothing to do with it—as it is to say of one blow by the hand that it has been rightfully awarded, and of another blow that such a moral characteristic is wholly inapplicable. Morality may at times characterize both the men-



tal feeling, and the muscular performance ; but it should be as little identified with the one as with the other. And however much analysts may have succeeded on other occasions, in reducing to sameness what appeared to be separate constituents of our nature, certain it is, that anger cannot thus be regarded as a resulting manufacture from any of its higher principles. It forms a distinct and original part of our constitution, of which morality, whenever it exists and has the predominance, might take the direction, without being at all essential to the presence or operation of it. So far from this, it is nowhere exhibited in greater vivacity and distinctness than by those creatures who possess but an animal, without so much as the germ, or the rudest elements of a moral nature.

S. Anger then is an emotion that may rage and tumultuate in a bosom into which one moral conception has never entered. For its excitement nothing more seems necessary than to thwart any desire however unreasonable, or to disappoint any one object which the heart may chance to be set upon. So far from a sense of justice being needful to originate this emotion—it is the man who, utterly devoid of justice, would monopolize to himself all that lies within the visible horizon, who is most exposed to its visitation. He is the most vulnerable to wrath from every point of the vast circumference around him—who, conceiving the Universe to be made for himself alone, is most insensible to the rights and interests of other men. It is in fact because he is so unfurnished with the ideas of justice, that he is so unbridled in resentment. Justice views the world and all its interests as already partitioned among the various members of the human population, each occupying his own little domain ; and, instead of permitting anger to expatiate at random over the universal face of things, justice would curb and over-rule its ebullitions in the bosom of every individual, till a trespass was made within the limits of that territory which is properly and peculiarly his own. In other words, it is the office of this virtue, not to inspire anger, but to draw landmarks and limitations around it ; and, so far from a high moral principle originating this propensity, it is but an animal propensity, restrained and kept within check and confinement at the bidding of principle.

9. The distinction between reflective and unreflective anger did not escape the notice of the sagacious Butler, as may be seen in the following passages of a sermon upon resentment.—“ Resentment is of two kinds—hasty and sudden, or settled and deliberate. The former is called anger and often passion, which, though a general word, is frequently appropriated and

confined to the particular feeling, sudden anger, as distinct from deliberate resentment malice and revenge." "Sudden anger upon certain occasions is mere instinct, as merely so, as the disposition to close our eyes upon the apprehension of something falling into them, and no more necessarily implies any degree of reason. I say necessarily, for, to be sure, hasty as well as deliberate anger, may be occasioned by injury or contempt, in which cases reason suggests to our thoughts the injury and contempt which is the occasion of the emotion: But I am speaking of the former, only in so far as it is to be distinguished from the latter. The only way in which our reason and understanding can raise anger, is by representing to our mind an injustice or injury of some kind or other. Now momentary anger is frequently raised, not only without any rule, but without any reason; that is, without any appearance of injury as distinct from hurt or pain. It cannot, I suppose, be thought that this passion in infants and the lower species of animals, and which is often seen in man towards them, it cannot, I say, be imagined that these instances of this emotion are the effect of reason: no, they are occasioned by mere sensation and feeling. It is opposition, sudden hurt, violence which naturally excites this passion; and the real demerit or fault of him who offers that violence, or is the cause of that opposition or hurt, does not in many cases so much as come into thought." "The reason and end for which man was made thus liable to this emotion, is that he might be better qualified to prevent, and likewise or perhaps chiefly to resist and defeat sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such, and without regard to the fault or demerit of him who is the author of them; yet since violence may be considered in this other and further view, as implying fault, and since injury as distinct from harm may raise sudden anger, sudden anger may likewise accidentally serve to prevent or remedy such fault and injury. But considered as distinct from settled anger, it stands in our nature for self-defence, and not for the administration of justice. There are plainly cases, and in the uncultivated parts of the world, and where regular governments are not formed, they frequently happen, in which there is no time for considering, and yet to be passive is certain destruction, in which sudden resistance is the only security."—It is an exceeding good instance that Bishop Butler gives of the distinction between instinctive and what may be called rational anger, when he specifies the anger that we often feel towards the inferior animals. There is properly no injury done, where there is no injury intended. And he who is incapable of conceiving what an injury is, is not a rightful ob-

ject for at least any moral resentment. But that there is what may be called a physical as well as a moral resentment, is quite palpable from the positive wrath which is felt when any thing untoward or hurtful is done to us even by the irrational creatures. The men who use them as instruments of service often discharge the most outrageous wrath upon them—acting the part of ferocious tyrants towards these wretched victims of their cruelty. When a combat takes place between man and one of the inferior animals, there is a resentment felt by the former just as keen and persevering, as if it were between two human combatants. This makes it quite obvious that there may be anger without any sense of designed injury on the part of him who is the object of it. Even children, idiots, lunatics, might all be the objects of such a resentment.

10. The final cause of this emotion in the inferior animals is abundantly obvious. It stimulates and ensures resistance to that violence, which, if not resisted, would often terminate in the destruction of its object. And it probably much oftener serves the purpose of prevention than of defence. The first demonstration of a violence to be offered on the one hand, when met by the preparation and the counter-menace of an incipient resentment on the other, not only repels the aggression after it has begun, but still more frequently, we believe, through the reaction and restraint of fear on the otherwise attacking party, prevents the aggression from being made. The stout and formidable antagonists eye each other with a sort of natural respect; and, as if by a common though tacit consent, wisely abstain on either side from molestation, and pass onward without a quarrel. It is thus that many a fierce contest is forborne, which, but for the operation of anger on the one side and fear upon the other, would most certainly have been entered upon. And so by a system, or machinery of reciprocal checks and counteractives, and where the mental affections too perform the part of essential forces, there is not that incessant warfare of extermination which might have depopulated the world. And here we might observe, that, in studying that balance of powers and of preserving influences, which obtains even in a commonwealth of brutes, the uses of a mental are just as palpable as those of a material collocation. The anger which prompts to the resistance of aggression is as obviously inserted by the hand of a contriver, as are the horns or the bristles or any other defensive weapons wherewith the body of the animal is furnished. The fear which wings the flight of a pursued animal is as obviously intended for its safety, as is its muscular conformation or capacity for speed. The affection of a mother for her young

points as intelligibly to a designer's care for the preservation of the species, as does that apparatus of nourishment wherewith nature hath endowed her. The mother's fondness supplies as distinct and powerful an argument as the mother's milk—or, in other words, a mental constitution might, as well as a physical constitution, be pregnant with the indications of a God.

11. But to return to the special affection of anger, with a reference more particularly to its working in our own species, where we have the advantage of nearer and distincter observation. We must be abundantly sensible of the pain which there is, not merely in the feeling of resentment, when it burns and festers within our own hearts, but also in being, the objects of another's resentment. They are not the effects only of his anger that we are afraid of; we are afraid of the anger itself, of but the looks and the words of angry violence, though we should be perfectly secure from all the deeds of violence. The simple displeasure of another is formidable, though no chastisement whatever shall follow upon it. We are so constituted, that we tremble before the frown of an offended countenance, and perhaps as readily as we would under the menace of an uplifted arm; and would often make as great a sacrifice to shun the moral discomfort of another's wrath, as to shun the physical infliction which his wrath might impel him to lay upon us. It is thus that where there is no strength for any physical infliction, still there may be a power of correction that amply makes up for it, in the rebuke of an indignant eye or an indignant voice. This goes far to repair the inequalities of muscular force among men; and forms indeed a most important mound of defence against the effervescence and the outbreakings of brute violence in society. It is incalculable how much we owe to this influence for the peace and courteousness that obtain in every neighbourhood. The more patent view of anger is, that it is an instrument of defence against the aggressions of violence or injustice; and by which they are kept in check, from desolating, as they otherwise would, the face of society. But it not only operates as a corrective against the outrages that are actually made. It has a preventive operation also; and we are wholly unable to say, in how far the dread of its forth-breaking, serves to soften and to subdue human intercourse into those many thousand decencies of mutual forbearance and complaisance, by which it is gladdened and adorned. There is a recoil from anger in the heart of every man when directed against himself; and many who would disdain to make one sacrifice by which to appease it, after it had thrown down the gauntlet of hostility, will in fact make one continued sacrifice of their tone and manner



and habit, that it may not be awakened out of its slumbers. It were difficult to compute how much we are indebted, for the blandness and the amenity of human companionships, to the consciousness of so many sleeping fires, in readiness to blaze forth, at the touch or on the moment of any provocation being offered. We doubt not, that, in military and fashionable, and indeed in all society, it acts as a powerful restraint on every thing that is offensive. The domineering insolence of those who, with the instrument of anger too, would hold society in bondage, is most effectually arrested, when met by an anger which throws back the fear upon themselves, and so quiets and composes all their violence. It is thus that a balance is maintained, without which human society might go into utter derangement; and without which too, even the animal creation might lose its stability and disappear. And there is a kind of moral power in the anger itself, that is separate from the animal or the physical strength which it puts into operation; and which invests with command, or at least provides with defensive armour those who would otherwise be the most helpless of our species—so that decrepid age or feeble womanhood has by the mere rebuke of an angry countenance made the stoutest heart to tremble before them. It is a moral force, by which the inequalities of muscular force are repaired; and, while itself a firebrand and a destroyer, yet, by the very terror of its ravages, which it diffuses among all, were it to stalk abroad and at large over the world—does it contribute to uphold the pacific virtues among men.

12. When the anger of one individual in a household is the terror of the rest, then that individual may become the little despot of the establishment; and thus it is that often the feeblest of them all in muscular strength may wield a domestic tyranny by which the stoutest is overpowered. But when the anger of this one is fortunately met by the spirit and resolution of another, then, kept at bay with its own weapon, it is neutralized into a state of innocence. It is not necessary for the production of this effect, that the parties ever should have come to the extremity of an open and declared violence. If there be only a mutual consciousness of each other's energy of passion and of purpose, then a mutual awe and mutual forbearance may be the result of it. And thus it is, that, by the operation of these reciprocal checks in a family, the peace and order of it may be securely upholden. We have witnessed how much a wayward and outrageous temper has been sweetened, by the very presence in the same mansion, of one who could speak again, and would not succumb to any unreasonable violence. The violence is abated. And we cannot compute how much it

is that the blandness and the mutual complaisance which obtain in society, are due to the secret dread in which men stand of each other's irritation; or, in other words, little do we know to what extent, the smile and the courteousness and the urbanity of civilized life, that are in semblance so many expressions of human benevolence, may, really and substantially, be owing to the fears of human selfishness. Were this speculation pursued, it might lead to a very humiliating estimate indeed of the virtue of individuals—though we cannot but admire the wisdom of that economy, by which, even without virtue, individuals may be made, through the mutual action and reaction of their emotions, to form the materials of a society that can stand. Anger does in private life, what the terrors of the penal code do in the community at large. It acts with salutary influence, in a vast multiplicity of cases, which no law could possibly provide for; and where the chastisements of law, whether in their corrective or preventive influence, cannot reach. The good of a penal discipline in society extends far and wide beyond the degree in which it is actually inflicted; and many are the pacific habits of a neighbourhood, that might be ascribed, not to the pacific virtues of the men who compose it, but to the terror of those consequences which all men know would ensue upon their violation. And it is just so of anger, in the more frequent and retired intercourse of private life. The good which it does by the fear of its ebullitions is greater far than all which is done by the actual ebullitions themselves. But we cannot fail to perceive that the amount of service which is done *in this way* to the species at large, must all be regarded as a deduction from the amount of credit which is due to the individuals who belong to it. We have already remarked on the propensity of moralists to accredit the wisdom of man with effects, which, as being provided for not by any care or reflection of ours, but by the operation of constitutional instincts—are more properly and immediately to be ascribed to the wisdom of God. And in like manner, there is a propensity in moralists to accredit the wisdom of man with effects, which, as being provided for not by any consciousness or exercise of principle on our part, but by the operation still of constitutional instincts—are more properly and immediately to be ascribed to the goodness of God.\*

\* The following extract from Brown tends well to illustrate one of the final causes for the implantation of this principle in our constitution.—“What human wants required, that all-foreseeing Power, who is the guardian of our infirmities, has supplied to human weakness. There is a principle in our mind, which is to us like a constant protector, which may slumber, indeed, but which slumbers only at seasons when its vigilance would be useless, which awakes therefore, at the first appearance of unjust intention, and which becomes more watchful and more vigorous, in proportion to the

13. There is another special affection which we feel more particularly induced to notice, from its palpable effect in restraining the excess of one of nature's strongest appetites. Its position in the mental system reminds one of the very obvious adaptation to each other of the antagonist muscles in anatomy. We allude to the operation of shame between the sexes, considered as a check or counteractive to the indulgence of passion between the sexes. The former is as clear an instance of moral, as the latter is of physical adaptation. And in their adjustment the one to the other, we observe that sort of exquisite balancing, which, perhaps more than any thing else, indicates the wisdom and the hand of a master—as if when, in the execution of some very nice and difficult task, he is managing between contrary extremes, or is devising in just proportion for contrary interests. We might better comprehend the design of this strikingly peculiar mechanism, by imagining of the two opposite instincts, that either of them was in excess, or either of them in defect. Did the constitutional modesty prevail to a certain conceivable extent—it might depopulate the world. Did the animal propensity preponderate, on the other hand—it might land the world in an anarchy of unblushing and universal licentiousness—to the entire breaking up of our present blissful economy, by which society is partitioned into separate families; and, with the interests of domestic life to provide for, and its affections continually to recreate the heart in the midst of anxieties and labours, mankind are kept in a state both of most useful activity and of greatest enjoyment. We cannot conceive a more skilful, we had almost said a more delicate or dexterous adjustment, than the one actually fixed upon—by which, in the first instance, through an appetency sufficiently strong the species is upholden; and, in the second in-

violence of the attack which it has to dread. What should we think of the providence of nature, if, when aggression was threatened against the weak and unarmed, at a distance from the aid of others, there were instantly and uniformly, by the intervention of some wonder-working power, to rush into the hand of the defenceless a sword or other weapon of defence? And yet this would be but a feeble assistance, if compared with that which we receive from the simple emotions which Heaven has caused to rush, as it were, into our mind for repelling every attack. What would be a sword in the trembling hand of the infirm, of the aged, of him whose pusillanimous spirit shrinks at the very appearance, not of danger merely, but even of the arms by the use of which danger might be averted, and to whom consequently, the very sword, which he scarcely knew how to grasp, would be an additional cause of terror, not an instrument of defence and safety? The instant anger which arises does more than many such weapons. It gives the spirit, which knows how to make a weapon of every thing, or, which of itself does, without a weapon, what even a thunder-bolt would be powerless to do, in the shuddering grasp of the coward. When anger arises, fear is gone; there is no coward, for all are brave. Even bodily infirmity seems to yield to it, like the very infirmities of the mind. The old are, for the moment, young again; the weakest, vigorous." Lect. lxiii.

stance, through the same appetency sufficiently restrained, those hallowed decencies of life are kept unviolated, which are so indispensable to all order and to all moral gracefulness among men. We have only to conceive the frightful aspect which society would put on, did unbridled licentiousness stalk at large as a destroyer, and rifle every home of those virtues which at once guard and adorn it. The actual and the beautiful result, when viewed in connexion with that moral force, by the insertion of which in our nature it is accomplished, strongly bespeaks a presiding intellect—which in framing the mechanism of the human mind, had respect to what was most beneficent and best for the mechanism of human society.

14. It is well that man is so much the creature of a constitution which is anterior to his own wisdom and his own will, and of circumstances which are also anterior to his wisdom and his will. It would have needed a far more comprehensive view than we are equal to, both of what was best for men in a community and for man as an individual, to have left a creature so short-sighted or of such brief and narrow survey, with the fixing either of his own principles of action or of his relation with the external world. That constitutional shame, that quick and trembling delicacy, a prompt and ever-present guardian, appearing as it does in very early childhood, is most assuredly not a result from any anticipation by us, either of future or distant consequences. Even the moral sense within us, does not speak so loudly or so distinctly the evil of this transgression, as it does of falsehood, or of injurious freedom with the property of a neighbour, or of personal violence. Other forces than those of human prudence or human principle seem to have been necessary, for resisting a most powerful and destructive fascination, which never is indulged, without deterioration to the whole structure of the moral character and constitution; and which, when once permitted to lord it over the habits, so often terminates in the cruel disruption of families, and the irretrievable ruin and disgrace of the offender. It is not by any prospective calculation of ours, that this natural modesty, acting as a strong precautionary check against evils which however tremendous, we are too heedless to reflect upon, has been established within us. It is directly implanted by one, who sees the end from the beginning; and so forms altogether a most palpable instance, in which we have reason to congratulate ourselves, that the well-being of man, instead of being abandoned to himself, has been placed so immediately under the management of better and higher hands.

15. There are many other special affections in our nature—the principal of which will fall to be noticed in succeeding



chapters ; and the interests to which they are respectively subservient form a natural ground of division, in our treatment of them. Certain of these affections stand related to the civil, and certain of them to the economic well-being of society ; and each of these subserviencies will form the subject of a separate argument.

---

## CHAPTER VI.

### *On those special Affections which conduce to the civil and political Well-being of Society.*

1. THE first step towards the aggregation of men into a community, or the first departure from a state of perfect isolation, could that state ever have subsisted for a single day, is the patriarchal arrangement. No sooner indeed is the infant creature ushered into being, than it is met by the cares and the caresses of those who are around it, and who have either attended or welcomed its entry on this scene of existence—as if, in very proportion to the extremity of its utter helplessness, was the strength of that security which nature hath provided, in the workings of the human constitution, for the protection of its weakness and the supply of all its little wants. That there should be hands to receive and to manage this tender visitant, is not more obviously a benevolent adaptation, than that there should be hearts to sympathise with its cries of impotency or distress. The maternal affection is as express an instance of this as the maternal nourishment—nor is the inference at all weakened, by the attempts, even though they should be successful, of those who would demonstrate of this universal fondness of mothers, that, instead of an original instinct, it is but a derived or secondary law of our nature. Were that analysis as distinct and satisfactory as it is doubtful and obscure, which would resolve all mental phenomena into the single principle of association—still the argument would stand. A secondary law, if not the evidence of a distinct principle, requires at least distinct and peculiar circumstances for its development ; and the right ordering of these for a beneficial result, is just as decisively the proof and the characteristic of a plan, as are the collocations of Anatomy. It might not have been necessary to endow matter with any new property for the preparation of a child's aliment in the breast of its mother—

yet the frame-work of that very peculiar apparatus by which the milk is secreted, and the suckling's mouth provided with a duct of conveyance for the abstraction of it, is, in the many fitnesses of time and place and complicated arrangement, pregnant with the evidence of a designer's contrivance and a designer's care. And in like manner, though it should be established, that the affection of a mother for her young from the moment of their birth, instead of an independent principle in her nature, was the dependent product of remembrances and feelings which had accumulated during the period of gestation, and were at length fixed, amidst the agonies of parturition, into the strongest of all her earthly regards—the argument for design is just as entire, though, instead of connecting it with the peculiarity of an original law, we connect it with the peculiarity of those circumstances which favor the development of this maternal feeling, in the form of a secondary law. There is an infinity of conceivable methods, by which the successive generations of men might have risen into being; and our argument is entire, if, out of these, that method has been selected, whereof the result is an intense affection on the part of mothers for their offspring. It matters not whether this universal propensity of theirs be a primary instinct of nature, or but a resulting habit which can be traced to the process which they have been actually made to undergo, or the circumstances in which they have actually been placed. The ordination of this process, the mandate for the assemblage and collocation of these circumstances, gives as distinct and decisive indication of an ordaining mind, as would the establishment of any peculiar law. Let it suffice once for all to have said this—for if in the prosecution of our inquiry, we stopped at every turn to entertain the question, whether each beneficial tendency on which we reasoned, were an original or only a secondary principle in nature—we should be constantly rushing uncalled into the mists of obscurity; and fastening upon our cause an element of doubt and weakness, which in no wise belongs to it.

2. The other affections which enter into the composition, or rather, form the cement of a family, are more obviously of a derivative, and less obviously of an instinctive character, than is that strong maternal affinity which meets so opportunely with the extreme helplessness of its objects, that but for the succour and sympathy of those whose delight it is to cherish and sustain them, would perish in the infancy of their being. However questionable the analysis might be, which would resolve the universal fondness of mothers for their young into something anterior—the paternal and brotherly and filial affections seem, on

surer grounds, and which are accessible to observation, not to be original but originated feelings. Inquirers, according to their respective tastes and tendencies, have deviated on both sides of the evidence—that is, either to an excessive and hypothetic simplification of nature, or to an undue multiplication of her first principles. And certain it is, that when told of the mystic ties which bind together into a domestic community, as if by a sort of certain peculiar attraction, all of the same kindred and the same blood—we are reminded of those occult qualities, which, in the physics both of matter and of mind, afforded so much of entertainment, to the scholastics of a former age. But with the adjustment of this philosophy we properly have no concern. It matters not to our argument whether the result in question be due to the force of instincts or to the force of circumstances,—any more than whether in the physical system, a certain beneficial result may be ascribed to apt and peculiar laws, or to apt and peculiar collocations. In virtue of one or other or both of these causes, we behold the individuals of the species grouped together—or, as it may be otherwise expressed, the aggregate mass of the species, broken asunder into distinct families, and generally living by themselves, each family under one common roof, but apart from all the rest in distinct habitations; while the members of every little commonwealth are so linked by certain affections, or by certain feelings of reciprocal obligation, that each member feels almost as intensely for the wants and sufferings of the rest as he would for his own, or labours as strenuously for the sustenance of all as he would for his own individual sustenance. There is very generally a union of hearts, and still oftener a union of hands, for the common interest and provision of the household.

3. The benefits of such an arrangement are too obvious to be enumerated. Even though the law of self-preservation had sufficed in those cases where the individual has adequate wisdom to devise, and adequate strength to provide for his own maintenance—of itself, it could not have availed, when this strength and this wisdom are wanting. It is in the bosom of families, and under the touch and impulse of family affections, that helpless infancy is nurtured into manhood, and helpless disease or age have the kindest and most effective succour afforded to them. Even when the strength for labour, instead of being confined to one, is shared among several of the household, there is often an incalculable benefit, in the very concert of their forces and community of their gains—so long, for example, as a brotherhood, yet advancing towards maturity, continue to live under the same roof, and to live under the direction of one authority, or by the

movement of one will. We shall not expatiate, either on the enjoyment that might be had under such an economy, while it lasts, in the sweets of mutual affection ; or minutely explain how, after the economy is dissolved, and the separate members betake themselves each to his own way in the world—the duties and the friendships of domestic life are not annihilated by this dispersion ; but, under the powerful influence of a felt and acknowledged relationship, the affinities of kindred spread and multiply beyond their original precincts, to the vast increase of mutual sympathy and aid and good offices in general society. It will not, we suppose, be questioned—that a vastly greater amount of good is done by the instrumentality of others, and that the instrumentality itself is greatly more available, under the family system, to which we are prompted by the strong affections of nature, than if that system were dissolved. But the remarkable thing is, that these affections had to be provided, as so many impellent forces—guiding men onward to an arrangement the most prolific of advantage for the whole, but which no care or consideration of the general good would have led them to form. This provision for the wants of the social economy, is analogous to that, which we have already observed, for the wants of the animal economy. Neither of these interests was confided to any cold generality, whether of principle or prudence. In the one, the strong appetite of hunger supplements the deficiency of the rational principle of self-preservation. In the other, the strong family affections supplement the deficiency of the moral principle of general benevolence. Without the first, the requisite measures would not have been taken for the regular sustenance of the individual. Without the other, the requisite measures would not have been taken for the diffused sustenance of the community at large.

4. Such is the mechanism of human society, as it comes direct, from the hand of nature or of nature's God. But many have been the attempts of human wisdom to mend and to meddle with it. Cosmopolitism, in particular, has endeavoured to substitute a sort of universal citizenship, in place of the family affections—regarding these as so many disturbing forces ; because, operating only as incentives to a partial or particular benevolence, they divert the aim from that which should, it is contended, be the object of every enlightened philanthropist, the general and greatest good of the whole. It is thus that certain transcendental speculatists would cut asunder all the special affinities of our nature, in order that men, set at large from the ties and the duties of the domestic relationship, might be at liberty to prosecute a more magnificent and god-like career of virtue ; and, in every single action, have respect, not to the well-being



of the individual, but to the well-being of the species. And thus also, friendship and patriotism have been stigmatized, along with the family affections, as so many narrow minded-virtues, which, by their distracting influence, seduce men from that all-comprehensive virtue, whose constant study being the good of the world—a happy and regenerated world, it is the fond imagination of some, would be the result of its universal prevalence among men.

5. Fortunately, nature is too strong for this speculation, which, therefore, has only its full being, in the reveries or the pages of those who, in authorship, may well be termed the philosophical novelists of our race. But, beside the actual strength of those special propensities in the heart of man, which no generalization can overrule, there is an utter impotency in human means or human expedients, for carrying this hollow, this heartless generalization into effect. It is easy to erect into a moral axiom, the principle of greatest happiness; and then, on the strength of it, to denounce all the special affections, and propose the substitution of a universal affection in their place. But in prosecuting the object of this last affection, what specific and intelligible thing are they to do? How shall they go about it? What conventional scheme shall men fall upon next for obtaining the maximum of utility, after they have broken loose, each from his own little home, and have been emancipated from those intense regards, which worked so effectively and with such force of concentration there? It has never been clearly shown, how the glorious simplifications of those cosmopolites admit of being practically realized—whether by a combination, of which the chance is that all men might not agree upon it; or by each issuing quixotically forth of his own habitation, and labouring the best he may to realize the splendid conception by which he is fired and actuated. And it does not occur to those who would thus labour to extirpate the special affections from our nature, that it is in the indulgence of them that all conceivable happiness lies; and that, in being bereft of them, we should be in truth bereft of all the means and materials of enjoyment. And there is the utmost difference in point of effect, as well as in point of feeling, between the strong love wherewith nature hath endued us for a few particular men, and the general love wherewith philosophers would inspire us for men in the abstract—the former philanthropy leading to a devoted and sustained habit of well directed exertion, for supplying the wants and multiplying the enjoyments of every separate household; the latter philanthropy, at once indefinite in its aim and intangible in its objects, overlooking every man just because charging itself with the oversight of all men. It is by a summation of particular utilities which each man, under the impulse of

his own particular affections, contributes to the general good, that nature provides for the happiness of the world. But ambitious and aspiring man would take the charge of this happiness upon himself; and his first step would be to rid the heart of all its special affections—or, in other words, to unsettle the moral dynamics which nature hath established there, without any other moral dynamics, either of precise direction or of operative force, to establish in their room. After having paralyzed all the ordinary principles of action, he would, in his newly modelled system of humanity, be able to set up no principle of action whatever. His wisdom, when thus opposed to the wisdom of nature, is utterly powerless to direct, however much, in those seasons of delusion when the merest nonentities and names find a temporary sway, it may be powerful to destroy.

6. Now there is nothing which so sets off the superior skill of one artist, as the utter failure of every other artist in his attempts to improve upon it. And so the failure of every philanthropic or political experiment which proceeds on the distrust of nature's strong and urgent and general affections, may be regarded as an impressive while experimental demonstration for the matchless wisdom of nature's God. The abortive enterprises of wild yet benevolent Utopianism; the impotent and hurtful schemes of artificial charity which so teem throughout the cities and parishes of our land; the pernicious legislation, which mars instead of medicates, whenever it intermeddles with the operations of a previous and better mechanism than its own—have all of them mis-given only because, instead of conforming to nature, they have tried to divert her from her courses, or have thwarted and traversed the strongest of her implanted tendencies. It is thus that every attempt for taking to pieces, whether totally or partially, the actual frame-work of society, and reconstructing it in a new way or on new principles—is altogether fruitless of good; and often fruitful of sorest evil both to the happiness and virtue of the commonwealth. That economy by which the family system would have been entirely broken up; and associated men, living together in planned and regulated villages, would have laboured for the common good, and given up their children wholly undomesticated to a common education—could not have been carried into effect, without overbearing the parental affection, and other strong propensities of nature besides; and so, it was stifled in embryo, by the instant revolt of nature against it. That legislation, which, instead of overbearing, would but seduce nature from her principles, may subsist for generations—yet not without such distemper to society, as may at length amount to utter disorganization. And this is precisely the mischief which the pau-

perism of England hath inflicted on the habits of English families. It hath, by the most pernicious of all bribery, relaxed the ties and obligations of mutual relationship—exonerating parents on the one hand from the care and maintenance of their own offspring; and tempting children on the other to cast off the parents who gave them birth, and, instead of an asylum gladdened by the associations and sympathies of home, consigning them for the last closing years of weakness and decrepitude to the dreary imprisonment of a poor house. Had the beautiful arrangements of nature not been disturbed, the relative affections which she herself has implanted would have been found strong enough, as in other countries, to have secured, through the means of a domestic economy alone, a provision both for young and old, in far greater unison with both the comfort and the virtue of families. The corrupt and demoralizing system of England might well serve as a lesson to philanthropists and statesmen, of the hazard, nay of the positive and undoubted mischief, to which the best interests of humanity are exposed—when they traverse the processes of a better mechanism instituted by the wisdom of God, through the operation of another mechanism devised by a wisdom of their own.

7. And those family relations in which all men necessarily find themselves at the outset of life, serve to strengthen, if they do not originate certain other subsequent affections of wider operation, and which bear with most important effect on the state and security of a commonwealth. Each man's house may be regarded as a preparatory school, where he acquires in boyhood, those habits of subordination and dependence and reverence for superiors, by which he all the more readily conforms in after-life, to the useful gradations of rank and authority and wealth which obtain in the order of general society. We are aware of a cosmopolitanism that would unsettle those principles which bind together the larger commonwealth of a state; and that too with still greater force and frequency, than it would unsettle those affections which bind together the little commonwealth of a family. It is easier to undermine in the hearts of subjects, their reverence for rank and station; than it is to dissolve the ties of parentage and brotherhood, or to denaturalize the hearts of children. Accordingly we may remember those seasons, when, in the form of what may be termed a moral epidemic, a certain spirit of lawlessness went abroad upon the land; and the minds of men were set at large from the habit of that homage and respect, which in more pacific times, they, without pusillanimity and in spite of themselves, do render to family or fortune or office in society. We know that in specific instances, an adequate

cause is too often given why men should cast off that veneration for rank by which they are naturally and habitually actuated—as, individually, when the prince or the noble, however elevated, may have disgraced himself by his tyranny or his vices; or, generally, when the patrician orders of the state may have entered into some guilty combination of force and fraud against the liberties of mankind, and outraged nature is called forth to a generous and wholesome re-action against the oppressors of their species. This is the revolt of one natural principle against the abuse of another. But the case is very different—when, instead of an hostility resting on practical grounds and justified by the abuses of a principle, there is a sort of theoretical yet withal virulent and inflamed hostility abroad in the land against the principle itself—when wealth and rank without having abused their privileges, are made *per se* the objects of a jealous and resentful malignity—when the people all reckless and agog, because the dupes of designing and industrious agitators, have been led to regard every man of affluence or station as their natural enemy—and when, with the bulk of the community in this attitude of stout and sullen defiance, authority is weakened and all the natural influences of rank and wealth are suspended. Now nature never gives more effectual demonstration of her wisdom, than by the mischief which ensues on the abjuration of her own principles; and never is the lesson thus held forth more palpable and convincing, than when respect for station and respect for office cease to be operating principles in society. We are abundantly sensible that both mighty possessions and the honours of an industrious ancestry may be disjoined from individual talent and character,—nay, that they may meet in the person of one so utterly weak or worthless, as that our reverence because of the adventitious circumstances in which he is placed, may be completely overborne by our contempt either for the imbecility or the moral turpitude by which he is deformed. But this is only the example of a contest between two principles, and of a victory by the superior over the inferior one. We are not, however, because of the inferiority of a principle to lose sight of its existence; or to betray such an imperfect discernment and analysis of the human mind, as to deny the reality of any one principle, because liable to be modified, or kept in check, or even for the time rendered altogether powerless, by the interposition and the conflict of another principle. If, on the one hand, rank may be so disjoined from righteousness as to forfeit all its claims to respect—on the other hand, to be convinced that these claims are the objects of a natural and universal acknowledgment, and have therefore a foundation in the actual constitution



of human nature, let us only consider the effect, when pre-eminent rank and pre-eminent or even but fair and ordinary righteousness, meet together in the person of the same individual. The effect of such a composition upon human feelings may well persuade us that, while a respect for righteousness admitted by all enters as one ingredient, a respect for rank has its distinct and substantive being also as another ingredient. We have the former ingredient by itself in a state of separation, and are therefore most sensible of its presence, when the object of contemplation is a virtuous man. But we are distinctly sensible to the superaddition of the latter ingredient, when, instead of a virtuous man, the object of contemplation is a virtuous monarch—though it becomes more palpable still, when it too is made to exist in a state of separation, which it does, when the monarch is neither hateful for his vices nor very estimable for his virtues; but stands forth in the average possession of those moralities and of that intellect which belong to common and every day humanity. Even such a monarch has only to appear among his subjects; and, in all ordinary times, he will be received with the greetings of an honest and heartfelt loyalty, while any unwonted progress through his dominions is sure to be met all over the land, by the acclamations of a generous enthusiasm. Even the sturdiest demagogue, if he come within the sphere of the royal presence, cannot resist the infection of that common sentiment by which all are actuated; but, as if struck with a moral impotency, he also, carried away by the fascination, is constrained to feel and to acknowledge its influence. Some there are, who might affect to despise human nature for such an exhibition, and indignantly exclaim that men are born to be slaves. But the truth is, that there is nothing prostrate, nothing pusillanimous in the emotion at all. Instead of this, it is a lofty chivalrous emotion, of which the most exalted spirits are the most susceptible, and which all might indulge without any forfeiture of their native or becoming dignity. We do not affirm of this respect either for the sovereignty of an empire, or for the chieftainship of a province—that it forms an original or constituent part of our nature. It is enough for our argument, if it be a universal result of the circumstances in every land, where such gradations of power and property are established. In a word, it is the doing of nature, and not of man; and if man, in the proud and presumptuous exercise of his own wisdom, shall lift his rebel hand against the wisdom of nature, and try to uproot this principle from human hearts—he will find that it cannot be accomplished, without tearing asunder one of the strongest of those ligaments, which bind together the component parts of

human society into a harmonious and well-adjusted mechanism. And it is then that the wisdom which made nature, will demonstrate its vast superiority over the wisdom which would mend it—when the desperate experiment of the latter has been tried and found wanting. There are certain restraining forces (and reverence for rank and station is one of them) which never so convincingly announce their own importance to the peace and stability of the commonwealth, as in those seasons of popular frenzy, when, for a time, they are slackened or suspended. For it is then that the vessel of the state, as if slipped from her moorings, drifts headlong among the surges of insurrectionary violence, till, as the effect of this great national effervescence, the land mourns over its ravaged fields and desolated families; when, after, the sweeping anarchy has blown over it, and the sore chastisement has been undergone, the now schooled and humbled people seek refuge anew in those very principles, which they had before traduced and discarded: And it will be fortunate if, when again settled down in the quietude of their much needed and much longed-for repose, there be not too vigorous a re-action of those conservative influences, which, in the moment of their wantonness, they had flung so recklessly away—in virtue of which the whips may become scorpions, and the mild and well-balanced monarchy may become a grinding despotism.

8. Next to the wisdom which nature discovers in her implanation or developement of those affections, by which society is parcelled down into separate families; is the wisdom which she discovers in those other affections, by which the territory of a nation, and all upon it that admits of such a distribution, is likewise parcelled and broken off into separate properties. Both among the analysts of the human mind, and among metaphysical jurists and politicians, there is to be found much obscure and unsatisfactory speculation respecting those principles, whether elementary or complex, by which property is originated and by which property is upholden. We are not called to enter upon any subtle analysis for the purpose of ascertaining either what that is which gives birth to the possessory feeling on the part of an owner, or what that is which leads to such a universal recognition and respect for his rights in general society. It will be enough if we can evince that neither of these is a factitious product, devised by the wisdom or engendered by the authority of patriots and legislators, deliberating on what was best for the good and order of a community; but that both of them are the results of a prior wisdom, employed, not in framing a constitution for a state, but in framing a constitution for human

nature. It will suffice to demonstrate this, if we can show, that, in very early childhood, there are germinated both a sense of property and a respect for the property of others ; and that, long before the children have been made the subjects of any artificial training on the thing in question, or are at all capable of any anticipation, or even wish, respecting the public and collective well-being of the country at large. Just as the affection of a mother is altogether special, and terminates upon the infant, without any calculation as to the superiority of the family system over the speculative systems of the cosmopolites ; and just as the appetite of hunger impels to the use of food, without the least regard, for the time being, to the support or preservation of the animal economy—so, most assuredly, do the desires or notions of property, and even the principles by which it is limited, spring up in the breasts of children, without the slightest apprehension, on their part, of its vast importance to the social economy of the world. It is the provision, not of man, but of God.

9. That is my property, to the use and enjoyment of which I, without the permission of others, am free, in a manner that no other is ; and it is mine and mine only, in as far as this use and enjoyment are limited to myself—and others, apart from any grant or permission by me, are restrained from the like use and the like enjoyment. Now the first tendency of a child, instead of regarding only certain things, as those to the use and enjoyment of which it alone is free, is to regard itself as alike free to the use and enjoyment of all things. We should say that it regards the whole of external nature as a vast common, but for this difference—that, instead of regarding nature as free to all, it rather regards it as free to itself alone. When others intermeddle with any one thing, in a way that suits not its fancy or pleasure, it resents and storms and exclaims like one bereft of its rights—so that, instead of regarding the universe as a common, it were more accurate to say, that it regarded the whole as its own property, or itself as the universal proprietor of all on which it may have cast a pleased or a wishful eye. Whatever it grasps, it feels to be as much its own as it does the fingers which grasp it. And not only do its claims extend to all within its reach, but to all within the field of its vision—insomuch, that it will even stretch forth its hands to the moon in the firmament ; and wreak its displeasure on the nurse, for not bringing the splendid bauble within its grasp. Instead then of saying, that, at this particular stage, it knows not how to appropriate any thing, it were more accurate to say, that a universal tyrant and monopolist, it would claim and appropriate all things—exactng from the whole of nature a subserviency to its caprices ; and,

the little despot of its establishment, giving forth its intimations and its mandates, with the expectation, and often with the real power and authority of instant obedience. We before said that its anger was coextensive with the capacity of sensation; and we now say that, whatever its rectified notion of property may be, it has the original notion of an unlimited range over which itself at least may expatiate, without let or contradiction—the self-constituted proprietor of a domain, wide as its desires, and on which none may interfere against its will, without awakening in its bosom, somewhat like the sense and feeling of an injurious molestation.\*

10. And it is instructive to observe the process, by which this original notion of property is at length rectified into the subsequent notion, which obtains in general society. For this purpose we must enquire what the circumstances are which limit and determine that sense of property, which was quite general and unrestricted before, to certain special things, of which the child learns to feel that they are peculiarly its own—and that too, in a manner which distinguishes them from all other things, which are not so felt to be its own. The child was blind to any such distinction before—its first habit being to arrogate and monopolize all things; and the question is, what those circumstances are, which serve to signalize some things, to which, its feelings of property, now withdrawn from wide and boundless generality, are exclusively and specifically directed. It will make conclusively for our argument, if it shall appear, that this sense of property, even in its posterior and rectified form, is the work of nature, operating on the hearts of children; and not the work of man, devising, in the maturity of his political wisdom, such a regulated system of things, as might be best for the order and well being of society.

11. This matter then might be illustrated by the contests of very young children, and by the manner in which these are adjusted to the acquiescence and satisfaction of them all. We might gather a lesson even from the quarrel which sometimes arises among them, about a matter so small as their right to the

\* From what has been already said of resentment, it would appear, that the instinctive feeling of property, and instinctive anger are in a state of co-relation with each other. It is by offence being rendered to the former, that the latter is called forth. Anterior to a sense of justice, our disposition is to arrogate every thing—and it is then that we are vulnerable to anger from all points of the compass. Let another meddle, to our annoyance, with any thing whatever, at this early stage, and we shall feel the very emotion of anger, which in a higher stage of moral and mental cultivation, is only called forth by its meddling with that which really and rightfully belongs to us. The sense of justice, instead of originating either the emotion of anger, or a sense of property, has the effect to limit and restrain both.



particular chairs of a room. If one for example, have just sat on a chair, though only for a few minutes, and then left it for a moment—it will feel itself injured, if, on returning, it shall find the chair in the possession of another occupier. The brief occupation which it has already had, gives it the feeling of a right to the continued occupation of it—insomuch, that, when kept out by an intruder, it has the sense of having been wrongously dispossessed. The particular chair of which it was for some time the occupier, is the object of a special possessory affection or feeling, which it attaches to no other chair; and by which it stands invested in its own imagination, as being, for the time, the only rightful occupier. This then may be regarded as a very early indication of that possessory feeling, which is afterwards of such extensive influence in the economy of social life—a feeling so strong, as often of itself to constitute a plea, not only sufficient in the apprehension of the claimant, but sufficient in the general sense of the community, for substantiating the right of many a proprietor.

12. But there is still another primitive ingredient which enters into this feeling of property; and we call it primitive, because anterior to the sanctions or the application of law. Let the child in addition to the plea that it had been the recent occupier of the chair in question, be able further to advance in argument for its right—that, with its own hands, it had just placed it beside the fire, and thereby given additional value to the occupation of it. This reason is both felt by the child itself, and will be admitted by other children even of a very tender age, as a strengthener of its claim. It exemplifies the second great principle on which the natural right of property rests—even that every man is proprietor of the fruit of his own labour; and that to whatever extent he may have impressed additional value on any given thing by the work of his own hands, to that extent, at least, he should be held the owner of it.

13. This then seems the way, in which the sense of his right to any given thing arises in the heart of the claimant; but something more must be said to account for the manner in which this right is deferred to by his companions. It accounts for the manner, in which the possessory feeling arises in the hearts of one and all of them, when similarly circumstanced; but it does not account for the manner in which this possessory feeling, in the heart of each, is respected by all his fellows—so that he is suffered to remain, in the secure and unmolested possession of that which he rightfully claims. The circumstances which originate the sense of property, serve to explain this one fact, the existence of a possessory feeling, in the heart of every individual

who is actuated thereby. But the deference rendered to this feeling by any other individuals, is another and a distinct fact; and we must refer to a distinct principle from that of the mere sense of property, for the explanation of it. This new or distinct principle is a sense of equity—or that which prompts to likeness or equality, between the treatment which I should claim of others and my treatment of them; and in virtue of which, I should hold it unrighteous and unfair, if I disregarded or inflicted violence on the claim of another, which, in the same circumstances with him, I am conscious that I should have felt, and would have advanced for myself. Had I been the occupier of that chair, in like manner with the little claimant who is now insisting on the possession of it, I should have felt and claimed precisely as he is doing. Still more, had I like him placed it beside the fire, I should have felt what he is now expressing—a still more distinct and decided right to it. If conscious of an identity of feeling between me and another in the same circumstances—then let my moral nature be so far evolved as to feel the force of this consideration; and, under the operation of a sense of equity, I shall defer to the very claim, which I should myself have urged, had I been similarly placed. And it is marvellous, how soon the hearts of children discover a sensibility to this consideration, and how soon they are capable of becoming obedient to the power of it. It is, in fact, the principle on which a thousand contests of the nursery are settled, and many thousand more are prevented; what else would be an incessant scramble of rival and ravenous cupidity, being mitigated and reduced to a very great, though unknown and undefinable extent, by the sense of justice coming into play. It is altogether worthy of remark, however, that the sense of property is anterior to the sense of justice, and comes from an anterior and distinct source in our nature. It is not justice which originates the proprietary feeling in the heart of any individual. It only arbitrates between the proprietary claims and feelings of different individuals—after these had previously arisen by the operation of other principles in the human constitution. Those writers on jurisprudence are sadly and inextricably puzzled, who imagine that justice presided over the first ordinations of property—utterly at a loss as they must be, to find out the principle that could guide her initial movements. Justice did not create property; but found it already created—her only office being to decide between the antecedent claims of one man and another: And, in the discharge of this office, she but compares the rights which each of them can allege, as founded either on the length of undisputed and undisposed of possession, or on the value they had impressed on the thing at issue by labour of their own. In

other words, she bears respect to those two great primitive ingredients by which property is constituted, before that she had ever bestowed any attention, or given any award whatever regarding it. The matter may be illustrated by the peculiar relation in which each man stands to his own body, as being, in a certain view, the same with the peculiar relation in which each man stands to his own property. His sensitive feelings are hurt, by the infliction of a neighbour's violence upon the one; and his proprietary feelings are hurt by the encroachment of a neighbour's violence upon the other. But justice no more originated the proprietary, than it did the sensitive feelings—no more gave me the peculiar affection which I feel for the property I now occupy as my own, than it gave me my peculiar affection for the person which I now occupy as my own. Justice pronounces on the iniquity of any hurtful infliction by us on the person of another—seeing that such an infliction upon our own person, to which we stand similarly related, would be resented by ourselves. And Justice, in like manner, pronounces on the inequality or iniquity of any hurtful encroachment by us on the property of another—also seeing, that such an encroachment upon our own property, to which we stand similarly related, would be felt and resented by ourselves. Man feels one kind of pain, when the hand which belongs to him is struck by another; and he feels another kind of pain, when some article which it holds, and which he conceives to belong to him, is wrested by another from its grasp. But it was not justice which instituted either the animal economy in the one case, or the proprietary economy in the other. Justice found them both already instituted. Property is not the creation of justice; but is in truth a prior creation. Justice did not form this material, or command it into being; but in the course of misunderstanding or controversy between man and man, property, a material pre-existent or already made, forms the subject of many of those questions which are put into her hands.

14. But, recurring to the juvenile controversy which we have already imagined for the purpose of illustration, there is still a third way in which we may conceive it to be conclusively and definitively settled. The parents may interpose their authority, and assign his own particular chair to each member of the household. The instant effect of such a decree, in fixing and distinguishing the respective properties in all time coming, has led, we believe, to a misconception regarding the real origin of property—in consequence of a certain obscure analogy between this act of parents or legislators over the family of a household, and a supposed act of rulers or legislators over the great family of a

nation. Now, not only have the parents this advantage over the magistrates—that the property which they thus distribute is previously their own; but there is both a power of enforcement and a disposition to acquiescence within the limits of a home, which exist in an immeasurably weaker degree within the limits of a kingdom. Still, with all this superiority on the part of the household legislators, it would even be their wisdom, to conform their decree as much as possible to those natural principles and feelings of property, which had been in previous exercise among their children—to have respect, in fact, when making distribution of the chairs, both to their habits of previous occupation, and to the additional value which any of them may have impressed upon their favourite seats, by such little arts of upholstery or mechanics, as they are competent to practice. A wise domestic legislator would not thwart, but rather defer to the claims and expectations which nature had previously founded. And still more a national legislator or statesman, would evince his best wisdom, by, instead of traversing the constitution of property which nature had previously established, greatly deferring to that sense of a possessory right, which long and unquestioned occupation so universally gives; and greatly deferring to the principle, that, whatever the fruit of each man's labour may be, it rightfully, and therefore should legitimately belong to him. A government could, and at the termination of a revolutionary storm, often does, traverse these principles; but not without the excitement of a thousand heart-burnings, and so the establishment of a strong counteraction to its own authority in the heart of its dominions. It is the dictate of sound policy—that the natural, on the one hand, and the legal or political on the other, should quadrate as much as possible. And thus, instead of saying with Dr. Paley that property derived its constitution and being from the law of the land—we should say that law never exhibits a better understanding of her own place and functions, than when, founding on materials already provided, she feels that her wisest part is but to act as an auxiliary, and to ratify that prior constitution which nature had put into her hands.

15. In this exposition which we have now attempted of the origin and rights of property, we are not insensible to the mighty use of law. By its power of enforcement, it perpetuates or defends from violation that existent order of things which itself had established, or, rather, which itself had ratified. Even though at its first ordinations it had contravened those natural principles which enter into the foundation of property, these very principles will, in time, re-appear in favour of the new system, and yield to it a firmer and a stronger support with every day of its continuance.



Whatever fraud or force may have been concerned at the historical commencement of the present and actual distribution of property—the then new possessors have at length become old; and, under the canopy and protection of law, the natural rights have been superadded to the factitious or the political. Law has guaranteed to each proprietor a long continued occupation, till a strong and inveterate possessory feeling has taken root and arisen in every heart. And secure of this occupation, each may, in the course of years, have mixed up to an indefinite amount, the improvements of his own skill and labour with those estates—which, as the fruit whether of anarchy or of victorious invasion, had fallen into his hands. So that these first and second principles of natural jurisprudence, whatever violence may have been done to them at the overthrow of a former regime, are again fostered into all their original efficacy and strength during the continuance of a present one. Inasmuch, that if, at the end of half a century, those outcasts of a great revolutionary hurricane, the descendants of a confiscated noblesse, were to rally and combine for the recovery of their ancient domains—they would be met in the encounter, not by the force of the existing government only, but by the outraged and resentful feelings of the existing proprietors, whose possessory and prescriptive rights, now nurtured into full and firm establishment, would, in addition to the sense of interest, enlist even the sense of justice upon their side. Apart from the physical, did we but compute the moral forces which enter into such a conflict, it will often be found that the superiority is in favour of the actual occupiers. Those feelings, on the one hand, which are associated with the recollection of a now departed ancestry and their violated rights, are found to be inoperative and feeble, when brought into comparison or collision with that strength which nature has annexed to the feelings of actual possession. Regarded as but a contest of sentiment alone, the disposition to recover is not so strong as the disposition to retain. The recollection that these were once my parental acres, though wrested from the hand of remote ancestors by anarchists and marauders, would not enlist so great or so practical a moral force on the aggressive side of a new warfare, as the reflection that these are now my possessed acres, which, though left but by immediate ancestors, I have been accustomed from infancy to call my own, would enlist on the side of the defensive. In the course of generations, those sedative influences, which tend to the preservation of the existing order wax stronger and stronger; and those disturbing influences, which tend to the restoration of the ancient order, wax weaker and weaker—till man at last ceases to charge himself with a task so infinitely above his strength, as

the adjustment of the quarrels and the accumulated wrongs of the centuries which have gone by. In other words, the constitution of law in regard to property, which is the work of man, may be so framed as to sanction, and, therefore, to encourage the enormities which have been perpetrated by the force of arms—while the constitution of the mind in regard to property, which is the work of nature, is so framed, as, with conservative virtue, to be altogether on the side of perpetuity and peace.

16. Had a legislator of supreme wisdom and armed with despotic power been free to establish the best scheme for augmenting the wealth and the comforts of human society—he could have devised nothing more effectual than that existing constitution of property, which obtains so generally throughout the world; and by which, each man, secure within the limits of his own special and recognized possession, might claim as being rightly and originally his, the fruit of all the labour which he may choose to expend upon it. But this was not left to the discovery of man, or to any ordinations of his consequent upon that discovery. He was not led to this arrangement by the experience of its consequences; but prompted to it by certain feelings, as much prior to that experience, as the appetite of hunger is prior to our experience of the use of food. In this matter, too, the wisdom of nature has anticipated the wisdom of man, by providing him with original principles of her own. Man was not left to find out the direction in which his benevolence might be most productive of enjoyment to others; but he has been irresistibly, and, as far as he is concerned, blindly impelled thereto by means of a family affection—which, concentrating his efforts on a certain few, has made them a hundred times more prolific of benefit to mankind than if all had been left to provide the best they may for the whole, without a precise or determinate impulse to any. And in like manner, man was not left to find out the direction in which his industry might be made most productive of the materials of enjoyment; but, with the efforts of each concentrated by means of a special possessory affection on a certain portion of the territory, the universal produce is incalculably greater than under a medley system of indifference, with every field alike open to all, and, therefore, alike unreclaimed from the wilderness—unless one man shall consent to labour it in seed time, although another should reap the fruit of his labour in the harvest. It is good that man was not trusted with the whole disentanglement of this chaos—but that a natural jurisprudence, founded on the constitution of the human mind, so far advances and facilitates the task of that artificial jurisprudence, which frames the various codes or constitutions of human law. It is well that nature has

connected with the past and actual possession of any thing, so strong a sense of right to its continued possession; and that she has so powerfully backed this principle, by means of another as strongly and universally felt as the former, even that each man has a right to possess the fruit of his own industry. The human legislator has little more to do than to conform, or rather to promulgate and make known his determination to abide by principles already felt and recognized by all men. Wanting these, he could have fixed nothing, he could have perpetuated nothing. The legal constitution of every state, in its last and finished form, comes from the hand of man. But the great and natural principles, which secure for these constitutions the acceptance of whole communities—implanted in man from his birth, or at least evincing their presence and power in very early childhood—these are what bespeak the immediate hand of God.

17. But these principles, strongly conservative though they be, on the side of existing property do not at all times prevent a revolution—which is much more frequently, however, a revolution of power than of property. But when such is the degree of violence abroad in society, that even the latter is effected—this most assuredly, does not arise from any decay or intermission of the possessory feelings, that we have just been expounding; but from the force and fermentation of other causes which prevail in opposition to these, and in spite of them. And, after that such revolution has done its work and ejected the old dynasty of proprietors, the mischief to them may be as irrecoverable, as if their estates had been wrested from them, by an irruption from the waters of the ocean, by earthquake, or the sweeping resistless visitation of any other great physical calamity. The moral world has its epochs and its transitions as well as the natural, during which the ordinary laws are not suspended but only for the time overborne; but this does not hinder the recurrence and full reinstatement of these laws during the long eras of intermediate repose. And it is marvellous, with what certainty and speed, the conservative influences, of which we have treated, gather around a new system of things, with whatever violence, and even injustice, it may have been ushered into the world—insomuch that, under the guardianship of the powers which be, those links of a natural jurisprudence, now irretrievably torn from the former, are at length transferred in all their wonted tenacity to the existing proprietors; riveting each of them to his own several property, and altogether establishing a present order of as great firmness and strength as ever belonged to the order which went before it, but which is now superseded and forgotten. It is well that nature hath annexed so potent a charm to actual possession; and a

charm which strengthens with every year and day of its continuance. This may not efface the historical infamy of many ancient usurpations. But the world cannot be kept in a state of perpetual effervescence; and now that the many thousand wrongs of years gone by, as well as the dead on whom they have been inflicted, are fading into deep oblivion—it is well for the repose of its living generations, that, in virtue of the strong possessory feelings which nature causes to arise in the hearts of existing proprietors and to be sympathized with by all other men, the possessors *de facto* have at length the homage done to them of possessors *de jure*; strong in their own consciousness of right, and strong in the recognition thereof by all their contemporaries.

18. But ere we have completed our views upon this subject, we must shortly dwell on a principle of very extensive application in morals; and which itself forms a striking example of a most beautiful and beneficent adaptation in the constitution of the human mind to the needs and the well-being of human society. It may be thus announced, briefly and generally:—however strong the special affections of our nature may be, yet, if along with them there be but a principle of equity in the mind, then, these affections, so far from concentrating our selfish regards upon their several objects to the disregard and injury of others, will but enhance our respect and our sympathy for the like affections in other men.

19. This may be illustrated, in the first instance, by the equity observed between man and man, in respect to the bodies which they wear—endowed, as we may suppose them to be, with equal, at least with like capacities of pain and suffering from external violence. To inflict that very pain upon another which I should resent or shrink from in agony, if inflicted upon myself—this to all sense of justice appears a very palpable iniquity. Let us now conceive then, that the sentient frame-work of each of the parties was made twice more sensitive, or twice more alive to pain and pungency of feeling than it actually is. In one view it may be said that each would become twice more selfish than before. Each would feel a double interest in warding off external violence from himself; and so be doubly more anxious for his own protection and safety. But, with the very same moral nature as ever, each, now aware of the increased sensibility, not merely in himself but in his fellows, would feel doubly restrained from putting forth upon him a hand of violence. So, grant him to have but a sense of equity—and, exactly in proportion as he became tender of himself, would he become tender of another also. If the now superior exquisiteness of his own frame afforded him a topic, on which, what may be called his selfishness would feel more intensely than before—the now superior exquisiteness of another's frame would, in like



manner, afford a topic, on which his sense of justice would feel more intensely than before. It is even as when men of very acute sensibilities company together—each has, on that very account, a more delicate and refined consideration for the feelings of all the rest; and it is only among men of tougher pellicle and rigid fibre, where coarseness and freedom prevail, because there coarseness and freedom are not felt to be offensive. Grant me but a sense of equity—and the very fineness of my sensations which weds me so much more to the care and the defence of my own person, would also, on the imagination of a similar fineness in a fellow-man, restrain me so much more from the putting forth of any violence upon his person. If I had any compassion at all, or any horror at the injustice of inflicting upon another, that which I should feel to be a cruelty, if inflicted upon myself—I would experience a greater recoil of sympathy from the blow that was directed to the surface of a recent wound upon another, precisely as I would feel a severer agony in a similar infliction upon myself. So, there is nothing in the quickness of my physical sensibilities, and by which I am rendered more alive to the care and the guardianship of my own person—there is nothing in this to blunt, far less to extinguish my sensibilities for other men. Nay, it may give a quicker moral delicacy to all the sympathies which I before felt for them. And especially, the more sensitive I am to the hurts and the annoyances which others bring upon my own person, the more scrupulous may I be of being in any way instrumental to the hurt or the annoyance of others.

20. The same holds true between man and man, not merely of the bodies which they wear, but of the families which belong to them. Each man, by nature, hath a strong affection for his own offspring—the young whom he hath reared, and with whom the daily habit of converse under the same roof, hath strengthened all the original affinities that subsisted between them. But one man a parent knows that another man, also a parent, is actuated by the very same appropriate sensibilities towards his offspring; and nought remains but to graft on these separate and special affections in each, a sympathy between one neighbour and another; that there might be a mutual respect for each other's family affections. After the matter is advanced thus far, we can be at no loss to perceive, that, in proportion to the strength of the parental affection with each, will be the strength of the fellow-feeling that each has with the affection of the other—insomuch that he who bears in his heart the greatest tenderness for his own offspring, would feel the greatest revolt against an act of severity towards the offspring of his friend. Now it is

altogether so with the separate and original sense of property in each of two neighbours, and a sense of justice grafted thereupon—even as a mutual neighbourlike sympathy may be grafted on the separate family affections. One man a proprietor, linked by many ties, with that which he hath possessed and been in the habitual use and management of for years, is perfectly conscious of the very same kind of affinity, between another man a proprietor and that which belongs to him. It is not the justice which so links him to his own property, any more than it is the sympathy with his neighbour which has linked him to his own children. But the justice hath given him a respectful feeling for his neighbour's rights, even as the sympathy would give him a tenderness for his neighbour's offspring. And so far from there being aught in the strength of the appropriating principle that relaxes this deference to the rights of his neighbour, the second principle may in fact grow with the growth, and strengthen with the strength of the first one.

21. For the purpose of maintaining an equitable regard, or an equitable conduct to others—it is no more necessary that we should reduce or extirpate the special affections of our nature, than that, in order to make room for the love of another, we should discharge from the bosom all love of ourselves. So far from this, the affection we have for ourselves, or for those various objects which by the constitution of our nature we are formed to seek after and to delight in—is the measure of that dutiful regard which we owe to others, and of that dutiful respect which we owe to all their rights and all their interests. The very highest behest of social morality, while at the same time the most comprehensive of its rules, is that we should love our neighbour as we do ourselves. Love to our neighbour is the thing which this rule measures off—and love to ourselves is the thing which it measures by. These two then, the social and the selfish affections, instead of being as they too often are inversely, might under a virtuous regimen be directly proportional to each other. At all events the way to advance or magnify the one, is not surely to weaken or abridge the other. The strength of certain prior affections which by nature we do have, is the standard of certain posterior affections which morality tells that we ought to have. Morality neither plants these prior affections, nor does she enjoin us to extirpate them. They were inserted by the hand of nature for the most useful purposes; and morality, instead of demolishing her work, applies the rule and compass to it for the construction of her own.

22. It was not justice which presided over the original distribution of property. It was not she who assigned to each man his separate field, any more than it was she who assigned to each

man his separate family. It was nature that did both, by investing with such power those anterior circumstances of habit and possession, which gave rise—first, to the special love that each man bears to his own children, and secondly, to the special love that each man bears to his own acres. Had there been no such processes beforehand, for thus isolating the parental regards of each on that certain household group which nature placed under his roof, and the proprietary regards of each on that certain local territory which history casts into his possession: or, had each man been so constituted, that, instead of certain children whom he felt to be his own, he was alike loose to them or susceptible of a like random and indiscriminate affection for any children; or, instead of certain lands which he felt to be his own, he was alike loose to them or susceptible of a like tenacious adherence to any lands—had such been the rudimental chaos which nature put into the hands of man for the exercise of his matured faculties, neither his morality nor his wisdom would have enabled him to unravel it. But nature prepared for man an easier task; and when justice arose to her work, she found a territory so far already partitioned, and each proprietor linked by a strong and separate tie of peculiar force to that part which he himself did occupy. She found this to be the land which one man went to possess and cultivate, and that to be the land which another man went to possess and cultivate—the destination, not originally, of justice, but of accident, which her office nevertheless is not to reverse, but to confirm. We hold it a beautiful part of our constitution, that, the firmer the tenacity wherewith the first man adheres to his own, once that justice takes her place among the other principles of his nature, the prompter will be his recognition of the second man's right to his own. If each man sat more loosely to his own portion, each would have viewed more loosely the right of his neighbour to the other portion. The sense of property, anterior to justice, exists in the hearts of all; and the principle of justice, subsequent to property, does not extirpate these special affections, but only arbitrates between them. In proportion to the felt strength of the proprietary affection in the hearts of each; will be the strength of that deference which each, in so far as justice has the mastery over him, renders to the rights and the property of his neighbour. These are the principles of the *histoire raisonnée*, that has been more or less exemplified in all the countries of the world; and which might still be exemplified in the appropriation of a desert island. If we had not had the prior and special determinations of nature, justice would have felt the work of appropriation to be an inextricable problem. If we had not had justice, with each man

obeying only the impulse of his own affections and unobservant of the like affection of others, we should have been kept in a state of constant and interminable war. Under the guidance of nature and justice together, the whole earth might have been parcelled out, without conflict and without interference.

23. If a strong self-interest in one's person may not only be consistent with, but, by the aid of the moral sense, may be conducive to a proportionally strong principle of forbearance from all injury to the persons of other men—why may not the very same law be at work in regard to property as to person? The fondness wherewith one nourishes and cherishes his own flesh, might, we have seen, enhance his sympathy and his sense of justice for that of other men; and so, we affirm, might it be of the fondness wherewith one nourishes and cherishes his own field. The relation in which each man stands to his own body, was anterior to the first dawnings of his moral nature; and his instinctive sensibilities of pain and suffering, when any violence is inflicted, were also anterior. But as his moral perceptions expand, and he considers others beside himself who are similarly related to their bodies—these very susceptibilities not only lead him to recoil from the violence that is offered to himself; but they lead him to refrain from the offering of violence to other men. They may have an air of selfishness at the first; yet so far from being obstacles in the way of justice, they are indispensable helps to it. And so may each man stand related to a property as well as to a person; and by ties that bind him to it, ere he thought of his neighbour's property at all—by instinctive affections, which operated previously to a sense of justice in his bosom; and yet which, so far from acting as a thwart upon his justice to others, give additional impulse to all his observations of it. He feels what has passed within his own bosom, in reference to the field that he has possessed, and has laboured, and that has for a time been respected by society as his; and he is aware of the very same feeling in the breast of a neighbour in relation to another field; and in very proportion to the strength of his own feeling, does he defer to that of his fellow-men. It is at this point that the sense of justice begins to operate—not for the purpose of leading him to appropriate his own, for this he has already done; but for the purpose of leading him to respect the property of others. It was not justice which gave to either of them at the first that feeling of property, which each has in his own separate domain; any more than it was justice which gave to either of them that feeling of affection which each has for his own children. It is after, and not before these feelings are formed, that justice steps in with her golden rule, of not doing to others as we would



not others to do unto us ; and, all conscious as we are of the dislike and resentment we should feel on the invasion of our property, it teaches to defer to a similar dislike and a similar resentment in other men. And, so far from this original and instinctive regard for this property which is my own serving at all to impair, when once the moral sense comes into play, it enhances my equitable regard for the property of others. It is just with me the proprietor, as it is with me the parent. My affection for my own family does not prompt me to appropriate the family of another ; but it strengthens my sympathetic consideration for the tenderness and feeling of their own parent towards them. My affection for my own field does not incline me to seize upon that of another man ; but it strengthens my equitable consideration for all the attachments and the claims which its proprietor has upon it. In proportion to the strength of that instinct which binds me to my own offspring, is the sympathy I feel with the tenderness of other parents. In proportion to the strength of that instinct which binds me to my own property, is the sense of equity I feel towards the rights of all other proprietors. It was not justice which gave either the one instinct or the other ; but justice teaches each man to bear respect to that instinct in another, which he feels to be of powerful operation in his own bosom.

24. It is in virtue of my sentient nature that I am so painfully alive to the violence done upon my own body, as to recoil from the infliction of it upon myself. And it is in virtue of my moral nature, that, alive to the pain of other bodies than my own, I refrain from the infliction of it upon them. It is not justice which gives the sensations ; but justice pronounces on the equal respect that is due to the sensations of all. Neither does justice give the sensations of property, but it finds them ; and pronounces on the respect which each owes to the sensations of all the rest. It was not justice which gave the personal feeling ; neither is it justice which gives the possessory feeling. Justice has nothing to do with the process by which this body came to be my own ; and although now, perhaps, there is not a property, at least in the civilized world, which may not have passed into the hand of their actual possessors, by a series of purchases, over which justice had the direction—yet there was a time when it might have been said, that justice has had nothing to do with the process by which this garden came to be my own ; and yet, then as well as now, it would have been the utterance of a true feeling ; that he who touches this garden, touches the apple of mine eye. And it is as much the dictate of justice, that we shall respect the one sensation as the other. He, indeed, who has the greatest

sensitiveness, whether about his own person or his own property, will, with an equal principle of justice in his constitution, have the greatest sympathy, both for the personal and the proprietary rights of others. This view of it saves all the impracticable mysticism that has gathered around the speculations of those, who conceive of justice, as presiding over the first distributions of property; and so have fallen into the very common mistake, of trying to account for that which had been provided for by the wisdom of nature, as if it had been provided by the wisdom and the principle of man. At the first allocations of property, justice may have had no hand in them: They were altogether fortuitous. One man set himself down, perhaps on a better soil than his neighbour, and chalked out for himself a larger territory, at a time when there was none who interfered or who offered to share it with him; and so he came to as firm a possessory feeling in reference to his wider domain, as the other has in reference to his smaller. Our metaphysical jurists are sadly puzzled to account for the original inequalities of property, and for the practical acquiescence of all men in the actual and very unequal distribution of it—having recourse to an original social compact, and to other fictions alike visionary. But if there be truth in our theory, it is just as easy to explain, why the humble proprietor, would no more think of laying claim to certain acres of his rich neighbour's estate because it was larger than his own, than he would think of laying claim to certain children of his neighbour's family because it was larger—or even of laying claim to certain parts of his neighbour's person because it was larger. He is sufficiently acquainted with his own nature to be aware, that, were the circumstances changed, he should feel precisely as his affluent neighbour does; and he respects the feeling accordingly. He knows that, if himself at the head of a larger property, he would have the same affection for all its fields that the actual proprietor has; and that, if at the head of a larger family, he would have the same affection with the actual parent for all its children. It is by making justice come in at the right place, that is, not prior to these strong affections of nature but posterior to them, that the perplexities of this inquiry are done away. The principle on which it arbitrates, is, not the comparative magnitude of the properties, but the relative feelings of each actual possessor towards each actual property; and if it find these in every instance, to be the very feelings which all men would have in the circumstances belonging to that instance—it attempts no new distribution, but gives its full sanction to the distribution which is already before it. This is the real origin and upholder of that conservative influence which binds together the rich and

the poor in society; and thus it is that property is respected throughout all its gradations.

25. It is from the treatment of an original as if it were a derived affection, that the whole obscurity on this topic has arisen. It is quite as impossible to educe the possessory feeling from an anterior sense of justice, or from a respect for law—as it is to educe the parental feeling from a previous and comprehensive regard for the interests of humanity. There is no doubt that the general good is best promoted by the play of special family affections; but this is the work of nature, and not the work of man. And there is no doubt that the wealth and comfort of society are inconceivably augmented by those influences, which bind each individual nearly as much to his own property, as he is bound to his own offspring. But in the one case as well as the other, there were certain instinctive regards that came first, and the office of justice is altogether a subsequent one; not to put these regards into the breast of any, but to award the equal deference that is due to the regards of all—insomuch that the vast domain of one individual, perhaps transmitted to him from generation to generation, throughout the lengthened series of an ancestry, whose feet are now upon the earth, but whose top reaches the clouds and is there lost in distant and obscure antiquity—is, to the last inch of its margin, under a guardianship of justice as unviolable, as that which assures protection and ownership to the humble possessor of one solitary acre. The right of property is not the less deferred to, either because its divisions are unequal, or because its origin is unknown. And, even when history tells us that it is founded on some deed of iniquitous usurpation, there is a charm in the continued occupation, that prevails and has the mastery over our most indignant remembrance of the villany of other days. It says much for the strength of the possessory feeling, that, even in less than half a century, it will, if legal claims are meanwhile forborne, cast into obliteration, all the deeds, and even all the delinquencies, which attach to the commencement of a property. At length the prescriptive right bears every thing before it, as by the consuetude of English, by the use and wont of Scottish law. And therefore, once more, instead of saying, with Dr. Paley that it is the law of the land which constitutes the basis of property—the law exhibits her best wisdom, when she finds on the materials of that basis, which nature and the common sense of mankind have laid before her.

26. Dr. Thomas Brown, we hold to have been partly right and partly wrong upon this subject. He evinces a true discernment of what may be termed the pedigree of our feelings in regard to property, when he says and says admirably well—that,

\* "Justice is not what constitutes property; it is a virtue which presupposes property and respects it however constituted." And further, that—"justice as a moral virtue is not the creation of property, but the conformity of our actions to those views of property, which vary in the various states of society." But it is not as he would affirm, it is not because obedience to a system of law, of which the evident tendency is to the public good, is the object of our moral regard—it is not this, which moralizes, if we may be allowed such an application of the term, or rather, which constitutes the virtuousness of our respect to another man's property. This is the common mistake of those moralists, who would ascribe every useful direction or habitude of man to some previous and comprehensive view taken by himself of what is best for the good of the individual or the good of society; instead of regarding such habitude as the fruit of a special tendency impressed direct by the hand of nature, on a previous and comprehensive view taken by its author, and therefore bearing on it a palpable indication both of the goodness and the wisdom of nature's God—even as hunger is the involuntary result of man's physical constitution, and not of any care or consideration by man on the uses of food. the truth is—when, deferring to another's right of property, we do not think of the public good in the matter at all. But we are glad, in the first instance, each to possess and to use and to improve all that we are able to do without molestation, whether that freedom from molestation has been secured to us by law or by the mere circumstances of our state; and, in virtue of principles, not resulting from any anticipations of wisdom or any views of general philanthropy, (because developed in early childhood and long before we are capable of being either philanthropists or legislators) we feel a strong link of ownership with that which we have thus possessed and used, and on which we have bestowed our improvements; and we are aware that another man, in similar relation with another property, will feel towards it in like manner; and a sense of justice, or its still more significant and instructive name, of equity, suggests this equality between me and him—that, in the same manner as I would regard his encroachment on myself as injurious, so it were alike injurious in me to make a similar encroachment upon my neighbour.

27. We have expatiated thus long on the origin and rights of property—because of all subjects, it is the one, regarding which our writers on jurisprudence have sent forth the greatest amount of doubtful and unsatisfactory metaphysics. They labour and are in great perplexity to explain even the rise of the feeling or



desire that is in the mind regarding it. They reason, as if the very conception of property was that, which could not have entered into the heart of man without a previous sense of justice. In this we hold them to have antedated matters wrong. The conception of property is aboriginal; and the office of justice is not to put it into any man's head; but to arbitrate among the rival feelings of cupidity, or the arrogant and overpassing claims that are apt to get into all men's heads—not to initiate man into the notion of property; but, in fact, to limit and restrain his notion of it—not to teach the creatures who at first conceive themselves to have nothing, what that is which they might call their own; but to teach the creatures whose first and earliest tendency is to call every thing their own, what that is which they must refrain from and concede to others. When justice rises to authority among men, her office is, not to wed each individual by the link of property to that which he formerly thought it was not competent for him to use or to possess; but it is to divorce each individual from that, which it is not rightly competent for him to use or to possess—and thus restrict each to his own rightful portion. Its office in fact is restrictive, not dispensatory. The use of it is, not to give the first notion of property to those who were destitute of it, but to limit and restrain the notion with those among whom it is apt to exist in a state of overflow. The use of law, in short, the great expounder and enforcer of property, is not to instruct the men, who but for her lessons would appropriate none; but it is to restrain the men who, but for her checks and prohibitions, would monopolize all.

28. Such then seems to have been the purpose of nature in so framing our mental constitution, that we not only appropriate from the first; but feel, each, such a power in those circumstances, which serve to limit the appropriation of every one man and to distinguish them from those of others—that all, as if with common and practical consent, sit side by side together, without conflict and without interference, on their own respective portions, however unequal, of the territory in which they are placed. On the uses, the indispensable uses of such an arrangement, we need not expatiate.\* The hundred-fold superiority, in the

\* "The effect (of the abolition of property) would be as instant as inevitable. The cultivation of the fields would be abandoned. The population would be broken up into straggling bands—each prowling in quest of a share in the remaining subsistence for themselves; and in the mutual contests of rapacity, they would anticipate, by deaths of violence, those still crueller deaths that would ensue, in the fearful destitution which awaited them. Yet many would be left whom the sword had spared, but whom famine would not spare—that overwhelming calamity under which a whole nation might ultimately disappear.—But a few miserable survivors would dispute the spontaneous fruits of the earth with the beasts of the field, who now multiplied and over-

amount of produce for the subsistence of human beings, which an appropriated country has over an equal extent of a like fertile but unappropriated, and, therefore, unreclaimed wilderness, is too obvious to be explained. It may be stated however; and when an economy so beneficial, without which even a few stragglers of our race could not be supported in comfort; and a large human family, though many times inferior to that which now peoples our globe, could not be supported at all—when the effect of this economy, in multiplying to a degree inconceivable the aliment of human bodies, is viewed in connexion with those prior tendencies of the human mind which gave it birth, we cannot but regard the whole as an instance, and one of the strongest which it is possible to allege, of the adaptation of external nature to that mental constitution, wherewith the Author of nature hath endowed us.

29. In connexion with this part of our subject, there is one especial adaptation, the statement of which we more willingly bring forward, that, beside being highly important in itself, it forms an instance of adaptation in the pure and limited sense of the term\*—even the influence of a circumstance strictly material on the state of the moral world, in all the civilized, and indeed in all the appropriated countries on the face of the earth. We advert to the actual fertility of the land, and to the circumstances purely physical by which the degree or measure of that fertility is determined. It has been well stated by some of the expounders of geological science, that, while the vegetable mould on the earth's surface is subject to perpetual waste, from the action both of the winds and of the waters, either blowing it away in dust, or washing it down in rivers to the ocean—the loss thus sustained, is nevertheless perpetually repaired by the operation of the same material agents on the uplands of the territory—whence the dust and the debris, produced by a disintegration that is constantly going on even in the hardest rocks, is either strewed by the atmosphere, or carried down in an enriching sediment by mountain streams to the lands which are beneath

ran that land which had been desolated of its people. And so by a series, every step of which was marked with increasing wretchedness, the transition would at length be made to a thinly scattered tribe of hunters, on what before had been a peopled territory of industrious and cultivated men. Thus, on the abolition of this single law, the fairest and most civilized region of the globe, which at present sustains its millions of families, out of a fertility that now waves over its cultivated, because its appropriated acres, would, on the simple tie of appropriation being broken, lapse in a very few years into a frightful solitude, or, if not bereft of humanity altogether, would at last become as desolate and dreary as a North American wilderness.”—Political Economy in connexion with the Moral State and Moral Prospects of Society.

\* See the first paragraphs of the introductory chapter.

them. It has been rightly argued, as the evidence and example of a benevolent design, that the opposite causes of consumption and of supply are so adjusted to each other, as to have ensured the perpetuity of our soils.\* But even though these counteracting forces had been somewhat differently balanced; though the wasting operation had remained as active and as powerful, while a more difficult pulverization of the rocks had made the restorative operation slower and feebler than before—still we might have had our permanent or stationary soils, but only all of less fertility than that in which we now find them. A somewhat different constitution of the rocks; or a somewhat altered proportion in the forces of that machinery which is brought to bear upon them—in the cohesion that withstands, or in the impulse and the atmospherical depositions and the grinding frosts and the undermining torrents that separate and carry off the materials—a slight change in one or all of these causes, might have let down each of the various soils on the face of the world to a lower point in the scale of productiveness than at present belongs to them. And when we think of the mighty bearing which the determination of this single element has on the state and interests of human society, we cannot resist the conclusion that, depending as it does on so many influences, there has, in the

\* “It is highly interesting to trace up, in this manner, the action of causes with which we are familiar, to the production of effects, which at first seem to require the introduction of unknown and extraordinary powers; and it is no less interesting to observe, how skilfully nature has balanced the action of all the minute causes of waste and rendered them conducive to the general good. Of this we have a most remarkable instance, in the provision made for preserving the soil, or the coat of vegetable mould, spread out over the surface of the earth. This coat, as it consists of loose materials, is easily washed away by the rains, and is continually carried down by the rivers into the sea. This effect is visible to every one; the earth is removed not only in the form of sand and gravel, but its finer particles suspended in the waters, tinge those of some rivers continually, and those of all occasionally, that is, when they are flooded or swollen with rains. The quantity of earth thus carried down, varies according to circumstances; it has been computed in some instances, that the water of a river in a flood, contains earthly matter suspended in it, amounting to more than the two hundred and fiftieth part of its own bulk. The soil therefore, is continually diminished, its parts being delivered from higher to lower levels, and finally delivered into the sea. But it is a fact, that the soil, notwithstanding, remains the same in quantity, or at least nearly the same, and must have done so, ever since the earth was the receptacle of animal or vegetable life. The soil therefore is augmented from other causes, just as much, at an average, as it is diminished by those now mentioned; and this augmentation evidently can proceed from nothing but the constant and slow disintegration of the rocks. In the permanence, therefore, of a coat of vegetable mould on the surface of the earth, we have a demonstrative proof of the continual destruction of the rocks; and cannot but admire the skill, with which the powers of the many chemical and mechanical agents employed in this complicated work, are so adjusted, as to make the supply and the waste of the soil exactly equal to one another.”—Playfair’s *Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory*. Section III Art. 13.

assortment of these, been a studied adaptation of the material and the mental worlds to each other. For only let us consider the effect, had the fertility been brought so low, as that on the best of soils, the produce extracted by the most strenuous efforts of human toil, could no more than repay the cultivation bestowed on them—or that the food, thus laboriously raised, would barely suffice for the maintenance of the labourers. It is obvious that a fertility beneath this point would have kept the whole earth in a state of perpetual barrenness and desolation—when, though performing as now its astronomical circuit in the heavens, it would have been a planet bereft of life, or at least unfit for the abode and sustenance of the rational generations by whom it is at present occupied. But even with a fertility at this point, although a race of men might have been upholden, the tenure by which each man held his existence behoved to have been a life of unremitting drudgery; and we should have beheld the whole species engaged in a constant struggle of penury and pain for the supply of their animal necessities. And it is because of a fertility above this point, the actual fertility of vast portions of land in most countries of the earth—that many and extensive are the soils which yield a large surplus produce, over and above the maintenance of all, who are engaged, whether directly or indirectly, in the work of their cultivation. The strength of the possessory feelings on the one hand, giving rise to possessory rights recognized and acquiesced in by all men; these rights investing a single individual with the ownership of lands, that yield on the other hand a surplus produce, over which he has the uncontrolled disposal—make up together, such a constitution of the moral, combined with such a constitution of the material system, as demonstrates that the gradation of wealth in human society has its deep and its lasting foundation in the nature of things. And that the construction of such an economy, with all the conservative influences by which it is upholden,\* attests both the wisdom and the benevolence of Him who is the Author of nature, may best be evinced by the momentous purposes, to which this surplus produce of land, (the great originator of all that can be termed affluence in the world) is subservient.—“Had no ground yielded more in return for the labour expended on it, than the food of the cultivators and their secondaries, the existence of one and all of the human race would have been spent in mere labour. Every man would have been doomed to a life of unremitting toil for his bodily subsistence; and none could have been supported in a

\* See Art. 7 of this Chapter.



state of leisure, either for idleness, or for other employments than those of husbandry, and such coarser manufactures as serve to provide society with the second necessaries of existence. The species would have risen but a few degrees, whether physical or moral, above the condition of mere savages. It is just because of a fertility in the earth, by which it yields a surplus over and above the food of the direct and secondary labourers, that we can command the services of a disposable population, who, in return for their maintenance, minister to the proprietors of this surplus, all the higher comforts and elegancies of life. It is precisely to this surplus we owe it, that society is provided with more than a coarse and a bare supply for the necessities of animal nature. It is the original fund out of which are paid the expenses of art, and science, and civilization, and luxury, and law, and defence, and all, in short, that contributes either to strengthen or to adorn the commonwealth. Without this surplus, we should have had but an agrarian population—consisting of husbandmen, and those few homely and rustic artificers, who, scattered in hamlets over the land, would have given their secondary services to the whole population. It marks an interesting connexion between the capabilities of the soil, and the condition of social life, that to this surplus we stand indispensably indebted for our crowded cities, our thousand manufactories for the supply of comforts and refinements to society, our wide and diversified commerce, our armies of protection, our schools and colleges of education, our halls of legislation and justice, even our altars of piety and temple services. It has been remarked by geologists, as the evidence of a presiding design in nature, that the waste of the soil is so nicely balanced by the supply from the disintegration of the upland rocks, which are worn and pulverized at such a rate, as to keep up a good vegetable mould on the surface of the earth. But each science teems with the like evidences of a devising and intelligent God; and when we view aright the many beneficent functions, to which, through the instrumentality of its surplus produce, the actual degree of the earth's fertility is subservient, we cannot imagine a more wondrous and beautiful adaptation between the state of external nature and the mechanism of human society.”\*

\* Political Economy in connexion with the moral State and Moral Prospects of Society. C. II, Art. 10. In the appendix to this work on the subject of rent, there are further observations tending to prove that “there is an optimism in the actual constitution of the land, as in every thing else that has proceeded from the hand of the Almighty.

## CHAPTER VII.

*On those special Affections which conduce to the economic well-being of Society.*

1. WE now proceed to consider the economic, in contra-distinction to the civil and political well-being of society, to the extent that this is dependent on certain mental tendencies—whether these can be demonstrated by analysis to be only secondary results or in themselves to be simple elements of the human constitution. We may be said indeed, to have already bordered on this part of our argument—when considering the origin and the rights of property; or the manner in which certain possessory affections, that appear even in the infancy of the mind and anticipate by many years the exercise of human wisdom, lead to a better distribution, both of the earth and of all the valuables which are upon it, than human wisdom could possibly have devised, or at least than human power without the help of these special affections could have carried into effect. For there might be a useful economy sanctioned by law, yet which law could not have securely established, unless it had had a foundation in nature. For in this respect, there is a limit to the force even of the mightiest despotism—insomuch that the most absolute monarch on the face of the earth must so far conform himself, to the indelible human nature of the subjects over whom he proudly bears the sway; else, in the reaction of their outraged principles and feelings, they would hurl him from his throne. And thus it is well, that, so very generally in the different countries of the world, law, both in her respect for the possessory and acquired rights of property and in her enforcement of them, has, instead of chalking out an arbitrary path for herself, only followed where nature beforehand had pointed the way. It is far better, that, rather than devise a jurisprudence made up of her own capricious inventions—she should, to so great an extent, have but ratified a prior jurisprudence, founded on the original or at least the universal affections of humanity. We know few things more instructive than a study of the mischievous effects, which attend a deviation from this course—of which, we at present shall state two remarkable instances. The evils which ensue when law traverses any of those principles, that lie deeply seated in the very make and constitution of the mind, bring out into more striking exhibition the superior wisdom of that nature from which she has

departed—even as the original perfection of a mechanism is never more fully demonstrated, than by the contrast of those repeated failures, which shows of every change or attempted improvement, that it but deranges or deteriorates the operations of the instrument in question. And thus too it is, that a lesson of sound theology may be gathered, from the errors with their accompanying evils of unsound legislation—on those occasions when the wisdom of man comes into conflict and collision with the wisdom of God.

2. Of the two instances that we are now to produce, in which law hath made a deviation from nature, and done in consequence a tremendous quantity of evil, the first is the the Tythe System of England. We do not think that the provision of her established clergy is in any way too liberal—but very much the reverse. Still we hold it signally unfortunate that it should have been levied so, as to do most unnecessary violence to the possessory feeling, both of the owners and occupiers of land all over the country. Had the tythe, like some other of the public burthens, been commuted into a pecuniary and yearly tax on the proprietors—the possessory feeling would not have been so painfully or so directly thwarted by it. But it is the constant intromission of the tythe agents or proctors with the fields, and the *ipsa corpora* that are within the limits of the property—which exposes this strong natural affection to an annoyance that is felt to be intolerable.\* But far the best method of adjusting the state of the law to those principles of ownership which are anterior to law, and which all its authority is unable to quench—would be a commutation into land. Let the church property in each parish be dissevered in this way from its main territory; and then, both for the lay and the ecclesiastical domain, there would be an accordance of the legal with the possessory right. It is because these are in such painful dissonance, under the existing state of things, that there is so much exasperation in England, connected with the support and maintenance of her clergy. No doubt law

\* The following example of the thousands which might be alleged will show how apt the possessory feeling is to revolt against the legal right, and at length to overbear it. The fee-simple of the Church property of the Dean and Chapter of Durham is in the Dean and Chapter of Durham.

The custom for ages has been to let houses on leases of forty years, and lands on leases of twenty-one years, at small reserved rents, these leases being renewable at the end of seven years, at the pleasure of the Dean and Chapter on the payment of arbitrary fines—which fines however as actually levied are exceedingly moderate, one year and a quarter being asked for houses, and one and a half for lands.

Several of the families of the occupiers of lands and houses so leased have been in possession for generations—and long possession has given to some of these occupiers such a strength of possessory feeling, that they have the sense of being aggrieved, if they do not get the renewals on their own terms.

can enforce her own arrangements, however arbitrary and unnatural they might be ; but it is a striking exhibition, we have always thought, of the triumph of the possessory over the legal, that, in the contests between the two parties, the clergy have constantly been losing ground. And, in resistance to all the opprobrium which has been thrown upon them, do we affirm, that, with a disinterestedness which is almost heroic, they have, in deed and in practice, forborne to the average extent of at least one half, the assertion of their claims. The truth is, that the felt odium which attaches to the system ought never to have fallen upon them. It is an inseparable consequence of the arrangement itself, by which law hath traversed nature—so as to be constantly rubbing, as it were, against that possessory feeling, which may be regarded as one of the strongest of her instincts. There are few reformatations that would do more to sweeten the breath of English society, than the removal of this sore annoyance—the brooding fountain of so many heartburnings and so many festerments, by which the elements of an unappeasable warfare are ever at work between the landed interest of the country, and far the most important class of its public functionaries ; and, what is the saddest perversity of all, those, whose office it is by the mild persuasions of Christianity, to train the population of our land in the lessons of love and peace and righteousness—they are forced by the necessities of a system which many of them deplore, into the attitude of extortioners ; and placed in that very current, along which a people's hatred and a people's obloquy are wholly unavoidable.\* Even under the theocracy of the Jews, the system of tithes was with difficulty upholden ; and many are the remonstrances which the gifted seers of Israel held with its people, for having brought of the lame and the diseased as offerings. Such, in fact, is the violence done by this system to the possessory feelings, that a conscientious submission to its exactions, may be regarded as a most decisive test of religious obedience—such an obedience, indeed, as was but ill maintained, even in the days of the Hebrew polity, although it had the force of temporal sanctions, with the miracles and manifestations of a presiding deity to sustain it. Unless by the express appointment of heaven, this yoke of Judaism, unaccompanied as it now is by

\* There is often the utmost injustice in that professional odium which is laid upon a whole order, and none have suffered more under it, than the clergy of England have, from the sweeping and indiscriminate charges, which have been preferred against them, by the demagogues of our land. We believe that nothing has given more of edge and currency to these invectives, than the very unfortunate way in which their maintenance has been provided for ; and many are the amiable and accomplished individuals among themselves to whom it is a matter of downright agony.



the peculiar and preternatural enforcements of that dispensation, ought never to have been perpetuated in the days of Christianity. There are distinct, and, we hold, valid reasons, for the national maintenance of an order of men in the capacity of religious instructors to the people. But maintenance in a way so obnoxious to nature, is alike adverse to a sound civil and a sound Christian policy. Both the cause of religion and the cause of loyalty have suffered by it. The alienation of the church's wealth, were a deadly blow to the best and highest interests of England; but there are few things which would conduce more to the strength and peace of our nation, than a fair and right commutation of it.

3. Our next very flagrant example of a mischievous collision between the legal and the possessory, is the English system of poor laws. By law each man who can make good his plea of necessity, has a claim for the relief of it, from the owners or occupiers of the soil, or from the owners and occupiers of houses; and never, till the end of time, will all the authority, and all the enactments of the statute-book, be able to divest them of the feeling, that their property is invaded. Law never can so counterwork the strong possessory feeling, as to reconcile the proprietors of England to this legalized enormity, or rid them of the sensation of a perpetual violence. It is this mal-adjustment between the voice that nature gives forth on the right of property, and the voice that arbitrary law gives forth upon it—it is this, which begets something more than a painful insecurity as to the stability of their possessions. There is besides, a positive, and what we should call, a most natural irritation. That strong possessory feeling, by which each is wedded to his own domain in the relation of its rightful proprietor; and which they can no more help, because as much a part of their original constitution, than the parental feeling by which each is wedded to his own family in the relation of its natural protector—this strong possessory feeling, we say, is, under their existing economy, subject all over England to a perpetual and most painful annoyance. And accordingly we do find the utmost acerbity of tone and temper, among the upper classes of England, in reference to their poor. We are not sure, indeed, if there be any great difference, with many of them, between the feeling which they have towards the poor, and the feeling which they have towards poachers. It is true that the law is on the side of the one, and against the other. Yet it goes most strikingly to prove, how impossible it is for law to carry the acquiescence of the heart, when it contravenes the primary and urgent affections of nature—that paupers are in any degree assimilated to poachers in

the public imagination ; and that the inroads of both upon property should be resented, as if both alike were a sort of trespass or invasion.

4. And it is further interesting to observe the effect of this unnatural state of things on the paupers themselves. Even in their deportment, we might read an unconscious homage to the possessory right. And whereas, it has been argued in behalf of a poor-rate, that, so far from degrading, it sustains an independence of spirit among the peasantry, by turning that which would have been a matter of beggary into a matter of rightful and manly assertion—there is none who has attended the meeting of a parish vestry, that will not readily admit, the total dissimilarity which obtains between the assertion to a right of maintenance, and the assertion of any other right whatever, whether in the field of war or of patriotism. There may be much of the insolence of beggary ; but along with this, there is a most discernible mixture of its mean, and crouching, and ignoble sordidness. There is no common quality whatever between the clamorous onset of this worthless and dissipated crew, and the generous battle-cry *pro aris et focis*, in which the humblest of our population will join—when paternal acres, or the rights of any actually holden property are invaded. In the mind of the pauper, with all his challenging and all his boisterousness, there is still the latent impression, that, after all, there is a certain want of firmness about his plea. He is not altogether sure of the ground upon which he is standing ; and, in spite of all that law has done to pervert his imagination, the possessory right of those against whom he prefers his demand, stares him in the face, and disturbs him not a little out of that confidence, wherewith a man represents and urges the demands of unquestionable justice. In spite of himself, he cannot avoid having somewhat the look and the consciousness of a poacher. And so the effect of England's most unfortunate blunder, has been, to alienate on the one hand her rich from her poor ; and on the other to debase into the very spirit and sordidness of beggary, a large and ever-increasing mass of her population. There is but one way, we can never cease to affirm, by which this grievous distemper of the body politic can be removed. And that is, by causing the law of property to harmonize with the strong and universal instincts of nature in regard to it ; by making the possessory right to be at least as inviolable as the common sense of mankind would make it ; and as to the poor, by utterly recalling the blunder that England made, when she turned into a matter of legal constraint, that which should ever be a matter of love and liberty, and when she aggravated ten-fold the depen-

dence and misery of the lower classes, by divorcing the cause of humanity from the willing generousities, the spontaneous and unforced sympathies of our nature.

5. But this brings into view another of our special affections—our compassion for the distress, including, as one of its most prominent and frequently recurring objects, our compassion for the destitution of others. We have already seen, how nature hath provided, by one of its implanted affections, for the establishment of property; and for the respect in which, amid all its inequalities, it is held by society. But helpless destitution forms one extreme of this inequality, which a mere system of property appears to leave out; and which, if not otherwise provided for by the wisdom of nature in the constitution of the human mind, would perhaps justify an attempt by the wisdom of man to provide for it in the constitution of human law. We do not instance, at present, certain other securities which have been instituted by the hand of nature, and which, if not traversed and enfeebled by a legislation wholly uncalled for, would of themselves, prevent the extensive prevalence of want in society. These are the urgent law of self-preservation, prompting to industry on the one hand and to economy on the other; and the strong law of relative affection—which laws, if not tampered with and undermined in their force and efficacy by the law of pauperism, would not have relieved, but greatly better, would have prevented the vast majority of those cases which fill the workhouses, and swarm around the vestries of England. Still these, however, would not have prevented all poverty. A few instances, like those which are so quietly and manageably, but withal effectually met in the country parishes of Scotland, would still occur in every little community, however virtuous or well regulated. And in regard to these, there is another law of the mental constitution, by which nature hath made special provision for them—even the beautiful law of compassion, in virtue of which the sight of another in agony, (and most of all perhaps in the agony of pining hunger,) would, if unrelieved, create a sensation of discomfort in the heart of the observer, scarcely inferior to what he should have felt, had the suffering and the agony been his own.

6. But in England, the state, regardless of all the indices which nature had planted in the human constitution, hath taken the regulation of this matter into its own hands. By its law of pauperism, it hath, in the first instance, ordained for the poor a legal property in the soil; and thereby, running counter to the strong possessory affection, it hath done violence to the natural and original distribution of the land, and loosened the secure

hold of each separate owner, on the portion which belongs to him. And in the second instance, distrustful of the efficacy of compassion, it, by way of helping forward its languid energies, hath applied the strong hand of power to it. Now it so happens, that nothing more effectually stifles compassion, or puts it to flight, than to be thus meddled with. The spirit of kindness utterly refuses the constraints of authority; and law in England, by taking the business of charity upon itself, instead of supplementing, hath well nigh destroyed the anterior provision made for it by nature—thus leaving it to be chiefly provided for, by methods and by a machinery of its own. The proper function of law is to enforce the rights of justice, or to defend against the violation of them; and never does it make a more flagrant or a more hurtful invasion, beyond the confines of its own legitimate territory—than, when confounding humanity with justice, it would apply the same enforcements to the one virtue as to the other. It should have taken a lesson from the strong and evident distinction which nature hath made between these two virtues, in her construction of our moral system; and should have observed a corresponding distinction in its own treatment of them—resenting the violation of the one; but leaving the other to the free interchanges of good-will on the side of the dispenser, and of gratitude on the side of the recipient. When law, distrustful of the compassion that is in all hearts, enacted a system of compulsory relief, lest, in our neglect of others, the indigent should starve; it did incomparably worse, than if, distrustful of the appetite of hunger, it had enacted for the use of food a certain regimen of times and quantities, lest, neglectful of ourselves, our bodies might have perished. Nature has made a better provision than this for both these interests; but law has done more mischief by interference with the one, than it could ever have done by interference with the other. It could not have quelled the appetite of hunger, which still, in spite of all the law's officiousness, would have remained the great practical impellent to the use of food, for the well-being of our physical economy. But it has done much to quell and to overbear the affection of compassion—that never-failing impellent, in a free and natural state of things, to deeds of charity, for the well-being of the social economy. The evils which have ensued are of too potent and pressing a character to require description. They have placed England in a grievous dilemma, from which she can only be extricated, by the new modelling of this part of her statute-book, and a nearer conformity of its provisions to the principles of natural jurisprudence. Meanwhile they afford an emphatic demonstration for the superior wisdom of nature, which



is never so decisively or so triumphantly attested, as by the mischief that is done, when her processes are contravened or her principles are violated.\*

7. We are aware of a certain ethical system, that would obliterate the distinction between justice and humanity, by running or resolving the one into the other—affirming of the former more particularly, that all its virtue is founded on its utility; and that therefore justice, to which may be added truth, is no further a virtue, than as it is instrumental of good to men—thus making both truth and justice, mere species or modifications of benevolence. Now, as we have already stated, it is not with the theory of morals, but with the moral constitution of man that we have properly to do; and, most certain it is, that man does feel the moral rightness both of justice and truth, irrespective altogether of their consequences—or, at least, apart from any such view to these consequences at the time, as the mind is at all conscious of. There is an appetite of our sentient nature which terminates in food, and that is irrespective of all its subsequent utilities to the animal economy; and there is an appetite for doing what is right which terminates in virtue, and which bears as little respect to its utilities—whether for the good of self or for the good of society. The man whom some temptation to what is dishonorable would put into a state of recoil and restlessness, has no other aim, in the resistance he makes to it, than simply to make full acquittal of his integrity. This is his landing place; and he looks no further. There may be a thousand dependent blessings to humanity, from the observation of moral rectitude. But the pure and simple appetency for rectitude, rests upon this as its object, without any onward reference to the consequences which shall flow from it. This consideration alone is sufficient to dispose of the system of utility—as being metaphysically incorrect in point of conception, and incorrect in the expression of it. If a man can do virtuously, when not aiming at the useful, and not so much as thinking of it—then to design and execute what is useful, may be and is a virtue; but it is not all virtue.†

\* Without contending for the language of our older moralists, the distinction which they mean to express, by virtues of perfect and imperfect obligation, has a foundation in reality and in the nature of things—as between justice where the obligation on one side implies a counterpart right upon the other, and benevolence to which, whatever the obligation may be on the part of the dispenser, there is no corresponding right on the part of the recipient. The proper office of law is to enforce the former virtues. When it attempts to enforce the latter, it makes a mischievous extension of itself beyond its own legitimate boundaries.

† If our moral judgment tell that some particular thing is right, without our advert-  
ing to its utility—then though all that we hold to be morally right should be proved by  
observation to yield the maximum of utility, utility is not on that account the mind's

8. There is one way in which a theorist may take refuge from this conclusion. It is quite palpable, that a man often feels himself to be doing virtuously—when, to all sense, he is not thinking of the utilities which follow in its train. But then it may be affirmed, that he really is so thinking—although he is not sensible of it. There can be little doubt of such being the actual economy of the world, such the existing arrangement of its laws and its sequences—that virtue and happiness are very closely associated; and that, no less in those instances, where the resulting happiness is not at all thought of, than in those where happiness is the direct and declared object of the virtue. Who can doubt that truth and justice bear as manifold and as important a subserviency to the good of the species as beneficence does?—and yet it is only with the latter, that this good is the object of our immediate contemplation. But then it is affirmed, that, when two terms are constantly associated in nature, there must be as constant an association of them in the mind of the observer of nature—an association at length so habitual, and therefore so rapid, that we become utterly unconscious of it. Of this we have examples, in the most frequent and familiar operations of human life. In the act of reading, every alphabetical letter must have been present to the mind—yet how many thousands of them, in the course of a single hour, must have passed in fleeting succession, without so much as one moment's sense of their presence, which the mind has any recollection of. And it is the same in listening to an acquaintance, when we receive the whole meaning and effect of his discourse, without the distinct consciousness of very many of those individual words which still were indispensable to the meaning. Nay, there are other and yet more inscrutable mysteries in the human constitution; and which relate, not to the thoughts that we conceive without being sensible of them, but even to the volitions that we put forth, and to very many of which we are alike insensible. We have only to reflect on the number and complexity of those muscles which are put into action, in the mere processes of writing or walking, or even of so balancing ourselves as to maintain a posture of stability. It is understood to be at the bidding of the will, that each of our muscles performs its distinct office; and yet, out of the countless volitions, which had their part and their play, in

critterion for the rightness of this particular thing. God hath given us the sense of what is right; and He hath besides so ordained the system of things, that what is right is generally that which is most useful—yet, in many instances, it is not the perceived usefulness, which makes us recognize it to be right. We agree too with Bishop Butler in not venturing to assume that God's sole end in creation was the production of the greatest happiness.

these complicated, and yet withal most familiar and easily practicable operations—how many there are which wholly escape the eye of consciousness. And thus too, recourse may be had to the imagination of certain associating processes, too hidden for being the objects of sense at the time, and too fugitive for being the objects of remembrance afterwards. And on the strength of these it may be asked—how are we to know, that the utility of truth and justice is not present to the mind of man, when he discharges the obligation of these virtues; and how are we to know, that it is not the undiscoverable thought of this utility, which forms the impellent principle of that undiscoverable volition, by which man is urged to the performance of them?

9. Now we are precluded from replying to this question in any other way, than that the theory which requires such an argument for its support, may be said to fetch all its materials from the region of conjecture. It ventures on the affirmation of what is going on in a terra incognita; and we have not the means within our reach, for meeting it in the terms of a positive contradiction. But we can at least say, that a mere *argumentum ab ignorantia* is not a sufficient basis on which to ground a philosophic theory; and that thus to fetch an hypothesis from among the inscrutabilities of the mind, to speak of processes going on there so quick and so evanescent that the eye of consciousness cannot discover them—is to rear a superstructure not upon the facts which lie within the limit of separation between the known and the unknown, but upon the fancies which lie without this limit. A great deal more is necessary for the establishment of an assertion, than that an adversary cannot disprove it. A thousand possibilities may be affirmed which are susceptible neither of proof nor of disproof; and surely it were the worst of logic to accept as proof, the mere circumstance that they are beyond the reach of disproof. They, in fact, lie alike beyond the reach of both; in which case they should be ranked among the figments of mere imagination, and not among the findings of experience. How are we to know but that, in the bosom of our great planetary amplitude, there do not float, and in elliptic orbits round the sun, pieces of matter vastly too diminutive for our telescopes; and that thus the large intermediate spaces between the known bodies of the system, instead of so many desolate blanks, are in fact peopled with little worlds—all of them teeming, like our own, with busy and cheerful animation. Now, in the powerlessness of our existing telescopes, we do not know but it may be so. But we will not believe that it is so, till a telescope of power enough be invented, for disclosing this

scene of wonders to our observation. And it is the same of the moral theory that now engages us. It rests, not upon what it finds among the arcana of the human spirit, but upon what it fancies to be there; and they are fancies too which we cannot deny, but which we will not admit—till, by some improved power of internal observation, they are turned into findings. We are quite sensible of the virtuousness of truth; but we have not yet been made sensible, that we always recognize this virtuousness, because of a glance we have had of the utility of truth—though only perhaps for a moment of time, too minute and microscopical for being noticed by the naked eye of consciousness. We can go no further upon this question than the light of evidence will carry us. And, while we both feel in our own bosoms and observe in the testimony of those around us, the moral deference which is due to truth and justice—we have not yet detected this to be the same with that deference, which we render to the virtue of benevolence. Or, in other words, we do venerate and regard these as virtues—while, *for aught we know*, the utility of them is not in all our thoughts. We agree with Dugald Stewart in thinking, that, “considerations of utility do not seem to us the only ground of the approbation we bestow on this disposition.” He further observes, that, “abstracting from all regard to consequences, there is something pleasing and amiable in sincerity, openness, and truth; something disagreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood. Dr. Hutcheson himself, the great patron of that theory which resolves all moral qualities into benevolence, confesses this—for he speaks of a *sense* which leads us to approve of veracity, distinct from the sense which approves of qualities useful to mankind.”\*

10. However difficult it may be, to resolve the objective question which respects the constitution of virtue in itself—in the subjective question, which respects the constitution of the mind, we cannot but acknowledge the broad and palpable distinction, which the Author of our moral frame hath made, between justice and truth on the one hand, and benevolence on the other. And it had been well, if law-givers had discriminated, as nature has done, between justice and humanity—although the mischief of their unfortunate deviation serves, all the more strikingly, to prove the adaptation of our moral constitution to the exigencies of human society. The law of pauperism hath assimilated beneficence to justice, by enacting the former,

\* Stewart's "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," Art. Veracity.



in the very way that it does the latter ; and enforcing what it has thus enacted by penalties. Beneficence loses altogether its proper and original character—when, instead of moving on the impulse of a spontaneous kindness that operates from within, it moves on the impulse of a legal obligation from without. Should law specify the yearly sum that must pass from my hands to the destitute around me—then, it is not beneficence which has to do with the matter. What I have to surrender, law hath already ordained to be the property of another ; and I, in giving it up, am doing an act of justice and not an act of liberality. To exercise the virtue of beneficence, I must go beyond the sum that is specified by law ; and thus law in her attempts to seize upon beneficence, and to bring her under rule, hath only forced her to retire within a narrower territory, on which alone it is that she can put forth the free and native characteristics which belong to her. Law, in fact, cannot, with any possible ingenuity, obtain an imperative hold on beneficence at all—for her very touch transforms this virtue into another. Should law go forth on the enterprize of arresting beneficence upon her own domain, and there laying upon her its authoritative dictates—it would find that beneficence had eluded its pursuit ; and that all which it could possibly do, was to wrest from her that part of the domain of which it had taken occupation, and bring it under the authority of justice. When it thought to enact for beneficence, it only, in truth, enacted a new division of property ; and in so doing, it contravenes the possessory, one of nature's special affections—while, by its attempts to force what should have been left to the free exercise of compassion, it has done much to supersede or to extinguish another of these affections. It hath so pushed forward the line of demarcation—as to widen the space which justice might call her own, and to contract the space which beneficence might call her own. But never will law be able to make a captive of beneficence, or to lay personal arrest upon her. It might lessen and limit her means, or even starve her into utter annihilation. But never can it make a living captive of her. It is altogether a vain and hopeless undertaking to legislate on the duties of beneficence ; for the very nature of this virtue, is to do good freely and willingly with its own. But on the moment that law interposes to any given extent with one's property, to that extent it ceases to be his own ; and any good that is done by it is not done freely. The force of law and the freeness of love cannot amalgamate the one with the other. Like water and oil they are immiscible. We cannot translate beneficence into the statute-book of law, without expunging it from the statute-book of the heart ; and, to whatever extent

we make it the object of compulsion, to that extent we must destroy it.

11. And in the proportion that beneficence is put to flight, is gratitude put to flight along with it. The proper object of this emotion is another's good-will. But I do not hold as from the good-will of another, that which law hath enabled me to plea as my own right—nay to demand, with a front of hardy and resolute assertion. It is this which makes it the most delicate and dangerous of all ground—when law offers to prescribe rules for the exercise of beneficence, or to lay its compulsory hand on a virtue, the very freedom of which is indispensable to its existence. And it not only extinguishes the virtue; but it puts an end to all those responses of glad and grateful emotion, which its presence and its smile and the generosity of its free-will offerings awaken in society. It is laying an arrest on all the music of living intercourse, thus to forbid those beautiful and delicious echoes, which are reflected, on every visit of unconstrained mercy, from those families that are gladdened by her footsteps. And what is worse, it is substituting in their place, the hoarse and jarring discords of the challenge and the conflict and the angry litigation. We may thus see, that there is a province in human affairs, on which law should make no entrance—a certain department of human virtue wherein the moralities should be left to their own unfettered play, else they shall be frozen into utter apathy—a field sacred to liberty and good-will that should ever be kept beyond the reach of jurisprudence; or on which, if she once obtain a footing, she will spoil it of all those unbought and unbidden graces that natively adorn it. So that while to law we would commit the defence of society from all the aggressions of violence, and confide the strict and the stern guardianship of the interests of justice—we should tremble for humanity lest it withered and expired under the grasp of so rough a protector; and lest before a countenance grave as that of a judge, and grim as that of a messenger-at-arms, this frail but loveliest of the virtues should be turned, as if by the head of Medusa, into stone.

12. But there are other moral ills in this unfortunate perversion, beside the extinction of good-will in the hearts of the affluent and of gratitude in the hearts of the poor—though it be no slight mischief to any community, that the tie of kindness between these two orders should have been broken; and that the business of charity, which when left spontaneous is so fertile in all the amenities of life, should be transformed into a fierce warfare of rights, from its very nature incapable of adjustment, and, whether they be the encroached upon or the repelled, subjecting both parties to the sense of a perpetual violence. But over and

above this, there are other distempers, wherewith it hath smitten the social economy of England, and of which experience will supply the English observer with many a vivid recollection. The reckless but withal most natural improvidence of those whom the state has undertaken to provide for, seeing that law hath proclaimed in their favour a discharge from the cares and the duties of self-preservation—the headlong dissipation, in consequence—the dissolution of family ties, for the same public and proclaimed charity which absolves a man from attention to himself will absolve him also from attention to his relatives—the decay and interruption of sympathy in all the little vicinities of town and country, for each man under this system of an assured and universal provision feels himself absolved too from attention to his neighbours—These distempers both social and economic have a common origin; and the excess of them above what taketh place in a natural state of things may all be traced to the unfortunate aberration, which, in this instance, the constitution of human law hath made from the constitution of human nature.

13. In our attempts to trace the rise of the possessory affection and of a sense of property, we have not been able to discover any foundation in nature, for a sentiment that we often hear impetuously urged by the advocates of the system of pauperism—that every man has a *right* to the means of subsistence. Nature does not connect this right with existence; but with continued occupation, and with another principle, to which it also gives the sanction of its voice—that, each man is legitimate owner of the fruits of his own industry. These are the principles on which nature hath drawn her landmarks over every territory that is peopled and cultivated by human beings. And the actual distribution of property is the fruit, partly of man's own direct aim and acquisition, and partly of circumstances over which he had no control. The right of man to the means of existence on the sole ground that he exists has been loudly and vehemently asserted; yet is a factitious sentiment notwithstanding—tending to efface the distinctness of nature's landmarks, and to traverse those arrangements, by which she hath provided far better for the peace and comfort of society, nay for the more sure and liberal support of all its members. It is true that nature, in fixing the principles on which man has a right to the fruits of the earth, to the materials of his subsistence, has left out certain individuals of the human family—some outcast stragglers, who, on neither of nature's principles, will be found possessed of any right or of any property. It is for their sake that human law hath interposed, in some countries of the world; and, by creating or ordaining a

right for them, has endeavoured to make good the deficiency of nature. But if justice alone could have ensured a right distribution for the supply of want, and if it must be through the medium of a right that the destitute shall obtain their maintenance—then, would there have been no need for another principle, which stands out most noticeably in our nature ; and compassion would have been a superfluous part of the human constitution. It is thus that nature provides for the unprovided—not by unsettling their limits which her previous education had established in all minds—not by the extension of a right to every man ; but by establishing in behalf of those some men, whom accident or the necessity of circumstances or even their own misconduct had left without a right, a compassionate interest in the bosom of their fellows. They have no advocate to plead for them at the bar of justice ; and therefore nature hath furnished them with a gentler and more persuasive advocate, who might solicit for them at the bar of mercy ; and, for their express benefit, hath given to most men an ear for pity, to many a hand open as day for melting charity. But it is not to any rare, or romantic generosity, that she hath confided the relief of their wants. She hath made compassion one of the strongest, and, in spite of all their depravations to which humanity is exposed, one of the steadiest of our universal instincts. It were an intolerable spectacle even to the inmates of a felon's cell, did they behold one of their fellows in the agonies of hunger ; and rather than endure it, would they share their own scanty meal with them.\* It were still more intolerable to the householders of any neighbourhood—insomuch that, where law had not attempted to supersede nature, every instance of distress or destitution would, whether in town or country, give rise to an internal operation of charity throughout every little vicinity of the land. The mischief which law hath done, by trying to mend the better mechanism which nature had instituted, is itself a most impressive testimony to the wisdom of nature. The perfection of her arrangements, is never more strikingly exhibited, than by those evils which the disturbance of them brings upon society—as when her law in the heart has been overborne

\* The certainty of this operation is beautifully exemplified in a passage of Mr. Buxton's interesting book on prisons—from which it appears that there is no allowance of food to the debtors, and a very inferior allowance of food to the criminals, who are confined in the gaol at Bristol. The former live on their own means or the casual charity of the benevolent. Instances have occurred when both of these resources failed them—and starvation would have ensued, had not the criminals, rather than endure the neighbourhood of such a suffering, shared their own scanty pittance along with them—thus affording an argumentum a fortiore for a like strength of compassion throughout the land—seeing that it had survived the depraving process which leads to the malefactor's cell.



by England's wretched law of pauperism; and this violation of the natural order has been followed up, in consequence, by a tenfold increase both of poverty and crime.

14. It is interesting to pursue the outgoings of such a system; and to ascertain whether nature hath vindicated her wisdom, by the evil consequences of a departure from her guidance on the part of man—for if so, it will supply another proof, or furnish us with another sight of the exquisite adaptation which she hath established between the moral and the physical, or between the two worlds of mind and matter. Certain, then, of the parishes of England have afforded a very near exemplification of the ultimate state to which one and all of them are tending—a state which is consummated, when the poor rates form so large a deduction from the rents of the land, that it shall at length cease to be an object to keep them in cultivation.\* It is thus that some tracts of country are on the eve of being actually vacated by their proprietors; and as their place of superintendance cannot be vacated by others, who have no right of superintendance—the result might be, that whole estates shall be as effectually lost to the wealth and resources of the country, as if buried by an earthquake under water, or, as if some blight of nature had gone over them and bereft them of their powers of vegetation. Now we know not, if the whole history of the world furnishes a more striking demonstration than this, of the mischief that may be done, by attempting to carry into practice a theoretical speculation, which, under the guise and even with the real purpose of benevolence, has for its plausible object, to equalize among the children of one common humanity, the blessings and the fruits of one common inheritance. The truth is that we have not been conducted to the present state of our rights and arrangements respecting property, by any artificial process of legislation at all. The state of property in which we find ourselves actually landed, is the result of a natural process, under which, all that a man earns by his industry is acknow-

\* The following is an extract from the report of a select committee on the poor law printed in 1817. "The consequences which are likely to result from this state of things, are clearly set forth in the petition from the parish of Wombidge in Salop, which is fast approaching to this state. The petitioners state 'that the annual value of lands, mines and houses in this parish, is not sufficient to maintain the numerous and increasing poor, even if the same were set free of rent; and that these circumstances will inevitably compel the occupiers of lands and mines to relinquish them; and the poor will be without relief, or any known mode of obtaining it, unless some assistance be speedily afforded to them.' And your committee apprehend, from the petition before them, that this is one of many parishes that are fast approaching to a state of dereliction."

The inquiries of the present Poor law Commission have led to a still more aggravated and confirmed view of the evils of the system.

ledged to be his own—or, when the original mode of acquisition is lost sight of, all that a man retains by long and undisturbed possession is felt and acknowledged to be his own also. Legislation ought to do no more than barely recognize these principles, and defend its subjects against the violation of them. And when it attempts more than this—when it offers to tamper with the great arrangements of nature, by placing the rights and the securities of property on a footing different from that of nature—when, as in the case of the English poor-laws, it does so, under the pretence and doubtless too with the honest design of establishing between the rich and the poor a nearer equality of enjoyment; we know not in what way violated nature could have inflicted on the enterprize a more signal and instructive chastisement, than when the whole territory of this plausible but presumptuous experiment is made to droop and to wither under it as if struck by a judgment from heaven—till at length that earth out of which the rich draw all their wealth and the poor all their subsistence, refuses to nourish the children who have abandoned her; and both parties are involved in the wreck of one common and overwhelming visitation.

15. But we read the same lesson in all the laws and movements of political economy. The superior wisdom of nature is demonstrated in the mischief which is done by any aberration therefrom—when her processes are disturbed or intermeddled with by the wisdom of man. The philosophy of free trade is grounded on the principle, that society is most enriched or best served, when commerce is left to its own spontaneous evolutions; and is neither fostered by the artificial encouragements, nor fettered by the artificial restraints of human policy. The greatest economic good is rendered to the community, by each man being left to consult and to labour for his own particular good—or, in other words, a more prosperous result is obtained by the spontaneous play and busy competition of many thousand wills, each bent on the prosecution of its own selfishness, than by the anxious superintendance of a government, vainly attempting to medicate the fancied imperfections of nature, or to improve on the arrangements of her previous and better mechanism. It is when each man is left to seek, with concentrated and exclusive aim, his own individual benefit—it is then, that markets are best supplied; that commodities are furnished for general use, of best quality, and in greatest cheapness and abundance; that the comforts of life are most multiplied; and the most free and rapid augmentation takes place in the riches and resources of the commonwealth. Such a result, which at the same time not a single agent in this vast and complicated system

of trade contemplates or cares for, each caring only for himself—strongly bespeaks a higher agent, by whose transcendental wisdom it is, that all is made to conspire so harmoniously and to terminate so beneficially. We are apt to recognize no higher wisdom than that of man, in those mighty concerts of human agency—a battle, or a revolution, or the accomplishment of some prosperous and pacific scheme of universal education; where each who shares in the undertaking is aware of its object, or acts in obedience to some master-mind who may have devised and who actuates the whole. But it is widely different, when, as in political economy, some great and beneficent end both unlooked and unlaboured for, is the result, not of any concert or general purpose among the thousands who are engaged in it—but is the compound effect, nevertheless, of each looking severally, and in the strenuous pursuit of individual advantage, to some distinct object of his own. When we behold the working of a complex inanimate machine, and the usefulness of its products—we infer, from the unconsciousness of all its parts, that there must have been a planning and a presiding wisdom in the construction of it. The conclusion is not the less obvious, we think it emphatically more so, when, instead of this, we behold in one of the animate machines of human society, the busy world of trade, a beneficent result, an optimism of public and economical advantage, wrought out by the free movements of a vast multitude of men, not one of whom had the advantage of the public in all his thoughts. When good is effected by a combination of unconscious agents incapable of all aim, we ascribe the combination to an intellect that devised and gave it birth. When good is effected by a combination of conscious agents capable of aim, but that an aim wholly different with each from the compound and general result of their united operations—this bespeaks a higher will and a higher wisdom than any by which the individuals, taken separately, are actuated. When we look at each striving to better his own condition, we see nothing in this but the selfishness of man. When we look at the effect of this universal principle, in cheapening and multiplying to the uttermost all the articles of human enjoyment, and establishing a thousand reciprocities of mutual interest in the world—we see in this the benevolence and comprehensive wisdom of God.

16. The whole science of Political Economy is full of those exquisite adaptations to the wants and the comforts of human life, which bespeak the skill of a master-hand, in the adjustment of its laws, and the working of its profoundly constructed mechanism. We shall instance, first, that speciality in the law of

prices, by which they oscillate more largely with the varieties in the supply of the necessaries, than they do in the mere comforts or luxuries of human life. The deficiency of one tenth in the imports of sugar, would not so raise the price of that article, as a similar deficiency in the supply of corn, which might rise even a third in price, by the diminution of a tenth from the usual quantity brought to market. It is not with the reason, but with the beneficial effect of this phenomenon, that we at present have to do—not with its efficient, but with its final cause; or the great and obvious utilities to which it is subservient. Connected with this law of wider variation in the price than in the supply of first necessaries, is the reason why a population survive so well those years of famine, when the prices perhaps are tripled. This does not argue that they must be therefore three times worse fed than usual. The food of the country may only, for aught we know, have been lessened by a fourth part of its usual supply—or, in other words, the families may at an average be served with three-fourths of their usual subsistence, at the very time that the cost of it is three times greater than usual. And to make out this large payment, they have to retrench for the year in other articles—altogether, it is likely, to give up the use of comforts; and to limit themselves more largely in the second, than they can possibly do in the first necessaries of life—to forego perhaps many of the little seasonings, wherewith they wont to impart a relish to their coarse and humble fare—to husband more strictly their fuel; and be satisfied for a time with vestments more threadbare, and even more tattered, than what in better times they would choose to appear in. It is thus that—even although the first necessaries should be tripled in price for a season, and although the pecuniary income of the labouring classes should not at all be increased—yet they are found to weather the hardships of such a visitation. The food is still served out to them at a much larger proportion than the cost of it would in the first instance appear to indicate. And in the second instance they are enabled to purchase at this cost—because, and more especially if they be a well-habited and well-conditioned peasantry, with a pretty high standard of enjoyment in ordinary years, they have more that they can save and retrench upon in a year of severe scarcity. They can disengage much of that revenue which before went to the purchase of dress, and of various luxuries that might for a season be dispensed with; and so have the more to expend on the materials of subsistence. It is this which explains how roughly a population can bear to be handled, both by adverse seasons and by the vicissitudes of trade; and how after all, there is a stability about a people's



means, which will keep its ground against many checks, and amidst many fluctuations. It is a mystery and a marvel to many an observer, how the seemingly frail and precarious interest of the labouring classes should after all, have the stamina of such endurance as to weather the most fearful reverses both of commerce and of the seasons; and that, somehow or other, we find after an interval of gloomy suffering and still gloomier fears, that the families do emerge again into the same state of sufficiency as before. We know not a fitter study for the philanthropist than the working of that mechanism, by which a process so gratifying is caused, or in which he will find greater reason to admire the exquisite skill of those various adaptations that must be referred to the providence of Him who framed society, and suited so wisely to each other the elements of which it is composed.

17. There is nought which appears more variable than the operation of those elements by which the annual supply of the national subsistence is regulated. How unlike in character is one season to another; and between the extremes of dryness and moisture, how exceedingly different may be the amount of that produce on which the sustenance of man essentially depends. Even after that the promise of abundance is well nigh realized, the hurricane of a single day, passing over the yet uncut but ripened corn; or the rain of a few weeks, to drench and macerate the sheaves that lie piled together on the harvest-field, were enough to destroy the food of millions. We are aware of a compensation, in the varieties of soil and exposure, so that the weather which is adverse to one part of the country might be favourable to another; besides that the mischief of a desolating tempest in autumn must only be partial, from the harvest of the plains and uplands falling upon different months. Still, with all these balancing causes, the produce of different years is very far from being equalized; and its fluctuations would come charged with still more of distress and destitution to families—were there not a counterpoise to the laws of nature, in what may be termed the laws of political economy.

18. The price of human food does not immediately depend on the quantity of it that is produced, but on the quantity of it that is brought to market; and it is well that, in every year of scarcity, there should be instant causes put into operation for increasing the latter quantity to the uttermost—so as to repair as much as possible the deficiencies of the former. It is well that even a small short-coming in the crop should be so surely followed by a great advance of prices; for this has instantly the effect of putting the families of the land upon that shortness of

allowance, which might cause the supply, limited as it is, to serve throughout the year. But, besides the wholesome restraint which is thus imposed on the general consumption of families, there is encouragement given by this dearness to abridge the consumption upon farms, and by certain shifts in their management to make out the greatest possible surplus, for the object of sale and supply to the population at large. With a high price, the farmer feels it a more urgent interest, to carry as much of his produce to market as he can; and for this purpose, he will retrench to the uttermost at home. And he has much in his power. More particularly, he can and does retrench considerably upon the feed of his cattle, and in as far as this wont to consist of potatoes or grain, there must an important addition be gained in this way to the supplies of the market. One must often have been struck with the comparative cheapness of animal food in a year of scarcity. This is because of the greater slaughter of cattle which takes place in such a year, to save the heavy expense of maintaining them; and which, besides affording a direct accession to the sustenance of man, lightens still more the farm consumption, and disengages for sale a still greater amount of the necessaries of life. We do not say but that the farm suffers a derangement by this change of regimen, from which it might take years to recover fully. But the evil becomes more tolerable by being spread. The horrors of extreme scarcity are prevented. The extremity is weathered at its furthest point. The country emerges from the visitation, and without, in all probability, the starvation of one individual; and all because, from the operation of the causes that we have now explained, the supply of the market is made to oscillate within smaller limits than the crop—insomuch that though the latter should be deficient by one-third of the whole, the former might not be deficient by one-fifth or one-sixth of what is brought to market annually.

19. This effect is greatly increased by the suspending of distillation in years of scarcity. And after all, should the supplies be yet very short, and the prices therefore far more than proportionally high, this will naturally and of itself, bring on the importation of grain from foreign parts. If such be the variety of weather and soil, even within the limits of a country, as in some measure to balance the scarcity which is experienced in one set of farms, by the comparative abundance of another set—this will apply with much greater force to a whole continent, or to the world at large. If a small deficiency in the home supply of grain induce a higher price than with other articles of commerce, this is just a provision for a securer and readier filling up of the

deficiency by a movement from abroad—a thing of far greater importance with the necessaries than with the mere comforts or luxuries of life. That law of wider and more tremulous oscillation in the price of corn, which we have attempted to expound, is in itself a security for a more equal distribution of it over the globe by man, in those seasons when nature has been partial—so as to diffuse the more certainly and the more speedily through the earth that which has been dropped upon it unequally from Heaven. It is well that greater efficacy should thus be given to that corrective force, by which the yearly supplies of food are spread over the world with greater uniformity than they at first descend upon it; and, however much it may be thought to aggravate a people's hardships, that a slight failure in their home supply should create such a rise in the cost of necessaries—yet certainly it makes the impulse all the more powerful, by which corn flows in from lands of plenty to a land of famine. But what we have long esteemed the most beautiful part of this operation, is the instant advantage, which a large importation from abroad gives to our export manufactures at home. There is a limit in the rate of exchange to the exportation of articles from any country; but up to this limit, there is a class of labourers employed in the preparation of these articles. Now the effect of an augmented importation upon the exchange is such as to enlarge this limit—so that our export traders can then sell with a larger profit, and carry out a greater amount of goods than before, and thus enlist a more numerous population in the service of preparing them. An increased importation always gives an impulse to exportation, so as to make employment spring up in one quarter, at the very time that it disappears in another. Or, rather, at the very time when the demand for a particular commodity is slackened at home, it is stimulated abroad. We have already adverted to the way in which families shift their expenditure in a year of scarcity, directing a far greater proportion of it than usual to the first necessaries of life, and withdrawing it proportionally from the comforts, and even second necessaries of life. Cloth may be regarded as one of the second necessaries; and it were woful indeed, if on the precise year when food was dearest, the numerous workmen engaged in this branch of industry should find that employment was scarcest. But in very proportion as they are abandoned by customers at home, do they find a compensation in the more quickened demand of customers from abroad. It is in these various ways that a country is found to survive so well its hardest and heaviest visitations; and even under a triple price for the first articles of subsistence, it has been found to emerge into

prosperity again, without an authentic instance of starvation throughout all its families.\*

20. When any given object is anxiously cared for by a legislature, and all its wisdom is put forth in devising measures for securing or extending it—it forms a pleasing discovery to find, that what may have hitherto been the laborious aim and effort of human policy, has already been provided for, with all perfection and entireness in the spontaneous workings of human nature ; and that therefore, in this instance, the wisdom of the state has been anticipated by a higher wisdom—or the wisdom which presides over the ordinations of a human government, has been anticipated by the wisdom which ordained the laws of the human constitution. Of this there are manifold examples in political economy—as in the object of population, for the keeping up and increase of which, there was at one time a misplaced anxiety on the part of rulers ; and the object of capital for the preservation and growth of which there is a like misplaced anxiety, and for the decay and disappearance of which there is an equally misplaced alarm. Both, in fact, are what may be termed self-regulating interests—or, in other words, interests which result with so much certainty from the checks and the principles that nature hath already instituted, as to supersede all public or patriotic regulation in regard to either of them. This has now been long understood on the subject of population ; but it holds equally true on the subject of capital. There is, on the one hand, throughout society enough of the appetite for enjoyment, to secure us against its needless excess ; and, on the other, enough of the appetite for gain, to secure us against its hurtful deficiency. And, by a law of oscillation as beautiful as that which obtains in the planetary system, and by which amid all disturbances and errors, it is upheld in its mean state indestructible and inviolate—does capital, in like manner, constantly tend to a condition of optimism, and is never far from it, amid all the variations, whether of defect, or redundancy, to which it is exposed. When in defect, by the operation of high prices, it almost instantly recovers itself—when in excess, it, by the operation of low profits, or rather of losing speculations, almost instantly collapses into a right mediocrity. In the first case, the inducement is to trade rather than to spend ; and there is a speedy accumulation of capital. In the second case, the inducement is to spend rather than to trade ; and there is a speedy reduction of capital. It is thus that capital ever suits itself,

\* It is right to mention that the four preceding paragraphs are taken in substance, and very much in language, from a former publication—as presenting a notable adaptation of external to human nature which offered itself, in the course of other investigations, and at a time when we were not in quest of it.



in the way that is best possible, to the circumstances of the country—so as to leave uncalled for, any economic regulation by the wisdom of man; and that precisely because of a previous moral and mental regulation by the wisdom of God.

21. But if any thing can demonstrate the hand of a righteous Deity in the nature and workings of what may well be termed a mechanism the very peculiar mechanism of trade; it is the healthful impulse given to all its movements, wherever there is a reigning principle of sobriety and virtue in the land—so as to ensure an inseparable connexion between the moral worth and the economic comfort of a people. Of this we should meet with innumerable verifications in political economy—did we make a study of the science, with the express design of fixing and ascertaining them. There is one very beautiful instance in the effect, which the frugality and foresight of workmen would have, to control and equalize the fluctuations of commerce—acting with the power of a fly in mechanics; and so as to save, or at least indefinitely to shorten, those dreary intervals of suspended work or miserable wages, which now occur so often, and with almost periodic regularity in the trading world. What constitutes a sore aggravation to the wretchedness of such a season, is the necessity of overworking—so as, if possible, to compensate by the amount of labour for the deficiency of its remuneration; and yet the inverse effect of this in augmenting and perpetuating that glut, or overproduction, which is the real origin of this whole calamity. It would not happen in the hands of a people elevated and exempted above the urgencies of immediate want; and nothing will so elevate and exempt them, but their own accumulated wealth—the produce of a resolute economy and good management in prosperous times. Would they only save during high wages, what they might spend during low wages—so as when the depression comes, to slacken, instead of adding to their work, or even cease from it altogether—could they only afford to live through the months of such a visitation, on their well husbanded means, the commodities of the overladen market would soon clear away; when, with the return of a brisk demand on empty warehouses, a few weeks instead of months would restore them to importance and prosperity in the commonwealth. This is but a single specimen from many others of that enlargement which awaits the labouring classes, after that by their own intelligence and virtue, they have won their way to it. With but wisdom and goodness among the common people, the whole of this economic machinery would work most beneficently for them—a moral ordination, containing in it most direct evidence for the wisdom and goodness of that Being by

whose hands it is that the machinery has been framed and constituted ; and who, the Preserver and Governor, as well as the Creator of His works, sits with presiding authority over all its evolutions.

22. But this is only one specimen out of the many—the particular instance of a quality that is universal, and which may be detected in almost all the phenomena and principles of the science ; for throughout, political economy is but one grand exemplification of the alliance, which a God of righteousness hath established, between prudence and moral principle on the one hand, and physical comfort on the other. However obnoxious the modern doctrine of population, as expounded by Mr. Malthus, may have been, and still is, to weak and limited sentimentalists, it is the truth which of all others sheds the greatest brightness over the earthly prospects of humanity—and this in spite of the hideous, the yet sustained outcry which has risen against it. This is a pure case of adaptation, between the external nature of the world in which we live, and the moral nature of man, its chief occupier. There is a demonstrable inadequacy in all the material resources which the globe can furnish, for the increasing wants of a recklessly increasing species. But over and against this, man is gifted with a moral and a mental power by which the inadequacy might be fully countervailed ; and the species, in virtue of their restrained and regulated numbers, be upholden on the face of our world, in circumstances of large and staple sufficiency, even to the most distant ages. The first origin of this blissful consummation is in the virtue of the people ; but carried into sure and lasting effect by the laws of political economy, through the indissoluble connexion which obtains between the wages and the supply of labour—so that in every given state of commerce and civilization, the amount of the produce of industry and of the produce of the soil, which shall fall to the share of the work-men, is virtually at the determination of the work-men themselves, who, by dint of resolute prudence and resolute principle together, may rise to an indefinitely higher status than they now occupy, of comfort and independence in the commonwealth. This opens up a cheering prospect to the lovers of our race ; and not the less so, that it is seen through the medium of popular intelligence and virtue—the only medium through which it can ever be realized. And it sheds a revelation, not only on the hopeful destinies of man, but on the character of God—in having instituted this palpable alliance between the moral and the physical ; and so assorted the economy of outward nature to the economy of human principles and passions. The lights of modern science have made us apprehend more clearly, by what steps the con-

dition and the character of the common people rise and fall with each other—insomuch, that, while on the one hand their general destitution is the inevitable result of their general worthlessness, they, on the other, by dint of wisdom and moral strength, can augment indefinitely, not the produce of the earth, nor the produce of human industry, but that proportion of both which falls to their own share. Their economic is sure to follow by successive advances in the career of their moral elevation; nor do we hold it impossible, or even unlikely—that gaining, every generation, on the distance which now separates them from the upper classes of society, they shall, in respect both of decent sufficiency and dignified leisure, make perpetual approximations to the fellowships and the enjoyments of cultivated life.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*On the Relation in which the special Affections of our Nature stand to Virtue; and on the Demonstration given forth by it, both to the Character of Man and the Character of God.*

1. THERE are certain broad and decisive indications of moral design, and so of a moral designer, in the constitution of our world, which instead of expounding at great length, we have only stated briefly or incidentally—because, however effective as proofs, they possess a character of such extreme obviousness, as to require no anxious or formal explanation; but, on the instant of being presented to their notice, are read and recognized by all men. One patent example of this in the constitution of man, is the force and prevalence of compassion—an endowment which could not have proceeded from a malignant being; but which evinces the Author of our nature to be himself compassionate and generous. Another example may be given alike patent and recognizable, if not of a virtuous principle in the human constitution, at least of such an adaptation of the external world to that constitution—that, with the virtuous practice which that principle would both originate and sustain, the outward and general prosperity of man is indispensably connected. We mean the manifest and indispensable subserviency of a general truth in the world, to the general well-being of society. It is difficult to imagine, that a God of infinite power, and consummate skill of workmanship, but withal a lover of falsehood, would have devised such a world; or rather, that he would not, in patronage to those of his own likeness, have ordered the whole of its system differently—so reversing its present laws and sequences, as that, instead of honour and integrity, duplicity disingenuousness and fraud, should have been the usual stepping-stones to the possession both of this world's esteem and of this world's enjoyments. How palpably opposite this is to the actual economy of things, the whole experience of life abundantly testifies—making it evident, of individual examples, that the connexion between honesty and success in the world is the rule; the connexion between dishonesty and success is the exception. But perhaps, instead of attempting the induction of particular cases, we should observe a still more distinct avowal of the character of God, of his favour for truth, and of the discountenance which he has laid upon falsehood, by tracing, which could be easily done in imagination,



the effect it would have in society, if, all things else remaining unaltered, there should this single difference be introduced, of a predominant falsehood, instead of a predominant truth in the world. The consequences of a universal distrust, in the almost universal stoppage that would ensue of the useful interchanges of life, are too obvious to be enumerated. The world of trade would henceforth break up into a state of anarchy, or rather be paralyzed into a state of cessation and stillness. The mutual confidence between man and man, if not the mainspring of commerce, is at least the oil, without which its movements were impracticable. And were truth to disappear, and all dependence on human testimony to be destroyed, this is not the only interest which would be ruined by it. It would vitiate, and that incurably, every social and every domestic relationship; and all the charities as well as all the comforts of life would take their departure from the world.

2. Seeing then that the observation of honesty and truth is of such vital importance to society, that without it society would cease to keep together—it might be well to ascertain, by what special provision it is in the constitution of man, that the practice of these virtues is upheld in the world. Did it proceed in every instance, from the natural power and love of integrity in the heart—we should rejoice in contemplating this alliance between the worth of man's character, on the one hand; and the security, as well as the abundance of his outward comforts upon the other. And such, in fact, is the habitual disposition to truth in the world—that, in spite of the great moral depravation into which our species has obviously fallen, we probably do not overrate the proportion, when we affirm, that at least a hundred truths are uttered among men for one falsehood. But then, in the vast majority of cases, there is no temptation to struggle with, nothing by which to try or to estimate the strength of the virtue so that, without virtue being at all concerned—in it, man's words might spontaneously flow in the natural current of his ideas, of the knowledge or the convictions which belong to him. But more than this. Instead of selfishness seducing man, which it often does, from the observations of truth and honesty—it vastly oftener is on the side of these observations. Generally speaking, it is not more his interest that he should have men of integrity to deal with—than that he himself should, in his own dealings, be strictly observant of this virtue. To be abandoned by the confidence of his fellows, he would find to be not more mortifying to his pride, than ruinous to his prosperity in the world. We are aware that many an occasional harvest is made from deceit and injustice; but, in the vast majority of cases, men would cease to thrive when they

ceased to be trusted. A man's actual truth is not more beneficial to others, than the reputation of it is gainful to himself. And therefore it is, that, throughout the mercantile world, men are as sensitive of an aspersion on their name, as they would be of an encroachment on their property. The one, in fact, is tantamount to the other. It is thus, that, under the constraints of selfishness alone, fidelity and justice may be in copious and current observation among men; and while, perhaps, the principle of these virtues is exceedingly frail and uncertain in all hearts—human society may still subsist by the literal and outward observation of them.

3. Here then is the example, not of a virtue in principle, but of a virtue in performance, with all the indispensable benefits of that performance, being sustained on the soil of selfishness. Were a profound observer of human life to take account of all the honesties of mercantile intercourse, he would find, that, in the general amount of them, they were mainly due to the operation of this cause; or that they were so prevalent in society, because each man was bound to their observance, by the tie of his own personal interest—insomuch, that if this particular tie were broken, it would as surely derange or break up the world of trade, as the world of matter would become an inert or turbid chaos, on the repeal or suspension of the law of gravitation. Confidence, the very soul of commercial enterprize, and without which the transactions of merchandize were impossible, is the goodly result, not of that native respect which each man has for another's rights, but of that native regard which each man has for his own special advantage. This forms another example of a great and general good wrought out for society—while each component member is intently set, only on a distinct and specific good for himself—a high interest, which could not have been confided to human virtue; but which has been skilfully extracted from the workings of human selfishness. In as far as truth and justice prevail in the world, not by the operation of principle but of policy, in so far the goodness of man has no share in it: but so beneficent a result out of such unpromising materials, speaks all the more emphatically both for the wisdom and the goodness of God.

4. But in this there is no singularity. Other examples can be named, of God placing us in such circumstances, as to enlist even our selfishness on the side of virtuous conduct; or implanting such special affections, as do, by their own impulse, lead to that conduct, although virtuousness is not in all our thoughts. We are often so actuated, as to do what is best for society, at the very time that the good of society is forming no part of our

concern ; and our footsteps are often directed in that very path, which a moral regard to the greatest happiness of the species would dictate—without any moral purpose having been conceived or any moral principle been in exercise within us. It is thus that our resentment operates as a check on the injuriousness of others, although our single aim be the protection of our own interests—not the diminution of violence or injustice in the world : And thus too our own dread of resentment from others, works the same outward effect, which honour or a respect for their rights would have had upon our transactions, which delicacy or a respect for their feelings would have had upon our converse with those around us. It is in this way that God makes the wrath of man to praise Him ; and the same is true of other affections of our nature, which have less the character of selfishness, than either anger or fear. It is not because prompted by a sense of duty, but under the force of a mere natural proneness, that mothers watch so assiduously over the helplessness, and fathers toil so painfully for the subsistence of their children. Even compassion, with the speed and the discrimination of its movements, does for human life, more than man is capable of doing with his highest efforts of morality and reason—yet, not in the shape of a principle, but in the shape of a strong constitutional propensity. The good is rendered, not by man acting as he thinks that he ought, or under the force of a moral suggestion ; but man acting because he feels himself constrained, as if by the force of a physical necessity—not surely because, in the exercise of a sovereign liberty, he hath assumed a lordly ascendant over all the inferior passions of his nature ; but because himself is lorded over by a law of his nature, having in it all the might and mastery of a passion. It is when, in the contemplation of phenomena like these, we are enabled to view man as an instrument, that we are also led more clearly to perceive who the agent is—not the being who is endowed, but the Being who has endowed him. The instinct of animals is a substitute for their wisdom ; but, at the same time, a palpable demonstration of the wisdom of God. Man also has his instincts, which serve as the substitutes of moral goodness in him ; but which therefore mark all the more strongly, by their beneficial operation the goodness of his Maker.\*

\* Dr. Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments has well remarked that—“ though in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind, we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God.”

5. To see how widely these gifts or endowments of our nature by the hand of God, may stand apart from aught like proper goodness or virtue in the heart of man—we have only to witness the similar provision which has been made for the care and preservation of the inferior animals. The anger which arouses to defence against injury, and the fear which prompts to an escape from it, and the maternal affection which nourishes and rears forward the successive young into a condition of strength and independence for the protection of themselves—these all have their indispensable uses, for upholding and perpetuating the various tribes of living creatures, who at the same time are alike incapable of morality and reason. There is no *moral* purpose served by these implantations, so far at least as respects the creatures themselves, with whom virtue is a thing utterly incompetent and unattainable. In reference to them, they may be viewed simply as beneficent contrivances, and as bespeaking no other characteristic on the part of the Deity than that of pure kindness, or regard for the happiness and safety, throughout their respective generations, of the creatures whom He has made. This might help us to distinguish between those mental endowments of our own species, which have but for their object the comfort and protection; and those which have for their object the character of man. The former we have in common with the inferior animals; and so far they only discover to us the kindness of the divine nature, or the parental and benevolent concern which God takes in us. The latter are peculiar to our race, and are indicated by certain phenomena of our mental nature, in which the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air have no share with us—by the conscience within us, asserting its own rightful supremacy over all our affections and doings; by our capacities for virtue and vice, along with the pleasures or the pains which are respectively blended with them; and finally by the operation of habit, whose office, like that of a schoolmaster, is to perfect our education, and to fix, in one way or other, but at length unmoveably, the character of its disciples. These present us with a distinct exhibition of the Deity, or a distinct and additional relation in which He stands to us—revealing to us, not Him only as the affectionate Father, and ourselves only as the fondlings of His regard; but Him also as the great moral Teacher, the Lawgiver, and moral Governor of man, and ourselves in a state of pupilage and probation, or as the subjects of a moral discipline.

6. And here it may be proper to remark, that we understand by the goodness of God, not His benevolence or His kindness alone. The term is comprehensive of all moral excellence. Truth, and justice, and that strong repugnance to moral evil



which has received the peculiar denomination of Holiness—these are all good moral properties, and so enter into the composition of perfect moral goodness. There are some who have analyzed, or, in the mere force of their own wishfulness, would resolve the whole character of the Deity into but one attribute—that of a placid undistinguishing tenderness; and, in virtue of this tasteful or sentimental but withal meagre imagination, would they despoil Him of all sovereignty and of all sacredness—holding Him forth as but the indulgent father, and not also as the righteous Governor of men. But this analysis is as impracticable in the character of God, as we have already found it to be in the character of man.\* Unsophisticated conscience speaks differently. The forebodings of the human spirit in regard to futurity, as well as the present phenomena of human life, point to truth and righteousness, as distinct and stable and independent perfections of the divine nature—however glossed or disguised they may have been, by the patrons of a mild and easy religion. In the various provisions of nature for the defence and security of the inferior animals, we may read but one lesson—the benevolence of its Author. In the like provisions, whether for the defence and prolongation of human life, or the maintenance of human society—we read that lesson too, but other lessons in conjunction with it. For in the larger capacities of man, and more especially in his possession of a moral nature, do we regard him as born for something ulterior and something higher than the passing enjoyments of a brief and ephemeral existence. And so when we witness in the provisions, whether of his animal or mental economy, a subserviency to the protection, or even to the enjoyments of his transition state—we cannot disconnect this with subserviency to the remoter objects of that ultimate state whither he is going. In the instinctive fondness of parents, and the affinities of kindness from the fellows of our species, and even the private affections of anger and fear,—we behold so many elements conjoined into what may be termed an apparatus of guardianship; and such an apparatus has been reared by Providence in behalf of every creature that breathes. But in the case of man, with his larger capacities and prospects, the terminating object, even of such an intermediate and temporary apparatus, is not to secure for him, the safety or happiness of the present life. It is to fulfil the period, and subserve the purposes of a moral discipline. For meanwhile character is ripening; and, whether good or bad, settling by the power and operation of habit into a state of inveteracy—and so, as to fix

and prepare the disciples of a probationary state for their final destinations. What to the inferior animals are the provisions of a life, are to man the accommodations of a journey. In the one we singly behold the indications of a divine benevolence. With the other, we connect the purposes of a divine administration; and beside the love and liberality of a Parent, we recognize the designs of a Teacher, and Governor, and Judge.

7. And these special affections, though their present and more conspicuous use be to uphold the existing economy of life, are not without their influence and their uses in a system of moral discipline. And it is quite obvious, that, ere we can pronounce on the strict and essential virtuousness of any human being, they must be admitted into the reckoning. In estimating the precise moral quality of any beneficence which man may have executed, it is indispensable to know, in how far he was schooled into it at the bidding of principle, and in how far urged forward to it by the impulse of a special affection. To do good to another because he feels that he ought, is an essentially distinct exhibition from doing the same good, by the force of parental love, or of an instinctive and spontaneous compassion—as distinct as the strength of a constitutionally implanted desire is from the sense of a morally incumbent obligation. In as far as I am prompted to the relief of distress, by a movement of natural pity—in so far less is left for virtue to do. In as far as I am restrained from the out-breakings of an anger which tumultuates within, by the dread of a counter-resentment and retaliation from without—in so far virtue has less to resist. It is thus that the special affections may at once lighten the tasks and lessen the temptations of virtue; and, whether in the way of help at one time or of defence at another, may save the very existence of a principle, which in its own unaided frailty, might, among the rude conflicts of life, have else been overborne. It is perhaps indispensable to the very being of virtue among men, that, by means of the special affections, a certain force of inclination has been superadded to the force of principle—we doubt not, in proportions of highest wisdom, of most exquisite skill and delicacy. But still the strength of the one must be deducted, in computing the real amount and strength of the other; and so the special affections of our nature not only subserve a purpose in time, but are of essential and intimate effect in the processes of our moral preparation, and will eventually tell on the high retributions and judgments of eternity.

8. Man is not a utilitarian either in his propensities or in his principles. When doing what he likes—it is not always, it is not generally, because of its perceived usefulness, that he so

likes it. But his inclinations, these properties of his nature, have been so adapted both to the material world and to human society, that a great accompanying or great resulting usefulness, is the effect of that particular constitution which God hath given to him. And when doing what he feels that he ought, it is far from always because of its perceived usefulness, that he so feels. But God hath so formed our mental constitution, and hath so adapted the whole economy of external things to the stable and everlasting principles of virtue, that, in effect and historical fulfilment, the greatest virtue and the greatest happiness are at one. But the union of these two does not constitute their unity. Virtue is not right, because it is useful; but God hath made it useful, because it is right. He both loves virtue, and wills the happiness of his creatures—this benevolence of will, being itself, not the whole, but one of the brightest moralities in the character of the Godhead. He wills the happiness of man, but wills his virtue more; and accordingly, hath so constructed both the system of humanity, and the system of external nature, that, only through the medium of virtue, can any substantial or lasting happiness be realized. The utilitarians have confounded these two elements, because of the inseparable yet contingent alliance, which a God of virtue hath established between them. The Cosmopolites are for merging all the particular affections into one; and would substitute in their place a general desire for the greatest possible amount of good to others, as the alone guide and impellent of human conduct. And the Utilitarians are for merging all the particular virtues into one; and would substitute in their place the greatest usefulness, as the alone principle to which every question respecting the morality of actions should be referred. The former would do away friendship, and patriotism, and all the partialities or even instincts of relationship, from the system of human nature. The latter would at least degrade, if not do away, truth and justice from the place which they now hold in the system of Ethics. The desolating effect of such changes on the happiness and security of social life, would exhibit the vast superiority of the existent economy of things, over that speculative economy into which these theorists would transform it; or, in other words, would prove by how mighty an interval, the goodness and the wisdom of God transcended both the goodness and the wisdom of man.

9. The whole of this speculation, if followed out into its just and legitimate consequences, would serve greatly to humble and reduce our estimate of human virtue. Nothing is virtuous, but what is done under a sense of duty; or done, simply and solely because it ought. It is only in as far as this consideration is

present to the mind, and is of practical and prevalent operation there—that man can be said to feel virtuously, or to act virtuously. We should not think of affixing this moral characteristic to any performance however beneficial, that is done under the mere impulse of a headlong sensibility, without any sense or any sentiment of a moral obligation. In every good action, that is named good because useful to society, we should subduct or separate all which is due to the force of a special affection, that we might precisely ascertain how much or how little remains, which may be due to the force of principle. The inferior animals, destitute though they be of a moral nature and therefore incapable of virtue, share with us in some of the most useful and amiable instincts which belong to humanity; and when we stop to admire the workings of nature's sensibility—whether in the tears that compassion sheds over the miseries of the unfortunate, or in the smiles and endearments which are lavished by a mother upon her infant family, we seldom reflect how little of the real and proper character of virtue is there. We accredit man, as if they were his own principles, with those instincts which the divinity hath implanted within him; and it aggravates the error, or rather the guilt of so perverse a reckoning—that, while we offer this incense to humanity, we forget all the while the hand of Him, by whom it is that humanity is so bountifully gifted and so beautifully adorned.



## CHAPTER IX.

### *Miscellaneous Evidences of virtuous and benevolent Design, in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man.*

1. It will be enough, if, after having led the way on a new territory of investigation, we shall select one or two out of the goodly number of instances, as specimens of the richness and fertility of the land. We have already endeavoured to prove, why a number of distinct benefits, even though reducible by analysis into one principle or law, still affords not a solitary, but a multiple of evidence, of the wise and benevolent Creator.\* This evidence, in fact, is proportioned to the number, not of efficient but final causes in nature—so that each separate example of a good rendered to humanity, in virtue of its actual constitution, may be regarded as a separate and additional evidence, of its having been formed by an artificer, at once of intelligent device and kind purposes. The reduction of these examples into fewer laws does not extenuate the argument for His goodness; and it may enhance the argument for His wisdom.

2. The first instance which occurs to us is that law of affection, by which its intensity or strength is proportioned to the helplessness of its object. It takes a direction downwards; descending, for example, with much greater force from parents to children, than ascending from children to parents back again—save when they lapse again into second infancy, and the dutiful devoted attendance by the helpful daughters of a family, throughout the protracted ailments and infirmity of their declining years, instead of an exception, is in truth a confirmation of the law—as much so, as the stronger attraction of a mother's heart towards the youngest of the family; or, more impressive still, her more special and concentrated regard towards her sickly or decrepit or even idiot boy. It is impossible not to recognize in this beautiful determination of nature, the benevolence of nature's God.

3. Such instances could be greatly multiplied; and we invite the future explorers of this untrodden field to the task of collecting them. We hasten to instances of another kind, which we all the more gladly seize upon, as being cases of purest and

\* Introductory Chapter. Art. 27, 28, 29.

strictest adaptation, not of the external mental, but of the external material world, to the moral constitution of man.

4. The power of speech is precisely such an adaptation. Whether we regard the organs of utterance and hearing in man, or the aerial medium by which sounds are conveyed—do we behold a pure subserviency of the material to the mental system of our world. It is true that the great object subserved by it, is the action and reaction between mind and mind—nor can we estimate this object too highly, when we think of the mighty influence of language, both on the moral and intellectual condition of our species. Still it is by means of an elaborate material construction that this pathway has been formed, from one heart and from one understanding to another. And therefore it is, that the faculty of communication by words, with all the power and flexibility which belong to it, by which the countless benefits of human intercourse are secured, and all the stores of sentiment and thought are turned into a common property for the good of mankind, may well be ranked among the highest of the examples that we are now in quest of—it being indeed as illustrious an adaptation as can be named of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man. Of the converse of disembodied spirits we know nothing. But to man cased in materialism, certain material passages or ducts of conveyance, for the interchange of thought and feeling between one mind and another seem indispensable. The exquisite provision which has been made for these, both in the powers of articulation and hearing, as also in that intermediate element, by the pulsations of which ideas are borne forward, as on so many winged messengers from one intellect to another—bespeaks, and perhaps more impressively than any other phenomena in nature, the contrivance of a supreme artificer, the device and finger of a Deity.\*

5. But articulate and arbitrary sound is not the only vehicle, either of meaning or sentiment. There is a natural as well as artificial language, consisting chiefly of expressive tones—though greatly reinforced both by expressive looks and expressive gestures. The voice, by its intonations alone, is a powerful instrument for the propagation of sympathy between man and man; and there is similarity enough between us and the inferior animals, in the natural signs of various of the emotions,

\* It will at once be seen that the same observations may be extended to written language, and to the fitness of those materials which subserve through its means, the wide and rapid communication of human thoughts. We in truth could have multiplied indefinitely such instances of adaptation as we are now giving—but we judge it better to have confined ourselves throughout the volume, to matters of a more rudimentary and general character—leaving the manifold detail and fuller developements of the argument to future labourers in the field.

as anger and fear and grief and cheerfulness, for the sympathy being extended beyond the limits of our own species, and over a great part of the sentient creation. We learn by experience and association the significancy of the merely vocal apart from vocables; for almost each shade of meaning, at least each distinct sensibility, has its own appropriate intonation—so that, without catching one syllable of the utterance, we can, from its melody alone, often tell what are the workings of the heart, and even what are the workings of the intellect. It is thus that music, even though altogether apart from words, is so powerfully fitted, both to represent and to awaken the mental processes—insomuch that, without the aid of spoken characters, many a story of deepest interest is most impressively told, many a noble or tender sentiment is most emphatically conveyed by it. It says much for the native and original predominance of virtue—it may be deemed another assertion of its designed pre-eminence in the world, that our best and highest music is that which is charged with loftiest principle, whether it breathes in orisons of sacredness, or is employed to kindle the purposes and to animate the struggles of resolved patriotism; and that never does it fall with more exquisite cadence on the ear of the delightful listener, than when attuned to the home sympathies of nature, it tells in accents of love or pity, of its woes and its wishes for all humanity. The power and expressiveness of music may well be regarded as a most beautiful adaptation of external Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man—for what can be more adapted to his moral constitution, than that which is so helpful as music eminently is, to his moral culture? Its sweetest sounds are those of kind affection. Its sublimest sounds are those most expressive of moral heroism; or most fitted to solemnize the devotions of the heart, and prompt the aspirations and resolves of exalted piety.

6. A philosophy of taste has been founded on this contemplation; and some have contended that both the beauty and the sublimity of sounds are derived from their association with moral qualities alone. Without affirming that association is the only, or the universal cause, it must at least be admitted to have a very extensive influence over this class of our emotions. If each of the mental affections have its own appropriate intonation; and there be the same or similar intonations given forth, either by the inanimate creation or by the creatures having life which are inferior to man—then, frequent and familiar on every side of him, must be many of those sounds by which human passions are suggested, and the memory of things awakened which are fitted to affect and interest the heart. And thus it is, that, to

the ear of a poet, all nature is vocal with sentiment; and he can fancy a genius or residing spirit, in the ocean, or in the tempest, or in the rushing waterfall, or in the stream whose softer murmurs would lull him to repose—or in the mighty forest, when he hears the general sigh omitted by its innumerable leaves as they rustle in the wind, and from whose fitful changes he seems to catch the import of some deep and mysterious soliloquy. But the imagination will be still more readily excited by the notes and the cries of animals, as when the peopled grove awakens to harmony; or when it is figured, that, amid the amplitudes of savage and solitary nature, the lioness robbed of her whelps, calls forth the echoes of the wilderness—making it to ring with the proclamation of her wrongs. But, without conceiving any such rare or extreme sensibility as this, there is a common, an every-day enjoyment which all have in the sounds of nature; and, as far as sympathy with human emotions is awakened by them, and this forms an ingredient of the pleasure, it affords another fine example, of an adaptation in the external world to the mental constitution of its occupiers.

7. But the same philosophy has been extended to sights as well as sounds. The interchange of mind with mind is not restricted to language. There is an interchange by looks also; and the ever-varying hues of the mind are represented, not by the complexion of the face alone or the composition of its features, but by the attitude and gestures of the body.\* It is thus that human sentiment or passion may come to be expressed by the colour and form and even the motion of visible things; by a kindred physiognomy for all the like emotions on the part of the inferior animals—nay, by a certain countenance or shape in the objects of mute and unconscious nature. It is thus that a moral investment sits on the aspects of the purely material world; and we accordingly speak of the modesty of the violet, the innocence of the lily, the commanding mountain, the smiling landscape. Each material object has its character, as is amply set forth in the beautiful illustrations of Mr. Alison; and so to the poet's eye, the whole panorama of nature is one grand personification, lighted up throughout by consciousness and feeling. This is the reason why in all languages, material images and moral characteristics are so blended and identified.

\* We may here state that as the air is the medium by which sounds are conveyed—so light may be regarded as standing in the same relation to those natural signs whether of colour, gesture or attitude, which are addressed to the eye. Much could be said respecting the adaptation of light to the moral constitution of man—arising from the power which the very observation of our fellow-men has in repressing, so long as we are under it, indecency or crime. The works of iniquity are called works of darkness.



It is the law of association which thus connects the two worlds of sense and of sentiment. Sublimity in the one is the counterpart to moral greatness in the other; and beauty in the one is the counterpart to moral delicacy in the other. Both the graceful and the grand of human character are as effectually embodied in the objects and scenery of nature, as in those immortal forms which have been transmitted by the hand of sculptors to the admiration of distant ages. It is a noble testimony to the righteousness of God, that the moral and the external loveliness are thus harmonized—as well as to the wisdom which has so adapted the moral and the material system to each other, that supreme virtue and supreme beauty are at one.

“ Mind, mind alone, bear witness earth and heaven!  
 The living fountain, in itself contains  
 Of beauteous and sublime.  
 There hand in hand sit paramount the graces;  
 There enthroned, celestial Venus with divinest airs  
 Invites the soul to never fading joy.”

AKENSIDE.

8. And we may here remark a certain neglect of external things and external influences, which, however enlightened or transcendently rational it may seem, is at variance with truth of principle and sound philosophy. We would instance the undervaluing of the natural signs in eloquence, although their effect makes all the difference in point of impression and power between spoken and written language—seeing that, superadded to articulate utterance, the eye and the intonations and the gestures also serve as so many signals of conveyance for the transmission of sentiment from one mind to another. It is thus that indifference to manner or even to dress, may be as grievous a dereliction against the real philosophy of social intercourse—as indifference to the attitude and the drapery of figures would be against the philosophy of the fine arts. Both proceed on the forgetfulness of that adaptation, in virtue of which materialism is throughout instinct with principle, and both in its colouring and forms, gives forth the most significant expressions of it. On this ground too we would affirm, both of state ceremonial and professional costume, that neither of them is insignificant; and that he who in the spirit of rash and restless innovation would upset them, as if they were the relics of a gross and barbaric age, may be doing violence not only to the usages of venerable antiquity, but to the still older and more venerable constitution of human nature—weakening in truth the bonds of social union, by dispensing with certain of those influences which the Great Author of our constitution designed for the consolidation and good order of society. This is not accordant with the phi-

losophy of Butler, who wrote on the "use of externals in matters of religion,"—nor with the philosophy of those who prefer the findings of experience, however irreducible to system they may be, to all the subtleties or simplifications of unsupported theory.\*

9. Before quitting this subject, we remark, that it is no proof against the theory which makes taste a derivative from morality, that our emotions of taste may be vivid and powerful, while our principles of morality are so weak as to have no ascendant or governing influence over the conduct. This is no unusual phenomenon of our mysterious nature. There is a general homage rendered to virtue in the world; but it is the homage, more of a dilettanti than of an obedient and practical devotee. This is not more surprising, than that the man of profligate habits should have a tasteful admiration of sacred pictures and sacred melodies; or that, with the heart of a coward, he should nevertheless catch the glow of at least a momentary inspiration from the music of war and patriotism. It seems the effect and evidence of some great moral derangement, that there should be such an incongruity in subjective man between his taste and his principles; and the evidence is not lessened but confirmed, when we observe a like incongruity in the objective nature by which he is surrounded—we mean, between the external mental and external material world. We have only to open our eyes and see how wide, in point of loveliness, the contrast or dissimilarity is, between the moral and the material of our actual contemplation—the one coming immediately from the hand of God; the other tainted and transformed by the spirit of man. We believe with Alison and others, that, to at least a very great extent, much of the beauty of visible things lies in association; that it is this which gives its reigning expression to every tree and lake and waterfall, and which may be said to have impregnated with character the whole of the surrounding landscape. How comes it then, that, in the midst of living society, where we might expect to meet with the originals of all this fascination, we find scarcely any other thing than a tame and uninteresting level of the flat and the sordid and the ordinary—whereas, in that inanimate scenery, which yields but the faint and secondary reflection of moral qualities, there is, on every line and on every feature, so vivid an impress of loveliness and glory? One cannot go forth of the crowded city to the fresh and the fair of rural nature, without the experience, that, while in the moral scene, there is so

\* The perusal of those works which treat scientifically of the fine arts, as Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, is well adapted to rebuke and rectify the light estimation, in which all sensible accompaniments are apt to be held by us.

much to thwart and to revolt and to irritate—in the natural scene, all is gracefulness and harmony. It reminds us of the contrast which is sometimes exhibited, between the soft and flowery lawn of a cultivated domain, and the dark or angry spirit of its owner—of whom we might almost imagine, that he scowls from the battlements of his castle, on the intrusion of every unlicensed visitor. And again the question may be put—whence is it that the moral picturesque in our world of sense, as it beams upon us from its woods and its eminencies and its sweet recesses of crystal stream or of grassy sunshine, should yield a delight so unqualified—while the primary moral characteristics, of which these are but the imagery or the visible representation, should, in our world of human spirits, be so wholly obliterated, or at least so wofully deformed? Does it not look as if a blight had come over the face of our terrestrial creation, which hath left its materialism in a great measure untouched, while it hath inflicted on man a sore and withering leprosy? Do not the very openness and benignity which sit on the aspect of nature reproach him, for the cold and narrow and creeping jealousies that be at work in his own selfish and suspicious bosom; and most impressively tell the difference between what man is, and what he ought to be?

10. There are certain other adaptations; but on which we forbear to expatiate.\* Some of them indeed border on a terri-

\* It must be obvious that we cannot exhaust the subject, but only *exemplify* it, by means of a few specimens. There is an adaptation, which, had it occurred in time, might have been stated in the text—suggested by the celebrated question respecting the liberty of the human will. We cannot but admit how much it would have deteriorated the constitution of humanity, or rather destroyed one of its noblest and most essential parts, had it been so constructed, as that either man was not accountable for his own actions, or that these actions were free in the sense contended for by one of the parties in the controversy—that is, were so many random contingencies which had no parentage in any events or influences that went before them, or occupied no place in a train of causation. Of the reasoners on the opposite sides of this sorely agitated question—the one contending for the moral liberty, and the other for the physical necessity of human actions—it is clear that there are many who hold the one to be destructive of the other. But what the wisdom of man cannot argumentatively harmonize in the world of speculation, the power and wisdom of God have executive harmonized in the world of realities—so that man, on the one hand, irresistibly feels himself to be an accountable creature; and yet, on the other, his doings are as much the subject of calculation and of a philosophy, as many of those classes of phenomena in the material world, which, fixed and certain in themselves, are only uncertain to us, not because of their contingency, but because of their complication. We are not sure if the evolutions of the will are more beyond the reach of prediction than the evolutions of the weather. It is this union of the moral character with the historical certainty of our volitions, which has proved so puzzling, to many of our controversialists; but in proportion to the difficulty felt by us in the adjustment of these two elements, should be our admiration of that profound and exquisite skill which has mastered the apparent incongruity—so that while every voluntary action of man is, in point of reckoning, the subject of a moral, it is, in point of result, no less the subject of a physical law.

tory distinct from our own, if they do not altogether belong to it. The relation between food and hunger, between the object and the appetite, is an instance of the adaptation between external nature and man's physical constitution—yet the periodical recurrence of the appetite itself, with its imperious demand to be satisfied, viewed as an impellent to labour even the most irksome and severe, has an important effect both on the moral constitution of the individual and on the state of society. The superficies of the human body, in having been made so exquisitely alive at every pore to the sensations of pain, may be regarded as nature's defensive covering against those exposures from without, which else might injure or destroy it. This is purely a physical adaptation, but it involves a moral adaptation also; for this shrinking and sensitive avoidance, at the first approaches of pain affords a similar protection against certain hazards from within—as self-mutilation in the moment of the spirit's wantonness, or even self-destruction in the moment of its despair. But, without enlarging further on specific instances, we shall now advert to one subject, furnished by the history of moral science; and replete, we have long thought, with the materials of a very strong and comprehensive argument.

11. We have already adverted to the objective nature of virtue, and the subjective nature of man, as forming two wholly distinct objects of contemplation. It is the latter and not the former which indicates the moral character of God. The mere system of ethical doctrine is no more fitted to supply an argument of this character, than would the system of geometry. It is not geometry in the abstract, but geometry as embodied in the Heavens, or in the exquisite structures of the terrestrial physics—which bespeaks the skill of the artificer who framed them. In like manner it is not moral science in the abstract—but the moral constitution of beings so circumstanced and so made, that virtue is the only element in which their permanent individual or social happiness can be realized, which bespeaks the great Parent of the human family to be Himself the lover and the exemplar of righteousness. In a word, it is not from an abstraction, but from the facts of a creation, that our lesson respecting the divine character, itself a fact, is to be learned; and it is by keeping this distinction in view, that we obtain one important help for drawing from the very conflict and diversity of moral theories on the nature of virtue, a clear, nay a cumulative argument for the virtuous nature of the Godhead.

12. The painful suspicion is apt to intrude upon us, that virtue may not be a thing of any substance or stability at all—when we witness the confusion and the controversy into which moralists



have fallen, on the subject of its elementary principles. But, to allay this feeling, it should be observed, in the first place, that, with all the perplexity which obtains on the question of what virtue, in the abstract or in its own essential and constituting quality, is—there is a pretty general agreement among moralists, as to what the separate and specific virtues of the human character are. According to the selfish system, temperance may be a virtue, because of its subservience to the good of the individual; while by the system of utility it is a virtue, because through its observation, our powers and services are kept entire for the good of society. But again, beside this controversy which relates to the nature of virtue in itself, and which may be termed the objective question in morals—there is a subjective or an organic question which relates, not to the existence, but to the origin and formation of the notion or feeling of virtue in the human mind. The question, for example, whether virtue be a thing of opinion or a thing of sentiment, belongs to this class. Now, in regard to all those questions which respect the origin or the pedigree of our moral judgments, it should not be forgotten, that, while the controvertists are at issue upon this, they are nearly unanimous, as to morality itself being felt by the mind as a matter of supreme obligation. They dispute about the moral sense in man, or about the origin and constitution of the court of conscience; but they have no dispute about the supreme authority of conscience—even as, in questions of civil polity and legislation, there may be no dispute about the rightful authority of some certain court, while there may be antiquarian doubts and differences on the subject of its origin and formation. Dr. Smith, for example, while he has his own peculiar views on the origin of our moral principles, never questions their authority. He differs from others, in regard to the rationale, or the anterior steps of that process, which at length terminates in a decision of the mind, on the merit or demerit of a particular action. The rightness and the supremacy of that decision are not in the least doubted by him. There may be a metaphysical controversy about the mode of arriving at our moral judgment, and at the same time a perfect concurrence in it as the guide and the regulator of human conduct—just as there may be an anatomical controversy about the structure of the eye or the terminations of the optic nerve, and a perfect confidence with all parties, in the correctness of those intimations which the eye gives, of the position of external objects and their visible properties. By attending to this we obtain a second important help for eliciting from the diversity of theories on the nature of virtue, a cumulative argument for the virtuous nature of the Godhead.

13. When the conflict then of its opposing theories, would seem to bring fearful insecurity on moral science, let it not be forgotten, that the very multitude of props and securities, by which virtue is upholden, is that which has given rise to the conflict. There is little or no scepticism, in regard to the worth or substantive being of morality, but chiefly in regard to its sustaining principle; and it is because of so much to sustain it, or of the many distinct and firm props which it rests upon, that there has been such an amount of ethical controversy in the world. There has been many a combat, and many a combatant—not because of the baselessness of morality, but because it rests on a basis of so many goodly pillars, and because of such a varied convenience and beauty in the elevation of the noble fabric. The reason of so much controversy is, that each puny controversialist, wedded to his own exclusive view of an edifice too mighty and majestic for his grasp, has either selected but one of the upholding props, and affirmed it to be the only support of the architecture; or attended to but one of its graces and utilities, and affirmed it to be the alone purpose of the magnificent building. The argument of each, whether on the foundation of virtue or on its nature, when beheld aright, will be found a distinct trophy to its worth—for each can plead some undoubted excellence or good effect of virtue in behalf of his own theory. Each may have so magnified the property which himself had selected—as that those properties of virtue which others had selected, were thrown into the shade, or at most but admitted as humble attendants, in the retinue of his own great principle. And so the controversy is not, whether morality be a solidly constituted fabric; but what that is which constitutes its solidity, and which should be singled out as the keystone of the fabric. Each of the champions in this warfare has fastened on a different keystone; and each pushes the triumph against his adversary by a demonstration of its firmness. Or in other words, virtue is compassed about with such a number of securities, and possesses such a superabundance of strength, as to have given room for the question that was raised about Samson of old—what that is, wherein its great strength lies. It is like the controversy which sometimes arises about a building of perfect symmetry—when sides are taken, and counter-explanations are advanced and argued, about the one characteristic or constituting charm, which hath conferred upon it so much gracefulness. It is even so of morality. Each partisan hath advocated his own system; and each, in doing so, hath more fully exhibited some distinct property or perfection of moral rectitude. Morality is not neutralized by this conflict of testimonies; but rises in statelier pride, and with aug-

mented security, from the foam and the turbulence which play around its base. To her this conflict yields, not a balance, but a summation of testimonies; and, instead of an impaired, it is a cumulative argument, that may be reared out of the manifold controversies to which she has given rise. For when it is asserted by one party in the strife, that the foundation of all morality is the right of God to the obedience of his creatures—let God's absolute right be fully conceded to them. And when others reply, that, apart from such right, there is a native and essential rightness in morality, let this be conceded also. There is indeed such a rightness, which, anterior to law, hath had everlasting residence in the character of the Godhead; and which prompted him to a law, all whose enactments bear the impress of purest morality. And when the advocates of the selfish system affirm, that the good of self is the sole aim and principle of virtue; while we refuse their theory, let us at least admit the fact to which all its plausibility is owing—that nought conduces more surely to happiness, than the strict observation of all the recognized moralities of human conduct. And when a fourth party affirms that nought but the useful is virtuous; and, in support of their theory, can state the unvarying tendencies of virtue in the world towards the highest good of the human family—let it forthwith be granted, that the same God, who blends in his own person, both the rightness of morality and the right of law, that He hath so devised the economy of things and so directs its processes, as to make peace and prosperity follow in the train of righteousness. And when the position that virtue is its own reward, is cast as another dogma into the whirlpool of debate, let it be fondly allowed, that the God, who delights in moral excellence himself, hath made it the direct minister of enjoyment to him, who, formed after his own image, delights in it also. And when others, expatiating on the beauty of virtue, would almost rank it among the objects of taste rather than of principle—let this be followed up by the kindred testimony, that, in all its exhibitions, there is indeed a supreme gracefulness; and that God, rich and varied in all the attestations which He has given of his regard to it, hath so endowed His creatures, that, in moral worth, they have the beatitudes of taste as well as the beatitudes of conscience. And should there be philosophers who say of morality that it is wholly founded upon the emotions—let it at least be granted, that He whose hand did frame our internal mechanism, has attuned it in the most correct and delicate correspondency, with all the moralities of which human nature is capable. And should there be other philosophers who affirm that morality hath a real and substantive existence in the nature

of things, so as to make it as much an object of judgment distinct from him who judges, as are the eternal and immutable truths of geometry—let it with gratitude be acknowledged that the mind is so constituted as to have the same firm hold of the moral which it has of the mathematical relations; and if this prove nothing else, it at least proves, that the Author of our constitution hath stamped there, a clear and legible impress on the side of virtue. We should not exclude from this argument even the degrading systems of Hobbes and Mandeville; the former representing virtue as the creation of human policy, and the latter representing its sole principle to be the love of human praise—for even they tell thus much, the one that virtue is linked with the well-being of the community, the other that it has an echo in every bosom. We would not dissever all these testimonies; but bind them together into the sum and strength of a cumulative argument. The controversialists have lost themselves, but it is in a wilderness of sweets—out of which the materials might be gathered, of such an incense at the shrine of morality, as should be altogether overpowering. Each party hath selected but one of its claims; and, in the anxiety to exalt it, would shed a comparative obscurity over all the rest. This is the contest between them—not whether morality be destitute of claims; but what, out of the number that she possesses, is the great and pre-eminent claim on which man should do her homage. Their controversy perhaps never may be settled; but to make the cause of virtue suffer on this account, would be to make it suffer from the very force and abundance of its recommendations.

14. But this contemplation is pregnant with another inference, beside the worth of virtue—even the righteous character of Him, who, for the sake of upholding it hath brought such a number of contingencies together. When we look to the systems of utility and selfishness, let us look upwardly to Him, through whose ordination alone it is, that virtue hath such power to prosper the arrangements of life and of society. Or when told of the principle that virtue is its own reward, let us not forget Him, who so constituted our moral nature, as to give the feeling of an exquisite charm, both in the possession of virtue and in the contemplation of it. Or when the theory of a moral sense offers itself to our regards, let us bear regard along with it to that God, who constructed this organ of the inner man, and endowed it with all its perceptions and all its feelings. In the utility wherewith He hath followed up the various observations of moral rectitude; in the exquisite relish which He hath infused into the rectitude itself; in the law of conformity thereto which He hath written on the hearts of all men; in the aspect of eternal and



unchangeable fitness, under which He hath made it manifest to every conscience—in these, we behold the elements of many a controversy, on the nature of virtue ; but in these, when viewed aright, we also behold a glorious harmony of attestations to the nature of God. It is thus that the perplexities of the question, when virtue is looked to as but a thing of earthly residence, are all done away, when we carry the speculation upward to heaven. They find solution there ; and cast a radiance over the character of Him who hath not only established in righteousness His throne, but, by means of a rich and varied adaptation, hath profusely shed over the universe that He hath formed, the graces by which He would adorn, and the beatitudes by which He would reward it.

15. Although the establishment of a moral theory is not now our proper concern, we may nevertheless take the opportunity of expressing our dissent from the system of those, who would resolve virtue, not into any native or independent rightness of its own, but unto the will of Him who has a right to all our services. Without disparagement to the Supreme Being, it is not His law which constitutes virtue ; but, far higher homage both to Him and to His law, the law derives all its authority and its being from a virtue of anterior residence in the character of the Divinity. It is not by the authority of any law over Him, that truth and justice and goodness and all the other perfections of supreme moral excellence, have, in His person, had their everlasting residence. He had a nature, before that He uttered it forth into a law. Previous to creation, there existed in His mind, all those conceptions of the great and the graceful, which He hath embodied into a gorgeous universe ; and of which every rude sublimity of the wilderness, or every fair and smiling landscape, gives such vivid representation. And in like manner, previous to all government, there existed in His mind, those principles of righteousness, which afterwards, with the right of an absolute sovereign, He proclaimed into a law. Those virtues of which we now read on a tablet of jurisprudence were all transcribed and taken off from the previous tablet of the divine character. The law is but a reflection of this character. In the fashioning of this law, He pictured forth Himself ; and we, in the act of observing His law, are only conforming ourselves to His likeness. It is there that we are to look for the primeval seat of moral goodness. Or, in other words, virtue has an inherent character of her own—apart from law, and anterior to all jurisdiction.

16. Yet the right of God to command, and the rightness of His commandments, are distinct elements of thought, and should not be merged into one another. We should not lose

sight of the individuality of each, nor identify these two things—because, instead of antagonists, they do in fact stand side by side, and act together in friendly co-operation. Because two influences are conjoined in agency, that is no reason why they should be confounded in thought. Their union does not constitute their unity—and though, in the conscience of man, there be an approbation of all rectitude; and all rectitude, be an obligation laid upon the conduct of man by the divine law—yet still, the approbation of man's moral nature is one thing, and the obligation of God's authority is another.

17. That there is an approval of rectitude, apart from all legal sanctions and legal obligations, there is eternal and unchangeable demonstration in the character of God Himself. He is under no law, and owns the authority of no superior. It is not by the force of sanctions, but by the force of sentiments that the divinity is moved. Morality with Him is not of prescription, but of spontaneous principle alone; and He acts virtuously, not because He is bidden; but because virtue hath its inherent and eternal residence in His own nature. Instead of deriving morality from law, we should derive law, even the law of God, from the primeval morality of His own character; and so far from looking upwardly to His law as the fountain of morality, do we hold it to be the emanation from a higher fountain that is seated in the depths of His unchangeable essence, and is eternal as the nature of the Godhead.

18. The moral hath antecedency over the juridical, God acts righteously, not because of jurisdiction by another, but because of a primary and independent justice in Himself. It was not law which originated the moralities of the divine character; but these moralities are self-existent and eternal as is the being of the Godhead. The virtues had all their dwelling-place in the constitution of the Divinity—ere He stamped the impress of them on a tablet of jurisprudence. There was an inherent, before there was a preceptive morality; and righteousness, and goodness, and truth, which all are imperative enactments of law, were all prior characteristics, in the underived and uncreated excellence of the Lawgiver.

## CHAPTER X.

*On the capacities of the World for making a virtuous Species happy; and the Argument deducible from this, both for the Character of God, and the Immortality of Man.*

1. WE have already stated the distinction, between the theology of those, who would make the divine goodness consist of all moral excellence; and of those, who would make it consist of benevolence alone. Attempts have been made to simplify the science of morals, by the reduction of its various duties or obligations into one element—as when it is alleged, that the virtuousness of every separate morality is reducible into benevolence, which is regarded as the central, or as the great master and generic virtue that is comprehensive of them all. There is a theoretic beauty in this imagination—yet it cannot be satisfactorily established, by all our powers of moral or mental analysis. We cannot rid ourselves of the obstinate impression, that there is a distinct and native virtuousness, both in truth and in justice, apart from their subserviency to the good of men; and accordingly, in the ethical systems of all our most orthodox expounders, they are done separate homage to—as virtues standing forth in their own independent character, and having their own independent claims both on the reverence and observation of mankind. Now, akin with this attempt to generalize the whole of virtue into one single morality, is the attempt to generalize the character of God into one single moral perfection. Truth and justice have been exposed to the same treatment, in the one contemplation as in the other—that is, regarded more as derivatives from the higher characteristic of benevolence, than as distinct and primary characteristics themselves. The love of philosophic simplicity may have led to this in the abstract or moral question; but something more has operated in the theological question. It falls in with a still more urgent affection than the taste of man; it falls in with his hope and his sense of personal interest, that the truth and justice of the Divinity should be removed, as it were, to the back-ground of his perspective. And accordingly, this inclination to soften, if not to suppress, the sterner affections of righteousness and holiness, appears, not merely in the pleasing and poetic effusions of the sentimental, but also in the didactic expositions of the academic theism. It is thus that Paley, so full and effective, and able in his demonstrations of the natural, is yet so

meagre in his demonstrations of the moral attributes. It is, in truth, the general defect, not of natural theology in itself—but of natural theology, as set forth at the termination of ethical courses, or as expounded in the schools. In this respect, the natural theology of the heart, is at variance, with the natural theology of our popular and prevailing literature. The one takes its lesson direct from conscience, which depones to the authority of truth and justice, as distinct from benevolence; and carries this lesson upwards, from that tablet of virtue which it reads on the nature of man below, to that higher tablet upon which it reads the character of God above. The other again, of more lax and adventurous speculation, would fain amalgamate all the qualities of the Godhead into one; and would make that one the beautiful and undistinguishing quality of tenderness. It would sink the venerable or the awful into the lovely; and to this it is prompted, not merely for the sake of theoretic simplicity—but in order to quell the alarms of nature, the dread and the disturbance which sinners feel, when they look to their sovereign in heaven, as a God of judgment and of unspotted holiness. Nevertheless the same conscience which tells what is sound in ethics, is ever and anon suggesting what is sound in theology—that we have to do with a God of truth, that we have to do with a God of righteousness; and this lesson is never perhaps obliterated in any breast, by the imagery, however pleasing, of a universal parent, throned in soft and smiling radiance, and whose supreme delight is to scatter beatitudes innumerable through a universal family. We cannot forget, although we would, that justice and judgment are the habitation of His throne; and that His dwelling-place is not a mere blissful elysium or paradise of sweets, but an august and inviolable sanctuary. It is an elysium, but only to the spirits of the holy; and this sacredness, we repeat, is immediately forced upon the consciousness of every bosom, by the moral sense which is within it—however fearful a topic it may be of recoil to the sinner, and of *reticence* in the demonstrations of philosophy. The sense of heaven's sacredness is not a superstitious fear. It is the instant suggestion of our moral nature. What conscience apprehends virtue to be in itself, that also it will apprehend virtue to be in the Author of conscience; and if truth and justice be constituent elements in the one, these it will regard as constituent elements in the other also. It is by learning direct of God from the phenomena of human conscience; or taking what it tells us to be virtues in themselves, for the very virtues of the Godhead, realized in actual and living exemplification upon His character—it is thus that we escape from the illusion of poetical religionists, who, in the insense which they offer to the benign virtues



of the parent, are so apt to overlook the virtues of the Lawgiver and Judge.

2. When we take this fuller view of God's moral nature—when we make account of the righteousness as well as the benevolence—when we yield to the suggestion of our own hearts, that to Him belongs the sovereign state, and, if needful, the severity of the lawgiver, as well as the fond affection of the parent—when we assign to Him the character, which, instead of but one virtue, is comprehensive of them all—we are then on firmer vantage-ground for the establishment of a natural Theology, in harmony, both with the lessons of conscience, and with the phenomena of the external world. Many of our academic theists have greatly crippled their argument, by confining themselves to but one feature in the character of the Divinity—as if His only wish in reference to the creatures that He had made, was a wish for their happiness; or as if, instead of the subjects of a righteous and moral government, they were but the nurslings of His tenderness. They have exiled and put forth every thing like jurisprudence from the relation in which God stands to man; and by giving the foremost place in their demonstrations to the mere beneficence of the Deity, they have made the difficulties of the subject far more perplexing and unresolvable than they needed to have been. For with benevolence alone we cannot even extenuate and much less extricate ourselves, from the puzzling difficulty of those physical sufferings to which the sentient creation, as far as our acquaintance extends with it, is universally liable. It is only by admitting the sanctities along with what may be termed the humanities of the divine character, that this enigma can be at all alleviated. Whereas, if, apart from the equities of a moral government, we look to God in no other light, than mere tasteful and sentimental religionists do, or as but a benign and indulgent Father whose sole delight is the happiness of his family—there are certain stubborn anomalies which stand in the way of this frail imagination, and would render the whole subject a hopeless and utterly intractable mystery.

3. A specimen of the weakness which attaches to the system of Natural Theology, when the infinite benevolence of the Deity is the only element which it will admit into its explanations and its reasonings, is the manner in which its advocates labour to dispose of the numerous ills, wherewith the world is infested. They have recourse to arithmetic—balancing the phenomena on each side of the question, as they would the columns of a ledger. They institute respective summations of the good and the evil; and by the preponderance of the former over the latter, hold the difficulty to be resolved. The computation is neither a sure

nor an easy one ; but even under the admission of its justness, it remains an impracticable puzzle—why under a Being of infinite power and infinite benevolence, there should be suffering at all. This is an enigma which the single attribute of benevolence cannot unriddle, or rather the very enigma which it has created—nor shall we even approximate to the solution of it, without the aid of other attributes to help the explanation.

4. It is under the pressure of these difficulties that refuge is taken in the imagination of a future state—where it is assumed that all the disorders of the present scene are to be repaired, and full compensation made for the sufferings of our earthly existence. It is affirmed, that although the body dies the soul is unperishable, and, after it hath burst its unfettered way from the prison-house of its earthly tabernacle, that it will expatiate forever in the full buoyancy and delight of its then emancipated energies—that, even as from the lacerated shell of the inert chrysalis the winged insect rises in all the pride of its now expanded beauty among the fields of light and ether which are above it, so the human spirit finds its way through the opening made by death upon its corporeal framework among the glories of the upper Elysium. It is this immortality which is supposed to unriddle all the difficulties that attach to our present condition ; which converts the evil that is in the world, into the instrument of a greatly over-passing good ; and affords a scene for the imagination to rest upon, where all the anomalies which now exercise us shall be rectified, and where, from the larger prospects we shall then have of the whole march and destiny of man, the ways of God to His creatures shall appear in all the lustre of their full and noble vindication.

5. But as the superiority of the happiness over the misery of the world, affords insufficient premises on which to conclude the benevolence of God, *so long as God is conceived of under the partial view of possessing but this as his alone moral attribute*—when that benevolence is employed as the argument for some ulterior doctrine in Natural Theology, it must impart to this latter the same inconclusiveness by which itself is characterized. The proof and the thing proved must be alike strong or alike weak. If the excess of enjoyment over suffering in the life that now is, be a matter of far too doubtful calculation, on which to rest a confident inference in favour of the divine benevolence ; then, let this benevolence have no other prop to lean upon, and in its turn, it is far too doubtful a premise, on which to infer a coming immortality. Accordingly, to help out the argument, many of our slender and sentimental theists, who will admit of no other moral attribute for the divinity, than the paternal attri-

bute of kind affection for the creatures who have sprung from Him do, in fact, assume the thing to be proved, and reason in a circle. The mere balance of the pleasures and pains of the present life, is greatly too uncertain, for what may be called an initial footing to this argument. But let a future life be assumed, in which all the defects and disorders of the present are to be repaired; and this may reconcile the doctrine of the benevolence of God, with the otherwise stumbling fact of the great actual wretchedness that is now in the world. Out of the observed phenomena of life and an assumed immortality together, a tolerable argument may be raised for this most pleasing and amiable of all the moral characteristics; but it is obvious that the doctrine of immortality enters into the premises of this first argument. But how is the immortality itself proved? not by the phenomena of life alone, but by these phenomena taken in conjunction with the divine benevolence—which benevolence, therefore, enters into the premise of the second argument. In the one argument, the doctrine of immortality is required to prove the benevolence of God. In the other this benevolence is required to prove the immortality. Each is used as an assumption for the establishment of the other; and this nullifies the reasoning for both. Either of these terms—that is, the divine benevolence, or a future state of compensation for the evils and inequalities of the present one—either of them, if admitted, may be held a very sufficient, or, at least, likely consideration on which to rest the other. But it makes very bad reasoning to vibrate between both—first to go forth with the assumption that God is benevolent, and therefore it is impossible that a scene so dark and disordered as that immediately before us can offer to our contemplation the full and final developement of all his designs for the human family; and then, feeling that this scene does not afford a sufficient basis on which to rest the demonstration of this attribute, to strengthen the basis and make it broader by the assertion, that it is not from a part of His ways, but from their complete and comprehensive whole, as made up both of time and eternity, that we draw the inference of a benevolent Deity. There is no march of argument. We swing as it were between two assumptions. It is like one of those cases in geometry, which remains indeterminate for the want of data. And the only effectual method of being extricated from such an ambiguity, would be the satisfactory assurance either of a benevolence independent of all considerations of immortality, or of an immortality independent of all the considerations of the benevolence.

6. But then it should be recollected that it is the partiality of our contemplation, and it alone which incapacitates this whole

argument. There is a sickly religion of taste which clings exclusively to the parental benevolence of God; and will not, cannot brave the contemplation of His righteousness. It is this which makes the reasoning as feeble, as the sentiment is flimsy. It, in fact, leaves the system of natural theology without a ground-work—first to argue for immortality on the doubtful assumption of a supreme benevolence, and then to argue this immortality in proof of the benevolence. The whole fabric, bereft of argument and strength, is ready to sink under the weight of unresolved difficulties. The mere benevolence of the Deity is not so obviously or decisively the lesson of surrounding phenomena, as, of itself to be the foundation of a solid inference regarding either the character of God or the prospects of man. If we would receive the full lesson—if we would learn all which these phenomena, when rightly and attentively regarded, are capable of teaching—if along with the present indications of a benevolence, we take the present indications of a righteousness in God—out of these blended characteristics, we should have materials for an argument of firmer texture. It is to the leaving out of certain data, even though placed within the reach of observation, that the infirmity of the argument is owing—whereas, did we employ aright all the data in our possession, we might incorporate them together into the solid ground-work of a solid reasoning. It is by our sensitive avoidance of certain parts in this contemplation, that we enfeeble the cause. We should find a stable basis in existing appearances, did we give them a fair and full interpretation—as indicating not only the benevolence of God, but, both by the course of nature and the laws of man's moral economy, indicating his love of righteousness and hatred of iniquity. It might not resolve, but it would alleviate the mystery of things, could we within the sphere of actual observation, collect notices, not merely of a God who rejoiced in the physical happiness of His creatures, but of a God who had respect unto their virtue. Now the great evidence for this latter characteristic of the Divinity, lies near at hand—even among the intimacies of our own felt and familiar nature. It is not fetched by imagination from a distance, for every man has it within himself. The supremacy of conscience is a fact or phenomenon of man's moral constitution; and from this law of the heart, we pass, by direct and legitimate inference, to the character of Him who established it there. In a law, we read the character of the law-giver; and this, whether it be a felt or a written law. We learn from the phenomena of conscience, that, however God may will the happiness of his creatures, His paramount and peremptory demand is for their virtue. He is the moral gover-



nor of a kingdom, as well as the father of a family; and it is a partial view that we take of Him, unless, along with the kindness which belongs to Him as a parent, we have respect unto that authority which belongs to Him as a sovereign and a judge. We have direct intimation of this in our own bosoms, in the constant assertion which is made there on the side of virtue, in the discomfort and remorse which attend its violation.

7. But though conscience be our original and chief instructor in the righteousness of God, the same lesson may be learned in another way. It may be gathered from the phenomena of human life—even those very phenomena, which so perplex the mind, so long as in quest of but one attribute and refusing to admit the evidence or even entertain the notion of any other,—it cherishes a partial and prejudiced view of the Deity. Those theists, who, in the spirit, have attempted to strike a balance between the pleasures and the pains of sentient nature, and to ground thereupon the very doubtful inference of the divine benevolence—seldom or never think of connecting these pleasures and pains with the moral causes, which, whether proximately or remotely, go before them. Without adverting to these, they rest their conclusion on the affirmed superiority, however ill or uncertainly made out, of the physical enjoyments over the physical sufferings of life. Now we hold it of capital importance in this argument, that, in our own species at least, both these enjoyments and these sufferings are mainly resolvable into moral causes—insomuch that, in the vast majority of cases, the deviation from happiness, can be traced to an anterior deviation from virtue; and that, apart from death and accident and unavoidable disease, the wretchedness of humanity is due to a vicious and ill regulated *morale*. When we thus look to the ills of life in their immediate origin, though it may not altogether dissipate, it goes far to reduce, and even to explain the mystery of their existence. Those evils which vex and agitate man, emanate, in the great amount of them, from the fountain of his own heart; and come forth, not of a distempered material, but of a distempered moral economy. Were each separate infelicity referred to its distinct source, we should, generally speaking, arrive at some moral perversity, whether of the affections or of the temper—so that but for the one, the other would not have been realized. It is true, that, perhaps in every instance, some external cause may be assigned, for any felt annoyance to which our nature is liable; but then, it is a cause without, operating on a sensibility within. So that in all computations, whether of suffering or of enjoyment, the state of the subjective or recipient mind must be taken into account, as well as the influences which

play upon it from the surrounding world; and what we affirm is, that, to a rightly conditioned mind, the misery would be reduced and the happiness augmented tenfold. When disappointment agonizes the heart; or a very slight, perhaps unintentional neglect, lights up in many a soul the fierceness of resentment; or coldness, and disdain, and the mutual glances of contempt and hatred, circulate a prodigious mass of infelicity through the world—these are to be ascribed, not to the untowardness of outward circumstances, but to the untowardness of man's own constitution, and are the fruits of a disordered spiritual system. And the same may be said of the poverty which springs from indolence or dissipation; of the disgrace which comes on the back of misconduct; of the pain or uneasiness which festers in every heart that is the prey, whether of licentious or malignant passions; in short, of the general restlessness and unhingement of every spirit, which, thrown adrift from the restraints of principle, has no well-spring of satisfaction in itself, but precariously vacillates, in regard to happiness, with the hazard and the casual fluctuation of outward things. There are, it is true, sufferings purely physical, which belong to the sentient and not to the moral nature—as the maladies of infant disease, and the accidental inflictions wherewith the material frame is sometimes agonized. Still it will be found, that the vast amount of human wretchedness, can be directly referred to the waywardness and morbid state of the human will—to the character of man, and not to the condition which he occupies.

8. Now what is the legitimate argument for the character of God, not from the mere existence of misery, but from the existence of misery thus originated? Wretchedness, of itself, were fitted to cast an uncertainty, even a suspicion, on the benevolence of God. But wretchedness as the result of wickedness, may not indicate the negation of this one attribute. It may only indicate the reality or the presence of another. Suffering without a cause and without an object, may be the infliction of a malignant being. But suffering in alliance with sin, should lead to a very different conclusion. When thus related it may cast no impeachment on the benevolence, and only bespeak the righteousness of God. It tells us that however much He may love the happiness of His creatures, He loves their virtue more. So that, instead of extinguishing the evidence of one perfection, it may leave this evidence entire, and bring out into open manifestation another perfection of the Godhead.

9. In attempting to form our estimate of the divine character from the existing phenomena, the fair proceeding would be, not to found it on the actual miseries which abound in the world,

peopled with a depraved species—but on the fitnesses which abound in the world, to make a virtuous species happy. We should try to figure its result on human life, were perfect virtue to revisit earth, and take up its abode in every family. The question is, are we so constructed and so accommodated, that, in the vast majority of cases we, if morally right, should be physically happy. What, we should ask, is the real tendency of nature's laws—whether to minister enjoyment to the good or the evil? It were a very strong, almost an unequivocal testimony to the righteousness of Him, who framed the system of things and all its adaptations—if, while it secured a general harmony between the virtue of mankind and their happiness or peace, it as constantly impeded either the prosperity or the heart's ease of the profligate and the lawless. Now of this we might be informed by an actual survey of human life. We can justly imagine the consequences upon human society—were perfect uprightness and sympathy and good-will to obtain universally; were every man to look to his fellow with a brother's eye; were a universal courteousness to reign in our streets and our houses and our market-places, and this to be the spontaneous emanation of a universal cordiality; were each man's interest and reputation as safe in the custody of another, as he now strives to make them by a jealous guardianship of his own; were, on the one hand, a prompt and eager benevolence on the part of the rich, ever on the watch to meet, nay, to overpass all the wants of humanity, and, on the other hand, an honest moderation and independence on the part of the poor, to be a full defence for their superiors against the encroachments of deceit and rapacity; were liberality to walk diffusively abroad among men, and love to settle pure and unruffled in the bosom of families; were that moral sunshine to arise in every heart, which purity and innocence and kind affection are ever sure to kindle there; and even when some visitation from without was in painful dissonance with the harmony within, were a thousand sweets ready to be poured into the cup of tribulation from the feeling and the friendship of all the good who were around us—on this single transition from vice to virtue among men, does there not hinge the alternative between a pandæmonium and a paradise? If the moral elements were in place and operation among us, should we still continue to fester and be unhappy from the want of the physical? Or, is it not rather true, that all nature smiles in beauty, or wantons in bounteousness for our enjoyment—were but the disease of our spirits medicated, were there but moral soundness in the heart of man!

10. And what must be the character of the Being who formed

such a world, where the moral and the physical economies are so adjusted to each other, that virtue, if universal, would bring ten thousand blessings and beatitudes in its train, and turn our earth into an elysium—whereas nothing so distempers the human spirit, and so multiplies distress in society, as the vice and the violence and the varieties of moral turpitude wherewith it is infested. Would a God who loved iniquity and who hated righteousness have created such a world? Would He have so attuned the organism of the human spirit, that the consciousness of worth should be felt through all its recesses, like the oil of gladness? Or would He have so constructed the mechanism of human society, that it should never work prosperously for the general good of the species, but by means of truth and philanthropy and uprightness? Would the friend and patron of falsehood have let such a world out of his hands? Or would an unholy being have so fashioned the heart of man—that, wayward and irresolute as he is, he never feels so ennobled, as by the high resolve that would spurn every base allurements of sensuality away from him; and never breathes so etherially, as when he maintains that chastity of spirit which would recoil even from one unhallowed imagination; and never rises to such a sense of grandeur and godlike elevation, as when principle hath taken the direction, and is vested with full ascendancy over the restrained and regulated passions? What other inference can be drawn from such sequences as these, but that our moral architect loves the virtue He thus follows up with the delights of a high and generous complacency; and execrates the vice He thus follows up with disgust and degradation? If we look but to misery unconnected and alone, we may well doubt the benevolence of the Deity. But should it not modify the conclusion, to have ascertained—that, in proportion as virtue made entrance upon the world, misery would retire from it? There is nothing to spoil Him of this perfection, in a misery so originated; but, leaving this perfection untouched, it attaches to Him another, and we infer, that He is not merely benevolent, but benevolent and holy. After that the moral cause has been discovered for the unhappiness of man, we feel Him to be a God of benevolence still; that He wills the happiness of his creatures, but with this reservation, that the only sound and sincere happiness He awards to them, is happiness through the medium of virtue; that still He is willing to be the dispenser of joy substantial and unfading, but of no such joy apart from moral excellence; that He loves the gratification of His children, but He loves their righteousness more; that dear to Him is the happiness of all His offspring, but dearer still their worth; and that therefore He, the moral



governor, will so conduct the affairs of His empire, as that virtue and happiness, or that vice and misery shall be associated.

11. We have already said, that, by inspecting a mechanism, we can infer both the original design of Him who framed it, and the derangement it has subsequently undergone—even as by the inspection of a watch, we can infer, from the place of command which its regulator occupies, that it was made for the purpose of moving regularly; and that, notwithstanding the state of disrepair and aberration into which it may have fallen. And so, from the obvious place of rightful supremacy which is occupied by the conscience of man in his moral system, we can infer that virtue was the proper and primary design of his creation; and that, notwithstanding the actual prevalence of obviously inferior principles, over the habits and history of his life. Connect this with the grand and general adaptation of External Nature for which we have now been contending—even the capacity of that world in which we are placed for making a virtuous species happy; and it were surely far juster, in arguing for the divine character, that we founded our interpretation on the happiness which man's original constitution is fitted to secure for him, than on the misery which he suffers by that constitution having been in some way perverted. It is from the native and proper tendency of aught which is made, that we conclude as to the mind and disposition of the maker; and not from the actual effect, when that tendency has been rendered abortive, by the extrinsic operation of some disturbing force on an else goodly and well-going mechanism. The original design of the Creator may be read in the natural, the universal tendency of things; and surely, it speaks strongly both for His benevolence and His righteousness that nothing is so fitted to ensure the general happiness of society as the general virtue of them who compose it. And if, instead of this, we behold a world, ill at ease, with its many heart-burnings and many inquietudes—the fair conclusion is, that the beneficial tendencies which have been established therein, and which are therefore due to the benevolence of God, have all been thwarted by the moral perversity of man. The compound lesson to be gathered from such a contemplation is, that God is the friend of human happiness but the enemy of human vice—seeing, He hath set up an economy in which the former would have grown up and prospered universally, had not the latter stepped in and overborne it.

12. We are now on a ground-work of more firm texture, for an argument in behalf of man's immortality. But it is only by a more comprehensive view both of the character of God, and the actual state of the world—that we obtain as much evidence both for His benevolence and His righteousness, as

might furnish logical premises for the logical inference of a future state.

13. We have already stated that the miseries of life, in their great and general amount, are resolvable into moral causes ; and did each man suffer here, accurately in proportion to his own sins, there might be less reason for the anticipation of another state hereafter. But this proportion is, in no individual instance perhaps, ever realized on this side of death. The miseries of the good are still due to a moral perversity—though but to the moral perversity of others, not of his own. He suffers from the injustice and calumny and violence and evil tempers of those who are around him. On the large and open theatre of the world, the cause of oppression is often the triumphant one ; and, in the bosom of families, the most meek and innocent of the household, are frequently the victims for life, of a harsh and injurious though unseen tyranny. It is this inequality of fortune, or rather of enjoyment, between the good and the evil, which forms the most popular, and enters as a constituent part at least, into the most powerful argument, which nature furnishes, for the immortality of the soul. We cannot imagine of a God of righteousness, that He will leave any question of justice unsettled ; and there is nothing which more powerfully suggests to the human conscience the apprehension of a life to come, than that in this life, there should be so many unsettled questions of justice—first between man and man, secondly between man and his Maker.

14. The strength of the former consideration lies in the multiplicity, and often the fearful aggravation, of the unredressed wrongs inflicted every day by man upon his fellows. The history of human society teems with these ; and the unappeased cry, whether for vengeance or reparation, rises to heaven because of them. We might here expatiate on the monstrous, the wholesale atrocities, perpetrated on the defenceless by the strong ; and which custom has almost legalized—having stood their ground against the indignation of the upright and the good for many ages. Perhaps for the most gigantic example of this, in the dark annals of our guilty world, we should turn our eyes upon injured Africa—that devoted region, where the lust of gain has made the fiercest and fellest exhibition of its hardihood ; and whose weeping families are broken up in thousands every year, that the families of Europe might the more delicately and luxuriously regale themselves. It is a picturesque, and seems a powerful argument for some future day of retribution, when we look, on the one hand, to the prosperity of the lordly oppressor, wrung from the sufferings of a captive and subjugated people ; and look, on the other, to the tears and the untold agony of the hundreds beneath him, whose

lives of dreariness and hard labour are ten fold embittered, by the imagery of that dear and distant land, from which they have been irrecoverably torn. But, even within the confines of civilized society, there do exist materials for our argument. There are cruelties and wrongs innumerable, in the conduct of business; there are even cruelties and wrongs, in the bosom of families. There are the triumphs of injustice; the success of deep-laid and malignant policy on the one side, on the other the ruin and the overthrow of unprotected weakness. Apart from the violence of the midnight assault, or the violence of the high way—there is, even under the forms of law, and amid the blandness of social courtesies, a moral violence that carries as grievous and substantial iniquity in its train; by which friendless and confiding simplicity may at once be bereft of its rights, and the artful oppressor be enriched by the spoliation. Have we never seen the bankrupt rise again with undiminished splendour, from amid the desolation and despair of the families that have been ruined by him? Or, more secret though not less severe, have we not seen the inmates of a wretched home doomed to a hopeless and unhappy existence, under the sullen brow of the tyrant who lorded over them? There are sufferings from which there is no redress or rectification upon earth; inequalities between man and man, of which there is no adjustment here—but because of that very reason, there is the utmost desire, and we might add expectancy of our nature, that there shall be an adjustment hereafter. In the unsated appetency of our hearts for justice, there is all the force of an appeal to the Being who planted the appetite within us; and we feel that if Death is to make sudden disruption, in the midst of all these unfinished questions, and so to leave them eternally—we feel a violence done both to our own moral constitution, and to the high jurisprudence of Him who framed us.

15. But there are furthermore, in this life, unfinished questions between man and his Maker. The same conscience which asserts its own supremacy within the breast, suggests the God and the Moral Governor who placed it there. It is thus that man not only takes cognizance of his own delinquencies; but he connects them with the thought of a law-giver to whom he is accountable. He passes by one step, and with rapid inference, from the feeling of a judge who is within, to the fear of a Judge who sits in high authority over him. With the sense of a reigning principle in his own constitution, there stands associated the sense of a reigning power in the universe—the one challenging the prerogatives of a moral law, the other avenging the violation of them. Even the hardest in guilt are not insensible to the force of this sentiment. They feel it, as did Cataline and the

worst of Roman emperors, in the horrors of remorse. There is, in spite of themselves, the impression of an avenging God—not the less founded upon reasoning, that it is the reasoning of but one truth or rather of but one transition, from a thing intimately known to a thing immediately concluded, from the reckoning of a felt and a present conscience within, to the more awful reckoning of a God who is the author of conscience and who knoweth all things. Now, it is thus, that men are led irresistibly to the anticipation of a future state—not by their hopes, we think, but by their fears; not by a sense of unfulfilled promises, but by the sense and the terror of unfulfilled penalties; by their sense of a judgment not yet executed, of a wrath not yet discharged upon them. Hence the impression of a futurity upon all spirits, whither are carried forward the issues of a jurisprudence, which bears no marks but the contrary of a full and final consummation on this side of death. The prosperity of many wicked who spend their days in resolute and contemptuous irreligion; the practical defiance of their lives to the bidding of conscience, and yet a voice of remonstrance and of warning from this said conscience which they are unable wholly to quell; the many emphatic denunciations, not uttered in audible thunder from above, but uttered in secret and impressive whispers from within—these all point to accounts between God and His creatures that are yet unfinished. If there be no future state, the great moral question between heaven and earth, broken off at the middle, is frittered into a degrading mockery. There is violence done to the continuity of things. The moral constitution of man is stript of its significancy and the Author of that constitution is stript of His wisdom and authority and honour. That consistent march which we behold in all the cycles, and progressive movements of the natural economy, is, in the moral economy, brought to sudden arrest and disruption—if death annihilate the man, instead of only transforming him. And it is only the doctrine of his immortality by which all can be adjusted and harmonized.\*

16. And there is one especial proof for the immortality of the soul, founded on adaptation; and therefore so identical in principle with the subject and main argument of our essay—that we feel its statement to be our best and most appropriate termination of this especial enquiry. The argument is this. For every desire or every faculty, whether in man or in the inferior animals, there seems a counterpart object in external na-

\* It is well said by Mr. Davison, in his profound and original work on Prophecy—that “Conscience and the *present* constitution of things are not corresponding terms. The one is not the object of perception to the other. It is conscience and the issue of things which go together.”



ture. Let it be either an appetite or a power; and let it reside either in the sentient or in the intellectual or in the moral economy—still there exists a something without that is altogether suited to it, and which seems to be expressly provided for its gratification. There is light for the eye; there is air for the lungs; there is food for the ever-recurring appetite of hunger; there is water for the appetite of thirst; there is society for the love, whether of fame or of fellowship; there is a boundless field in all the objects of all the sciences for the exercise of curiosity—in a word, there seems not one affection in the living creature, which is not met by a counterpart and a congenial object in the surrounding creation. It is this, in fact, which forms an important class of those adaptations, on which the argument for a Deity is founded. The adaptation of the parts to each other within the organic structure, is distinct from the adaptation of the whole to the things of circumambient nature; and is well unfolded in a separate chapter by Paley, on the relation of inanimate bodies to animated nature. But there is another chapter on prospective contrivances, in which he unfolds to us other adaptations, that approximate still more nearly to our argument. They consist of embryo arrangements or parts, not of immediate use, but to be of use eventually—preparations going on in the animal economy, whereof the full benefit is not to be realized, till some future and often considerably distant development shall have taken place; such as the teeth buried in their sockets, that would be inconvenient during the first months of infancy, but come forth when it is sufficiently advanced for another and a new sort of nourishment; such as the manifold preparations, anterior to the birth, that are of no use to the foetus, but are afterwards to be of indispensable use in a larger and freer state of existence; such as the instructive tendencies to action that appear before even the instruments of action are provided, as in the calf of a day old to butt with its head before it has been furnished with horns. Nature abounds, not merely in present expedients for an immediate use, but in providential expedients for a future one; and, as far as we can observe, we have no reason to believe, that, either in the first or second sort of expedients, there has ever aught been noticed, which either bears on no object now, or lands in no result afterwards. We may perceive in this, the glimpse of an argument for the soul's immortality. We may enter into the analogy, as stated by Dr. Ferguson, when he says—"whoever considers the anatomy of the foetus, will find, in the strength of bones and muscles, in the organs of respiration and digestion, sufficient indications of a design to remove his being into a different state. The observant and the intel-

ligent may perhaps find in the mind of man parallel signs of his future destination.\*

17. Now what inference shall we draw from this remarkable law in nature, that there is nothing waste and nothing meaningless in the feelings and faculties wherewith living creatures are endowed? For each desire there is a counterpart object, for each faculty there is room and opportunity of exercise—either in the present, or in the coming futurity. Now, but for the doctrine of immortality, man would be an exception to this law. He would stand forth as an anomaly in nature—with aspirations in his heart for which the universe had no antitype to offer, with capacities of understanding and thought, that never were to be followed, by objects of corresponding greatness, through the whole history of his being. It were a violence to the harmony of things, whereof no other example can be given; and, in as far as an argument can be founded on this harmony for the wisdom of Him who made all things—it were a reflection on one of the conceived, if not one of the ascertained attributes of the Godhead. To feel the force of this argument, we have only to look to the obvious adaptation of his powers to a larger and more enduring theatre—to the dormant faculties which are in him for the mastery and acquisition of all the sciences, and yet the partial ignorance of all, and the profound or total ignorance of many, in which he spends the short-lived years of his present existence—to the boundless, but here, the unopened capabilities which lie up in him, for the comprehension of truths that never once draw

\* Dr. Ferguson's reasoning upon this subject is worthy of being extracted more largely than we have room for in the text—"If the human fœtus," he observes, "were qualified to reason of his prospects in the womb of his parent, as he may afterwards do in his range on this terrestrial globe, he might no doubt apprehend in the breach of his umbilical chord, and in his separation from the womb a total extinction of life, for how could he conceive it to continue after his only supply of nourishment from the vital stock of his parent had ceased? He might indeed observe many parts of his organization and frame which should seem to have no relation to his state in the womb. For what purpose, he might say, this duct which leads from the mouth to the intestines? Why these bones that each apart become hard and stiff, while they are separated from one another by so many flexures or joints? Why these joints in particular made to move upon hinges, and these germs of teeth, which are pushing to be felt above the surface of the gums? Why the stomach through which nothing is made to pass? And these spongy lungs, so well fitted to drink up the fluids, but into which the blood that passes every where else is scarcely permitted to enter?"

"To these queries, which the fœtus was neither qualified to make nor to answer, we are now well apprized the proper answer would be—the life which you now enjoy is but temporary; and those particulars which now seem to you so preposterous, are a provision which nature has made for a future course of life which you have to run, and in which their use and propriety will appear sufficiently evident.

"Such are the prognostics of a future destination that might be collected from the state of the fœtus; and similar prognostics of a destination still future might be collected from present appearances in the life and condition of man."

his attention on this side of death, for the contemplative enjoyment both of moral and intellectual beauties which have never here revealed themselves to his gaze. The whole labour of this mortal life would not suffice, for traversing in full extent any one of the sciences; and yet, there may lie undeveloped in his bosom, a taste and talent for them all—none of which he can even singly overtake; for each science, though definite in its commencement, has its out-goings in the infinite and the eternal. There is in man, a restlessness of ambition; an interminable longing after nobler and higher things, which nought but immortality and the greatness of immortality can satiate; a dissatisfaction with the present, which never is appeased by all that the world has to offer; an impatience and distaste with the felt littleness of all that he finds, and an unsated appetency for something larger and better, which he fancies in the perspective before him—to all which there is nothing like among any of the inferior animals, with whom, there is a certain squareness of adjustment, if we may so term it, between each desire and its correspondent gratification. The one is evenly met by the other; and there is a fulness and definiteness of enjoyment, up to the capacity of enjoyment. Not so with man, who both from the vastness of his propensities and the vastness of his powers, feels himself straitened and beset in a field too narrow for him. He alone labours under the discomfort of an incongruity between his circumstances and his powers; and, unless there be new circumstances awaiting him in a more advanced state of being, he, the noblest of Nature's products here below, would turn out to be the greatest of her failures.

## PART II.

## ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

## CHAPTER I.

*Chief Instances of this Adaptation.*

1. (1.) THE law of most extensive influence over the phenomena and processes of the mind, is the law of association, or, as denominated by Dr. Thomas Brown, the law of suggestion. If two objects have been seen in conjunction, or in immediate succession, at any one time—then the sight or thought of one of them afterwards, is apt to suggest the thought of the other also; and the same is true of the objects of all the senses. The same smells or sounds or tastes which have occurred formerly, when they occur again, will often recall the objects from which they then proceeded, the occasions or other objects with which they were then associated. When one meets with a fragrance of a particular sort, it may often instantly suggest a fragrance of the same kind experienced months or years ago; the rose-bush from which it came; the garden where it grew; the friend with whom we then walked; his features, his conversation, his relatives, his history. When two ideas have been once in juxtaposition, they are apt to present themselves in juxtaposition over again—an aptitude which ever increases the oftener that the conjunction has taken place, till, as if by an invincible necessity, the antecedent thought is sure to bring its usual consequent along with it; and, not only single sequences, but lengthened trains or progressions of thought, may in this manner be explained.

2. And such are the great speed and facility of these successions, that many of the intermediate terms, though all of them undoubtedly present to the mind, flit so quickly and evanescently, as to pass unnoticed. This will the more certainly happen, if the antecedents are of no further use than to introduce the



consequents ; in which case, the consequents remain as the sole objects of attention, and the antecedents are forgotten. In the art of reading, the ultimate object is to obtain possession of the author's sentiments or meaning ; and all memory of the words, still more of the component letters, though each of them must have been present to the mind, pass irrecoverably away from it. In like manner, the anterior steps of many a mental process may actually be described, yet without consciousness—the attention resting, not on the fugitive means, but on the important end in which they terminate. It is thus that we seem to judge, on the instant, of distances, as if under a guidance that was immediate and instinctive, and not by the result of a derivative process—because insensible to the rapid train of inference which led to it. The mind is too much occupied with the information itself, for looking back on the light and shadowy footsteps of the messenger who brought it, which it would find difficult if not impossible to trace—and besides, having no practical call upon it for making such a retrospect. It is thus that, when looking intensely on some beautiful object in Nature, we are so much occupied with the resulting enjoyment, as to overlook the intermediate train of unbidden associations, which connects the sight of that which is before us, with the resulting and exquisite pleasure, that we feel in the act of beholding it. The principle has been much resorted to, in expounding that process by which the education of the senses is carried forward ; and, more especially, the way in which the intimations of sight and touch are made to correct and to modify each other. It has also been employed with good effect, in the attempt to establish a philosophy of taste. But these rapid and fugitive associations, while they form a real, form also an unseen process ; and we are not therefore to wonder, if, along with many solid explanations, they should have been so applied in the investigation of mental phenomena, as occasionally to have given rise to subtle and fantastic theories.

3. But our proper business at present is with results, rather than with processes ; and instead of entering on the more recondite inquiries of the science, however interesting and however beautiful or even satisfactory the conclusions may be to which they lead—it is our task to point out those palpable benefits and subserviencies of our intellectual constitution, which demonstrate, without obscurity, the benevolent designs of Him who framed us. There are some of our mental philosophers, indeed, who have theorised and simplified beyond the evidence of those facts which lie before us ; and our argument should be kept clear, for in reality it does not partake, in the uncertainty or

error of their speculations. The law of association, for example, has been of late reasoned upon, as if it were the sole parent and predecessor of all the mental phenomena. Yet it does not explain, however largely it may influence, the phenomena of memory. When by means of one idea, any how awakened in the mind, the whole of some past transaction or scene is brought to recollection, it is association which recalls to our thoughts this portion of our former history. But association cannot explain our recognition of its actual and historical truth—or what it is, which, beside an act of conception, makes it also an act of remembrance. By means of this law we may understand how it is, that certain ideas, suggested by certain others which came before it, are now present to the mind. But superadded to the mere presence of these ideas, there is such a perception of the reality of their archetypes, as distinguishes a case of remembrance from a case of imagination—insomuch that over and above the conception of certain objects, there is also a conviction of their substantive being at the time which we connect with the thought of them; and this is what the law of association cannot by itself account for. It cannot account for our reliance upon memory—not as a conjurer of visions into the chamber of imagery, but as an informer of stable and objective truths which had place and fulfilment in the actual world of experience.

4. And the same is true of our believing anticipations of the future, which we have now affirmed to be true of our believing retrospects of the past. The confidence wherewith we count on the same sequences in future, that we have observed in the course of our past experience, has been resolved by some philosophers, into the principle of association alone. Now when we have seen a certain antecedent followed up by a certain consequent, the law of association does of itself afford a sufficient reason, why the idea of that antecedent should be followed up by the idea of its consequent; but it contains within it no reason, why, on the actual occurrence again of the antecedent, we should believe that the consequent will occur also. That the thought of the antecedent should suggest the thought of the consequent, is one mental phenomenon. That the knowledge of the antecedent having anew taken place, should induce the certainty, that the consequent must have taken place also, is another mental phenomenon. We cannot confound these two, without being involved in the idealism of Hume or Berkeley. Were the mere thought of the consequent all that was to be accounted for, we need not go farther than to the law of association. But when to the existence of this thought, there is superadded a belief in the reality of its archetype, a distinct mental phenomenon comes into view,

which the law of association does not explain; and which, for aught that the analysts of the mind have yet been able to trace or to discover, is an ultimate principle of the human understanding. This belief, then, is one thing. But ere we can make out an adaptation, we must be able to allege at least two things. And they are ready to our hands—for, in addition to the belief in the subjective mind, there is a correspondent and counterpart reality in objective nature. If we have formerly observed that a given antecedent is followed by a certain consequent, then, not only does the idea of the antecedent suggest the idea of the consequent; but there is a belief, that, on the actual occurrence of the same antecedent, the same consequent will follow over again. And the consequent does follow; or, in other words, this our instinctive faith meets with its unexcepted fulfilment, in the actual course and constancy of nature. The law of association does of itself, and without going further, secure this general convenience—that the courses of the mind are thereby conformed, or are made to quadrate and harmonize with the courses of the outer world. It is the best possible construction for the best and most useful guidance of the mind, as in the exercise of memory for example, that thought should be made to follow thought, according to the order in which the objects and events of nature are related to each other. But a belief in the certainty and uniformity of this order, with the counterpart verification of this belief in the actual history of things, is that which we now are especially regarding. It forms our first instance, perhaps the most striking and marvellous of all, of the adaptation of external nature to the intellectual constitution of man.

5. This disposition to count on the uniformity of Nature, or even to anticipate the same consequents from the same antecedents—is not the fruit of experience, but anterior to it; or at least anterior to the very earliest of those of her lessons, which can be traced backward in the history of an infant mind. Indeed it has been well observed by Dr. Thomas Brown, that the future constancy of Nature, is a lesson, which no observation of its past constancy, or no experience could have taught us. Because we have observed A a thousand times to be followed in immediate succession by B, there is no greater logical connexion between this proposition and the proposition that A will always be followed by B; than there is between the propositions that we have seen A followed once by B, and therefore A will always be followed by B. At whatever stage of the experience, the inference may be made, whether longer or shorter, whether oftener or seldomer repeated—the conversion of the past into the future seems to require a distinct and independent principle

of belief; and it is a principle which, to all appearance, is as vigorous in childhood, as in the full maturity of the human understanding. The child who strikes the table with a spoon for the first time, and is regaled by the noise, will strike again, with as confident an expectation of the same result, as if the succession had been familiar to it for years. There is the expectation before the experience of Nature's constancy; and still the topic of our wonder and gratitude is, that this instinctive and universal faith in the heart, should be responded to by objective nature, in one wide and universal fulfilment.

6. The proper office of experience, in this matter, is very generally misapprehended; and this has mystified the real principle and philosophy of the subject. Her office is not to tell, or to reassure us of the constancy of Nature; but to tell, what the terms of her unalterable progressions actually are. The human mind from its first outset, and in virtue of a constitutional bias coeval with the earliest dawn of the understanding, is prepared, and that before experience has begun her lessons, to count on the constancy of nature's sequences. But at that time, it is profoundly ignorant of the sequences in themselves. It is the proper business of experience to give this information; but it may require many lessons before that her disciples be made to understand, what be the distinct terms even but of one sequence. Nature presents us with her phenomena in complex assemblages; and it is often difficult, in the work of disentangling her trains from each other, to single out the proper and causal antecedent with its resulting consequent, from among the crowd of accessory or accidental circumstances by which they are surrounded. There is never any uncertainty, as to the invariableness of nature's successions. The only uncertainty is as to the steps of each succession; and the distinct achievement of experience, is to ascertain these steps. And many mistakes are committed in this course of education, from our disposition to confound the similarities with the samenesses of Nature. We never misgive in our general confidence, that the same antecedent will be followed by the same consequent; but we often mistake the semblance for the reality, and are as often disappointed in the expectations that we form. This is the real account of that growing confidence, where-with we anticipate the same results in the same apparent circumstances, the oftener that that result has in these circumstances been observed by us—as of a high-water about twice every day, or of a sun-rise every morning. It is not that we need to be more assured than we are already of the constancy of Nature, in the sense that every result must always be the sure effect of its strict and causal antecedent. But we need to be assured of the real



presence of this antecedent, in that mass of contemporaneous things under which the result has taken place hitherto; and of this we are more and more satisfied, with every new occurrence of the same event in the same apparent circumstances. This too is our real object in the repetition of experiments. Not that we suspect that Nature will ever vacillate from her constancy—for if by one decisive experiment we should fix the real terms of any succession, this experiment were to us as good as a thousand. But each succession in nature is so liable to be obscured and complicated by other influences, that we must be quite sure, ere we can proclaim our discovery of some new sequence, that we have properly disentangled her separate trains from each other. For this purpose, we have often to question Nature in many different ways; we have to combine and apply her elements variously; we have sometimes to detach one ingredient, or to add another, or to alter the proportions of a third—and all in order, not to ascertain the invariableness of Nature, for of this we have had instinctive certainty from the beginning; but, in order to ascertain what the actual footsteps of her progressions are, so as to connect each effect in the history of Nature's changes with its strict and proper cause. Meanwhile, amid all the suspense and the frequent disappointments which attend this search into the processes of nature, our confidence in the rigid and inviolable uniformity of these processes remains unshaken—a confidence not learned from experience, but amply confirmed and accorded to by experience. For this instinctive expectation is never once refuted, in the whole course of our subsequent researches. Nature though stretched on a rack, or put to the torture by the inquisitions of science, never falters from her immutability; but persists, unseduced and unwearied, in the same response to the same question; or gives forth, by a spark, or an explosion, or an effervescence, or some other definite phenomenon, the same result to the same circumstances or combination of data. The anticipations of infancy meet with their glorious verification, in all the findings of manhood; and a truth which would seem to require Omniscience for its grasp, as coextensive with all Nature and all History, is deposited by the hand of God, in the little cell of a nursling's cogitations.

7. Yet the immutability of Nature has ministered to the atheism of some spirits, as impressing on the universe a character of blind necessity, instead of that spontaneity, which might mark the intervention of a willing and a living God. To refute this notion of an unintelligent fate, as being the alone presiding Divinity, the common appeal is to the infinity and exquisite skill of nature's adaptations. But to attack this infidelity in its fortress,

and dislodge it thence, the more appropriate argument would be the very, the individual adaptation on which we have now insisted—the immutability of Nature, in conjunction with the universal sense and expectation, even from earliest childhood, that all men have of it; being itself one of the most marvellous and strikingly beneficial of these adaptations. When viewed aright, it leads to a wiser and sounder conclusion than that of the fatalists. In the instinctive, the universal faith of Nature's constancy, we behold a promise. In the actual constancy of Nature, we behold its fulfilment. When the two are viewed in connexion, then, to be told that Nature never recedes from her constancy, is to be told that the God of Nature never recedes from his faithfulness. If not by a whisper from His voice, at least by the impress of His hand, He hath deposited a silent expectation in every heart; and He makes all Nature and all History conspire to realize it. He hath not only enabled man to retain in his memory a faithful transcript of the past; but by means of this constitutional tendency, this instinct of the understanding as it has been termed, to look with prophetic eye upon the future. It is the link by which we connect experience with anticipation—a power or exercise of the mind coeval with the first dawnings of consciousness or observation, because obviously that to which we owe the confidence so early acquired and so firmly established, in the information of our senses.\* This disposition to

\*It is from our tactual sensations that we obtain our first original perceptions of distance and magnitude; and it is only because of the invariable connexion which subsists between the same tactual and the same visual sensations, that by means of the latter we obtain secondary or acquired perceptions of distance and magnitude. It is obvious that without a faith in the uniformity of nature, this rudimental education could not have taken effect; and from the confidence wherewith we proceed in very early childhood on the intimations of the eye, we may infer how strongly this principle must have been at work throughout the anterior stage of our still earlier infancy. The lucid and satisfactory demonstration upon this subject in that delightful little work, the *Theory of Vision*, by Bishop Berkeley, has not been superseded, because it has not been improved upon, by the lucubrations of any subsequent author. The theology which he would found on the beautiful process which he has unfolded so well, is somewhat tinged with the mysticism of that doctrine which represents our seeing all things in God. Certain it is, however, that the process could not have been advanced or consummated, without an aboriginal faith on the part of the infant mind in the uniformity of nature's sequences, a disposition to expect the same consequents from the same antecedents—an inference which is at length made, and that in very early childhood, with such rapidity as well as confidence, that it leads all men to confound their acquired with their original perceptions; and it requires a subtle analysis to disentangle the two from each other. Without partaking in the metaphysics of Berkeley, we fully concur in the strength and certainty of those theistical conclusions which are expressed by him in the following sentences—"Something there is of divine and admirable in this language addressed to our eyes, that may well awaken the mind, and deserve its utmost attention; it is learned with so little pains, it expresses the difference of things so clearly and aptly, it instructs with such facility and dispatch, by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of advices, and a more distinct knowledge of

presume on the constancy of nature, commences with the faculty of thought, and keeps by it through life, and enables the mind to convert its stores of memory into the treasures of science and wisdom ; and so to elicit from the recollections of the past, both the doctrines of a general philosophy, and the lessons of daily and familiar conduct—and that, by means of prognostics, not one of which can fail, for, in respect of her steadfast uniformity, Nature never disappoints, or, which is equivalent to this, the Author of Nature never deceives us. The generality of Nature's laws is indispensable, both to the formation of any system of truth for the understanding, and to the guidance of our actions. But ere we can make such use of it, the sense and the confident expectation of this generality must be previously in our minds ; and the concurrence, the contingent harmony of these two elements ; the exquisite adaptation of the objective to the subjective, with the manifest utilities to which it is subservient ; the palpable and perfect meetness which subsists, between this intellectual propensity in man, and all the processes of the outward universe—while they afford incontestable evidence to the existence and unity of that design, which must have adjusted the mental and the material formations to each other, speak most decisively in our estimation both for the truth and the wisdom of God.

8. We have long felt this close and unexcepted, while at the same time, contingent harmony, between the actual constancy of Nature and man's faith in that constancy, to be an effectual preservative against that scepticism, which would represent the whole system of our thoughts and perceptions to be founded on an illusion. Certain it is, that beside an indefinite number of truths received by the understanding as the conclusions of a proof more or less lengthened, there are truths recognized with-

things, than could be got by a discourse of several hours ; and, while it informs, it amuses and entertains the mind with such singular pleasure and delight ; it is of such excellent use in giving a stability and permanency to human discourse, in recording sounds and bestowing life on dead languages, enabling us to converse with men of remote ages and countries ; and it answers so apposite to the uses and necessities of mankind, informing us more distinctly of those objects, whose nearness or magnitude qualify them to be of greatest detriment or benefit to our bodies, and less exactly in proportion as their littleness or distance make them of less concern to us. But these things are not strange, they are familiar, and that makes them to be overlooked. Things which rarely happen strike ; whereas frequency lessens the admiration of things, though in themselves ever so admirable. Hence a common man who is not used to think and make reflections, would probably be more convinced of the being of a God by one single sentence heard once in his life from the sky, than by all the experience he has had of this visual language, contrived with such exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to his eyes, and so plainly declaring the nearness, wisdom, and providence of Him with whom we have to do." Minute Philosopher. Dialogue IV. Art. XV.

out proof by an instant act of intuition—not the results of a reasoning process, but themselves the first principles of all reasoning. At every step in the train of argumentation, we affirm one thing to be true, because of its logical connexion with another thing known to be true; but as this process of derivation is not eternal, it is obvious, that, at the commencement of at least some of these trains, there must be truths, which, instead of borrowing their evidence from others, announce themselves immediately to the mind in an original and independent evidence of their own. Now they are these primary convictions of the understanding, these cases of a belief without reason, which minister to the philosophical infidelity of those, who, professing to have no dependance on an instinctive faith, do in fact alike discard all truth, whether demonstrated or undemonstrated—seeing that undervived or unreasoned truth must necessarily form the basis, as well as the continuous cement of all reasoning. They challenge us to account for these native and original convictions of the mind; and affirm that they may be as much due to an arbitrary organization of the percipient faculty, as to the objective trueness of the things which are perceived. And we cannot dispute the possibility of this. We can neither establish by reasoning those truths, whose situation is, not any where in the stream, but at the fountain of ratiocination; nor can we deny that beings might have been so differently constituted, as that, with reverse intuitions to our own, they might have recognized as truths what we instantly recoil from as falsehoods, or felt to be absurdities our first and foremost principles of truth. And when this suspicion is once admitted, so as to shake our confidence in the judgments of the intellect, it were but consistent that it should be extended to the departments both of morality and taste. Our impressions of what is virtuous or of what is fair, may be regarded as alike accidental and arbitrary with our impressions of what is true—being referable to the structure of the mind, and not to any objective reality in the things which are contemplated. It is thus that the absolutely true, or good, or beautiful, may be conceived of, as having no stable or substantive being in nature; and the mind, adrift from all fixed principle, may thus lose itself in universal pyrrhonism.

9. Nature is fortunately too strong for this speculation; but still there is a comfort in being enabled to vindicate the confidence which she has inspired—as in those cases, where some original principle of hers admits of being clearly and decisively tested. And it is so of our faith in the constancy of nature, met and responded to, throughout all her dominions by nature's actual constancy—the one being the expectation, the other its



rigid and invariable fulfilment. This perhaps is the most palpable instance which can be quoted, of a belief anterior to experience, yet of which experience affords a wide and unexcepted verification. It proves at least of one of our implanted instincts, that it is unerring; and that, over against a subjective tendency in the mind, there is a great objective reality in circumambient nature to which it corresponds. This may well convince us, that we live, not in a world of imaginations—but in a world of realities. It is a noble example of the harmony which obtains, between the original make and constitution of the human spirit upon the one hand, and the constitution of external things upon the other; and nobly accredits the faithfulness of Him, who, as the Creator of both, ordained this happy and wondrous adaptation. The monstrous suspicion of the sceptics is, that we are in the hands of a God, who, by the insertion of falsities into the human system, sports himself with a laborious deception on the creatures whom He has made. The invariable order of nature, in conjunction with the apprehension of this invariableness existing in all hearts; the universal expectation with its universal fulfilment, is a triumphant refutation of this degrading mockery—evincing, that it is not a phantasmagoria in which we dwell, but a world peopled with realities. That we are never misled in our instinctive belief of nature's uniformity, demonstrates the perfect safety wherewith we may commit ourselves to the guidance of our original principles, whether intellectual or moral—assured, that, instead of occupying a land of shadows, a region of universal doubt and derision, they are the stabilities, both of an everlasting truth and an everlasting righteousness with which we have to do.

10. This lesson obtains a distinct and additional confirmation from every particular instance of adaptation, which can be found, of external nature, either to the moral or intellectual constitution of man.

11. (2.) To understand our second adaptation we must advert to the difference that obtains between those truths which are so distinct and independent, that each can only be ascertained by a separate act of observation; and those truths which are either logically or mathematically involved in each other.\* For ex-

\* See this distinction admirably expounded in Whately's *Logic*—a work of profound judgment, and which effectually vindicates the honours of a science, that since the days of Bacon, or rather (which is more recent) since the days of his extravagant because exclusive authority, it has been too much the fashion to depreciate. The author, if I might use the expression without irreverence, has given to Bacon the things which are Bacon's, and to Aristotle the things which are Aristotle's. He has strengthened the pretensions of logic by narrowing them—that is, instead of placing all the intellectual processes under its direction, by assigning to it as its

ample, there is no such dependence between the colour of a flower and its smell, as that the one can be reasoned from the other; and, in every different specimen therefore, we, to ascertain the two facts of the colour and the smell, must have recourse to two observations. On the other hand, there is such a dependence between the proposition that self-preservation is the strongest and most general law of our nature, and the proposition that no man will starve if able and in circumstances to work for his own maintenance—that the one proposition can be deduced by inference from the other, as the conclusion from the premises of an argument. And still more there is such a dependence between the proposition, that the planet moves in an elliptical orbit round the sun, having its focus in the centre of that luminary, and a thousand other propositions—so that without a separate observation for each of the latter, they can be reasoned from the former; just as an infinity of truths and properties can, without observation, be satisfactorily demonstrated of many a curve from the simple definition of it. We do not affirm, that, in any case, we can establish a dogma, or make a discovery independently of all observation—any more than in a syllogism we are independent of observation for the truth of the premises—both the major and the minor propositions being generally verified in this way; while the connexion between these and the conclusion, is all, in the syllogism, wherewith the art of logic has properly to do. In none of the sciences, is the logic of itself available for the purposes of discovery; and it can only contribute to this object, when furnished with sound data, the accuracy of which is determined by observation alone. This holds particularly true of the mixed mathematics, where the conclusions are sound, only in as far as the first premises are sound—which premises, in like manner, are not reasoned truths, but observed truths. Even in the pure mathematics, some obscurely initial or rudimental process of observation may have been necessary, ere the mind could arrive at its first conceptions, either of quantity or number. Certain it is, however, that, in all the sciences, however dependent on observation for the original data, we can, by reason-

proper subject the art of deduction alone. He has made most correct distinction between the inductive and the logical; and it is by attending to the respective provinces of each, that we come to perceive the incompetency of mere logic for the purpose of discovery strictly so called. The whole chapter on discovery is particularly valuable—leading us clearly to discriminate between that which logic can, and that which it cannot achieve. It is an instrument, not for the discovery of truth properly new, but for the discovery of truths which are enveloped or virtually contained in propositions already known. It instructs but does not inform; and has nought to do in syllogism with the truth of the premises, but only with the truth of the connexion between the premises and the conclusion.

ing on the data, establish an indefinite number of distinct and important and useful propositions—which, if soundly made out, observation will afterwards verify; but which, anterior to the application of this test, the mind, by its own excogitations, may have made the objects of its most legitimate conviction. It is thus that, on the one hand, we, by the inferences of a sound logic, can, on an infinity of subjects, discover what should for ever have remained unknown, had it been left to the findings of direct observation; and that, on the other hand, though observation could not have made the discovery, it never fails to attest it. Visionaries, on the one hand, may spurn at the ignoble patience and drudgery of observers; and ignorant practitioners, whether in the walks of business or legislation, may, on the other, raise their senseless and indiscriminate outcry against the reasoners—but he who knows to distinguish between an hypothesis based on imagination, and a theory based on experience, and perceives how helpless either reason or observation is, when not assisted by the other, will know how to assign the parts, and to estimate the prerogatives of both.

12. When the mind has retired from direct converse with the external world, and brought to its own inner chamber of thought the materials which it has collected there, it then delivers itself up to its own process—first ascending analytically from observed phenomena to principles, and then descending synthetically from principles to yet unobserved phenomena. We cannot but recognize it as an exquisite adaptation between the subjective and the objective, between the mental and the material systems—that the results of the abstract intellectual process and the realities of external nature should so strikingly harmonize.\* It is exemplified in all the sciences, in the econo-

\* There are some fine remarks by Sir John Herschell in his preliminary discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy on this adaptation of the abstract ideas to the concrete realities, of the discoveries made in the region of pure thought to the facts and phenomena of actual nature—as when the properties of conic sections, demonstrated by a laborious analysis, remained inapplicable till they came to be embodied in the real masses and movements of astronomy.

“These marvellous computations might almost seem to have been devised on purpose to show how closely the extremes of speculative refinement and practical utility can be brought to approximate.” Herschell’s Discourse, p. 28.

“They show how large a part pure reason has to perform in the examination of nature, and how implicit our reliance ought to be on that powerful and methodical system of rules and processes, which constitute the modern mathematical analysis, in all the more difficult applications of exact calculation to her phenomena.” p. 33.

“Almost all the great combinations of modern mechanism and many of its refinements and nicer improvements, are creations of pure intellect, grounding its exertion upon a very moderate number of elementary propositions, in theoretical mechanics and geometry.” p. 63.

The discovery of the principle of the achromatic telescope, is termed by Sir John

mical, and the mental, and the physical, and most of all in the physico-mathematical—as when Newton, on the calculations and profound musings of his solitude, predicted the oblate spheroidal figure of the earth, and the prediction was confirmed by the mensurations of the academicians, both in the polar and equatorial regions, or as, when abandoning himself to the devices and the diagrams of his own construction, he thence scanned the cycles of the firmament, and elicited from the scroll of enigmatical characters which himself had framed, the secrets of a sublime astronomy, that high field so replete with wonders, yet surpassed by this greatest wonder of all, the intellectual mastery which man has over it. That such a feeble creature should have made this conquest—that a light struck out in the little cell of his own cogitations should have led to a disclosure so magnificent—that by a calculus of his own formation, as with the power of a talisman, the heavens, with their stupendous masses and untrodden distances, should have thus been opened to his gaze—can only be explained by the intervention of a Being having supremacy over all, and who has adjusted the laws of matter and the properties of mind to each other. It is only thus we can be made to understand, how man by the mere workings of his spirit, should have penetrated so far into the workmanship of Nature; or that, restricted though he be to a spot of earth, he should nevertheless tell of the suns and the systems that be afar—as if he had travelled with the line and plummet in his hand to the outskirts of creation, or carried the torch of discovery round the universe.

13. (3.) Our next adaptation is most notably exemplified in those cases, when some isolated phenomenon, remote and having at first no conceivable relation to human affairs, is nevertheless converted by the plastic and productive intellect of man, into some application of mighty and important effect on the interests of the world. One example of this is the use that has been made of the occultations and emersions of Jupiter's satellites, in the computation of longitudes, and so the perfecting of navigation. When one contemplates a subserviency of this sort fetched to us from afar, it is difficult not to imagine of it as being the fruit of some special adjustment, that came within the purpose of Him, who, in constructing the vast mechanism of Nature, overlooked not the humblest of its parts—but incorporated the good of our species, with the wider generalities and laws of a

“a memorable case in science, though not a singular one, where the speculative geometer in his chamber, apart from the world, and existing among abstractions, has originated views of the noblest practical application.” p. 255.



universal system.\* The conclusion is rather enhanced than otherwise by the seemingly incidental way in which the telescope was discovered. The observation of the polarity of the magnet is an example of the same kind—and with the same result, in multiplying, by an enlarged commerce the enjoyments of life, and speeding onward the science and civilization of the globe. There cannot a purer instance be given, of adaptation between external nature and the mind of man—than when some material, that would have remained for ever useless in the hands of the unintelligent and unthoughtful, is converted, by the fertility and power of the human understanding, into an instrument for the further extension of our knowledge or our means of gratification. The prolongation of their eyesight to the aged by the means of convex lenses, made from a substance at once

\* The author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm*, in his edition of Edward's treatise on the will, presents us with the following energetic sentences on this subject.

“Every branch of modern science abounds with instances of remote correspondences between the great system of the world, and the artificial (*the truly natural*) condition to which knowledge raises him. If these correspondences were single or rare they might be deemed merely fortuitous; like the drifting of a plank athwart the track of one who is swimming from a wreck. But when they meet us on all sides and invariably, we must be resolute in atheism not to confess that they are emanations from one and the same centre of wisdom and goodness. Is it nothing more than a lucky accommodation which makes the polarity of the needle to subserve the purposer of the mariner? or may it not safely be affirmed, both that the magnetic influence (whatever its primary intention may be) had reference to the business of navigation—a reference incalculably important to the spread and improvement of the human race; and that the discovery and the application of this influence arrived at the destined moment in the revolution of human affairs, when in combination with other events, it would produce the greatest effect? Nor should we scruple to affirm that the relation between the inclination of the earth's axis and the conspicuous star which, without a near rival, attracts even the eye of the vulgar, and shows the north to the wanderer on the wilderness or on the ocean, is in like manner a beneficent arrangement. Those who would spurn the supposition that the celestial locality of a sun immeasurably remote from our system, should have reference to the accommodation of the inhabitants of a planet so inconsiderable as our own, forget the style of the Divine Works, which is, to serve some great or principal end, compatibly with ten thousand lesser and remote interests. Man if he would secure the greater, must neglect or sacrifice the less; not so the Omnipotent Contriver. It is a fact full of meaning, that those astronomical phenomena (and so others) which offer themselves as available for the purposes of art, as for instance of navigation, or geography, do not fully or effectively yield the end they promise, until after long and elaborate processes of calculation have disentangled them from variations, disturbing forces and apparent irregularities. To the rude fact, if so we might designate it, a mass of recondite science must be appended, before it can be brought to bear with precision upon the arts of life. Thus the polarity of the needle or the eclipses of Jupiter's moons are as nothing to the mariner, or the geographer, without the voluminous commentary furnished by the mathematics of astronomy. The fact of the expansive force of steam must employ the intelligence and energy of the mechanicians of an empire, during a century, before the whole of its beneficial powers can be put in activity. Chemical, medical, and botanical science is filled with parallel instances; and they all affirm, in an articulate manner, the two-fold purpose of the Creator—to benefit man and to educate him.

transparent and colourless—the force of steam with the manifold and ever growing applications which are made of it—the discovery of platina, which, by its resistance to the fiercest heats, is so available in prosecuting the ulterior researches of chemistry\*—even the very abundance and portability of those materials by which written characters can be multiplied, and, through the impulse thus given to the quick and copious circulation of human thoughts, mind acts with rapid diffusion upon mind though at the distance of a hemisphere from each other, conceptions and informations and reasonings these products of the intellect alone being made to travel over the world by the intervention of material substances—these, while but themselves only a few taken at random from the multitude of strictly appropriate specimens which could be alleged of an adaptation between the systems of mind and matter, are sufficient to mark an obvious contrivance and forth-putting of skill in the adjustment of the systems to each other. Enough has been already done to prove of mind with its various powers, that it is the fittest agent which could have been employed for working upon matter; and of matter, with its various properties and combinations, that it is the fittest instrument which could have been placed under the disposal of mind. Every new triumph achieved by the human intellect over external nature, whether in the way of discovery or of art, serves to make the proof more illustrious. In the indefinite progress of science and invention, the mastery of man over the elements which surround him is every year becoming more conspicuous—the pure result of adaptation, or of the way in which mind and matter have been conformed to each other; the first endowed by the Creator with those powers which qualify it to command; the second no less evidently endowed with those corresponding susceptibilities which cause it to obey.

14. (4.) The way is now prepared for our next adaptation which hinges upon this—that the highest efforts of intellectual power, and to which few men are competent; the most difficult

\* This among many such lessons will teach us that the most important uses of natural objects are not those which offer themselves to us most obviously. The chief use of the moon for man's immediate purposes remained unknown to him for five thousand years from his creation. And since it cannot but be that innumerable and most important uses remain to be discovered among the materials and objects already known to us, as well as among those which the progress of science must hereafter disclose, we may here conceive a well-grounded expectation, not only of constant increase in the physical resources of mankind, and the consequent improvement of their condition, but of continual accessions to our power of penetrating into the arcana of nature, and becoming acquainted with her highest laws. Sir John Herschell's Discourse, p. 308, 309.

intellectual process, requiring the utmost abstraction and leisure for their developement, are often indispensable to discoveries, which, when once made, are found capable of those useful applications, the value of which is felt and recognized by all men. The most arduous mathematics had to be put into requisition, for the establishment of the lunar theory—without which our present lunar observations could have been of no use for the determination of the longitude. This dependence of the popular and the practical on an anterior profound science runs through much of the business of life, in the mechanics and chemistry of manufactures as well as in navigation; and indeed is more or less exemplified so widely, or rather universally, throughout the various departments of human industry and art, that it most essentially contributes to the ascendancy of mind over muscular force in society—beside securing for mental qualities, the willing and reverential homage of the multitude. This peculiar influence stands complicated with other arrangements, requiring a multifarious combination, that speaks all the more emphatically for a presiding intellect, which must have devised and calculated the whole. We have already stated,\* by what peculiarity in the soil it was, that a certain number of the species was exempted from the necessity of labour; and without which, in fact, all science and civilization would have been impossible. We have also expounded in some degree the principle, which both originated the existing arrangements of property, and lead men to acquiesce in them. But still it is a precarious acquiescence, and liable to be disturbed by many operating causes of distress and discontent in society. If there be influences on the side of the established order of things, there are also counteractive influences on the opposite side, of revolt and irritation against it; and by which, the natural reverence of men for rank and station, may at length be overborne. In the progress of want and demoralization among the people, in the pressure of their increasing numbers, by which, they at once outgrow the means of instruction, and bear more heavily on the resources of the land than before; in the felt straitness of their condition, and the proportionate vehemence of their aspirations after enlargement—nothing is easier than to give them a factitious sense of their wrongs, and to inspire them with the wrangling imagination of a heartless and haughty indifference on the part of their lordly superiors towards them, whose very occupation of wealth, they may be taught to regard as a monopoly, the breaking down of which were an act of generous patriotism. Against these brooding

\* Part I. c. vi. 29.

elements of revolution in the popular mind, the most effectual preservative certainly, were the virtue of the upper classes,—or that our great men should be good men. But a mighty help to this, and next to it in importance were, that to the power which lies in wealth, they should superadd the power which lies in knowledge—or that the vulgar superiority of mere affluence and station, should be strengthened in a way that would command the willing homage of all spirits, that is, by the mental superiority which their opportunities of lengthened and laborious education enable them to acquire. By a wise ordination of Nature, the possessors of rank and fortune, simply as such, have a certain ascendant power over their fellows; and, by the same ordination, the possessors of learning have an ascendancy also—and it would mightily conduce to the strength and stability of the commonwealth, if these influences were conjoined, or, in other words, if the scale of wealth and the scale of intelligence, in as far as that was dependent on literary culture, could be made to harmonize. The constitution of science, or the adaptation which obtains between the objects of knowledge and the knowing faculties, is singularly favourable to the alliance for which we now plead—insomuch that, to sound the depths of philosophy, time and independence and exemption from the cares and labours of ordinary life seem indispensable; and, on the other hand, profound discoveries, or a profound acquaintance with them, are sure to command a ready deference even from the multitude, whether on account of the natural respect which all men feel for pre-eminent understanding, or on account of the palpable utilities to which, in a system of things so connected as ours, even the loftiest and most recondite science is found to be subservient. On the same principle that, in a ship, the skilful navigation of its captain will secure for him the prompt obedience of the crew to all his directions;\* or that, in an army, the consummate general-

\* We have before us an anecdote communicated to us by a naval officer, (Captain Basil Hall,) distinguished for the extent and variety of his attainments, which shows how impressive such results may become in practice. He sailed from San Blas on the west coast of Mexico, and after a voyage of 8000 miles, occupying eighty-nine days, arrived off Rio Janeiro, having in this interval passed through the Pacific Ocean, rounded Cape Horn, and crossed the South Atlantic, without making any land, or even seeing a single sail, with the exception of an American whaler off Cape Horn. Arrived within a week's sail of Rio, he set seriously about determining, by lunar observations, the precise line of the ship's course, and its situation in it at a determinate moment, and having ascertained this within from five to ten miles, ran the rest of the way by those more ready and compendious methods, known to navigators, which can be safely employed for short trips between one known point and another, but which cannot be trusted in long voyages, where the moon is their only guide. The rest of the tale we are enabled by his kindness to state in his own words:—"We steered towards Rio Janeiro for some days after taking the lunars above described, and having arrived within fifteen or twenty miles of the coast, I hove-to till four in the morning



ship of its commander will subordinate all the movements of the immense host, to the power of one controlling and actuating will—so, in general society, did wealth by means of a thorough scholarship on the part of the higher classes, but maintain an intimate fellowship with wisdom and sound philosophy—then, with the same conservative influence as in these other examples, would the intellectual ascendancy thus acquired, be found of mighty effect, to consolidate and maintain all the gradations of the commonwealth.

15. It is thus that a vain and frivolous aristocracy, averse to severe intellectual discipline, and beset with the narrow prejudices of an order, let themselves down from that high vantage-ground on which fortune hath placed them—where, by a right use of the capabilities belonging to the state in which they were born, they might have kept their firm footing to the latest generations. Did all truth lie at the surface of observation, and it was alike accessible to all men, they could not with such an adaptation of external nature to man's intellectual constitution, have realized the peculiar advantage on which we are now insisting. But it is because there is so much of important and applicable truth, which lies deep and hidden under the surface, and which can only be appropriated by men, who combine unbounded leisure with the habit or determination of strenuous mental effort—it is only because of such an adaptation, that they who are gifted with property are, as a class, gifted with the means, if they would use it, of a great intellectual superiority over the rest of the species. There is a strong natural veneration for wealth, and also a strong natural veneration for wisdom. It is by the union of the two that the horrors of revolutionary violence, might for ever be averted from the land. Did our high-born children of affluence, for every ten among them, the mere loungers of effeminacy and fashion, or the mere lovers of sport and sensuality and splendour—did they, for

when the day should break, and then bore up; for although it was very hazy, we could see before us a couple of miles or so. About eight o'clock it became so foggy that I did not like to stand in farther, and was just bringing the ship to the wind again before sending the people to breakfast, when it suddenly cleared off, and I had the satisfaction of seeing the great sugar-loaf peak, which stands on one side of the harbour's mouth, so nearly right a-head that we had not to alter our course above a point, in order to hit the entrance of Rio. This was the first land we had seen for three months, after crossing so many seas, and being set backwards and forwards by innumerable currents and foul winds." "The effect on all on board might well be conceived to have been electric; and it is needless to remark how essentially the authority of a commanding officer over his crew may be strengthened by the occurrence of such incidents, indicative of a degree of knowledge and consequent power beyond their reach."—Herschell's Discourse, p. 28, 29.

It is an extreme instance of the connexion between mental power and civil or political ascendancy, though often verified in the history of the world—that military science has often led to the establishment of a military despotism.

every ten of such, furnish but one enamoured of higher gymnastics, the gymnastics of the mind; and who accomplished himself for the work and warfare of the senate, by his deep and comprehensive views in all the proper sciences of a statesman, the science of government, and politics, and commerce, and economics, and history, and human nature,—by a few gigantic men among them, thus girded for the services of patriotism, a nation might be saved—because arrested on that headlong descent, which, at the impulse of the popular will, it might else have made, from one measure of fair but treacherous promise, from one ruinous plausibility to another. The thing most to be dreaded, is that hasty and superficial legislation, into which a government may be hurried by the successive onsets of public impatience, and under the impulse of a popular and prevailing cry. Now the thing most needed, as a counteractive to this evil, is a thoroughly intellectual parliament, where shall predominate that masculine sense which has been trained for act and application by masculine studies; and where the silly watch-word of theory shall not be employed, as heretofore, to overbear the lessons of soundly generalized truth—because instead of being discerned at a glance, they are fetched from the depths of philosophic observation, or shone upon by lights from afar, in the accumulated experience of ages. We have infinitely more to apprehend from the demagogues than from the doctrinaires of our present crisis; and it will require a far profounder attention to the principles of every question than many deem to be necessary, or than almost any are found to bestow, to save us from the crudities of a blindfold legislation.\*

\* This mental superiority which the higher classes might and ought to cultivate, is not incompatible, but the contrary, with a general ascent in the scholarship of the population at large. On this subject we have elsewhere said—that “there is a bigotry on the side of endowed seminaries which leads those whom it actuates to be jealous of popular institutions. And, on the other hand, there is a generous feeling towards these institutions, which is often accompanied with a certain despite towards the endowed and established seminaries. We think that a more comprehensive consideration of the actings and reactions which take place in society, should serve to abate the heats of this partizanship, and that what in one view is regarded as the conflict of jarring and hostile elements, should, in another, be rejoiced in as a luminous concourse of influences, tending to accomplish the grand and beneficent result of an enlightened nation. It is just because we wish so well to colleges, that we hail the prosperity of mechanic institutions. The latter will never outrun the former, but so stimulate them onwards, that the literature of our higher classes shall hold the same relative advancement as before over the literature of our artizans. It will cause no derangement and no disproportion. The light which shall then overspread the floor of the social edifice, will only cause the lustres which are in the higher apartments to blaze more gorgeously. The basement of the fabric will be greatly more elevated, yet without violence to the symmetry of the whole architecture; for the pinnacles and upper stories of the building will rise as proudly and as gracefully as ever above the platform which sustains them. There is indefinite room in truth and science for an ascending

16. And it augurs portentously for the coming destinies of our land, that, in the present rage for economy, such an indiscriminate havock should have been made—so that pensions and endowments for the reward or encouragement of science, should have had the same sentence of extinction passed upon them, as the most worthless sinecures. The difficulties of our most sublime, and often too our most useful knowledge, make it inaccessible to all but to those who are exempt from the care of their own maintenance—so that unless a certain, though truly insignificant portion of the country's wealth, be expended in this way, all high and transcendental philosophy, however conducive as it often is to the strength as well as glory of a nation must vanish from the land. When the original possessors of wealth neglect individually this application of it; and, whether from indolence or the love of pleasure, fall short of that superiority in mental culture, of which the means have been put into their hands—we can only reproach their ignoble preference, and lament the ascendant force of sordid and merely animal propensities, over the principles of their better and higher nature. But when that which individuals do in slavish compliance with their indolence and passions, the state is also found to do in the exercise of its deliberative wisdom, and on the maxims of a settled policy—when instead of ordaining any new destination of wealth in favour of science, it would divorce and break asunder the goodly alliance by a remorseless attack on the destinations of wiser and better days—such a gothic spoliation as this, not a deed of lawless cupidity but the mandate of a senate-house, were a still more direct and glaring contravention to the wisdom of Nature, and to the laws of that economy which Nature hath instituted. The adaptation of which we now speak, between the external system of the universe, and the intellectual system of man, were grossly violated by such an outrage; and it is a violence which Nature would resent by one of those signal chastisements, the examples of which are so frequent in history. The truth is that, viewed as a manifestation of the popular will, which tumultuates against all that wont to com-

movement, and the taking up of higher positions; and if, in virtue of a popular philosophy now taught in schools of art, we are to have more lettered mechanics, this will be instantly followed up by a higher philosophy in colleges than heretofore; and in virtue of which we shall also have a more accomplished gentry, a more intellectual parliament, a more erudite clergy, and altogether a greater force and fulness of mind throughout all the departments of the commonwealth. The whole of society will ascend together, and therefore without disturbance to the relation of its parts. But, in every stage of this progress, the endowed colleges will continue to be the highest places of intellect; the country's richest lore and its most solid and severest philosophy will always be found in them." Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Endowments.

mand the respect and admiration of society, and is strong enough to enforce its dictations—it may well be regarded, as one of the deadliest symptoms of a nation ripening for anarchy, that dread consummation, by which however, the social state, relieved of its distempers, is at length renovated like the atmosphere by a storm, after throwing off from it, the dregs and the degeneracy of an iron age.\*

17. (5.) We shall do little more than state two other adaptations, although more might be noticed, and all do admit of a much fuller elucidation than we can bestow upon them. And first, there is a countless diversity of sciences, and correspondent to this, a like diversity in the tastes and talents of men, presenting, therefore, a most beneficial adaptation, between the objects of human knowledge and the powers of human knowledge. Even in one science there are often many subdivisions, each requiring a separate mental fitness, on the part of those, who might select it as their own favourite walk, which they most love, and in which they are best qualified to excel. In most of the physical sciences, how distinct the business of the observation is from that of the philosophy; and how important to their progress, that, for each appropriate work, there should be men of appropriate faculties or habits, who in the execution of their respective tasks, do exceedingly multiply and enlarge the products of the mind—even as the grosser products of human industry are multiplied by the subdivision of employment.† It is well, that, for that infinite variety of intellectual pursuits, necessary to explore all the recesses of a various and complicated external nature, there should be a like variety of intellectual predilections and powers scattered over the species—a congruity between the world of mind and the world of matter, of the utmost importance, both to the perfecting of art, and to the progress and perfecting of science. Yet it is marvellous of these respective labourers, though in effect they work simultaneously and to each other's hands, how little respect or sympathy, or sense of importance, they have for any department of the general field, for any section in the wide encyclopædia of human learning, but that on which their own faculties are concentrated and absorbed. We cannot imagine aught more dissimilar and uncongenial, than the intent-

\* The same effect is still more likely to ensue from the spoliation and secularization of ecclesiastical property.

† There is no accounting for the difference of minds or inclinations, which leads one man to observe with interest the developement of phenomena, another to speculate on their causes; but were it not for this happy disagreement, it may be doubted whether the higher sciences could ever have attained even their present degree of perfection." Sir John Herschell's Discourses, p. 131.



ness of a mathematician on his demonstrations and diagrams, and the equal intentness, nay delight, of a collector or antiquarian on the faded manuscripts and uncial characters of other days. Yet in the compound result of all these multiform labours, there is a goodly and sustained harmony, between the practitioners and the theorists of science, between the pioneers and the monarchs of literature—even as in the various offices of a well-arranged household, although there should be no mutual intelligence between the subordinates who fill them, there is a supreme and connecting wisdom which presides over and animates the whole. The goodly system of philosophy, when viewed as the product of innumerable contributions, by minds of all possible variety and men of all ages—bears like evidence to the universe being a spacious household, under the one and consistent direction of Him who is at once the Parent and the Master of a universal family.\*

18. And here it is not out of place to remark, that it is the very perfection of the Divine workmanship, which leads every enquirer to imagine a surpassing worth and grace and dignity in his own special department of it. The fact is altogether notorious, that in order to attain a high sense of the importance of any science, and of the worth and beauty of the objects which it embraces—nothing more is necessary than the intent and persevering study of them. Whatever the walk of philosophy may be on which man shall enter, that is the walk which of all others he conceives to be most enriched, by all that is fitted to entertain the intellect, or arrest the admiration of the enamoured scholar. The astronomer who can unravel the mechanism of the heavens, or the chemist who can trace the atomic processes of matter upon earth, or the metaphysician who can assign the laws of human thought, or the grammarian who can discriminate the niceties of language, or the naturalist who can classify the flowers and the birds and the shells and the minerals and the insects which so teem and multiply in this world of wonders—each of these respective enquirers is apt to become the worshipper of his own theme, and to look with a sort of indifference, bordering on contempt, towards what he imagines the far less interesting track of his fellow-labourers. Now each is right in the admiration he renders to the grace and grandeur of that field which himself has explored; but all are wrong in the distaste they feel, or rather in the disregard they cast on the other fields which they have never

\* The benefit of subdivision in science should lead to the multiplication of professorships in our literary institutes, and at all events should prevent the parsimonious suppression of them, or the parsimonious amalgamation of the duties of two or more into one.

entered. We should take the testimony of each to the worth of that which he does know, and reject the testimony of each to the comparative worthlessness of that which he does not know; and then the unavoidable inference is that that must be indeed a replete and a gorgeous universe in which we dwell—and still more glorious the Eternal Mind, from whose conception it arose, and whose prolific fiat gave birth to it, in all its vastness and variety. And instead of the temple of science having been reared, it were more proper to say, that the temple of nature had been evolved. The archetype of science is the universe; and it is in the disclosure of its successive parts, that science advances from step to step—not properly raising any new architecture of its own, but rather unveiling by degrees an architecture that is old as the creation. The labourers in philosophy create nothing; but only bring out into exhibition that which was before created. And there is a resulting harmony in their labours, however widely apart from each other they may have been prosecuted—not because they have adjusted one part to another, but because the adjustment has been already made to their hands. There comes forth, it is true, of their labours, a most magnificent harmony, yet not a harmony which they have made, but a pre-existent harmony which they have only made visible—so that when tempted to idolize philosophy, let us transfer the homage to him who both formed the philosopher's mind, and furnished his philosophy with all its materials.

19. (6.) The last adaptation that we shall instance is rather one of mind to mind, and depends on a previous adaptation in each mind of the mental faculties to one another. For the right working of the mind, it is not enough that each of its separate powers shall be provided with adequate strength—they must be mixed in a certain proportion—for the greatest inconvenience might be felt, not in the defect merely, but in the excess of some of them. We have heard of too great a sensibility in the organ of hearing, giving rise to an excess in the faculty, which amounted to disease, by exposing the patient to the pain and disturbance of too many sounds, even of those so faint and low, as to be inaudible to the generality of men. In like manner we can imagine the excess of a property purely mental, of memory for example, amounting to a malady of the intellect, by exposing the victim of it to the presence and the perplexity of too many ideas, even of those which are so insignificant, that it would lighten and relieve the mind, if they had no place there at all.\* Certain it is

\* It has been said of Sir James Mackintosh, that the excess of his memory was felt by him as an incumbrance in the writing of history—adding as it did to the difficulty

that the more full and circumstantial is the memory, the more is given for the judgment to do—its proper work of selecting and comparing becoming the more oppressive, with the number and distraction of irrelevant materials. It would have been better that these had found no original admittance within the chamber of recollection ; or that only things of real and sufficient importance had left an enduring impression upon its tablet. In other words, it would have been better, that the memory had been less susceptible or less retentive than it is ; and this may enable us to perceive the exquisite balancing that must have been requisite, in the construction of the mind—when the very defect of one faculty is thus made to aid and to anticipate the operations of another. He who alone knoweth the secrets of the spirits, formed them with a wisdom to us unsearchable.

20. Certain it is however that variety in the proportion of their faculties, is one chief cause of the difference between the minds of men. And whatever the one faculty may be, in any individual, which predominates greatly beyond the average of the rest—that faculty is selected as the characteristic by which to distinguish him ; and thus he may be designed as a man of judgment, or information, or fancy, or wit, or oratory. It is this variety in their respective gifts, which originates so beautiful a dependence and reciprocity of mutual services among men ; and, more especially, when any united movement or united counsel is requisite, that calls forth the co-operation of numbers. No man combines all the ingredients of mental power ; and no man is wanting in all of them—so that, while none is wholly independent of others, each possesses some share of importance in the commonwealth. The defects, even of the highest minds, may thus need to be supplemented, by the counterpart excellencies of minds greatly inferior to their own—and, in this way, the pride of exclusive superiority is mitigated ; and the respect which is due to our common humanity is more largely diffused throughout society, and shared more equally among all the members of it. Nature hath so distributed her gifts among her children, as to promote a mutual helpfulness, and, what perhaps is still more precious, a mutual humility among men.

21. In almost all the instances of mental superiority, it will be found, that it is a superiority above the average level of the species, in but one thing—or that arises from the predominance of one faculty above all the rest. So much is this the case, that when

of selection. It is on the same principle that the very multitude of one's ideas and words may form an obstacle to extemporaneous speaking, as has been illustrated by Dean Swift under the comparison of a thin church emptying faster than a crowded one.

the example does occur, of an individual, so richly gifted as to excel in two of the general or leading powers of the mind, his reputation for the one will impede the establishment of his reputation for the other. There occurs to us one very remarkable case of the injustice, done by the men who have but one faculty, to the men who are under the misfortune of having two. In the writings of Edmund Burke, there has at length been discovered, a rich mine of profound and strikingly just reflections, on the philosophy of public affairs. But he felt as well as thought, and saw the greatness and beauty of things, as well as their relations; and so, he could at once penetrate the depths, and irradiate the surface of any object that he contemplated. The light which he flung from him, entered the very innermost shrines and recesses of his subject; but then it was light tinged with the hues of his own brilliant imagination, and many gazing at the splendour, recognized not the weight and the wisdom underneath. They thought him superficial, but just because themselves arrested at the surface; and either because with the capacity of emotion but without that of judgment, or because with the capacity of judgment but without that of emotion—they, from the very meagreness and mutilation of their own faculties, were incapable of that complex homage, due to a complex object which had both beauty and truth for its ingredients. Thus it was that the very exuberance of his genius, injured the man, in the estimation of the pigmies around him; and the splendour of his imagination detracted from the credit of his wisdom. Fox had the sagacity to see this; and posterity now see it. Now that, instead of a passing meteor, he is fixed by authorship in the literary hemisphere, men can make a study of him; and be at once regaled by the poetry, and instructed by the profoundness of his wondrous lucubrations.



## CHAPTER II.

### *On the Connexion between the Intellect and the Emotions.*

1. THE intellectual states of the mind, and its states of emotion, belong to distinct provinces of the mental constitution—the former to the percipient, and the latter to what Sir James Mackintosh would term the *emotive* or *pathematic* part of our nature. Bentham applies the term *pathology* to the mind in somewhat the same sense—not expressive, as in medical science, of states of disease, under which the body suffers; but expressive, in mental science, of states of susceptibility, under which the mind is in any way affected, whether painfully or pleasurably. Had it not been for the previous usurpation or engagement of this term by medical writers, who restrict the application of it to the distempers of our corporeal frame, it might have been conveniently extended to all the susceptibilities of the mental constitution—even when that constitution is in its healthful and natural state. According to the medical use of it, the Greek  $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$  from which it is derived, is understood in the sense of the Latin translation, *patior*, to suffer. According to the sense which we now propose for it, in treating of mental phenomena, the Greek  $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$  would be understood in the sense of the Latin translation *afficio* to be affected. When treating of the mental pathology, we treat, not of mental sufferings, but, more general, of mental susceptibilities. The  $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$  of the Greek, whence the term comes, is equivalent, either to the “*patior*” or the “*afficio*” of Latin,—the former signifying “to suffer,” and the latter simply “to be affected,”—the former sense being the one that is retained in medical, and the latter in mental pathology. The two differ as much the one from the other as passion does from affection, or the violence of a distempered does from the due and pacific effect of a natural influence. Even the Latin *patior* might be translated, not merely into “suffer” but into “the being acted upon” or into “the being passive.” Medical pathology is the study of those diseases under which the body suffers. Mental pathology is the study of all those phenomena that arise from influences acting upon the mind viewed as passive, or as not putting forth any choice or activity at the time. Now, when thus defined, it will embrace all that we understand by sensations, and affections, and passions. It is not of my will that certain colours impress their appropriate sensations upon my eye, or that certain sounds impress their

sensations upon my ear. It is not of my will, but of an organization which I often cannot help, that I am so nervously irritable, under certain disagreeable sights and disagreeable noises. It is not of my will, but of an aggressive influence which I cannot withstand, that, when placed on an airy summit, I forthwith swim in giddiness, and am seized with the imagination, that if I turn not my feet and my eyes from the frightful precipice's margin, I shall topple to its base. Neither is it of my will that I am visited with such ineffable disgust at the sight of some loathsome animal. But these are strong instances, and perhaps evince a state bordering upon disease. Yet we may gather from them some general conception of what is meant by mental pathology, whose design it is to set forth all those states of feeling, into which the mind is thrown, by the influence of those various objects that are fitted to excite, either the emotions or the sensitive affections of our nature. And, to keep the subject of mental pathology pure, we shall suppose these states of feeling to be altogether unmodified by the will, and to be the very states which result from the law of the external senses, or the laws of emotion, operating upon us at the time, when the mind is either wholly powerless or wholly inactive. To be furnished with one comprehensive term, by which to impress a mark on so large an order of phenomena, must be found very commodious; and though we have adverted to the etymology of the term, yet, in truth, it is of no consequence whether the process of derivation be accurate or not—seeing that the most arbitrary definition, if it only be precise in its objects, and have a precisely expressed sense affixed to it, can serve all the purposes for which a definition is desirable.

2. The emotions enter largely into the pathological department of our nature. They are distinguishable both from the appetites and the external affections, in that they are mental and not bodily—though, in common with these, they are characterized by a peculiar vividness of feeling, which distinguishes them from the intellectual states of the mind. It may not be easy to express the difference in language; but we never confound them in specific instances—being at no loss to which of the two classes we should refer the acts of memory and judgment; and to which we should refer the sentiments of fear, or gratitude, or shame, or any of the numerous affections and desires of which the mind is susceptible.

3. The first belonging to this class that we shall notice is the desire of knowledge, or the principle of curiosity—having all the appearance and character of a distinct and original tendency in the mind, implanted there for the purpose to which it is so

obviously subservient. This principle evinces its reality and strength in very early childhood, even anterior to the faculty of speech—as might be observed in the busy manipulations and exploring looks of the little infant, on any new article that is placed within its reach ; and afterwards, by its importunate and never-ending questions. It is this avidity of knowledge which forms the great impellent to the acquisition of it—being in fact the hunger of the mind, and strikingly analogous to the corresponding bodily appetite, in those respects, by which each is manifested, to be the product of a higher wisdom than ours, the effect of a more providential care than man would have taken of himself. The corporeal appetency seeks for food as its terminating object, without regard to its ulterior effect in the sustaining of life. The mental appetency seeks for knowledge, the food of the mind, as its terminating object, without regard to its ulterior benefits, both in the guidance of life, and the endless multiplication of its enjoyments. The prospective wisdom of man could be trusted with neither of these great interests ; and so the urgent appetite of hunger had to be provided for the one, and the like urgent principle of curiosity had to be provided for the other. Each of them bears the same evidence of a special contrivance for a special object—and that by one who took a more comprehensive view of our welfare, than we are capable of taking for ourselves ; and made his own additions to the mechanism, for the express purpose of supplementing the deficiency of human foresight. The resemblance between the two cases goes strikingly to demonstrate, how a mental constitution might as effectually bespeak the hand of an intelligent Maker, as does a physical or material constitution. It is true, that, with the great majority of men, the intellectual is not so urgent or imperious, as is the animal craving. But even for this difference, we can perceive a reason, which would not have been found, under a random economy of things. Each man's hunger would need to be alike strong, or at least strong enough to ensure the taking of food for himself—for to this effect, he will receive no benefit from another man's hunger. But there is not the same reason why each man's curiosity should be alike strong—for the curiosity of one man might subserve the supply of information and intellectual food to the rest of the species. To enlarge the knowledge of the world, it is not needed, that all men should be endowed with such a strength of desire for it, as to bear them onward through the toils of original investigation. The dominant, the aspiring curiosity, which impels the adventurous traveller to untrodden regions, will earn discoveries, not for himself alone, but for all men—if their curiosity be but strong enough

for the perusal of his agreeable record, under the shelter, and amid the comforts of their own home. And it is so in all the sciences. The unquenchable thirst of a few, is ever drawing supplies of new truth, which are shared in by thousands. There is an obvious meaning in this variety, between the stronger curiosity of the few who discover truth, and the weaker curiosity of the many who acquire it. The food which hunger impels man to take, is for his own aliment alone. The fruit of that study to which the strength of his own curiosity impels him, may become the property of all men.

4. But, apart from this singularity, we behold in curiosity, viewed as a general attribute, a manifest adaptation to the circumstances in which man is placed. If, on the one hand, we look to the rich and exhaustless variety of truth, in a universe fraught with the materials of a most stupendous and ever growing philosophy, and each department of which is fitted to stimulate and regale the curiosity of the human mind—we should say of such an external nature as this, that, presenting a most appropriate field to the inquisitive spirit of our race, it was signally adapted to the intellectual constitution of man. Or if, on the other hand, besides looking to the world as a theatre for the delightful entertainment of our powers, we behold it, in the intricacy of its phenomena and laws, in its recondite mysteries, in its deep and difficult recesses yet conquerable to an indefinite extent by the perseverance of man, and therefore as a befitting theatre for the busy and most laborious exercise of his powers—we should say of such an intellectual constitution as ours, that it was signally adapted to the system of external nature. It would require a curiosity as strong and steadfast as Nature hath given us, to urge us onward, through the appalling difficulties of a search so laborious. Hunger is the great impellent to corporeal labour, and the gratification of this appetite is its reward. Curiosity is a great impellent to mental labour, and, whether we look to the delights or the difficulties of knowledge, we cannot fail to perceive, that this mental appetency in man, and its counterpart objects in Nature, are suited with marvellous exactness to each other.

5. But the analogy between the mental and the corporeal affections does not stop here. The appetite of hunger would, of itself, impel to the use of food—although no additional pleasure had been annexed to the use of it, in the gratifications of the palate. The sense of taste, with its various pleasurable sensations, has ever been regarded, as a distinct proof of the benevolence and care of God. And the same is true of the delights which are felt by the mind, in the acquisition of knowledge—as when truth discloses her high and hidden beauties to the eye of



the enraptured student ; and he breathes an ethereal satisfaction, having in it the very substance of enjoyment, though the world at large cannot sympathize with it. The pleasures of the intellect, though calm, are intense : insomuch, that a life of deep philosophy were a life of deep emotion, when the understanding receives of its own proper aliment—having found its way to those harmonies of principle, those goodly classifications of phenomena, which the disciples of science love to gaze upon. And the whole charm does not lie in the ultimate discovery. There is a felt triumph in the march, and along the footsteps of the demonstration which leads to it ; in the successive evolutions of the reasoning, as well as its successful conclusion. Like every other enterprize of man, there is a happiness in the current and continuous pursuit, as well as in the final attainment—as every student in geometry can tell, who will remember, not only the delight he felt on his arrival at the landing place, but the delight he felt when guided onward by the traces and concatenations of the pathway. Even in the remotest abstractions of contemplative truth, there is a glory and a transcendental pleasure, which the world knoweth not ; but which becomes more intelligible, because more embodied, when the attention of the enquirer is directed to the realities of substantive nature. And though there be few who comprehend or follow Newton in his gigantic walk, yet all may participate in his triumphant feeling, when he reached that lofty summit, where the whole mystery and magnificence of Nature stood submitted to his gaze—an eminence won by him through the power and the patience of intellect alone ; but from which he descried a scene more glorious far than imagination could have formed, or than ever had been pictured and set forth, in the sublimest visions of poetry.

6. It is thus that while the love of beauty, operating upon the susceptible imagination of the theorist, is one of those seducing influences, which lead men astray from the pursuit of experimental truth—he, in fact, who at the outset resists her fascinations, because of his supreme respect for the lessons of observation, is at length repaid by the discoveries and sights of a surpassing loveliness. The inductive philosophy began its career, by a renunciation, painful we have no doubt at first to many of its disciples, of all the systems and harmonies of the schoolmen. But in the assiduous prosecution of its labours it worked its way to a far nobler and more magnificent harmony at the last—to the real system of the universe, more excellent than all the schemes of human conception—not in the solidity of its evidence alone, but as an object of tasteful contemplation. The self-denial which is laid upon us by Bacon's philosophy, like all other self-

denial whether in the cause of truth or virtue, hath its reward. In giving ourselves up to its guidance, we have often to quit the fascinations of beautiful theory; but in exchange for these, are at length regaled by the higher and substantial beauties of actual nature. There is a stubbornness in facts before which the specious ingenuity is compelled to give way; and perhaps the mind never suffers more painful laceration, than when, after having vainly attempted to force nature into a compliance with her own splendid generalizations, she, on the appearance of some rebellious and impracticable phenomenon, has to practise a force upon herself, when she thus finds the goodly speculation superseded by the homely and unwelcome experience. It seemed at the outset a cruel sacrifice, when the world of speculation, with all its manageable and engaging simplicities had to be abandoned; and, on becoming the pupils of observation, we, amid the varieties of the actual world around us, felt as if bewildered, if not lost among the perplexities of a chaos. This was the period of greatest sufferance, but it has had a glorious termination. In return for the assiduity wherewith the study of nature hath been prosecuted, she hath made a more abundant revelation of her charms. Order hath arisen out of confusion; and, in the ascertained structure of the universe, there are now found to be a state and a sublimity, beyond all that ever was pictured by the mind, in the days of her adventurous and unfettered imagination. Even viewed in the light of a noble and engaging spectacle for the fancy to dwell upon, who would ever think of comparing with the system of Newton, either that celestial machinery of Des Cartes, which was impelled by whirlpools of ether, or that still more cumbrous machinery of cycles and epicycles which was the progeny of a remoter age! It is thus that at the commencement of this observational process, there is an abjuration of beauty. But it soon reappears in another form, and brightens as we advance; and there at length arises, on solid foundation, a fairer and goodlier system, than ever floated in airy romance before the eye of genius.\* Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this. What we discover by observation, is the product of the divine imagination—bodied forth by creative power, into a stable and enduring

\* In the "Essays of John Sheppard,"—a work very recently published, and alike characterised by the depth of its Christian intelligence and feeling, and the beauty of its thoughts—there occurs the following passage, founded on the Manuscript Notes taken by the author, of Playfair's Lectures. "It was impressively stated in a preliminary lecture by a late eminent Scottish Professor of Natural Philosophy, that the actual physical wonders of creation far transcend the boldest and most hyperbolic imaginings of poetic minds;" "that the reason of Newton and Galileo took a sublimer flight than the fancy of Milton and Ariosto." That this is quite true I need only refer you to a few astronomical facts glanced at in subsequent pages of this volume in order to evince.' Sheppard's Essays, p. 69.

universe. What we devise by our own ingenuity is but the product of human imagination. The one is the solid archetype of those conceptions which are in the mind of God. The other is the shadowy representation of those conceptions which are in the mind of man. It is even as with the labourer, who, by excavating the rubbish which hides and besets some noble architecture, does more for the gratification of our taste, than if, with his unpractised hand, he should attempt to regale us by plans and sketches of his own. And so the drudgery of experimental science, in exchange for that beauty, whose fascinations it resisted at the outset of its career, has evolved a surpassing beauty from among the realities of truth and nature. The pain of the initial sacrifice is nobly compensated at the last. The views contemplated through the medium of observation, are found, not only to have a justness in them, but to have a grace and a grandeur in them, far above all the visions which are contemplated through the medium of fancy, or which ever regaled the fondest enthusiast in the enraptured walks of speculation and poetry. But the toils of investigation must be endured first, that the grace and the grandeur might be enjoyed afterwards. The same is true of science in all its departments, not of simple and sublime astronomy alone, but throughout of terrestrial physics; and most of all in chemistry, where the internal processes of actual and ascertained Nature are found to possess a beauty, which far surpasses the crude though specious plausibilities of other days. We perceive in this too, a fine adaptation of the external world to the faculties of man; a happy ordination of Nature by which the labour of the spirit is made to precede the luxury of the spirit, or every disciple of science must strenuously labour in the investigation of its truths, ere he can luxuriate in the contemplation of its beauties. It is by the patient seeking of truth first, that the pleasures of taste and imagination are superadded to him. For, in these days of stern and philosophic hardihood, nothing but evidence, strict and scrutinized and thoroughly sifted evidence, will secure acceptance for any opinion. Whatever its authority, whatever its engaging likelihood may be, it must first be made to undergo the freest treatment from human eyes and human hands. It is at one time stretched on the rack of an experiment. At another it has to pass through fiery trial in the bottom of a crucible. At another, it has to undergo a long questioning process among the fumes, and the filtrations, and the intense heat of a laboratory; and, not till it has been subjected to all this inquisitorial torture and survived it, is it preferred to a place in the temple of truth, or admitted among the laws and the lessons of a sound philosophy.



7. But, beside those rewards and excitements to science which lie in science itself, as the curiosity which impels to the prosecution of it, and the delights of prosperous study, and the pleasures that immediately spring from the contemplation of its objects—besides these, there is a remoter but not less powerful influence, and to which indeed we owe greatly more than half the philosophy of our world. We mean the respect in which high intellectual endowments are held by general society. We are not sure but that the love of fame has been of more powerful operation, in speeding onward the march of discovery, than the love of philosophy for the sake of its own inherent charms; and there are thousands of our most distinguished intellectual labourers, who but for an expected harvest of renown, would never have entered on the secret and solitary prosecution of their arduous walk. We are abundantly sensible, that this appetency for fame may have helped to vulgarise both the literature and science of the country; that men, capable of the most attic refinement in the one, may, for the sake of a wider popularity, have descended to verbiage and the false splendour of a meretricious eloquence; and that men, capable of the deepest research and purest demonstration in the other, may, by the same unworthy compliance with the flippancy of the public taste, have exchanged the profound argument for the showy and superficial illustration—preferring to the homage of the exalted few, the attendance and plaudits of the multitude. It is thus, that, when access to the easier and lighter parts of knowledge has been suddenly enlarged, the heights of philosophy may be abandoned for a season—the men who went to occupy there, being tempted to come down from their elevation, and hold converse with that increasing host, who have entered within the precincts, and now throng the outer courts of the temple. It is thus, that at certain transition periods, in the intellectual history of the species, philosophy may sustain a temporary depression—from which when she recovers, we shall combine, with the inestimable benefit of a more enlightened commonality, both the glory and the substantial benefit of as cultured a literature and as lofty and elaborate a philosophy as before. And we greatly mistake, if we think, that in those minds of nobler and purer ambition, the love of fame is extinguished, because they are willing to forego the bustling attendance and the clamorous applauses of a crowd. They too are intensely set on praise, but it must be such praise as that of Atticus, ‘the incense of which, though not copious, is exquisite—that precious aroma, which fills not the general atmosphere, but by which the few and the finer spirits of our race are satisfied. Theirs is not the broad day-light of popularity. It is a fame of a higher order, upheld



by the testimony of the amateurs or the *élite* in science, and grounded on those rare achievements which the public at large can neither comprehend nor sympathize with. "They sit on a hill apart," and there breathe of an ethereal element, in the calm brightness of an upper region, rather than in that glare and gorgeousness by which the eye of the multitude is dazzled. It is not the eclat of a bonfire for the regaling of a mob, but the enduring though quiet lustre of a star. The place which they occupy is aloft in the galaxy of a nation's literature, where the eyes of the more finely intellectual gaze upon them with delight, and the hearts only of such are lighted up in reverence and *con amore* towards them. Theirs is a high though hidden praise, flowing in secret course through the *savans* of a community, and felt by every true academic to be his most appropriate reward.\*

S. The emotions of which we have yet spoken stand connected, either in the way of cause or of consequence, with the higher efforts of the intellect—as the curiosity which prompts to these efforts, and the delights attendant on the investigation and discovery of truths which reward them; beside the grateful incense of those praises, whether general or select, that are awarded to mental superiority, and form perhaps the most powerful incitement to the arduous and sustained prosecution of mental labour. But there is a connexion of another sort, between the emotions and the intellect, of still higher importance—because of the alliance which it establishes between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature. We often speak of the pleasure that we receive from one class of the emotions, as those of taste—of the danger or disagreeableness of another, as anger or fear, or envy—of the obligation that lies upon us to cherish and retain certain other emotions, insomuch that the designation of virtuous is generally given to them, as gratitude, and compassion, and the special love of relatives or country, and in one word, all the benevolent affections of our nature. Now, however obvious when stated, it is not sufficiently adverted to, even when studying the philosophy of the subject, and still less in the practical government and regulation of the heart—that, for the very being of each of these specific emotions in the heart, there must a certain appropriate and counterpart object, whether through the channel of sense or of the memory, be present to the thoughts. We can only feel the emotion of beauty, in the act of beholding or conceiving a beautiful object; an emotion of terror, in the view of some danger which menaces us; an emotion of gratitude, in the recollection of a past kindness, or of the benefactor who con-

\* Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Endowments, p. 165—166.

ferred it. Such then is the necessary dependence between perception and feeling, that, without the one, the other cannot possibly be awakened. Present an object to the view of the mind, and the emotion suited to that object, whether it be love or resentment, or terror, or disgust, must consequently arise; and with as great sureness, as, on presenting visible things of different colour to the eye, the green and red and yellow and blue impress their different and peculiar sensations on the retina. It is very obvious, that the sensations owe their being to the external objects, without the presence and the perception of which they could not possibly have arisen. And it should be alike obvious, that the emotions owe their being to a mental perception, whether by sense or by memory, of the objects which are fitted to awaken them. Let an object be introduced to the notice of the mind, and its correlative emotion instantly arises in the heart; let the object be forgotten or disappear from the mental view, and the emotion disappears along with it.

9. We deem it no exception to the invariableness of that relation, which subsists between an object and its counterpart emotion, that, in many instances, a certain given object may be present and in full view of the observer, without awakening that sensibility which is proper to it. A spectacle of pain does generally, but not always, awaken compassion. It would always, we think, if a creature in agony were the single object of the mind's contemplation. But the person, now in suffering, may be undergoing the chastisement of some grievous provocation; and the emotion is different, because the object is really different—an offender who has excited the anger of our bosom, and, in the view of whose inflicted sufferings, this indignant feeling receives its gratification. Or the pain may be inflicted by our own hand on an unoffending animal in the prosecution of some cruel experiment. If compassion be wholly unfelt, it is not because in this instance the law has been repealed which connects this emotion with the view of pain; but it is because the attention of the mind to this object is displaced by another object; even the discovery of truth—and so what but for this might have been an intense compassion, is overborne by an intenser curiosity. And so with all the other emotions. Were danger singly the object of the mind's contemplation, fear, we think, would be the universal feeling; but it may be danger connected with the sight or the menaces of an insulting enemy who awakens burning resentment in the heart, and when anger rises fear is gone; or it may be danger shared with fellow-combatants, whose presence and observation kindle in the bosom the love of glory and impel to deeds of heroism—not because

any law which connects, and connects invariably, certain emotions with certain objects, is in any instance reversed or suspended; but because, in this conflict and composition of moral forces, one emotion displaced another from the feelings, only, however, because one object displaced another from the thoughts. Still, in every instance, the object is the stepping-stone to the emotion—insomuch, that if we want to recall a certain emotion, we must recall to the mind that certain object which awakens it; if we want to cease from the emotion, we must cease from thinking of its object, we must transfer the mind to other objects, or occupy it with other thoughts.

10. This connexion between the percipient faculties of the mind and its feelings, reveals to us a connexion between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature. How the one is brought instrumentally to bear upon the other, will be afterwards explained. But meanwhile it is abundantly obvious, that the presence or the absence of certain feelings stands connected with the presence or the absence of certain thoughts. We can no more break up the connexion between the thought of any object that is viewed mentally, and the feeling which it impresses on the heart, than we can break up the connexion between the sight of any object that is viewed materially, and the sensation which it impresses upon the retina. If we look singly and steadfastly to an object of a particular colour, as red, there is an organic necessity for the peculiar sensation of redness, from which we cannot escape, but by shutting our eyes, or turning them away to objects that are differently coloured. If we think singly and steadfastly on an object of a particular character, as an injury, there seems an organic necessity also for the peculiar emotion of resentment, from which there appears to be no other way of escaping, than by stifling the thought, or turning the mind away to other objects of contemplation. Now we hear both of virtuous emotions and of vicious emotions; and it is of capital importance to know how to retain the one and to exclude the other—which is by dwelling in thought on the objects that awaken the former, and discharging from thought the objects that awaken the latter. And so it is by thinking in a certain way that wrong sensibilities are avoided, and right sensibilities are upholden. It is by keeping up a remembrance of the kindness, that we keep up the emotion of gratitude. It is by forgetting the provocation, that we cease from the emotion of anger. It is by reflecting on the misery of a fellow creature in its vivid and affecting details, that pity is called forth. It is by meditating on the perfections of the Godhead, that we cherish and keep alive our reverence for the highest virtue and our love for the highest goodness. In one

word, thought is at once the harbinger and the sustainer of feeling : and this, of itself, forms an important link of communication between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature.

11. We shall not be able to complete our views, either on the moral character of the emotions, or their dependence on the percipient faculties of the mind, until we have established a certain ulterior principle which comes afterwards into notice. Neither do we now expatiate on their uses, of which we have already given sufficient specimens, in our treatment of the special affections. We would only remark at present, on their vast importance to human happiness—seeing that a state of mental happiness cannot even be so much as imagined without a state of emotion. They are the emotions, in fact, and the external affections together, which share between them the whole interest, whether pleasurable or painful, of human existence. And what a vivid and varied interest that is, may be rendered evident, by a mere repetition of those words which compose the nomenclature of our feelings—as hope, and fear, and grief, and joy, and love diversified into so many separate affections towards wealth, fame, power, knowledge, and all the other objects of human desire, besides the tasteful and benevolent emotions—which altogether keep their unremitting play in the heart, and sustain or fill up the continuity of our sensible being. It says enough for the adaptation of external nature to a mental constitution so complexly and variously endowed, that numerous as these susceptibilities are, the world is crowded with objects, that keep them in full and busy occupation. The details of this contemplation are inexhaustible ; and we are not sure but that the general lesson of the Divine care or Divine benevolence, which may be founded upon these, could be more effectually learned by a close attention of the mind upon one specific instance, than by a complete enumeration of all the instances, with at the same time only a briefer and slighter notice of each of them.

12. And it would make the lesson all the more impressive, if, instead of selecting as our example, an emotion of very exalted character, and of which the influence on human enjoyment stood forth in bright daylight to the observation of all, such as the sensibility of a heart that was feelingly alive to the calls of benevolence, or feelingly alive to the beauties of nature—we should take for our case some other kind of emotion, so common perhaps as to be ignobly familiar, and on which one would scarcely think of constructing aught so dignified or so serious as a theological argument. Yet we cannot help thinking, that it most emphatically tells us of the teeming, the profuse benevolence of the Deity—when we reflect on those homelier and those every-day sources,



out of which, the whole of human life, through the successive hours of it, is seasoned with enjoyment; and a most agreeable zest is imparted from them, to the ordinary occasions of converse and companionship among men. When the love of novelty finds in the walks of science the gratification that is suited to it, we can reason gravely on the final cause of the emotion, and speak of the purpose of Nature, or rather of the Author of Nature, in having instituted such a reward for intellectual labour. But we lose sight of all the wisdom and all the goodness that are connected with this mental ordination—when the very same principle, which, in the lofty and liberal *savant*, we call the love of novelty, becomes, in the plain and ordinary citizen, the love of news. Yet in this humbler and commonplace form, it is needless to say, how prolific it is of enjoyment—giving an edge as it were to the whole of one's conscious existence, and its principal charm to the innocent and enlivening gossip of every social party. Perhaps a still more effective exemplification may be had in another emotion of this class, that which arises from our sense of the ludicrous—which so often ministers to the gaiety of man's heart, even when alone; and which, when he congregates with his fellows, is ever and anon breaking forth into some humorous conception, that infects alike the fancies of all, and finds vent in one common shout of ecstasy. Like every other emotion, it stands allied with a perception as its antecedent, the object of the perception in this instance being the conjunction of things that are incongruous with each other—on the first discovery or conception of which, the mirth begins to tumultuate in the heart of some one; and on the first utterance of which, it passes with irrepressible sympathy into the hearts of all who are around him—whence it obtains the same ready discharge as before, in a loud and general effervescence. To perceive how inexhaustible the source of this enjoyment is, we have only to think of it in connexion with its cause; and then try to compute, if we can, all the possibilities of wayward deviation, from the sober literalities of truth and nature, whether in the shape of new imaginations by the mind of man, or of new combinations and events in actual history. It is thus that the pleasure connected with our sense of the ludicrous, forms one of the most current gratifications of human life; nor is it essential that there should be any rare peculiarity of mental conformation, in order to realize it. We find it the perennial source of a sort of gentle and quiet delectation, even to men of the most sober temperament, and whose habit is as remote as possible from that of fantastic levity, or wild and airy extravagance. When acquaintances meet together in the street, and hold colloquy for a few minutes, they may look grave

enough, if business or politics or some matter of serious intelligence be the theme—yet how seldom do they part before some coruscation of playfulness has been struck out between them; and the interview, though begun perhaps in sober earnest, but seldom passes off, without some pleasantry or other to enliven it. We should not dwell so long on this part of the human constitution, were there not so much of happiness and so much of benevolence allied with it—as is obvious indeed from the very synonymes, to which the language employed for the expression of its various phenomena and feeling has given rise. To what else but to the pleasure we have in the ludicrous is it owing, that a ludicrous observation has been termed a pleasantry; or how but to the affinity between happiness and mirth can we ascribe it, that the two terms are often employed as equivalent to each other; and whence but from the strong connexion which subsists between benevolence and humour can it be explained, that a man is said to be in good humour, when in a state of placidness and cordiality with all who are around him? We are aware that there is not a single disposition wherewith Nature hath endowed us which may not be perverted to evil; but when we see so much both of human kindness and of human enjoyment associated with that exhilaration of heart to which this emotion is so constantly giving rise—ministering with such copiousness, both to the smiles of the domestic hearth, and the gaieties of festive companionship—we cannot but regard it as the provision of an indulgent Father, who hath ordained it as a sweetener or an emollient amid the annoyances and the ills which flesh is heir to.

13. It were difficult to compute the whole effect of this ingredient, in alleviating the vexations of life; but certain it is that the ludicrous is often blended with the annoyances which befall us; and that its operation, in lightening the pressure of what might have otherwise been viewed as somewhat in the light of a calamity, is far from inconsiderable. This balancing of opposite emotions, suggested by different parts of the same complex event or object, and the effect of the one if a pleasant emotion, in assuaging the painfulness of the other, is not an uncommon phenomenon in the exhibitions of human feeling. A very obvious specimen of this is afforded by an acquaintance in the act of falling. There is no doubt an incongruity between the moment of his walking uprightly, and with the full anticipation of getting forward in that attitude to the object whither he is bending—and the next moment of his floundering in the mud, and hastening with all his might to gather himself up again. They who philosophize upon the laws of succession in the events of Nature, have a great demand for such successions as are immediate.

They go busily in quest of the contiguous links, and properly conceive that if any one hidden step be yet interposed, between the two which they regularly observe to follow each other, they have not completed the investigation, till that step also have been ascertained. It is therefore so far an advantage in regard to the above phenomenon, that there does not appear to be time even for the most rapid and fugitive intervention—for only let it occur in the presence of lookers on, and, with the speed of lightning, will it be followed up by the instant and obstreperous glee of a whole host of spectatorship.

14. But this very exhibition may give rise to a wholly different emotion. The provocative to laughter lies in the awkwardness of the fall. Let the awkwardness be conceived to abide as it was, and this other ingredient to be added, the severity of the fall—that a limb is fractured, or that a swoon, a convulsion, or a stream of blood is the immediate consequence. In proportion to the hurt that was sustained, would be the sympathy of far the greater number of the by-standers; and this might be so heightened by the palpable sufferings of him to whom the accident has befallen, that the sense of the ludicrous might be entirely overborne.

15. The two provocatives are the awkwardness of the fall and its severity. The two emotions are the mirth and the compassion. The one of these may so predominate over the other as to leave the mind under its entire and single ascendancy. A mathematician would require the point, at which, by a gradual increase or diminution upon either of the two elements, they were mutually neutralized—or the transition was made from the one to the other of them. In this we may not be able to satisfy him. But all may have been sensible of an occasion, when the two were so delicately poised, that the mind positively vibrated—so as to make a sort of tremulous and intermediate play, between these distinct and nearly opposite emotions. This is one of those nicer exhibitions of our nature that one feels an interest in remarking; and many perhaps may recollect the instances, when even some valued friend hath smarted pretty seriously, under some odd or ludicrous mishap in which he hath been involved, and when they have felt themselves in a state of most curious ambiguity, between the pity which they ought to feel, and the levity which they were not able to repress. The peculiarities of this midway condition are greatly aggravated, if there be so many acquaintances who share it among them, and more especially, if they meet together and talk over the subject of it—in which case, it will be no singular display of our mysterious nature, although the visitations of a common sympathy should be

found to alternate with the high-sounding peals of a most rapturous and uncontrollable merriment.

16. We cannot fail to perceive, in this instance too, how inseparable the alliance is between perception and feeling. According as the mind looks, so is the heart affected. When we look to the awkwardness of the mischance, whatever it may be, we become gay. When we look to its severity, we become sad. It is instructive to observe, with what fidelity the heart follows the mind in this process, and how whichever the object is that for the time is regarded by the one, it is sure to be responded to by an appropriate emotion from the other.

17. We should not have ventured on these illustrations, but for the lesson which they serve to establish. They prove the extent to which a sense of the ludicrous might lighten and divert the painfulness of those serious feelings to which humanity is exposed. It is true that much evil may be done, when it puts to flight, as it often does, seriousness of principle; but, on the other hand, there is unquestionable good done by it, when it puts to flight, either the seriousness of resentment—or the seriousness of suffering. And when we think of its frequent and powerful effect, both in softening the malignant asperities of debate, and in reconciling us to those misadventures and pettier miseries of life, which, if not so alleviated, would keep us in a state of continual festering—we cannot but regard even this humbler part of the constitution of man, as a palpable testimony both to the wisdom and goodness of Him who framed us.\*

\*. "The advantages which we derive from our susceptibility of this species of emotion, are, in their immediate influence on the cheerfulness, and therefore on the general happiness of society, sufficiently obvious. How many hours would pass wearily along, but for those pleasantries of wit, or of easier and less pretending gaiety which enliven what would have been dull, and throw many bright colours on what would have been gloomy. We are not to estimate these accessions of pleasure lightly, because they relate to objects that may seem trifling, when considered together with those more serious concerns, by which our ambition is occupied, and in relation to which, in the success or failure of our various projects, we look back on the past months or years of our life as fortunate or unfortunate. If these serious concerns alone were to be regarded, we might often have been very fortunate and very unhappy, as in other circumstances we might often have had much happiness in the hours and days of years, which terminated at last in the disappointment of some favourite scheme. It is good to travel with pure and balmy airs, and cheerful sunshine, though we should not find, at the end of our journey, the friend whom we wished to see; and the gaieties of social converse, though they are not, in our journey of life, what we travel to obtain, are during the continuance of our journey at once a freshness which we breathe, and a light that gives every object to sparkle to our eye with a radiance that is not its own." *Brown's Lectures—Lecture 59.* But this emotion is allied with benevolence as well as with enjoyment. There is perhaps not a more welcome topic at the tables of the great, than the characteristic peculiarities or oddities of humble life—and we have no doubt that along with the amusement which is felt in the cottage anecdotes of a domain, there is often awakened by them, a benevolent interest in the well-being of the occupiers.



18. Before quitting this department of the subject, we may advert, not to an individual peculiarity, but to the respective characters by which two classes of intellect are distinguished, and to the effect of their mutual action and reaction on the progress of opinion in the world.

19. The first of these intellectual tendencies may be seen in those who are distinguished by their fond and tenacious adherence to the existing philosophy, and by their indisposition to any changes of it. They feel it painful to relinquish their wonted and established habits of thought—as if the mind were to suffer violence, by having to quit its ancient courses, and to unlearn the opinions of other days. We have no doubt that the love of repose, the aversion to that mental labour which is requisite even for the understanding of a new system, or at least for the full comprehension and estimate of its proofs—enters largely into this dislike for all novelties of speculation, into this determined preference for the doctrines in which they have been educated—although the associations too of taste and reverence share largely in the result. It is thus that the old are more disinclined to changes; and there is a peculiar reason why schools and corporations of learning should make the sturdiest resistance to them. It is a formidable thing to make head against that majority within the walls of every venerable institute, which each new opinion has to encounter at the outset; and more especially, if it tend to derange the methods of a university, or unsettle the long established practice of its masters. This will explain that inveteracy of long possession, which, operating both in many individual minds and in the bosom of colleges, gives formation and strength to what may be termed the conservative party in science or in the literary commonwealth—that party which maintains the largest and most resolute contest with all new opinions, and will not give way, till overpowered by the weight of demonstration, and energy of the public voice in their favour.

20. Opposed to this array of strength on the side of existing principles, we have the incessant operations of what may be termed the movement party in science or in the literary commonwealth—some of whom are urged onward by the mere love of novelty and change; others by the love of truth; and very many by a sort of ardent and indefinite imagination of yet un-reached heights in philosophy, and of the new triumphs which await the human mind in its interminable progress from one brilliant or commanding discovery to another. We have often thought that a resulting optimism is the actual effect of the play or collision that is constantly kept up between these two rival parties in the world of letters. On the one hand it is well, that

philosophy should not be a fixture, but should at length give way to the accumulating force of evidence. But on the other hand it is well, that it should require a certain, and that a very considerable force of evidence, ere it shall quit its present holds, or resign the position which it now occupies. We had rather that it looked with an air of forbidding authority on the mere likelihoods of speculation than that, lightly set agog by every specious plausibility, it should open its schools to a restless and rapid succession of yet undigested theories. It is possible to hold out too obstinately and too long; but yet it is well, that a certain balance should obtain between the adhesive and the aggressive forces in the world of speculation; and that the general mind of society should have at least enough of the sedative in its composition, to protect it from aught like violent disturbance, or the incursion of any rash adventurer in the field of originality. And for this purpose it is well, that each novelty, kept at bay for a time, and made to undergo a sufficient probation, should be compelled, thoroughly to substantiate its claims—ere it be permitted to take a place beside the philosophy, which is recognized by all the authorities, and received into all the institutes of the land.

21. And they are the very same principles, which, when rightly blended, operate so beneficially, not in philosophy alone, but in politics. There is no spirit which requires more to be kept in check, than that of the mere wantonness of legislation; and so far from being annoyed by that indisposition to change, which is rather the characteristic of all established authorities, we should regard it in the light of a wholesome counteractive, by which to stay the excesses of wild and wayward innovators. There is a great purpose served in society by that law of nature, in virtue of which it is that great bodies move slowly. It would not answer, if a government were to veer and to vacillate with every breath of speculation—if easily liable to be diverted from the steadfastness of their course, by every lure or by every likelihood which sanguine adventurers held out to them. It is well, that in the ruling corporation, there should be a certain strength of resistance, against which all splendid imaginations and all unsound and hollow plausibilities, might spend their force and be dissipated; and, so far from complaining of it as an impracticable engine which is so hard and difficult of impulse, we should look upon its very unyieldingness in the light of a safeguard, without which we should be driven to and fro by every wind of doctrine on a troubled sea that never rests. On these accounts we feel inclined, that, in the vessel of the body politic, there should be a preponderance of ballast over sail; and that it really is so, we might put to the account of that optimism, which, with cer-

tain reservations, obtains to a very great degree, in the framework, and throughout the whole mechanism of human society.

22. But this property in the machine of a government to which we now advert, does not preclude that steady and sober-minded improvement which is all that is desirable. It only restrains the advocates of improvement from driving too rapidly. It does not stop, it only retards their course, by a certain number of defeats and disappointments, which, if their course be indeed a good one, are but the stepping stones to their ultimate triumph. Ere that the victory is gotten, they must run the gauntlet of many reverses and many mortifications; and they are not to expect by one, but by several and successive blows of the catapulta, that inveterate abuses and long established practices can possibly be overthrown. It is thus, in fact, that every weak cause is thrown back into the nonentity whence it sprung, and that every cause of inherent goodness or worth is ultimately carried—rejected, like the former, at its first and earliest overtures; but, unlike the former, coming back every time with a fresh weight of public feeling and public demonstration in its favour, till, like the abolition of the slave trade or that of commercial restrictions, causes which had the arduous struggle of many long years to undergo, it at length obtains the conclusive seal upon it of the highest authority in the land, and a seal by which the merits of the cause are far better authenticated, than if the legislature were apt to fluctuate at the sound of every new and seemly proposal. We have therefore no quarrel with a certain *vis inertiae* in a legislature. Only let it not be an absolute fixture; and there is the hope, with perseverance, of all that is really important or desirable in reformation. The sluggishness that has been ascribed to great corporations is, in the present instance, a good and desirable property—as being the means of separating the chaff from the wheat of all those overtures, that pour in upon representatives from every quarter of the land; and, so far from any feeling of annoyance at the retardation to which the best of them is subjected, it should be most patiently and cheerfully acquiesced in, as being in fact the process, by which it brightens into prosperity, and at length its worth and its excellence are fully manifested.

23. It is not the necessary effect of this peculiar mechanism, it is but the grievous perversion of it, when the corrupt inveteracy has withstood improvement so long, that ere it could be carried, the assailing force had to gather into the momentum of an energy that might afterwards prove mischievous, when the obstacle which provoked it into action had at length been cleared away. It is then that the vessel of the state which might have been

borne safely and prosperously onward in the course of ages, by a steady breeze and with a sufficiency of ballast, as if slipped from her moorings is drifted uncontrollably along, and precipitated from change to change with the violence of a hurricane.

---

### CHAPTER III.

#### *On the Connexion between the Intellect and the Will.*

1. THERE is distinction made between a mental susceptibility and a mental power. Should we attempt to define it, we might say of the power, that it implies a reference to something consequent and of the susceptibility that it implies a reference to something antecedent. It is thus that a volition is conceived to indicate the former, and an emotion to indicate the latter. Anger would be spoken of rather as a susceptibility of the mind than as a power; and will rather as a power than as a susceptibility. We view anger in connexion with the provocatives which went before it; and so regarding it as an effect, we conceive of the mind in which this effect has been wrought, as being at the time in a state of subject passiveness. We view the will in connexion with the deeds which follow on its determinations; and so regarding it as a cause, we conceive of the mind when it wills as being in a state of active efficiency. And yet a determination of the will may be viewed not merely as the prior term to the act which flows from it, but also as the posterior term to the influence which gave it birth—or in other words, either as the forthgoing of a power or as the result of a susceptibility. It is thus that desire, which on looking backward to the cause from whence it sprung, we should call a susceptibility—on looking forward to the effect which it prompts for the attainment of its object, we should call an impellent; and thus depth of feeling is identical, or at least, in immediate contact with decision and intensity of purpose.

2. But in our intent prosecution of this analysis, and use of those appropriate terms which are employed for expressing the results of it, we have often to desert the common language, and are apt to lose sight of certain great and palpable truths, of which that language is the ordinary vehicle. When tracing the intermediate steps, between the first exposure of the mind to a seducing influence, and the deed or perpetration of enormity into which it is hurried, we are engaged in what may properly be termed a physical inquiry—as much so as, when passing from cause to consequent, we are attending to any succession or train



of phenomena in the material world. But it is when thus employed that we are so apt to lose sight of the moral character of that which we are contemplating; and to forget when or at what point of the series it is that the designation whether of virtuous or vicious, the charge whether of merit or demerit, comes to be applicable.\* It is well that, amid all the difficulties attendant on the physiological inquiry, there should be such a degree of clearness and uniformity in the moral judgments of men—insomuch that the peasant can, with a just and prompt discernment equal to that of the philosopher, seize on the real moral characteristics of any action submitted to his notice, and pronounce on the merit or demerit of him who has performed it. It is in attending to these popular or rather universal decisions, that we learn those phenomena which are of main importance to our argument—now that, after having bestowed a separate attention on the moral and intellectual constitutions of human nature, we are investigating the connexion which is between them.

3. The first of those popular or rather universal decisions, which we shall at present notice, is, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. A murderer may be conceived, instead of striking with the dagger in his own hand, to force it, by an act of refined cruelty, into the hand of him, who is the dearest relative or friend of his devoted victim; and, by his superior strength, to compel the struggling and the reluctant instrument

\* Dr. Brown has well distinguished between the two inquiries in the following sentences. "In one very important respect, however, the inquiries, relating to the physiology of mind, differ from those which relate to the physiology of our animal frame. If we could render ourselves acquainted with the intimate structure of our bodily organs, and all the changes which take place, in the exercise of their various functions, our labour, with respect to them, might be said to terminate. But though our intellectual analysis were perfect, so that we could distinguish, in our most complex thought or emotion, its constituent elements, and trace with exactness the series of simpler thoughts which have progressively given rise to them, other inquiries, equally or still more important, would remain. We do not know all which is to be known of the mind when we know all its phenomena, as we know all which can be known of matter, when we know the appearances which it presents, in every situation in which it is possible to place it, and the manner in which it then acts or is acted upon by other bodies. When we know that man has certain affections and passions, there still remains the great inquiry, as to the propriety or impropriety of these passions, and of the conduct to which they lead. We have to consider, not only how he is capable of acting, but also, whether, acting in the manner supposed, he would be fulfilling a duty or perpetrating a crime. Every enjoyment which man can confer on man, and every evil which he can reciprocally inflict or suffer, thus become objects of two sciences—first of that intellectual analysis which traces the happiness and misery, in their various forms and sequences, as mere phenomena or states of the substance mind;—and secondly, of that ethical judgment, which measures our approbation and disapprobation, estimating, with more than judicial scrutiny, not merely what is done, but what is scarcely thought in secrecy and silence, and discriminating some element of moral good or evil, in all the physical good and evil, which it is in our feeble power to execute, or in our still frailer heart to conceive and desire." *Brown's Lectures*, Lecture I.

to its grasp. He may thus confine it to the hand, and give impulse to the arm of one, who recoils in utmost horror from that perpetration, of which he has been made as it were the material engine; and could matters be so contrived, as that the real murderer should be invisible, while the arm and the hand that inclosed the weapon, and the movements of the ostensible one, should alone be patent to the eye of the senses—then he and not the other would be held by the by-stander as chargeable with the guilt. But so soon as the real nature of the transaction came to be understood, this imputation would be wholly and instantly transferred. The distinction would at once be recognized between the willing agent in this deed of horror, and the unwilling instrument. There would no more of moral blame be attached to the latter, than to the weapon which inflicted the mortal blow; and on the former exclusively, the whole burthen of the crime and its condemnation would be laid. And the simple difference which gives rise to the whole of this moral distinction in the estimate between them, is, that with the one the act was with the will; with the other it was against it.

4. The will may be spoken of either as a faculty of the mind, or, it may denote one separate and individual act of willing. He willed to take a walk with me. It was his will so to do. But there is another term which is more properly expressive of the act, and is not at all expressive of the faculty. Those terms which discriminate, and which restrict language to a special meaning, are very convenient both in science and in common life. The will then may express both the faculty and the act of willing. But the act of willing has been further expressed by a term appropriated wholly to itself—and that is, volition. Mr. Locke defines volition to be “an act of the mind, knowingly, exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.” And Dr. Reid more briefly, but to the same effect, says that it is—“the determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power.” He very properly remarks, however, that, after all, determination is only another word for volition; and he excuses himself, at the same time, from giving any other more logical definition—on the plea, that simple acts of the mind do not admit of one.

5. There is certainly a ground, in the nature and actual workings of the mental constitution, for the distinction, which has been questioned of late, between will and desire. Desire has been thus defined by Locke—“It is the uneasiness man finds in himself, upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it”—an uneasiness which

many may remember to have felt in their younger days, at the sight of an apple of tempting physiognomy, that they would fain have laid hold of, but were restrained from touching by other considerations. The desire is just the liking that one has for the apple; and by its effectual solicitations, it may gain over the will to its side—in which case, through the medium of a volition, the apple is laid hold of, and turned to its natural application. But the will may, and often does, refuse its consent; and we then better perceive the distinction between the desire and the will, when we thus see them in a state of opposition—or when the urgency of the desire is met by other urgencies, which restrain the indulgence of it. One might be conceived, as having the greatest appetency for the fruit, and yet knowing it to be injurious to his health—so that however strong his desires, his will keeps its ground against their solicitations. Or he may wish to reserve it for one of his infant children; and so his will sides with the second desire against the first, and carries this latter one into execution. Or he may reflect, after all, that the apple is not his own property, or that perhaps he could not pull it from among the golden crowds and clusters around it, without injury to the tree upon which it is hanging; and so he is led by the sense of justice to keep both the one and the other desire at obedience—and the object of temptation remains untouched, just because the will combats the desire instead of complying with it, and refuses to issue that mandate, or in other words, to put forth that volition, which would instantly be followed up by an act and an accomplishment. And thus, however good the tree is for food, and however pleasant to the eyes, and however much to be desired, so as to make one taste and be satisfied—yet, if strong enough in all these determinations of prudence or principle, he may look on the fruit thereof and not eat.

6. Dr. Brown and others would say, that there is nothing in this process, but the contest of opposite desires and the prevalence of the strongest one—and so identify will and desire with each other.\* But though a volition should be the sure result of

\* Edwards, at the outset of his treatise on the Will, controverts Locke; but in such a way as reduces the difference between them very much to a question of nomenclature. On the one hand, the difference between a volition and a desire does not affect the main doctrine of Jonathan Edwards; for, though volitions be distinct from desires, they may nevertheless be the strict and unvarying results of them. Even Edwards himself seems to admit, that the mind has a different object in willing from what it has in desiring—an act of our own being the object of the one; the thing desired being the object of the other. It serves to mark more strikingly the distinction between willing and desiring, when even an act of our own is the proper object of each of them. There may be a great desire to inflict a blow on an offender; but this desire, restrained by considerations of prudence or principle, may not pass into a volition. Edwards would say that even here the volition does not run counter to the

a desire, that is no more reason why they should be identified, than why the prior term of any series in nature should be identified or confounded, with any of its posterior terms, whether more or less remote. In the process that we have been describing, there were different desires in play, but there were not different volitions in play. There was one volition appended to the strongest desire: but the other desires though felt by the mind, and therefore in actual being, had no volitions appended to them—proving that a desire may exist separately from the volition that is proper to it, and that therefore the two are separate and distinct from each other. The truth is, using Dr. Brown's own language, the mind is in a different state when framing a volition, from what it is when feeling a desire. When feeling a desire, the mind has respect to the object desired—which object, then in view of the mind, is acting with its own peculiar influence on a mental susceptibility. When framing a volition the mind has respect, not properly to the object, but to the act by which it shall attain the object—and so is said to be putting forth a mental power.\* But whether this distinction be accurately expressed or not, certain it is, the mind is differently conditioned, when in but a state of simple desire—from what it is when in the act of conceiving a volition. It is engaged with different things, and looking different ways—in the one case to the antecedent object which has excited the desire, in the other case to the posterior act on which the will has determined for the attainment of the object. The palsied man who cannot stretch forth his hand to the apple that is placed in the distance before him, may, nevertheless, long after it; and in him we perceive desire singly—for he is restrained by very helplessness from putting forth a volition, the proper object of which is some action of our own, and that we know to be in our own power. We accept with great pleasure of that simplification by Dr. Brown, in virtue of which we regard the mind not as a congeries of different faculties, but as, itself one and indivisible, having the capacity of passing into different states; and without conceiving any distinction of faculties, we only affirm that it is in a different state when it wills, from that in which it is when it simply desires. Notwithstanding the high authority both of Dr. Brown and Mr. Mill, we think that in

desire, but only marks the prevalency of the stronger desire over the weaker one. Now this is true; but without at all obliterating the distinction for which we contend. The volition does run counter to the weaker desire, though under the impulse of the stronger, and there are three distinct mental phenomena in this instance, the stronger desire, the weaker desire and the volition, which ought no more to be confounded, than any movement with the motive forces that gave rise to it, or than the posterior with the prior term of any sequence.

\* See Art. 1. of this Chapter.



confounding these two, they have fallen into an erroneous simplification; and we abide by the distinction of Dugald Stewart and the older writers upon this subject.\*

7. But the point of deepest interest is that step of the process, at which the character of right or wrong comes to be applicable. It is not at that point, when the appetites or affections of our nature solicit from the will a particular movement; neither is it at that point, when either a rational self love or a sense of duty remonstrates against it. It is not at that point when the consent of the will is pleaded for, on the one side or other—but all-important to be borne in mind, it is at that point when the consent is given. When we characterize a court at law for some one of its deeds—it is not upon the urgency of the argument on one side of the question, or of the reply upon the other, that we found our estimate; but wholly upon the decision of the bench, which decision is carried into effect by a certain order given out to the officers who execute it. And so, in characterising an individual for some one of his doings, we found our estimate, not upon the desires of appetite that may have instigated him on the one hand,

\* Hume says very well of desire, that—"It arises from good considered simply and aversion from evil. The will again exerts itself, when either the presence of the good or absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body." This is the definition of Hume, and it is a very good one. And it tallies with the sensible remark of Dr. Reid, that the object of every volition is some action of our own. And upon this he founds some very clear illustrations of the difference that there is between a desire and a volition. "A man desires that his children may be happy, and that they may behave well. Their being happy is no action at all; and their behaving well is not his action but theirs." "A man athirst has a strong desire to drink; but for some particular reason he determines not to gratify his desire." Here the man has the desire but not the will. In other cases he may have the will but not the desire. "A man for health may take a nauseous drug, for which he has no desire, but a great aversion." Desire, therefore, is not will; but only one of the incitements that often leads to it—though it may at all times be, and actually sometimes is withstood. It is, however, because desire is so often accompanied by will, that we are apt to overlook the distinction between them.

I may here observe that to frame a volition is sometimes expressed more shortly by the phrase, to will. I will put forth my hand, is different from, I desire to put it forth. There may be reasons why I should restrain the desire—so that though I desire it, I may not will it. For this application of the verb to will, we have the authority of the best English writers. "Whoever," says Dr. South, "wills the doing of a thing, if the doing of it be in his power, he will certainly do it; and whoever does not do the thing which he has in his power to do, does not properly will it." And Locke says, "the man that sits still is said to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it." Dr. South makes a happy discrimination, which serves to throw light upon the precise nature of a volition as opposed to other things that may or may not lead to a volition—when he says, "that there is as much difference between the approbation of the judgment and the actual volitions of the will, as between a man's viewing a desirable thing, and reaching after it with his hand." He further says of a wish, which is nought but a longing desire, that—"a wish is properly the desire of a man who is sitting or lying still; but an act of the will is a man of business vigorously going about his work."

or upon the dictates of conscience that may have withstood these upon the other—not upon the elements that conflicted in the struggle, but on the determination that put an end to it—even that determination of the will, which is carried into effect by those volitions, on the issuing of which, the hands, and the feet, and the other instruments of action are put into instant subserviency.

8. To prove how essentially linked together, the morality of any act is with its wilfulness, it is of no consequence, whether the volition that gave rise to the act, be the one which preceded it immediately as its proximate cause, or be a remote and anterior volition—in which latter case, it is termed a purpose, conceived at some period which may have long gone by, but which was kept unalterable till the opportunity for its execution came round.\* There may be an interval of time, between that resolution of the will which is effective, and that performance by which it is carried into effect. One may resolve to-day, with full consent and purpose of the will, on some criminal enterprise for to-morrow. It is to-day that he has become the criminal, and has incurred a guilt to which even the performance of the morrow may bring no addition and no enhancement. The performance of to-morrow does not constitute the guilt, but only indicates it. It may prove what before the execution of the will was still an uncertainty. It may prove the strength of that determination which has been already taken—how it can stand its ground through all the hours which intervene between the desire and its fulfilment; how meanwhile the visitations of reflection and remorse have been kept at a distance, or all been disregarded; how with relentless depravity, the purpose has been adhered to, and the remonstrances of conscience or perhaps the entreaties of virtuous friendship have all been set at nought; how, with a hardihood that could brave alike the disgrace and the condemnation which attach to moral worthlessness, he could proceed with unfaltering step from the reprobate design to its full and final accomplishment—nor suffer all the suggestions of his leisure and solitude, however affecting the thought of that innocence which he is now on the eve of forfeiting, or a tenderness for those relatives who are to be deeply wounded by the tidings of his fall, or the authority of a father's parting advice, or the remembrance of a mother's prayers, to stay his hand.

\* It is true that if the desire were to cease for the object to be attained by the proposed act, the purpose would cease along with it, but it were confounding the things which in reality are distinct from each other, to represent on this account the desire and the purpose as synonymous. The one respects the object that is wished for; the other respects the action, by which the object is to be attained.

9. That an action then be the rightful object, either of moral censure, or approval, it must have had the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of a volition—else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning, as are the pulsations of the wrist. Something ludicrous might occur, which all of a sudden sets one irresistibly on the action of laughing; or a tale of distress might be told, which whether he wills or not, forces from him the tears of sympathy, and sets him as irresistibly on the action of weeping; or, on the appearance of a ferocious animal, he might struggle with all his power for a serene and manly firmness, yet struggle in vain against the action of trembling; or if instead of a formidable a loathsome animal was presented to his notice, he might no more help the action of a violent recoil perhaps antipathy against it, than he can help any of the organic necessities of that constitution which has been given to him; or even upon the observation of what is disgusting in the habit or countenance of a fellow man, he may be overpowered into a sudden and sensitive aversion; and lastly, should some gross and grievous transgression against the decencies of civilized life be practised before him, he might no more be able to stop that rush of blood to the complexion which marks the inward workings of an outraged and offended delicacy, than he is able to alter or suspend the law of its circulation. In each of these cases the action is involuntary; and precisely because it is so, the epithet neither of morally good nor of morally evil can be applied to it. And so of every action that comes thus to speak of its own accord; and not at the will or bidding of the agent. It may be painful to himself. It may also be painful to others. But if it have not had the consent of his will, even that consent without which no action that is done can be called voluntary, it is his misfortune and not his choice; and though not indifferent in regard to its consequences on the happiness of man, yet, merely because disjoined from the will, it in point of moral estimation is an act of the purest indifference.

10. How then, it may be asked, can any moral character be affixed to an emotion, which seems to be an organic or pathological phenomenon, wherewith the will may have little, perhaps nothing to do. Nothing we have affirmed is either virtuous or vicious, unless the voluntary in some way intermingles with it; and how then shall we vindicate the moral rank which is commonly assigned to the mere susceptibilities of our nature? We regard compassion as a virtuous sensibility; and we regard malignity, or licentiousness, or envy, as so many depraved affec-

tions ; and yet, on our principle, they are virtuous or vicious, only in so far as they are wilful. It is clearly at the bidding of his will, that a man acts with his hand, and therefore we are at no loss to hold him responsible for his doings ; but we must learn how it is at the bidding of his will that he feels with his heart, ere we can hold him responsible for his desires. If apart from the will, there be neither moral worth nor moral worthlessness—if it be implied in the very notion of desert that the will has had some concern in that which we thus characterize—if neither actions nor affections are, without volitions, susceptible of any moral reckoning—it may require some consideration to perceive, how far the element of moral worth is at all implicated in an emotion. If the emotions of sympathy be as much the result of an organic frame-work as the emotions of taste, and if this be true of all the emotions—it remains to be seen, why either praise or censure should be awarded to any of them. Whether an emotion of taste arises within me at the sight of beauty, or an emotion of pity at the sight of distress—the mind may have been as passive, or there may have been as much of the strictly pathological in the one emotion as in the other.

11. Now it may be very true, that the will has as little to do with that pathological law, by which the sight of distress awakens in my bosom an emotion of pity, as with that other pathological law by which the sight of a red object impresses on my retina the sensation peculiar to that colour. Yet the will, though not the proximate, may have been the remote and so the real cause, both of the emotion and sensation notwithstanding. It may have been at the bidding of my will, that, instead of hiding myself, from my own flesh, I visited a scene of wretchedness, and entered within the confines as it were of that pathological influence, in virtue of which, after that the spectacle of suffering was seen the compassion was unavoidable. And it is also at the bidding of my will, that I place myself within view of an object of sense ; that I direct my eye towards it, and keep it open to that sensation, which, after the circumstances that I have voluntarily realized, is equally unavoidable. I might have escaped from the emotion, had I so willed, by keeping aloof from the spectacle which awakened it. And I might escape from the sensation, if I so will, by shutting my eyes, or turning them away from the object which is its cause ; or, in other words, by the command which I have over the looking faculty that belongs to me. And perhaps the mind has a looking faculty as well as the body, in virtue of which, as by the one objects are either removed from, or made present to the sight, so by the other, objects may be either removed from, or made present to the thoughts. Could



we ascertain the existence and operations of such a faculty, this would explain how it is, that the emotions are subordinated not immediately but mediately to the will—that the mind by the direction of its looking faculty towards the counterpart objects, could, on the one hand, will these emotions into being; or by the direction of it away from these objects, could, on the other hand, will them again into extinction. Such we hold to be the faculty of *attention*. It forms the great link between the intellectual and moral departments of our nature; or between the percipient and what has already been named the pathematic departments. It is the control which the will has over this faculty that makes man responsible for the objects which he chooses to entertain, and so responsible for the emotions which pathologically result from them.

12. If it be by a voluntary act that he comes to see certain objects, then, whatever the emotions are which are awakened by these objects, he may be said to have willed them into being. In like manner, if it be by a voluntary act that he comes to think of certain objects, then, may it also be said, that he wills all the emotions which follow in their train. It is admitted on all hands, that, by the power which the will has over the muscles of the human frame, it can either summon into presence or bid away certain objects of sight. And, notwithstanding the effect which the expositions of certain metaphysical reasoners have had, in obscuring the process, it is also admitted, almost universally, that, by the power which the will has over the thinking processes, it can either summon into presence or bid away certain objects of thought. The faculty of attention we regard as the great instrument for the achievement of this—the ligament which binds the one department of our constitution to the other—the messenger, to whose wakefulness and activity we owe all those influences, which pass and re-pass in constant succession between our moral and intellectual nature.

13. Dr. Reid, in his book on the active powers, has a most important chapter on those operations of the mind that are called voluntary. Among these, he gives a foremost place to attention—where, instead however of any profound or careful analysis, he presents us with a number of very sensible remarks; and from the undoubted part which the will has in the guidance and exercise of this faculty, he comes to the sound conclusion, that a great part of wisdom and virtue consists in giving the proper direction to it.

14. Dugald Stewart ranks attention among the intellectual faculties;—and seems to regard it as an original power, which had very much escaped the notice of former observers. But Dr.

Brown we hold to have been far the most successful in his expositions of this faculty ; and by which he makes it evident, that it is not more distinct from the mental perception of any object of thought, than the faculty of looking to any object of sight, is distinct from the faculty of seeing it.

15. In his chapter on the external affections combined with desire, he institutes a beautiful analysis ; in the conduct of which, he has thrown the magic tints of poetry over a process of very abstract but conclusive reasoning. We fear, that, in this age of superficial readers, the public are far from being adequately aware of that wondrous combination of talent, which this singularly gifted individual realized in his own person ; and with what facility, yet elegance, he could intersperse the graces of fancy, among the demonstrations of a most profound and original metaphysics. The passage to which we now refer, is perhaps the finest exemplification of this in all his volumes ; and though we can hardly hope, that the majority, even of the well educated, will ever be tempted to embark on his adventurous speculations—yet many, we doubt not, have been led by the fascination of his minor accomplishments, to brave the depths and the difficulties of that masterly course which he has given to the world. For among the steeps and the arduous elevations of that high walk which he has taken, he kindly provides the reader with many a resting place—some enchanted spot, over which the hand of taste hath thrown her choicest decorations ; or where, after the fatigues and the triumphs of successful intellect, the traveller may from the eminence that he has won, look abroad on some sweet or noble perspective, which the great master whose footsteps he follows hath thrown open to his gaze. It is thus that there is a constant relief and refreshment afforded along that ascending way, which but for this would be most severely intellectual ; and if never was philosophy more abstruse, yet never was it seasoned so exquisitely, or spread over a page so rich in all those attic delicacies of the imagination and the style which could make the study of it attractive.

16. There is a philosophy not more solid or more sublime of achievement than his, but of sterner frame—that would spurn “the fairy dreams of sacred fountains and Elysian groves and vales of bliss.” For these he ever had most benignant toleration, and himself sported among the creations of poetic genius. We are aware of nought more fascinating, than the kindness and complacency, wherewith philosophy, in some of the finer spirits of our race, can make her graceful descent into a humbler but lovelier region than her own—when “the intellectual power bends from his awful throne a willing ear and smiles.”

17. "If," says Dr. Brown, "Nature has given us the power of seeing many objects at once, she has given us also the faculty of looking but to one—that is to say of directing our eyes on one only of the multitude;" and again, "there are some objects which are more striking than others, and which of themselves almost call us to look at them. They are the predominant objects around which others seem to arrange themselves."

18. The difference between seeing a thing and looking at it, is tantamount to the difference which there is, between the mere presence of a thought in one's mind and the mind's attention to that which is the object of thought. Now the look, according to Dr. Brown's analysis, is made up of the simple external affection of sight, and a desire to know more about some one of the things which we do see. We think it the natural consequence of the error into which he has fallen, of confounding the desire with the will, that he has failed in giving a complete or continuous enough description of the process of attention—for, without any violence to the order of his own very peculiar contemplations, he might have gone on to say, as the effect of this mixed perception and desire on the part of the observer, that he willed to look to the object in question; and he might have spoken of the volition which fastened his eye and his attention upon it. Both he and Mr. Mill seem averse to the intervention of the will in this exercise at all—the one finding room only for desire; and the other for his processes of association, ascribing attention to the mere occurrence of interesting sensations or ideas in the train. Now if this question is to be decided by observation at all, or by consciousness which is the faculty of internal observation, the mental states of desiring and willing seem just as distinguishable as any other mental states whatever. At the time when the mind desires, it bears a respect towards the desirable object; at the time when it wills, it bears a respect towards something different from this, to that act of its own which is put forth for the purpose of attaining the object. The desire that is felt towards the object is specifically a distinct thing, from the volition which prompts or precedes the action. The desire may have caused the volition; but this is no reason why it should be confounded with the volition. And in like manner, a feeling of interest in an idea, or rather in the object of an idea, is quite distinguishable from that volition which respects a something different from this object—which respects an act or exercise of the mind, even the attention that we shall give to it. The interest that is felt in any object of thought may have been the cause, and the sole cause of the attention which we give to it. But the necessary connexion which obtains between the parts of a process, is no reason why we should over-

look any part, or confound the different parts with each other. In this instance, Mr. Hume seems to have observed more accurately than either of the philosophers whom we have now named, when he discriminates between the will and the desire, and tells us of the former, that it exerts itself when the thing desired is to be attained by any action of the *mind* or body. A volition is as distinctly felt in the mental as in the bodily process—although it be in the latter only, that the will first acts on some one of the muscles as its instrument, and issues in a visible movement as its required service. The power of the will over an intellectual process is marked by the difference, the palpable difference which there is, between a regulated train of thought and a passive reverie. And there is nothing in the intervention of the will to contravene, or even to modify the general laws of association. Neither does the wish to recover a particular idea, involve in it the incongruity of that idea being both present with and absent from the mind at the same time. We may not have an idea that is absent, and yet have the knowledge of its being related to some other idea that is present; and we therefore attend to this latter idea and dwell upon it, for the purpose, as is well expressed by Mr. Mill, of—“giving it the opportunity of exciting all the ideas with which it is associated; for by not attending to it, we deprive it more or less of that opportunity.” It is therefore, as he elsewhere expresses it, that we detain certain ideas and suffer others to pass. But there is nothing inconsistent with the laws or phenomena of association, in our saying of this act of detention that it is a voluntary act—that we detain certain ideas, because we will to detain them.\*

19. It is this which *virtuefies* emotion, even though there be nothing virtuous which is not voluntary. It is true that once the idea of an object is in the mind, its counterpart emotion may, by an organic or pathological law, have come unbidden into the heart. The emotion may have come unbidden; but the idea may not have come unbidden. By an act of the will, it may, in the way now explained, have been summoned at the first into the mind's presence; and at all events it is by a continuous act of the will that it is detained and dwelt upon. The will is not in contact with the emotion, but it is in contact with the idea of that object which awakens the emotion—and therefore, although not in contact with the emotion, it may be vested with an effectual control over it. It cannot bid compassion into the bosom, apart from the object which awakens it; but it can bid a personal entry into the house of mourning, and then the

\* See the Chapter on the Will in Mill's analysis of the human mind.



compassion will flow apace ; or it can bid a mental conception of the bereaved and afflicted family there, and then the sensibility will equally arise, whether a suffering be seen or a suffering be thought of. In like manner, it cannot bid into the breast the naked and unaccompanied feeling of gratitude ; but it can call to recollection, and keep in recollection the kindness which prompts it—and the emotion follows in faithful attendance on its counterpart object. It is thus that we can will the right emotions into being, not immediately but mediately—as the love of God, by thinking on God—a sentiment of friendship, by dwelling in contemplation on the congenial qualities of our friend—the admiration of moral excellence, by means of a serious and steadfast attention to it. It is thus too that we bid away the wrong emotions, not separately and in disjunction from their objects, for the pathological law which unites objects with emotion we cannot break asunder. But we rid our heart of the emotions, by ridding our mind of their exciting and originating thoughts ; of anger, for example, by forgetting the injury ; or of a licentious instigation, by dismissing from our fancy the licentious image, or turning our sight and our eyes from viewing vanity. It is this command of the will over the attention, which, transmuting the intellectual into the moral, makes duties of heedfulness and consideration—and duties too of prime importance, because of the place which attention occupies in the mental system, as the great ligament between the percipient and the pathematic parts of our nature. It is by its means that the will is made to touch at least the springs of emotion—if it do not touch the emotions themselves. The will tells on the sensibilities, through an intermediate machinery which has been placed at its disposal ; and thus it is, that the culture or regulation of the heart is mainly dependent on the regulation of the thoughts.

20. We may thus be enabled to explain, and perhaps more clearly than before, the force and inveteracy of habit ; and that, not by the power of emotions to suggest emotions, but purely by the power of thoughts to suggest thoughts. In this process, the motions will of course intermingle with their own counterpart thoughts ; and both ideas and feelings will succeed each other in their customary trains all the more surely, the oftener it has been suffered to pass unbroken by any intervention of the will, any remonstrance from the voice of conscience. It is in this way that the wretched voluptuary, becomes every year the more helpless victim of his own depraved inclinations—because more and more lorded over by those foul imaginations, which are lighted up to him, from almost every object he sees

or thinks of; and which now he scarcely has the power, because he never had the honest or sustained will to bid away. That may truly be called a moral chastisement under which he suffers. The more he has sinned, the more helpless is the necessity under which he lies of sinning—a bondage strengthened by every act of indulgence, till he may become the irrecoverable slave of those passions which war against the principles of a better and higher nature. And he is domineered over by passions, because domineered over by thoughts; and it is only by the force of mastery of counteracting thoughts, that the spell is broken—or, in other words, it is through an intellectual medium, that the moral distemper is cleared away. If he be rescued from his delusions to sobriety and virtue, ideas will be the stepping-stones of his returning path—the sirens that will recall him to himself, by chasing away the fascinations wherewith he is encompassed. Could the percipient part of his nature be set right, the pathological part of it would become whole. He would yet behave himself aright, did he only bethink himself aright; and noble recoveries have been effected, even from most deep and hopeless infatuation, simply by the power of thoughts—when made to dwell on the distress of friends, the poverty and despair of children, the ruin of health as well as fortune, the displeasure of an angry God, the horrors of an unprovided death-bed or an undone eternity.\*

21. Actions are voluntary in themselves, in that the mind can will them directly into being. Emotions, though not voluntary in themselves, are so far voluntary in their proximate or immediate causes—in that the mind, to a certain extent, and by the control which it has over the faculty of attention, can will those ideas into its presence by which the emotions are awakened. It is well that man is thus vested, not only with a control over his actions; but also in a great degree with a control over his emotions, these powerful impellents to action—and it required an exquisite fitting of the intellectual to the moral in man's mental system, ere such a mechanism could be framed. But we not only behold in the relation between the will and the emotions, a

\* A strict confinement to our assigned objects has hitherto prevented any allusion to Christianity, from which indeed we purposely abstain, till we approach more nearly towards the conclusion of this essay. Still we may here remark how strikingly accordant the philosophy of our nature is with the lessons of the Gospel in regard to the reciprocal acting of its moral and intellectual parts on each other—and that not merely in what Scripture enjoins on the management of temptations; but in its frequent affirmation, as a general and reigning principle of the power which its objective doctrines have in transforming the subjective mind which receives them—exemplified in such phrases, as “being sanctified by the truth,” and “keeping our hearts in the love of God, by building ourselves up on our most holy faith.”

skilful adaptation in the parts of the human constitution to each other; we also behold a general and manifold adaptation to this peculiarity in the various objects of external nature. Man can, by means of these objects, either kindle the right emotions in his bosom, or make his escape from those emotions that trouble and annoy him. By an entry into an abode of destitution, he can effectually soften his heart; by an entry into an abode of still deeper suffering, where are to be found the dead or the dying, he can effectually solemnize it. But a still more palpable use of that indefinite number of objects wherewith the world is so filled and variegated, is, that by creating an incessant diversion of the thoughts from such objects as are of malignant influence, it may rid the inner man of the grief, or the anger, or the wayward licentiousness of feeling, which might otherwise have lorded over him; and to the urgent calls of business or duty or amusement, do we owe such lengthened periods of exemption both from the emotions that pain, and from the emotions that would vitiate and deprave us.

22. But there is another application, of at least as high importance, to which this peculiarity of our mental structure is subservient. By the command which the will has over the attention, we become responsible, not only for our states of emotion, but also in a great degree for our intellectual states. The imagination that there is neither moral worth nor moral delinquency in the state of a man's belief, proceeds on the voluntary having had no share in the process which leads to it. Now through the intermedium of the very same faculty, the faculty of attention, the will stands related to the ultimate convictions of the understanding, precisely as it stands related to the ultimate emotions of the heart. It is true that as the object in view of the mind is, so the motion is.—And it is as true that as the evidence in view of the mind is, so the belief is. In neither case has the will to do with the concluding sequence; but in both cases it has equally to do with the sequences that went before it. There may be a pathological necessity beyond our control, in that final step of the succession, which connects the object that is perceived with its counterpart emotion, or the evidence that is perceived with its counterpart belief. But in like manner as it is by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the object is perceived by us, so is it by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the evidence is perceived by us. It is thus that on innumerable questions, and these of vital importance, both to the present well-being and the future prospects of humanity, the moral may have had causal antecedency over the intellectual; and the state of a man's

creed may depend on the prior state of his character. We have already seen how a present compassion may have been the result of a previous choice ; and so may a present conviction be the result of a previous choice—being in proportion not to the evidence possessed by the subject, but to the evidence attended to, and perceived in consequence of that attention. The designations of virtuous and vicious are only applicable to that which is voluntary ; and it is precisely because, through the faculty of attention, the voluntary has had so much to do, if not immediately with the belief, at least with the investigations which lead to it—that man may be reckoned with for the judgments of his understanding, as well as for the emotions of his heart or the actions of his history.

23. That man is not rightfully the subject of any moral reckoning for his belief, would appear then, to be as monstrous a heresy in science as it is in theology, as philosophically unsound as it is religiously unsound ; and deriving all its plausibility from the imagination, that the belief is in no way dependent upon the will. It is not morally incumbent upon man to see an object, which is placed beyond the sphere of his vision—nor can either a rightful condemnation or a rightful vengeance be laid upon him, because he has not perceived it. It must lie within that sphere, else he is no more responsible for not having reached it with his eye than for not having stretched forth his hand to any of the distant bodies in the firmament. It must be within range of his seeing ; and then the only question which needs to be resolved is, what the will has to do with the seeing of it. Now to see is not properly an act of the will, but to look is altogether so ; and it is the dependence of his looking faculty on the will, which makes man responsible for what he sees or what he does not see, in reference to all those objects of sight, that are placed within the territory of sensible vision. And if there be but a looking faculty in the mind, man may be alike responsible for what he believes or what he does not believe, in reference, not to sensible objects alone, but to those truths which are placed within the territory of his intellectual or mental vision. Now attention is even such a faculty. Man can turn and transfer it at pleasure from one to another topic of contemplation. He can take cognizance of any visible thing, in virtue of the power which he has over the eye of his body—a power not to alter the laws of vision, but to bring the organ of vision within the operation of these laws. And he can take cognizance of any announced truth, in virtue of the power he has over his attention which is his mental eye—a power, not to alter the laws of evidence, but to bring the organ of the intellect within their operation. Attention is the looking organ of the mind—the link of communication between man's



moral and man's intellectual nature—the messenger, as it were, by which the interchange between these two departments is carried on—a messenger too at the bidding of the will, which saith to it at one time go and it goeth, at another come and it cometh, and at a third do this and it doeth it. It is thus that man becomes directly responsible for the conclusions of his understanding—for these conclusions depend altogether, not on the evidence which exists, but on that portion of the evidence which is attended to. He is not to be reckoned with, either for the lack or the sufficiency of the existent evidence; but he might most justly be reckoned with, for the lack or the sufficiency of his attention. It is not for him to create the light of day; but it is for him both to open and to present his eye to all its manifestations. Neither is it for him to fetch down to earth the light of the upper sanctuary. But if it be indeed true that that light hath come into the world, then it is for him to guide the eye of his understanding towards it. There is a voluntary part for him to perform; and thenceforward the question is involved with most obvious moralities. The thing is now submitted to his choice. He may have the light, if he only love the light; and if he do not, then are his love of darkness and the evil of his doings, the unquestionable grounds of his most clear and emphatic condemnation.

24. And this principle is of force, throughout all the stages in the process of the inquiry—from the very first glance of that which is the subject of it, to the full and finished conviction in which the enquiry terminates. At the commencement of the process, we may see nothing but the likelihoods of a subject—not the conclusive proofs, but only as yet the dim and dawning probabilities of the question—nothing which is imperative upon our belief, and yet every thing which is imperative upon our attention. There may be as great a moral perversity in resisting that call, which the mere semblance of truth makes upon our further attention—as in resisting that call, which the broad and perfect manifestation of it makes upon our conviction. In the practice of Scottish law, there is a distinction made between the precognition and the proof—carried into effect in England by the respective functions of the grand and petty jury; it being the office of the former to find a true bill, or to decide whether the matter in question should be brought to a further trial; and it being the office of the latter to make that trial, and to pronounce the final verdict thereupon. Now what we affirm is, that there might be to the full as grievous a delinquency in the former act of judgment as in the latter; in the denial of a further hearing to the cause after the strong probabilities which have transpired at the one stage, as in the denial of a fair verdict after the strong

and satisfactory proofs which have transpired at the other. All the equities of rectitude may be as much traversed or violated, at the initial or progressive steps of such an enquiry, as by the ultimate judgment which forms the termination of it. To resist a good and valid precognition, and so to refuse the trial, is a moral unfairness of the very same kind, with that resistance of a good and valid proof which leads to the utterance of a false verdict. He were an iniquitous judge, who should internally stifle the impression of those verities, which now brightened forth upon him, at the close of his investigation. But he also were an iniquitous judge, who should stifle the impression of those verisimilitudes, that even but obscurely and languidly beamed upon him at the outset.

25. Now, in all the processes of the human intellect, there is a similar gradation silently yet substantially carried forward. There is first an aspect of probability, which constitutes no claim upon our immediate belief, but which at least constitutes a most rightful claim upon our attention, a faculty, as we before said, at the bidding of our will, and for the exercise of which we are therefore responsible—seeing that whenever there is a rightful claim upon our attention, and the attention is not given, it is wrongously withheld. But we know that the effect of this faculty, is to brighten every object of contemplation to which it is directed, gradually to evolve into greater clearness all its lineaments, and lastly to impress the right conviction upon the understanding. In other words, the man, on such an occasion as this, is intellectually right, but just because he is morally right. He becomes sound in faith; but only in virtue of having become sound in principle. The true belief in which he ultimately lands, is not all at once forced upon him, by the credentials wherewith it was associated; but he had the patience and the candour to wait the unrolling of these credentials; or rather he helped to unroll them with his own hand. He fastened his regards upon some proposition which involved in it the interests or the obligations of humanity; because there sat upon it, even at the first, a certain creditable aspect, which had he had the hardihood to withstand or to turn from, it would have made him chargeable, not with a mental alone, but with a moral perversity—not with the error that springs from a mistaken judgment, but with the guilt that springs from the violation of an incumbent duty. Many are the truths which do not carry an instant and overpowering evidence along with them; and which therefore, at their first announcement, are not entitled to demand admittance for themselves as the articles of a creed. Nevertheless they may be entitled to a hearing; and, by the refusal of that hearing, man incurs, not the misfortune of an involuntary blunder, but the turpitude of a voluntary crime.

## CHAPTER IV.

### *On the Defects and the Uses of Natural Theology.*

1. WE behold in the influence which the will has over the intellectual states, the same adaptations which we did in the influence of the will over the emotions. In the first place, it is well that the will should have a certain over-ruling power over the conclusions of the understanding—seeing that if emotions supply the great impellent forces; doctrines, or the truths which are believed, supply the great principles of action. And secondly, there is a striking adaptation, in this part of our constitution, to the things and the objects which be around us. For although there be much of truth, having that sort of immediate and resistless evidence, which forces itself upon our convictions whether we will or not—there is also much, and that too practically the most momentous, of which we can only attain the conviction and the knowledge, by a lengthened often a laborious process of enquiry. In like manner as of material objects, they may be seen but imperfectly at the first; and we become fully and minutely acquainted with their visible properties, only by a prolonged look, which is a sustained and voluntary act—so, many are the objects of thought, both the reality and the nature of which, are but dimly apprehended on the first suggestion of them; and of which, we can only be made firmly to believe and thoroughly to know, by means of a prolonged attention, which is a sustained and voluntary act also. It is thus that the moral state determines the intellectual—for it is by the exercise of a strong and continuous will, upholding or perpetuating the attention, that what at the outset were the probabilities of a subject are at length brightened into its proofs, and the verisimilitudes of our regardful notice become the verities of our confirmed faith.

2. Of all the subjects to which the attention of the human mind can be directed, this principle admits of pre-eminent application to the subject of theology—as involving in it, both the present duties and the final destinies of our race. In no other track of inquiry, are the moral and the intellectual more thoroughly blended,—as might be evinced by tracing the whole progress, from the first or incipient disposition of mind towards the theme, to the devotedness of its confirmed assurance.

3. Going back then to the very earliest of our mental conceptions on this subject, we advert first to the distinction in point

of real and logical import, between unbelief and disbelief. The former we apprehend, to be the furthest amount of the atheistical verdict on the question of a God. The atheist does not labour to demonstrate that there is no God. But he labours to demonstrate that there is no adequate proof of there being one. He does not positively affirm the position, that God is not; but he affirms the lack of evidence for the position, that God is. His verdict on the doctrine of a God is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an Atheist. He is not an Antitheist.

4. Now there is one consideration, which affords the enquirer a singularly clear and commanding position, at the outset of this great question. It is this. We cannot, without a glaring contravention to all the principles of the experimental philosophy, recede to a further distance from the doctrine of a God, than to the position of simple atheism. We do not need to take our departure from any point further back than this, in the region of antitheism; for that region cannot possibly be entered by us but by an act of tremendous presumption, which it were premature to denounce as impious, but which we have the authority of all modern science for denouncing as unphilosophical. To make this palpable, we have only to contrast the two intellectual states, not of theism and atheism, but of theism and antitheism—along with the two processes, by which alone, we can be logically and legitimately led to them.

5. To be able to say then that there is a God, we may have only to look abroad on some definite territory, and point to the vestiges that are given of His power and His presence somewhere. To be able to say that there is no God, we must walk the whole expanse of infinity, and ascertain by observation, that such vestiges are to be found nowhere. Grant that no trace of Him can be discerned in that quarter of contemplation, which our puny optics have explored—does it follow, that, throughout all immensity, a Being with the essence and sovereignty of a God is nowhere to be found? Because through our loopholes of communication with that small portion of external nature which is before us, we have not seen or ascertained a God—must we therefore conclude of every unknown and untrodden vastness in this illimitable universe, that no diversity is there. Or because, through the brief successions of our little day, these heavens have not once broken silence, is it therefore for us to speak to all the periods of that eternity which is behind us; and to say, that never hath a God come forth with the unequivocal tokens of His existence? Ere we can say that there is a God—we must have seen, on that portion of Nature to which we have



access, the print of His footsteps, or have had direct intimation from Himself; or been satisfied by the authentic memorials of His converse with our species in other days. But ere we can say that there is no God—we must have roamed over all nature, and seen that no mark of a Divine footstep was there; and we must have gotten intimacy with every existent spirit in the universe, and learned from each, that never did a revelation of the Deity visit him; and we must have searched, not into the records of one solitary planet, but into the archives of all worlds, and thence gathered, that, throughout the wide realms of immensity, not one exhibition of a reigning and living God ever has been made. Atheism might plead a lack of evidence within its own field of observation. But antitheism pronounces both upon the things which are, and the things which are not within that field. It breaks forth and beyond all those limits, that have been prescribed to man's excursive spirit, by the sound philosophy of experience; and by a presumption the most tremendous, even the usurpation of all space and of all time, it affirms that there is no God. To make this out, we should need to travel abroad over the surrounding universe till we had exhausted it, and to search backward through all the hidden recesses of eternity; to traverse in every direction the plains of infinitude, and sweep the outskirts of that space which is itself interminable; and then bring back to this little world of ours, the report of a universal blank, wherein we had not met with one manifestation or one movement of a presiding God. For man not to know of a God, he has only to sink beneath the level of our common nature. But to deny him, he must be a God himself. He must arrogate the ubiquity and omniscience of the Godhead.\*

6. It affords a firm outset to this investigation, that we cannot recede a greater way from the doctrine to be investigated, than

\* This idea has been powerfully rendered by Foster in the following passage extracted from one of his essays.—

“The wonder turns on the great process, by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence that can know there is no God. What ages and what lights are requisite for this attainment? This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity, while a God is denied. For unless this man is omnipresent, unless he is at this moment in every place in the Universe, he cannot know but there may be in some place manifestations of a Deity by which even *he* would be overpowered. If he does not absolutely know every agent in the Universe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himself the chief agent in the Universe, and does not know what is so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be that there is a God. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be a God. If he does not know every thing that has been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by a God. Thus unless he knows all things, that is, precludes another Deity by being one himself, he cannot know that the Being whose existence he rejects, does not exist.

to the simple point of ignorance or unbelief. We cannot, without making inroad on the soundest principles of evidence, move one step back from this, to the region of disbelief. We can figure an inquirer taking up his position in midway atheism. But he cannot, without defiance to the whole principle and philosophy of evidence, make aggression thence on the side of antitheism. There is a clear intellectual principle, which forbids his proceeding in that direction; and there is another principle equally clear, though not an intellectual but a moral one, which urges him, if not to move, at least to look in the opposite direction. We are not asking him, situated where he is, to believe in God. For the time being, we as little expect a friendly as we desire a hostile decision upon the question. Our only demand for the present is, that he shall entertain the question. And to enforce the demand, we think that an effective appeal might be made to his own moral nature. We suppose him still to be an atheist, but no more than an atheist—for, in all right Baconian logic, the very farthest remove from theism, at which he or any man can be placed by the lack of evidence for a God, is at the point of simple neutrality. We might well assume this point, as the utmost possible extreme of alienation from the doctrine of a Creator, to which the mind of a creature can in any circumstances be legitimately carried. We cannot move from it, in the direction towards antitheism, without violence to all that is just in philosophy; and we might therefore commence with enquiring, whether, in this lowest state of information and proof upon the question, there can be any thing assigned, which should lead us to move, or at least to look in the opposite direction.

7. In the utter destitution, for the present, of any argument, or even semblance of argument, that a God is—there is, perhaps, a certain duteous movement which the mind ought to take, on the bare suggestion that a God may be. The certainty of an actual God binds over to certain distinct and most undoubted proprieties. But so also may the imagination of a possible God—in which case, the very idea of a God, even in its most hypothetical form, might lay a responsibility, even upon atheists.

8. To make this palpable, we might imagine a family suffering under extreme destitution, and translated all at once into sufficiency or affluence by an anonymous donation. Had the benefactor been known, the gratitude that were due to him becomes abundantly obvious; and in the estimation of every conscience, nothing could exceed the turpitude of him, who should regale himself on the bounties wherewith he had been enriched, and yet pass unheedingly by the giver of them all. Yet does not a proportion of this very guilt rest upon him, who knows not the hand

that relieved him, yet cares not to enquire? It does not exonerate him from the burthen of all obligation that he knows not the hand which sustains him. He incurs a guilt, if he do not want to know. It is enough to convict him of a great moral delinquency, if he have gladly seized upon the liberalities which were brought in secret to his door, yet seeks not after the quarter whence they have come—willing that the hand of the dispenser should remain for ever unknown, and not wanting any such disclosures as would lay a distinct claim or obligation upon himself. He altogether lives by the bounty of another; yet would rather continue to live without the burthen of those services or acknowledgments that are due to him. His ignorance of the benefactor might alleviate the charge of ingratitude; but it plainly awakens the charge again, if he choose to remain in ignorance, and would shun the information that might dispel it. In reference then to this still undiscovered patron of his family, it is possible for him to evince ingratitude; to make full exhibition of a nature that is unmoved by kindness and withholds the moral responses which are due to it, that can riot with utmost selfishness and satisfaction upon the gifts while in total indifference about the giver—an indifference which might be quite as clearly and characteristically shown, by the man who seeks not after his unknown friend, as by the man who slights him after that he has found him.

9. It may thus be made to appear, that there is an ethics connected with theology, which may come into play, anterior to the clear view of any of its objects. More especially, we do not need to be sure of God, ere we ought to have certain feelings, or at least certain aspirations towards him. For this purpose we do not need, fully and absolutely to believe that God is. It is enough that our minds cannot fully and absolutely acquiesce in the position that God is not. To be fit subjects for our present argument, we do not need to have explored that territory of nature which is within our reach; and thence gathered, in the traces of a designer's hand the positive conclusion that there is a God. It is enough if we have not traversed, throughout all its directions and in all its extent, the sphere of immensity; and if we have not scaled the mysterious altitudes of the eternity that is past; nor, after having there searched for a divinity in vain, have come at length to the positive and the peremptory conclusion, that there is not a God. In a word, it is quite enough, that man is barely a finite creature, who has not yet put forth his faculties on the question whether God is; neither has yet so ranged over all space and all time, as definitely to have ascertained that God is not—but with whom though in ignorance of all proofs, it still remains a possibility that God may be.

10. Now to this condition, there attaches a most clear and incumbent morality. It is to go in quest of that unseen benefactor, who, for aught I know, has ushered me into existence, and spread so glorious a panorama around me. It is to probe the secret of my being and my birth; and, if possible, to make discovery whether it was indeed the hand of a benefactor, that brought me forth from the chambers of nonentity, and gave me place and entertainment in that glowing territory, which is lighted up with the hopes and the happiness of living men. It is thus that the very conception of a God throws a responsibility after it; and that duty, solemn and imperative duty, stands associated with the thought of a possible deity, as well as with the sight of a present deity, standing in full manifestation before us. Even anterior to all knowledge of God, or when that knowledge is in embryo, there is both a path of irreligion and a path of piety; and that law which denounces the one and gives to the other an approving testimony, may find in him who is still in utter darkness about his origin and his end, a fit subject for the retributions which she deals in. He cannot be said to have borne disregard to the will of that God, whom he has found. But his is the guilt of impiety, in that he has borne disregard to the knowledge of that God, whom he was bound by every tie of gratitude to seek after—a duty not founded on the proofs that may be exhibited for the being of a God, but a duty to which even the most slight and slender of presumptions should give rise. And who can deny that, antecedent to all close and careful examination of the proofs, there are at least many presumptions in behalf of a God, to meet the eye of every observer? Is there any so hardy as to deny, that the curious workmanship of his frame *may* have had a designer and an architect, that the ten thousand independent circumstances which must be united ere he can have a moment's ease, and the failure of any one of which would be agony, may not have met at random, but that there may be a skilful and unseen hand to have put them together into one wondrous concurrence, and that never ceases to uphold it; that there may be a real and living artist, whose fingers did frame the economy of actual things, and who hath so marvellously suited all that is around us to our senses and our powers of gratification? Without affirming aught which is positive, surely the air that we breathe, and the beautiful light in which we expatiate, these elements of sight and sound so exquisitely fitted to the organs of the human frame-work, *may* have been provided by one who did benevolently consult in them our special accommodation. The graces innumerable that lie widely spread over the face of our world, the glorious concave of heaven that is



placed over us, the grateful variety of seasons that like Nature's shifting panorama ever brings new entertainment and delight to the eye of spectators—these may, for aught we know, be the emanations of a creative mind, that originated our family and devised such a universe for their habitation. Regarding these, not as proofs, but in the humble light of presumptions for a God, they are truly enough to convict us of foulest ingratitude—if we go not forth in quest of a yet unknown, but at least possible or likely benefactor. They may not resolve the question of a God. But they bring the heaviest reproach on our listlessness to the question; and show that, anterior to our assured belief in his existence, there lies upon us a most imperious obligation to 'stir ourselves up that we may lay hold of Him.'

11. Such presumptions as these, if not so many demands on the belief of man, are at least so many demands upon his attention; and then, for aught he knows, the presumptions on which he ought to enquire may be more and more enhanced, till they brighten into proofs which ought to convince him. The *prima-facie* evidence for a God may not be enough to decide the question; but it should at least decide man to entertain the question. To think upon how slight a variation either in man or in external nature, the whole difference between physical enjoyment and the most acute and most appalling of physical agony may turn; to think how delicate the balance is, and yet how surely and steadfastly it is maintained, so as that the vast majority of creatures are not only upheld in comfort, but often may be seen disporting themselves in the redundance of gaiety; to think of the pleasurable sensations wherewith every hour is enlivened, and how much the most frequent and familiar occasions of life are mixed up with happiness; to think of the food, and the recreation, and the study, and the society, and the business, each having an appropriate relish of its own, so as in fact to season with enjoyment the great bulk of our existence in the world; to think that, instead of living in the midst of grievous and incessant annoyance to all our faculties, we should have awoke upon a world that so harmonized with the various senses of man, and both gave forth such music to his ear and to his eye such manifold loveliness; to think of all these palpable and most precious adaptations—and yet to care not, whether in this wide universe there exists a being who has had any hand in them—to riot and regale oneself to the uttermost in the midst of all this profusion—and yet to send not one wishful inquiry after that Benevolence which for aught we know may have laid it at our feet—this, however shaded from our view the object of the question may be, is,

from its very commencement, a clear outrage against its ethical proprieties. If that veil of dim transparency, which hides the Deity from our immediate perceptions, were lifted up; and we should then spurn from us the manifested God—this were direct and glaring impiety. But anterior to the lifting of that veil, there may be impiety. It is impiety to be so immersed as we are, in the busy objects and gratifications of life; and yet to care not whether there be a great and a good spirit by whose kindness it is that life is upholden. It needs not that this spirit should reveal himself in characters that force our attention to him, ere the guilt of our impiety has begun. But ours is the guilt of impiety, in not lifting our attention towards God, in not seeking after Him if haply we may find him.

12. Man is not to blame, if an atheist, because of the want of proof. But he is to blame, if an atheist, because he has shut his eyes. He is not to blame, that the evidence for a God has not been seen by him, if no such evidence there were within the field of his observation. But he is to blame, if the evidence have not been seen, because he turned away his attention from it. That the question of a God may lie unresolved in his mind, all he has to do, is to refuse a hearing to the question. He may abide without the conviction of a God, if he so choose. But this his choice is matter of condemnation. To resist God after that He is known, is criminality towards Him; but to be satisfied that He should remain unknown, is like criminality towards Him. There is a moral perversity of spirit with him who is willing, in the midst of many objects of gratification, that there should not be one object of gratitude. It is thus that, even in the ignorance of God, there may be a responsibility towards God. The Discerner of the heart sees, whether, for the blessings innumerable wherewith He has strewed the path of every man, He be treated, like the unknown benefactor who was diligently sought, or like the unknown benefactor who was never cared for. In respect, at least of desire after God, the same distinction of character may be observed between one man and another—whether God be wrapt in mystery, or stand forth in full developement to our world. Even though a mantle of deepest obscurity lay over the question of His existence; this would not efface the distinction, between the piety on the one hand which laboured and aspired after Him; and the impiety upon the other which never missed the evidence that it did not care for, and so grovelled in the midst of its own sensuality and selfishness. The eye of a heavenly witness is upon all these varieties; and thus, whether it be darkness or whether it be dislike which hath caused a people to be ignorant of God, there is

with him a clear principle of judgment, that He can extend even to the outfields of atheism.

13. It would appear then, that, even in the initial state of the human mind on the question of a God, there is an impellent force upon the conscience, which man ought to obey, and which he incurs guilt by resisting. We do not speak of that light which irradiates the termination of the inquirer's path, but of that embryo or rudimental light which glimmers over the outset of it; which serves at least to indicate the commencement of his way; and which, for aught he knows, may brighten, as he advances onwards, to the blaze of a full and finished revelation. At no point of this progress, does 'the trumpet give an uncertain sound,' extending, if not to those who stand on the ground of Antitheism, (which we have already pronounced upon and we trust proved to be madly irrational)—at least to those who stand on the ground of Atheism, who, though strangers to the conviction, are certainly not strangers to the conception of a Deity. It is of the utmost practical importance, that even these are not beyond the jurisdiction of an obvious principle; and that a right obligatory call can be addressed to men so far back on the domain of irreligion and ignorance. It is deeply interesting to know, by what sort of moral force, even an atheist ought to be evoked from the fastness which he occupies—what are the notices, by responding to which, he should come forth with open eyes and a willing mind to this high investigation; and by resisting which, he will incur a demerit, whereof a clear moral cognizance might be taken, and whereon a righteous moral condemnation might be passed. The "fishers of men" should know the uttermost reach of their argument; and it is well to understand of religion, that, if she have truth and authority at all, there is a voice proceeding from her which might be universally heard—so that even the remotest families of earth, if not reclaimed by her, are laid by her under sentence of righteous reprobation.

14. On this doctrine of the moral dynamics, which operate and are in force, even in our state of profoundest ignorance respecting God, there may be grounded three important applications.

15. The first is that all men, under all the possible varieties of illumination, may nevertheless be the fit subjects for a judicial cognizance. Their theology, seen through the hazy medium of a dull and imperfect evidence, may have arisen no higher than to the passing suggestion of a God—a mere surmise or rumination about an unseen spirit, who tending all their footsteps, was their guardian and their guide through the dangers of the pathless wil-

derness. Now in this thought, fugitive though it be, in these uncertain glimpses whether of a truth or of a possibility, there is that, to which the elements of their moral nature might respond—so that to them, there is not the same exemption from all responsibility, which will be granted to the man who is sunk in hopeless idiotism, or to the infant of a day old. Even with the scanty materials of a heathen creed, a pure or a perverse morality might be grounded thereupon—whether, in those longings of a vague and undefined earnestness that arise from him who feels in his bosom an affinity for God and godliness; or, in the heedlessness of him, who, careless of an unknown benefactor, would have been alike careless, although he had stood revealed to his gaze, with as much light and evidence as is to be had in Christendom. These differences attest what man is, under the dark economy of Paganism; and so give token to what he would be, under the bright economy of a full and finished revelation. It is thus that the Searcher of the heart will find out data for a reckoning, even among the rudest of nature's children, or among those whose spiritual light glimmers most feebly. Even the simple theology of the desert can supply the materials of a coming judgment—so that the Discerner of the inner man will be at no loss for a principle, on which He might clearly and righteously try all the men of all the generations that be upon the face of the earth.

16. The second important bearing of this principle is on the subject of religious education. For what is true of a savage is true of a child. Its moral may outrun its argumentative light. Long anterior to the possibility of any sound conviction as to the character or existence of a God, it may respond with sound and correct feeling to the mere conception of Him. We hold, that, on this principle, the practice of early, nay even of infantine religious education, may, in opposition to the invectives of Rousseau and others, be fully and philosophically vindicated. For the effect of this anticipative process is, that, though it do not *at once* enlighten the mind on the question of a God, it at least awakens to the question. It does not consummate the process; but, in as far as the moral precedes the intellectual, it makes good the preliminary steps of the process—inasmuch that, in every Christian land, the youth and the manhood are accountable for their belief, because accountable for their use or their neglect of that enquiry, by which the belief ought to have been determined. They have all from their infancy heard of God. Many have been trained to think of Him, amidst a thousand associations of reverence. Some, under a roof of piety, have often lisped the prayers of early childhood to this unseen



Being ; and, in the often repeated sound of morning and evening orisons, they have become familiar to His name. Even they who have grown up at random through the years of a neglected boyhood, are greatly within the limits of that responsibility for which we plead. They are fully possessed if not with the certainty, at least with the idea, of a great eternal Sovereign. The very imprecations of profaneness may have taught it to them. The very Sabbath they spend in riot and blasphemy at least remind them of a God. The worship-bell of the church they never enter, conveys to them, if not the truth, at least an imagination of the truth, which, if it do not arrest them by a sense of obligation, will leave guilt upon their souls—though it be guilt against a God who is unknown.

17. But lastly, we may now perceive what that is, on which a teacher of religion finds an introduction for his topic, even into the minds of the people in the lowest state both of moral and intellectual debasement. They may have not that in them, at the outset of his ministrations, which can enable them to decide the question of a God ; but they have at least that in them, which should summon all their faculties to the respectful entertainment of it. They have at least such a sense of the divinity, as their own consciences will tell, should put them on the regards and the enquiries of moral earnestness. This is a clear principle which operates at the very commencement of a religious course ; and causes the first transition, from the darkness and insensibility of alienated nature, to the feelings and attentions of seriousness. The truth is, that there is a certain rudimental theology every where, on which the lessons of a higher theology may be grafted—as much as to condemn, if not to awaken the apathy of nature. What we have already said of the relation in which the father of a starving household stands to the giver of an anonymous donation, holds true of the relation in which all men stand to the unseen or anonymous God. Though in a state of absolute darkness, and without one token or clue to a discovery, there is room for the exhibition of moral differences among men—for even then, all the elements of morality might be at work, and all the tests of moral propriety might be abundantly verified ; and still more, after that certain likelihoods had arisen, or some hopeful opening had occurred for investigating the secret of a God. There is the utmost moral difference that can be imagined between the man who would gaze with intense scrutiny upon these likelihoods, and the man who either in heedlessness or aversion would turn his eyes from them ; between the man who would seize upon such an opening and prosecute such an investigation to the uttermost, and the man who either retires or

shrinks from the opportunity of a disclosure that might burthen him both with the sense and with the services of some mighty obligation.

18. And the same moral force which begins this enquiry, also continues and sustains it. If there be power in the very conception of a God to create and constitute the duty of seeking after Him, this power grows and gathers with every footstep of advancement in the high investigation. If the thought of a merely possible Deity have rightfully awakened a sense of obligation within us to entertain the question; the view of a probable Deity must enhance this feeling, and make the claim upon our attention still more urgent and imperative than at the first. Every new likelihood makes the call louder, and the challenge more incumbently binding than before. In proportion to the light we had attained, would be the criminality of resisting any further notices or manifestations of that mighty Being with whom we had so nearly and so emphatically to do. Under the impulse of a right principle, we should follow on to know God—till, after having done full justice both to our opportunities and our powers, we had made the most of all the available evidence that was within our reach, and possessed ourselves of all the knowledge that was accessible.

19. We can conceive, how, under the influence of these considerations, one should begin and prosecute the study of Natural Theology, till he had exhausted it. But an interesting inquiry remains. We have already endeavoured to estimate what the proper leadings of the mind are, at the commencement and along the progress of the study. The remaining question is, what were the proper leadings of the mind at the termination of it.

20. And first it will be seen, on the principles which we have already endeavoured to establish, that no alleged defect of evidence in Natural Theology can extinguish the use of it—a use which might still remain, under every conceivable degree, whether of dimness or of distinctness in its views. Even the faint and distant probabilities of the subject, may still lay upon us, the duty of careful and strenuous inquisition; and that, long anterior to our full acquaintance with the certainties of the subject. The verisimilitudes of the question are the signal posts, by following the intimations of which, we are at length conducted to the verities of the question. Although Natural Theology therefore should fail to illuminate, yet, by a moral force upon the attention, it may fully retain the power to impel. Even if it should have but some evidence, however slender, this should put us at the very least into the attitudes of enquirers; and the larger the evidence, the more earnest and vigilant ought the enquiry to be. Thus a great object is practically fulfilled by Natural Theology.

It gives us to conceive, or to conjecture, or to know so much of God, that, if there be a profest message with the likely signatures upon it of having proceeded from Him—though not our duty all at once to surrender, it is at least our bounden duty to investigate. It may not yet be entitled to a place in our creed; but it is at least entitled to a place in the threshold of the understanding—where it may wait the full and fair examination of its credentials. It may not be easy to measure the intensity of Nature's light; but enough if it be a light, that, had we obeyed its intimations, would have guided us onwards to larger manifestations of the Deity. If Natural Theology but serve thus to fix and direct our inquiries, it may fulfil a most important part as the precursor of revelation. It may not be itself the temple; but it does much by leading the way to it. Even at the outset period of our thickest ignorance, there is a voice which calls upon us to go forth in quest of God. And in proportion as we advance, does the voice become more urgent and audible, in calling us onward to further manifestations. It says much for Natural Theology, that it begins at the commencement, and carries us forward a part of this way; and it has indeed discharged a most important function, if, at the point where it guesses or its discoveries terminate, it leaves us with as much light, as should make us all awake to the further notices of a God, or as shall leave our heedlessness wholly inexcusable.

21. There is a confused imagination with many, that every new accession, whether of evidence or of doctrine, made to the Natural, tends in so far, to reduce the claims or to depreciate the importance of the Christian Theology. The apprehension is, that as the latter was designed to supplement the insufficiency of the former—then, the more that the arguments of Natural Theology are strengthened, or its truths are multiplied; the more are the lessons of the Christian Theology unheeded and uncalled for. It is thus that the discoveries of reason are held as superseding, or as casting a shade of insignificance, and even of discredit over the discoveries of revelation. There is a certain dread or jealousy, with some humble Christians, of all that incense which is offered at the shrine of the divinity by human science—whose daring incursion on the field of Theology, it is thought, will, in very proportion to the brilliancy of its success, administer both to the proud independence of the infidel, and to the pious alarm of the believer.

22. But to mitigate this disquietude, it should be recollected, in the first place, that, if Christianity have real and independent evidence of being a message from God, it will be all the more humbly and respectfully deferred to, should a previous natural

theology have assured us of His existence, and thrown the radiance of a clear and satisfying demonstration over the perfections of His character. However plausible its credentials may be, we should feel no great interest in its statements or its overtures, if we doubted the reality of that Being from whom it professes to have come; and it is precisely in as far as we are preoccupied with the conviction of a throne in heaven, and of a God setting upon that throne, that we should receive what bore the signatures of an embassy from Him with awful reverence.

23. But there is another consideration still more decisive of the place and importance of Christianity, notwithstanding every possible achievement by the light of nature. There are many discoveries which, so far from alleviating, serve but to enhance the difficulties of the question. For example, though science has made known to us the magnitude of the universe, it has not thereby advanced one footstep towards the secret of God's moral administration; but has, in fact, receded to a greater distance, from this now more hopeless, because now more complex and unmanageable problem than before. To multiply the data of a question is not always the way to facilitate its solution; but often the way, rather, to make it more inextricable. And this is precisely the effect of all the discoveries that can be made by natural theology, on that problem which it is the special office of Christianity to resolve. With every new argument by which philosophy enhances the goodness and greatness of the Supreme Being, does it deepen still more the guilt and ingratitude of those who have revolted against Him. The more emphatically it can demonstrate the care and benevolence of God—the more emphatically, along with this, does it demonstrate the worthlessness of man. The same light which irradiates the perfections of the divine nature, irradiates, with more fearful manifestation than ever, the moral disease and depravation into which humanity has fallen. Had natural theology been altogether extinct, and there had been no sense of a law or law-giver among men, we should have been unconscious of any difficulty to be redressed, of any dilemma from which we needed extrication. But the theology of nature and conscience tells us of a law; and in proportion as it multiplies the claims of the Lawgiver in heaven, does it aggravate the criminality of its subjects upon earth. With the rebellious phenomenon of a depraved species before our eyes, every new discovery of God, but deepens the enigma of man's condition in time, and of his prospects in eternity; and so makes the louder call for that remedial system, which it is the very purpose of Christianity to introduce into the world.

24. We hold that the theology of nature sheds powerful light



on the being of a God ; and that, even from its unaided demonstrations, we can reach a considerable degree of probability, both for His moral and natural attributes. But when it undertakes the question between God and man, this is what it finds to be impracticable. It is here where the main helplessness of nature lies. It is baffled in all its attempts to decipher the state and the prospects of man, viewed in the relation of an offending subject to an offended sovereign. In a word, its chief obscurity, and which it is wholly unable to disperse, is that which rests on the hopes and the destiny of our species. There is in it enough of manifestation to awaken the fears of guilt, but not enough again to appease them. It emits, and audibly emits, a note of terror ; but in vain do we listen for one authentic word of comfort from any of its oracles. It is able to see the danger, but not the deliverance. It can excite the forebodings of the human spirit, but cannot quell them—knowing just enough to stir the perplexity, but not enough to set the perplexity at rest. It can state the difficulty, but cannot unriddle the difficulty—having just as much knowledge as to enunciate the problem, but not so much as might lead to the solution of the problem. There must be a measure of light, we do allow ; but, like the lurid gleam of a volcano, it is not a light which guides, but which bewilders and terrifies. It prompts the question, but cannot frame or furnish the reply. Natural theology may see as much as shall draw forth the anxious interrogation, “What shall I do to be saved ?” The answer to this comes from a higher theology.

25. These are the grounds on which we would affirm the insufficiency of that academic theism, which is sometimes set forth in such an aspect of completeness and certainty, as might seem to leave a revelation or a gospel wholly uncalled for. Many there are who would gloss over the difficulties of the question ; and who in the midst of all that undoubted outrage which has been inflicted by sinful creatures on the truth and the holiness and the justice of God, would, by merging all the attributes of the Divinity into a placid and undistinguishing tenderness, still keep their resolute hold of heaven, as at least the splendid imagination, by which to irradiate the destinies of our species. It is thus that an airy unsupported romance has been held forth as the vehicle, on which to embark all the hopes and the hazards of eternity. We would not disguise the meagreness of such a system. We would not deliver the lessons of natural theology, without telling at the same time of its limits. We abjure the cruelty of that sentimentalism, which, to hush the alarms of guilty man, would rob the Deity of his perfections, and stamp a degrading mockery upon his law. When expounding the arguments

of natural theology, along with the doctrines which it dimly shadows forth, we must speak of the difficulties which itself suggests but which it cannot dispose of; we must make mention of the obscurities into which it runs, but which it is unable to dissipate—of its unresolved doubts—of the mysteries through which it vainly tries to grope its uncertain way—of its weary and fruitless efforts—of its unutterable longings. And should, on the one hand, the speculations of human ingenuity, and, on the other, the certainties of a well accredited revelation, come forth to illuminate this scene of darkness—we must not so idolize the light or the sufficiency of nature, as to turn from the firmament's meridian blaze, that we might witness and admire the tiny lustre of a glow-worm.

26. The two positions are perfectly reconcilable—first of the insufficiency of natural religion; and secondly, the great actual importance of it. It is the wise and profound saying of D'Alembert, that, 'man has too little sagacity to resolve an infinity of questions, which he has yet sagacity enough to make.' Now this marks the degree, in which natural theology is sagacious—being able, from its own resources, to construct a number of cases, which at the same time it is not able to reduce. These must be handed up for solution to a higher calculus; and thus it is, that the theology of nature and of the schools, the theology of the ethical class—though most unsatisfactory, when treated as a terminating science—is most important, and the germ of developments at once precious and delightful, when treated as a rudimental one. It is a science, not so much of dicta as of desiderata; and, from the way in which these are met by the counterpart doctrines of the gospel, the light of a powerful and most pleasing evidence is struck out by the comparison between them. It is that species of evidence which arises from the adaptation of a mould to its counterpart form; for there is precisely this sort of fitting, in the adjustment which obtains, between the questions of the natural and the responses of the supernatural theology. For the problem which natural theology cannot resolve, the precise difficulty which it is wholly unable to meet or to overcome, is the restoration of sinners to acceptance and favour with a God of justice. All the resources and expedients of natural theology are incompetent for this solution—it being, in fact, the great desideratum which it cannot satisfy. Still it performs an important part in making us sensible of the desideratum. It makes known to us our sin; but it cannot make known to us salvation. Let us not overlook the importance of that which it does, in its utter helplessness as to that which it does not. It puts the question, though it cannot answer the question; and no where so much as

at this turning-point, are both the uses and the defects of natural theology so conspicuously blended.

27. Natural theology then, however little to be trusted as an informer, yet as an enquirer, or rather as a prompter to enquiry, is of inestimable service. It is a high function that she discharges, for though not able to satisfy the search she impels to the search. We are apt to undervalue, if not to set her aside altogether, when we compare her obscure and imperfect notices with the lustre and the fulness of revelation. But this is because we overlook the virtue that lies in the probabilities of a subject—a virtue, either, on the one hand, to fasten the attention; or, on the other hand, to condemn the want of it. This we hold to be the precise office of natural theology—and an office too, which she performs, not merely as the theology of science among those who listen to her demonstrations in the academic hall; but which she also performs with powerful and practical effect, as the theology of conscience, throughout all the classes of our general population. It is this initial work which makes her so useful, we should say so indispensable, as a preliminary to the gospel. Natural theology is quite overrated by those who would represent it as the foundation of the edifice. It is not that, but rather the taper by which we must grope our way to the edifice. The stability of a fabric is not greater than the stability of that upon which it rests; and it were inscribing a general infirmity to revelation, to set it forth, as leaning upon natural theism, in the way that a mathematical doctrine leans upon the axioms or first principles of the science. Christianity rests on its own proper evidence; and if, instead of this, she be made to rest on an antecedent natural religion, she becomes weak throughout because weak radically. It is true that in theology, the natural goes before the revealed, even as the cry of weakness or distress goes before the relief to which it aspires, and which it is prompted to seek after. It goes before, not synthetically in the order of demonstration, but historically in the mind of the enquirer. It is not that natural religion is the premises, and Christianity the conclusion; but it is that natural religion creates an appetite which it cannot quell; and he who is urged thereby, seeks for a rest and a satisfaction which he can only obtain in the fulness of the gospel. Natural theology has been called the basis of Christianity. It would accord better with our own views of the place which it occupies, and of the high purpose which it undoubtedly serves—if it were called the basis of Christianization.

28. The most important exemplification of the way in which natural religion bears upon Christianity, is furnished by the ques-

tion of a sinner's acceptance with God. Natural religion can suggest to man the apprehension of his guilt; for however dim her objective view of the Deity, there is no such dimness in her ethical notion of what is due even to an uncertain God. Without having seriously resolved the question, we may stand convicted to our own minds of a hardened and habitual carelessness of the question. If our whole lives long have been spent in the midst of created things, without any serious or sustained effort of our spirits in quest of a Creator—if, as our consciences can tell, the whole drift and practical earnestness of our thoughts are towards the gifts, with but a rare and occasional anxiety towards the Giver—if the sense of Him touch but lightly on our spirits, and we, by our perpetual lapses from the sacred to the secular, prove that our gravitation is to earth, and that in truth our best-loved element is atheism—if the notices of a God, however indistinct wherewith we are surrounded, instead of fastening our regards on this high contemplation, do but disturb without at all influencing the general tenor of our engagements—these are things of which the light of Nature can take cognizance; and these are things because of which, and of their felt unworthiness, nature is visited by the misgivings both of remorse and of terror. She has data enough on which to found the demonstration and the sense of her own unworthiness; and hence a general feeling of insecurity among all spirits, a secret but strong apprehension that all is not right between them and God.

29. This is not a matter of mere sensitive and popular impression; but in strict accordance with the views of a calm and intelligent jurisprudence. It enters into the very essence of our conception of a moral government, that it must have sanctions—which could not have place, were there either to be no dispensation of rewards and punishments; or were the penalties, though denounced with all the parade and proclamation of law, to be never executed. It is not the lesson of conscience, that God would, under the mere impulse of a parental fondness for the creatures whom He had made, let down the high state and sovereignty which belong to Him; or that He would forbear the infliction of the penalty, because of any soft or timid shrinking from the pain it would give to the objects of His displeasure. There is nothing either in history or nature, which countenances such an imagination of the Deity, as that, in the relentings of mere tenderness, He would stoop to any weak or unworthy compromise with guilt. The actual sufferings of life speak loudly and experimentally against the supposition; and when one looks to the disease and the agony of spirit, and above all the hideous and unsparing death, with its painful struggles and gloomy forebodings, which



are spread universally over the face of the earth—we cannot but imagine of the God who presides over such an economy, that He is not a being who will falter from the imposition of any severity, which might serve the objects of a high administration. Else all steadfastness of purpose, and steadfastness of principle were fallen from. God would stand forth to the eye of His own creatures, a spectacle of outraged dignity. And He of whom we image that He dwells in an unviolable sanctuary, the august monarch of heaven and earth—with a law by subjects dishonoured, by the sovereign unavenged—would possess but the semblance and the mockery of a throne.

30. Such a conception is not only a violence to the apprehensions of nature, but is even acknowledged at times by our academic theists, as a violence to the sound philosophy of the subject. The most striking testimony to this effect is that given by Dr. Adam Smith, on the first appearance of his “Theory of Moral Sentiments;” nor does it detract from its interest or its value, that he afterwards suppressed it in the subsequent editions of his work.—“All our natural sentiments,” he says, “prompt us to believe, that as perfect virtue is supposed necessarily to appear to the Deity as it does to us, as for its own sake and without any farther view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, so must vice of hatred and punishment. That the gods neither resent nor hurt was the general maxim of all the different sects of the ancient philosophy; and if by resenting, be understood that violent and disorderly perturbation which often distracts and confounds the human heart; or if by hurting, be understood the doing of mischief wantonly, and without regard to propriety or justice, such weakness is undoubtedly unworthy of the divine perfection. But if it be meant that vice does not appear to the Deity to be for its own sake the object of abhorrence and aversion, and what for its own sake, it is fit and reasonable should be punished, the truth of this maxim can by no means be so easily admitted. If we consult our natural sentiments we are apt to fear lest before the holiness of God, vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of human virtue can ever seem to be of reward. Man when about to appear before a Being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow creatures he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite different, when about to appear before his infinite Creator. To such a Being, he can scarcely imagine, that

his littleness and weakness should ever appear to be the proper objects either of esteem or of reward. But he can easily conceive how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty, should render him the proper object of aversion and punishment; neither can he see any reason why the divine indignation should not be let loose, without any restraint, upon so vile an insect as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice; but he must entreat it from the mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past misconduct, are upon this account the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left, for appeasing that wrath which he knows he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he imagines must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his manifold offences. The doctrines of revelation coincide in every respect with these original anticipations of nature; and as they teach us how little we can depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they show us at the same time that the most powerful intercession has been made, and that the most dreadful atonement has been paid, for our manifold transgressions and iniquities."

31. This interesting passage seems to have been written by its author, under a true apprehension of that dilemma, in which the world is involved. He admits a moral government on the part of God. He admits a universal delinquency on the part of man. And his feeling is, that the government would be nullified by a mere act of indemnity, which rendered no acknowledgment to the justice which had been violated, or to the authority of that law which had been trampled on. In these circumstances, he casts about as it were for an adjustment; and puts forth a conjectural speculation; and guesses what the provision should be, which, under a new economy, might be adopted for repairing a defect, that is evidently beyond all the resources of natural theism; and proposes the very expedient of our profest revelation, for the resolving of a difficulty which had been else impracticable. We deem it a melancholy fact, that this noble testimony to the need of a gospel, should have disappeared in the posterior editions of his work—revised and corrected as they were by his own hand. It is not for men to sit in the chair of judgment;

and never should they feel a greater awe or tenderness upon their spirits, than when called to witness or to pronounce upon the aberrations of departed genius. Yet when one compares the passage he could at one time have written, with the memoir that, after an interval of many years, he gave to the world of David Hume, that ablest champion of the infidel cause—one fears lest, under the contagion of a near and withering intimacy with him, his spirit may have imbibed of the kindred poison; and he at length have become ashamed, of the homage that he once had rendered to the worth and importance of Christianity.

32. This notwithstanding remains one of the finest examples of the way, in which the Natural bears upon the Christian theology; and of the outgoings, by which, the one conducts to a landing-place in the other. We hold that there are many such outgoings; that at the uttermost margin of the former there is a felt want, and that in accurate counterpart to this, the latter has something to offer in precise and perfect adaptation thereto. Now the great error of our academic theism, as commonly treated, is that it expresses no want; that it reposes in its own fancied sufficiency; and all its landing-places are within itself, and along the uttermost limits of its own territory. It is no reproach against our philosophical moralists, that they have not stepped beyond the threshold of that peculium, which is strictly and appropriately theirs; or not made incursion into another department than their own. The legitimate complaint is, that, on taking leave of their disciples, they warn them not, of their being only yet at the outset or in the prosecution of a journey, instead of having reached the termination of it. They in fact take leave of them, in the middle of an unprotected highway—when they should have reared a finger post of direction to the places which lie beyond. The paragraph which we have now extracted, was just such a finger post—though taken down, we deeply regret to say, by the very hand that had erected it. Our veneration for his name must not restrain the observation, that, by this, he undid the best service which a professor of moral science can render to humanity. Along the confines of its domain, there should be raised, in every quarter, the floating signals of distress, that its scholars, instead of being lulled into the imagination that now they may repose as in so many secure and splendid dwelling places, should be taught to regard them only as towers of observation—whence they have to look for their ulterior guidance and their ulterior supplies, to the region of a conterminous theology.

33. There is a difficulty here in the theism of nature, within the whole compass of which, no solution for it can be found. It

will at least afford a specimen of the way in which the one bears upon the other, if we state the method of escape from this difficulty that has been provided in the theism of Christianity. The great moral problem which under the former waits to be resolved, is to find acceptance in the mercy of God, for those who have braved His justice, and done despite to the authority of His law, and that, without any compromise of truth or dignity. By the offered solution of the New Testament, a channel has been opened up, through a high mediatorship between God and man, for the descent of a grace and a mercy the most exuberant on a guilty world; and through it, the overtures of reconciliation are extended unto all; and a sceptre of forgiveness, but of forgiveness consecrated by the blood of a great atonement, has been stretched forth, even to the most polluted and worthless outcasts of the human family; and thus the goodness of the divinity obtained its fullest vindication, yet not a goodness at the expense of justice—for the affront done to an outraged law, has been amply repaired by the homage to its authority of an illustrious sufferer, who took upon himself the burthen of all those penalties which we should have borne; and, in the spectacle of whose deep and mysterious sacrifice, God's hatred of moral evil stands forth in most impressive demonstration. So that, instead of a conflict or a concussion between these two essential attributes of His nature, a way has been found, by which each is enhanced to the uttermost, and a flood of most copious and convincing illustration has been poured upon them both.

34. This specimen will best illustrate of moral philosophy, even in its most finished state, that it is not what may be called a terminating science. It is at best but a science *in transitu*; and its lessons are those of a preparatory school. It contains but the rudiments of a nobler acquirement; and he discharges best the functions of a teacher, not who satiates but who excites the appetite, and then leaves it wholly unappeased. This arises from the real state and bearing of the science, as being a science, not so much of doctrines as of desiderata. At most it leaves its scholars in a sort of twilight obscurity. And, if a just account is rendered of the subject, there will unavoidably be the feeling, that, instead of having reached a secure landing-place, we have broken off, as in the middle of an unfinished demonstration.

35. That indeed is a most interesting adjustment between Moral Philosophy and the Christian Theology, which is represented to us by the unresolved difficulties of the one science, and the reduction which is made of these difficulties in the other. We have far the most important example of this, in the doctrine of the atonement—that sublime mystery, by which the attributes



of the divinity have all been harmonized ; and the most liberal outlet has been provided for mercy to the offender, while still the truth and justice of the Lawgiver have been vindicated, and all the securities of His moral government are upholden. By the disloyalty of our race, the principles of Heaven's jurisprudence are brought to a test of utmost delicacy ; for there seems to be no other alternative, than that man should perish in overwhelming vengeance, or that God should become a degraded sovereign. It nullifies the moral government of the world, if all force and authority be taken from its sanctions ; and it is a problem which even 'angels desired to look into,' how the breach could be healed, which had been made by this world's rebellion, and yet the honour of heaven's high Sovereign be untarnished by the compromise. The one science lands us in the difficulty ; and by the other alone it is, that we are extricated. The one presents us with the case ; but, for the solution of it, we must recur to a higher calculus, to an instrument of more powerful discovery and of fuller revelation. The one starts a question which itself cannot untie ; and the other furnishes the satisfactory response to it. The desideratum of the former meets with the doctrine of the latter ; and it is this frequent adjustment, as of a mould to its counterpart die ; it is this close and manifold adaptation between the wants of nature and the overtures of a profest revelation ; it is this fitting of the supernal application to the terrestrial subject upon which it is laid ; it is the way, more especially, in which the disruption between heaven and earth has been restored, and the frightful chasm that sin had made on the condition and prospects of our species is wholly repaired to all who will through the completeness of an offered Saviour ; it is this mingled harmony of the greater and lesser lights, which gives evidence that both have been kindled by the same hand, and that it is He who put the candle which glimmers so feebly into my heart, it is He also who poured the noonday effulgence of Christianity around me.

36. It were foreign to our prescribed subject to attempt an exposition, in however brief and rapid a sketch, of the credentials of Christianity. We only remark, that, amid the lustre and variety of its proofs, there is one strikingly analogous, and indeed identical in principle, with our own peculiar argument. If in the system of external nature, we can recognize the evidence of God being its author, in the adaptations wherewith it teems to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man—there is room and opportunity for this very evidence in the book of an external revelation. What appears in the construction of a world might be made to appear as manifestly in the construction of a volume,

whose objective truths may present as obvious and skilful an accommodation to our mental economy, as do the objective things of a created universe. And it is not the less favourable, for an indication of its divine original that whereas Nature, as being the original system, abounds with those fitnesses which harmonize with the mental constitution in a state of health—Christianity, as being a restorative system, abounds in fitnesses to the same constitution in a state of disease. We are not sure but that in the latter, from its very design, we shall meet with still more delicate and decisive tests of a designer, than have yet been noticed in the former; and certain it is, that the wisdom and goodness and even power of a moral architect, may be as strikingly evinced in the reparation, as in the primary establishment of a Moral Nature.

THE END.

6458 TB 297  
LBC  
11-16-00 32180 MS

IC  
INFORMATION  
CONSERVATION, INC.



